| paper | d4-journals-geb-2010-0077 |
| authors | — |
| venue | ? |
| filed under | unclassified |
| judged by | gpt-6-luna / xhigh (triple__luna__xhigh__c6r1) |
| judge confidence | high |
| authors would recognise it | unclear |
The paper derives equilibrium payoffs and reports experimental comparisons, but it contains no numbered theorem, lemma, corollary, or proposition asserting a computational result. That fails bit (a), regardless of whether a continuous bargaining model could be formulated.
fails bit a — no named computational result to mirror
No qualifying named computational result is covered; the equilibrium payoff derivations and experimental tests have no anchor under the stated criteria.
This paper contains no numbered Theorem, Lemma, Corollary, or Proposition asserting a computational result. It does not study whether a problem is in P, NP-hard, fixed-parameter tractable, or otherwise computationally complex.
The paper does derive equilibrium payoff predictions for VETO, SYMMETRIC, and ENLARGED, and reports experimental comparisons between treatments. Those are meaningful results, but they are not named computational anchors under your criteria. A continuum-agent bargaining model could be proposed as new work, but it would not mirror a qualifying result in this paper. So there is no honest lead anchor or per-anchor continuous problem to state.
The paper gives no computational anchor for a continuous mirror. Its formal contribution is to derive equilibrium payoffs in three specified, finite-player bargaining games; its experiments test whether earnings move as those predictions suggest. Neither is a result about the complexity or algorithms for a computational problem. The closest candidate—the comparisons in Section 2.6 and their experimental tests in Section 4.2—supports a question about strategic bargaining, but does not itself supply the computational target this programme is meant to continuize.
The strongest version of that candidate would compare incumbent role types’ payoffs before and after adding a positive mass of new members, with the budget scaled per capita. But the paper’s mechanism depends on named players with finite voting weights, each selected as proposer with probability \(1/n\), and each potentially pivotal. In an atomless population, an individual vote has zero mass and cannot change whether a proposal passes. A mass-positive type could be offered a share, but treating that type as a bargaining bloc gives it collective agency the paper’s individual players do not have. Alternatively, keeping people as individual agents leaves a proposer whose identity has zero mass. Either construction needs a new strategic model and equilibrium interpretation before there is a computational question to classify.
The experimental sample does not supply the missing population regime: participants were repeatedly assigned to bargaining groups of three or four, so the games themselves never had a large population of interchangeable members. One could study a different model of bargaining among large cohorts or blocs; that might be worthwhile in its own right. But the paper does not give a computational result for such a model to mirror. This is a strong case against calling the paper a ChoCo mirror, though not proof that no related continuous bargaining question could be valuable.
The adversarial triple: the proponent anchors on up to three named results; the opponent sees that case and must defeat every anchor; the judge decides which case convinced it. These are the pipeline’s own outputs, generated by tools/triple_run.py — no human edited them. The paper’s own text is not reproduced here beyond the quoted statement above.