Each paper counts once, at the furthest stage it reached. Gray = ready but not done yet; slate = blocked. "Not ComSoC" includes papers the region classifier or the judge later found outside the field. LLM-proof: a prover claims a proof and a verifier accepts it; 1 of these is formalized in Lean. Not on the map: 25 judged papers from the AAMAS'23 pilot and other early runs (14 green).
One square = one ComSoC paper (N=24,804), all squares the same size, so area is a paper count. Positions come from title similarity, nudged onto a grid; region names are the most distinctive title words of each cluster. The pipeline surveys in transects — venue by venue, year by year — so light spreads across the whole field, not one region. AI labels, preliminary. Data updates with every build.
4046/8763 papers continuizable (46%) · 1704 carry a hardness result · new results: 3401/4048 mirrors attempted (84%) · complexity drops: 363/1258 settled hardness mirrors (+9 encoding-dependent)
reset view4046/8763 papers continuizable (46%) · 1704 carry a hardness result · new results: 3401/4048 mirrors attempted (84%) · complexity drops: 363/1258 settled hardness mirrors (+9 encoding-dependent)
| paper | authors | area | venue | mirror | hardness | Δ complexity | outputs |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Locally Fair Partitioning | Pankaj K. Agarwal, Shao-Heng Ko, Kamesh Munagala, Erin Taylor | Fair Allocation · Fair Division Theory | AAAI 2022 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| Maximizing Nash Social Welfare in 2-Value Instances | Hannaneh Akrami, Bhaskar Ray Chaudhury, Martin Hoefer, Kurt Mehlhorn, Marco Schmalhofer, Golnoosh Shahkarami, Giovanna Varricchio, Quentin Vermande, Ernest van Wijland | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAAI 2022 | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | |
| Truth-Tracking via Approval Voting: Size Matters | Tahar Allouche, Jérôme Lang, Florian Yger | Voting · Rationalization | AAAI 2022 | – | – | triple | |
| Dimensionality and Coordination in Voting: The Distortion of STV | Ioannis Anagnostides, Dimitris Fotakis, Panagiotis Patsilinakos | Voting · Distortion | AAAI 2022 | – | – | triple | |
| Fair and Truthful Giveaway Lotteries | Tal Arbiv, Yonatan Aumann | Fair Allocation · Fair Division Theory | AAAI 2022 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| Universal and Tight Online Algorithms for Generalized-Mean Welfare | Siddharth Barman, Arindam Khan, Arnab Maiti | Fair Allocation · Chores, Online & Dynamic | AAAI 2022 | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | |
| Truthful and Fair Mechanisms for Matroid-Rank Valuations | Siddharth Barman, Paritosh Verma | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAAI 2022 | – | – | triple | |
| Truthful Cake Sharing | Xiaohui Bei, Xinhang Lu, Warut Suksompong | Fair Allocation · Cake Cutting | AAAI 2022 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| Almost Full EFX Exists for Four Agents | Ben Berger, Avi Cohen, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAAI 2022 | – | – | triple | |
| Sequential Blocked Matching | Nicholas Bishop, Hau Chan, Debmalya Mandal, Long Tran-Thanh | Fair Allocation · Chores, Online & Dynamic | AAAI 2022 | – | – | triple | |
| Combating Collusion Rings Is Hard but Possible | Niclas Boehmer, Robert Bredereck, André Nichterlein | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAAI 2022 | – | ✓ | triple | |
| Theory of and Experiments on Minimally Invasive Stability Preservation in Changing Two-Sided Matching Markets | Niclas Boehmer, Klaus Heeger, Rolf Niedermeier | Coalition Formation · Matching under Preferences | AAAI 2022 | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | |
| A Calculus for Computing Structured Justifications for Election Outcomes | Arthur Boixel, Ulle Endriss, Ronald de Haan | Voting · Voting Theory & Axioms | AAAI 2022 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| Single-Agent Dynamics in Additively Separable Hedonic Games | Felix Brandt, Martin Bullinger, Leo Tappe | Coalition Formation · Hedonic Games | AAAI 2022 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| On Improving Resource Allocations by Sharing | Robert Bredereck, Andrzej Kaczmarczyk, Junjie Luo, Rolf Niedermeier, Florian Sachse | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAAI 2022 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| Liquid Democracy with Ranked Delegations | Markus Brill, Théo Delemazure, Anne-Marie George, Martin Lackner, Ulrike Schmidt-Kraepelin | Voting · Voting Theory & Axioms | AAAI 2022 | – | – | triple | |
| Individual Representation in Approval-Based Committee Voting | Markus Brill, Jonas Israel, Evi Micha, Jannik Peters | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | AAAI 2022 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| The Metric Distortion of Multiwinner Voting | Ioannis Caragiannis, Nisarg Shah, Alexandros A. Voudouris | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | AAAI 2022 | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | |
| A Little Charity Guarantees Fair Connected Graph Partitioning | Ioannis Caragiannis, Evi Micha, Nisarg Shah | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAAI 2022 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| Truthful Aggregation of Budget Proposals with Proportionality Guarantees | Ioannis Caragiannis, George Christodoulou, Nicos Protopapas | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Participatory Budgeting | AAAI 2022 | – | ✓ | triple | |
| The Complexity of Learning Approval-Based Multiwinner Voting Rules | Ioannis Caragiannis, Karl Fehrs | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | AAAI 2022 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| Weighted Fairness Notions for Indivisible Items Revisited | Mithun Chakraborty, Erel Segal-Halevi, Warut Suksompong | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAAI 2022 | – | – | triple | |
| Pizza Sharing Is PPA-Hard | Argyrios Deligkas, John Fearnley, Themistoklis Melissourgos | Fair Allocation · Cake Cutting | AAAI 2022 | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | |
| Heterogeneous Facility Location with Limited Resources | Argyrios Deligkas, Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Alexandros A. Voudouris | Voting · Voting Theory & Axioms | AAAI 2022 | – | ✓ | triple | |
| Complexity of Deliberative Coalition Formation | Edith Elkind, Abheek Ghosh, Paul Goldberg | Coalition Formation · Hedonic Games | AAAI 2022 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| The Price of Justified Representation | Edith Elkind, Piotr Faliszewski, Ayumi Igarashi, Pasin Manurangsi, Ulrike Schmidt-Kraepelin, Warut Suksompong | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | AAAI 2022 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| The Complexity of Subelection Isomorphism Problems | Piotr Faliszewski, Krzysztof Sornat, Stanisław Szufa | Voting · Voting Theory & Axioms | AAAI 2022 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| Two-Price Equilibrium | Michal Feldman, Galia Shabtai, Aner Wolfenfeld | Fair Allocation · Markets & Equilibria | AAAI 2022 | – | – | triple | |
| Hedonic Diversity Games: A Complexity Picture with More than Two Colors | Robert Ganian, Thekla Hamm, Dušan Knop, Šimon Schierreich, Ondřej Suchý | Coalition Formation · Hedonic Games | AAAI 2022 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| Fair and Efficient Allocations of Chores under Bivalued Preferences | Jugal Garg, Aniket Murhekar, John Qin | Fair Allocation · Chores, Online & Dynamic | AAAI 2022 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| Approval-Based Committee Voting under Incomplete Information | Aviram Imber, Jonas Israel, Markus Brill, Benny Kimelfeld | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | AAAI 2022 | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof |
| Reforming an Envy-Free Matching | Takehiro Ito, Yuni Iwamasa, Naonori Kakimura, Naoyuki Kamiyama, Yusuke Kobayashi, Yuta Nozaki, Yoshio Okamoto, Kenta Ozeki | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAAI 2022 | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | |
| The Complexity of Proportionality Degree in Committee Elections | Łukasz Janeczko, Piotr Faliszewski | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | AAAI 2022 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| Worst-Case Voting When the Stakes Are High | Anson Kahng, Gregory Kehne | Voting · Distortion | AAAI 2022 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| The Semi-random Likelihood of Doctrinal Paradoxes | Ao Liu, Lirong Xia | Frontier · Judgment Aggregation | AAAI 2022 | – | – | triple | |
| Online Elicitation of Necessarily Optimal Matchings | Jannik Peters | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAAI 2022 | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | |
| Improved Maximin Guarantees for Subadditive and Fractionally Subadditive Fair Allocation Problem | Masoud Seddighin, Saeed Seddighin | Frontier · Computer-Aided Methods & Data | AAAI 2022 | – | – | triple | |
| Proportional Public Decisions | Piotr Skowron, Adrian Górecki | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | AAAI 2022 | – | – | triple | |
| Iterative Calculus of Voting under Plurality | Fabricio Vasselai | Voting · Manipulation | AAAI 2022 | – | – | triple | |
| Private Rank Aggregation in Central and Local Models | Daniel Alabi, Badih Ghazi, Ravi Kumar, Pasin Manurangsi | Frontier · Computer-Aided Methods & Data | AAAI 2022 | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | |
| Hedonic Games with Fixed-Size Coalitions | Vittorio Bilò, Gianpiero Monaco, Luca Moscardelli | Coalition Formation · Hedonic Games | AAAI 2022 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| Participatory Budgeting with Donations and Diversity Constraints | Jiehua Chen, Martin Lackner, Jan Maly | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Participatory Budgeting | AAAI 2022 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| How Many Representatives Do We Need? The Optimal Size of a Congress Voting on Binary Issues | Manon Revel, Tao Lin, Daniel Halpern | Voting · Voting Theory & Axioms | AAAI 2022 | – | – | triple | |
| Fairness Concepts for Indivisible Items with Externalities | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAAI 2023 | – | – | triple | ||
| Finding Fair Allocations under Budget Constraints | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAAI 2023 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| Now We’re Talking: Better Deliberation Groups through Submodular Optimization | Coalition Formation · Hedonic Games | AAAI 2023 | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| Causes of Stability in Dynamic Coalition Formation | Coalition Formation · Hedonic Games | AAAI 2023 | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| Properties of Position Matrices and Their Elections | Voting · Voting Theory & Axioms | AAAI 2023 | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| Rank Aggregation Using Scoring Rules | Voting · Voting Theory & Axioms | AAAI 2023 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| Proportionality in Approval-Based Participatory Budgeting | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Participatory Budgeting | AAAI 2023 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| Multiwinner Voting with Possibly Unavailable Candidates | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | AAAI 2023 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| Fair Division with Prioritized Agents | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAAI 2023 | ✓ | – | ↗ | triple proof | |
| Topological Distance Games | Coalition Formation · Hedonic Games | AAAI 2023 | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| Game Implementation: What Are the Obstructions? not comsoc | unclassified | AAAI 2023 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| Complexity of Probabilistic Inference in Random Dichotomous Hedonic Games | Coalition Formation · Hedonic Games | AAAI 2023 | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| Combinatorial Civic Crowdfunding with Budgeted Agents: Welfare Optimality at | Coalition Formation · Weighted Voting Games | AAAI 2023 | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| Strategyproofness and Proportionality in Party-Approval Multiwinner Elections | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | AAAI 2023 | – | – | triple | ||
| Participatory Budgeting Designs for the Real World | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Participatory Budgeting | AAAI 2023 | – | – | triple | ||
| PAC Learning and Stabilizing Hedonic Games: Towards a Unifying Approach. | Coalition Formation · Matching under Preferences | AAAI 2023 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| Representation with Incomplete Votes | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | AAAI 2023 | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| Optimizing Multiple Simultaneous Objectives for Voting and Facility Location | Voting · Distortion | AAAI 2023 | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| Class Fairness in Online Matching | Fair Allocation · Chores, Online & Dynamic | AAAI 2023 | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| How to Cut a Discrete Cake Fairly | Fair Allocation · Cake Cutting | AAAI 2023 | – | – | triple | ||
| Voting with Preference Intensities | Voting · Distortion | AAAI 2023 | – | – | triple | ||
| Approximations for Indivisible Concave Allocations with Applications to | Fair Allocation · Markets & Equilibria | AAAI 2023 | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| Strategic Facility Location with Clients That Minimize Total Waiting Time not comsoc | unclassified | AAAI 2023 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| Proportional Decisions in Perpetual Voting | Voting · Voting Theory & Axioms | AAAI 2023 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| Multiagent MST Cover: Pleasing All Optimally via a Simple Voting Rule | Voting · Combinatorial Domains | AAAI 2023 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| Partitioning Friends Fairly | Coalition Formation · Hedonic Games | AAAI 2023 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| Differentially Private Condorcet Voting | Voting · Probabilistic Social Choice | AAAI 2023 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| Approval-Based Voting with Mixed Goods | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | AAAI 2023 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| Facility Location Games with Entrance Fees | Frontier · Computer-Aided Methods & Data | AAAI 2023 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| Differentially Private Fair Division | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAAI 2023 | – | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| Fast and Interpretable Dynamics for Fisher Markets | Fair Allocation · Markets & Equilibria | AAAI 2023 | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| Ballot Length in Instant Runoff Voting | Voting · Voting Theory & Axioms | AAAI 2023 | – | – | triple | ||
| Multi-Stage Facility Location Problems with Transient Agents | Voting · Distortion | AAAI 2023 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| Bayesian Optimization-Based Combinatorial Assignment* | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAAI 2023 | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| Semi-random Impossibilities of Condorcet Criterion | Voting · Voting Theory & Axioms | AAAI 2023 | – | – | triple | ||
| Tournament Fixing Parameterized by Feedback Vertex Set Number Is FPT | Voting · Tournament Solutions | AAAI 2023 | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| Truthful Mechanisms for Steiner Tree Problems not comsoc | unclassified | AAAI 2023 | – | – | triple | ||
| Collusion-Proof and Sybil-Proof Reward Mechanisms for Query Incentive not comsoc | unclassified | AAAI 2023 | – | – | triple | ||
| Local Justice and Machine Learning: Modeling and Inferring not comsoc | unclassified | AAAI 2023 | – | – | triple | ||
| An Efficient Algorithm for Fair Multi-Agent Multi-Armed Bandit with Low Regret not comsoc | unclassified | AAAI 2023 | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| Multi-Unit Auctions for Allocating Chance-Constrained Resources | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAAI 2023 | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| Fairness in Contextual Resource Allocation Systems: | Fair Allocation · Fair Division Theory | AAAI 2023 | – | – | triple | ||
| Maximizing the Probability of Fixation in the Positional Voter Model not comsoc | unclassified | AAAI 2023 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| Exploring Tradeoffs in Automated School Redistricting: not comsoc | unclassified | AAAI 2023 | – | – | triple | ||
| Improved Metric Distortion via Threshold Approvals | Voting · Distortion | AAAI 2024 | – | – | triple | ||
| Fair Lotteries for Participatory Budgeting | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Participatory Budgeting | AAAI 2024 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| Envy-Free House Allocation under Uncertain Preferences | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAAI 2024 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| Nearly Equitable Allocations beyond Additivity and Monotonicity | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAAI 2024 | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| Enhancing the Efficiency of Altruism and Taxes not comsoc | unclassified | AAAI 2024 | – | – | triple | ||
| Approval-Based Committee Voting in Practice: | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | AAAI 2024 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| Completing Priceable Committees: | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | AAAI 2024 | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| Stability in Online Coalition Formation | Coalition Formation · Hedonic Games | AAAI 2024 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| Participation Incentives in Approval-Based Committee Elections | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | AAAI 2024 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| Low-Distortion Clustering with Ordinal and Limited Cardinal Information | Frontier · Computer-Aided Methods & Data | AAAI 2024 | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| Proportional Aggregation of Preferences for Sequential Decision Making | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | AAAI 2024 | – | – | triple | ||
| How to Make Knockout Tournaments More Popular? | Voting · Tournament Solutions | AAAI 2024 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| 1/2 - Approximate MMS Allocation for Separable Piecewise Linear Concave | Fair Allocation · Shares & Guarantees | AAAI 2024 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| Automated Design of Affine Maximizer Mechanisms in Dynamic Settings not comsoc | unclassified | AAAI 2024 | – | – | triple | ||
| Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives under the Lens of Pairwise Distortion | Voting · Distortion | AAAI 2024 | – | – | triple | ||
| The Complexity of Fair Division of Indivisible Items with Externalities | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAAI 2024 | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| Refined Characterizations of Approval-Based Committee Scoring Rules | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | AAAI 2024 | – | – | triple | ||
| Implications of Distance over Redistricting Maps: Central and Outlier Maps⇤ | Voting · Bribery & Control | AAAI 2024 | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| On Optimal Tradeoffs between EFX and Nash Welfare* | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAAI 2024 | ✓ | – | ↗ | triple proof | |
| Manipulation-Robust Selection of Citizens’ Assemblies | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | AAAI 2024 | – | – | triple | ||
| Project-Fair and Truthful Mechanisms for Budget Aggregation | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Participatory Budgeting | AAAI 2024 | – | – | triple | ||
| Maxileximin Envy Allocations and Connected Goods | Frontier · Computer-Aided Methods & Data | AAAI 2024 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| Worst-Case VCG Redistribution Mechanism Design Based on the Lottery Ticket | Voting · Voting Theory & Axioms | AAAI 2024 | – | – | triple | ||
| An Exercise in Tournament Design: When Some Matches Must Be Scheduled | Voting · Bribery & Control | AAAI 2024 | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| Regret Analysis of Repeated Delegated Choice not comsoc | unclassified | AAAI 2024 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| Cost Minimization for Equilibrium Transition not comsoc | unclassified | AAAI 2024 | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| Reachability of Fair Allocations via Sequential Exchanges | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAAI 2024 | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| Repeated Fair Allocation of Indivisible Items | Fair Allocation · Chores, Online & Dynamic | AAAI 2024 | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| Spatial Voting with Incomplete Voter Information | Voting · Incomplete Information | AAAI 2024 | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| Maximizing Nash Social Welfare under Two-Sided Preferences | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAAI 2024 | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| Proportional Representation in Metric Spaces and Low-Distortion Committee | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | AAAI 2024 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| Towards Optimal Subsidy Bounds for Envy-Freeable Allocations | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAAI 2024 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| Strategyproof Mechanisms for Group-Fair Obnoxious Facility Location Problems | Voting · Manipulation | AAAI 2024 | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| Weighted Envy-Freeness for Submodular Valuations | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAAI 2024 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| Machine Learning-Powered Combinatorial Clock Auction | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAAI 2024 | – | – | triple | ||
| Almost Envy-Free Allocations of Indivisible Goods or Chores with Entitlements | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAAI 2024 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| The Moderating Effect of Instant Runoff Voting | Voting · Manipulation | AAAI 2024 | – | – | triple | ||
| Unravelling Expressive Delegations: Complexity and Normative Analysis | Voting · Voting Theory & Axioms | AAAI 2024 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| Learning Coalition Structures with Games | Coalition Formation · Hedonic Games | AAAI 2024 | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| Greedy-Based Online Fair Allocation with Adversarial Input: | Fair Allocation · Chores, Online & Dynamic | AAAI 2024 | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| Eliciting Honest Information from Authors Using Sequential Review* | Voting · Rationalization | AAAI 2024 | – | – | triple | ||
| Fair Allocation of Items in Multiple Regions | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAAI 2024 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| Altruism in Facility Location Problems | Frontier · Computer-Aided Methods & Data | AAAI 2024 | – | – | triple | ||
| ‘Why Didn’t You Allocate This Task to Them?’ | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAAI 2024 | – | – | triple | ||
| Approximation Algorithms for Preference Aggregation Using CP-Nets | Voting · Combinatorial Domains | AAAI 2024 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| Axiomatic Aggregations of Abductive Explanations not comsoc | unclassified | AAAI 2024 | – | – | triple | ||
| Eliciting Kemeny Rankings | Voting · Incomplete Information | AAAI 2024 | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| Approximating the Shapley Value without Marginal Contributions | Coalition Formation · Weighted Voting Games | AAAI 2024 | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| Stable Matchings in Practice: A Constraint Programming Approach | Coalition Formation · Matching under Preferences | AAAI 2024 | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| Towards a More Burkean Approach to Computational Social Choice | Voting · Voting Theory & Axioms | AAAI 2024 | – | – | triple | ||
| The Fairness Fair: Bringing Human Perception into | Fair Allocation · Fair Division Theory | AAAI 2024 | – | – | triple | ||
| Temporal Fairness in Multiwinner Voting | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | AAAI 2024 | – | – | triple | ||
| Mixed Fair Division: A Survey | Fair Allocation · Chores, Online & Dynamic | AAAI 2024 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| Epistemic EFX Allocations Exist for Monotone Valuations | Hannaneh Akrami, Nidhi Rathi | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAAI 2025 | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | |
| Achieving Maximin Share and EFX/EF1 Guarantees Simultaneously | Hannaneh Akrami, Nidhi Rathi | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAAI 2025 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| The Cost Perspective of Liquid Democracy: Feasibility and Control | Shiri Alouf-Heffetz, Łukasz Janeczko, Grzegorz Lisowski, Georgios Papasotiropoulos | Voting · Bribery & Control | AAAI 2025 | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof |
| EF2X Exists for Four Agents | Arash Ashuri, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Alkmini Sgouritsa | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAAI 2025 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| Fair Division via the Cake-Cutting Share | Yannan Bai, Kamesh Munagala, Yiheng Shen, Ian Zhang | Fair Allocation · Shares & Guarantees | AAAI 2025 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| Increasing Revenue in Efficient Combinatorial Auctions by Learning to Generate Artificial Competition not comsoc | Maria-Florina Balcan, Siddharth Prasad, Tuomas Sandholm | unclassified | AAAI 2025 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| Proportional Representation in Practice: Quantifying Proportionality in Ordinal Elections | Tuva Bardal, Markus Brill, David McCune, Jannik Peters | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | AAAI 2025 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| Fair Division with Market Values | Siddharth Barman, Soroush Ebadian, Mohamad Latifian, Nisarg Shah | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAAI 2025 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| The Distortion of Public-Spirited Participatory Budgeting | Mark Bedaywi, Bailey Flanigan, Mohamad Latifian, Nisarg Shah | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Participatory Budgeting | AAAI 2025 | – | – | triple | |
| Optimal Auction Design for Mixed Bidders not comsoc | Xiaohui Bei, Pinyan Lu, Zhiqi Wang, Tao Xiao, Xiang Yan | unclassified | AAAI 2025 | – | – | triple | |
| Nearly Tight Bounds on Approximate Equilibria in Spatial Competition on the Line | Umang Bhaskar, Soumyajit Pyne | Voting · Structured Preferences | AAAI 2025 | – | – | triple | |
| Weak Strategyproofness in Randomized Social Choice | Felix Brandt, Patrick Lederer | Voting · Manipulation | AAAI 2025 | – | – | triple | |
| Welfare-Optimal Serial Dictatorships Have Polynomial Query Complexity | Ioannis Caragiannis, Kurt Mehlhorn, Nidhi Rathi | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAAI 2025 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| Mechanism Design for Connecting Regions Under Disruptions | Hau Chan, Jianan Lin, Zining Qin, Chenhao Wang | Voting · Structured Preferences | AAAI 2025 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| Adaptive Manipulation for Coalitions in Knockout Tournaments | Juhi Chaudhary, Hendrik Molter, Meirav Zehavi | Voting · Manipulation | AAAI 2025 | – | – | triple | |
| Online Learning of Coalition Structures by Selfish Agents | Saar Cohen, Noa Agmon | Coalition Formation · Hedonic Games | AAAI 2025 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| Constrained Fair and Efficient Allocations | Benjamin Cookson, Soroush Ebadian, Nisarg Shah | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAAI 2025 | – | – | triple | |
| Temporal Fair Division | Benjamin Cookson, Soroush Ebadian, Nisarg Shah | Fair Allocation · Chores, Online & Dynamic | AAAI 2025 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| Characterising Simulation-Based Program Equilibria not comsoc | Emery Cooper, Caspar Oesterheld, Vincent Conitzer | unclassified | AAAI 2025 | – | – | triple | |
| The Complexity of Extending Fair Allocations of Indivisible Goods | Argyrios Deligkas, Eduard Eiben, Robert Ganian, Tiger-Lily Goldsmith, Stavros D. Ioannidis | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAAI 2025 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| Balanced and Fair Partitioning of Friends | Argyrios Deligkas, Eduard Eiben, Stavros D. Ioannidis, Dušan Knop, Šimon Schierreich | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAAI 2025 | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof |
| Eliminating Majority Illusion Is Easy | Jack Dippel, Max Dupré la Tour, April Niu, Sanjukta Roy, Adrian Vetta | Voting · Bribery & Control | AAAI 2025 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| Private Blotto: Viewpoint Competition with Polarized Agents not comsoc | Kate Donahue, Jon Kleinberg | unclassified | AAAI 2025 | – | – | triple | |
| Every Bit Helps: Achieving the Optimal Distortion with a Few Queries | Soroush Ebadian, Nisarg Shah | Voting · Distortion | AAAI 2025 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| Verifying Proportionality in Temporal Voting | Edith Elkind, Svetlana Obraztsova, Jannik Peters, Nicholas Teh | Voting · Voting Theory & Axioms | AAAI 2025 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| Distances Between Top-Truncated Elections of Different Sizes | Piotr Faliszewski, Jitka Mertlová, Pierre Nunn, Stanisław Szufa, Tomasz Wąs | Voting · Rationalization | AAAI 2025 | – | – | triple | |
| Individually Stable Dynamics in Coalition Formation over Graphs | Angelo Fanelli, Laurent Gourvès, Ayumi Igarashi, Luca Moscardelli | Coalition Formation · Hedonic Games | AAAI 2025 | – | – | triple | |
| Proportionally Fair Makespan Approximation | Michal Feldman, Jugal Garg, Vishnu V. Narayan, Tomasz Ponitka | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAAI 2025 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| Exact Algorithms and Lower Bounds for Forming Coalitions of Constrained Maximum Size | Foivos Fioravantes, Harmender Gahlawat, Nikolaos Melissinos | Coalition Formation · Hedonic Games | AAAI 2025 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| Fair Division with Social Impact | Michele Flammini, Gianluigi Greco, Giovanna Varricchio | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAAI 2025 | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | |
| On the Distortion of Committee Election with 1-Euclidean Preferences and Few Distance Queries | Dimitris Fotakis, Laurent Gourvès, Panagiotis Patsilinakos | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | AAAI 2025 | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | |
| Forecasting Competitions with Correlated Events | Rafael Frongillo, Manuel Lladser, Anish Thilagar, Bo Waggoner | Frontier · Computer-Aided Methods & Data | AAAI 2025 | – | – | triple | |
| Improved Maximin Share Approximations for Chores by Bin Packing | Jugal Garg, Xin Huang, Erel Segal-Halevi | Fair Allocation · Shares & Guarantees | AAAI 2025 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| (Almost Full) EFX for Three (and More) Types of Agents | Pratik Ghosal, Vishwa Prakash HV, Prajakta Nimbhorkar, Nithin Varma | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAAI 2025 | – | – | triple | |
| Federated Assemblies | Daniel Halpern, Ariel D. Procaccia, Ehud Shapiro, Nimrod Talmon | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | AAAI 2025 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| Reducing Leximin Fairness to Utilitarian Optimization | Eden Hartman, Yonatan Aumann, Avinatan Hassidim, Erel Segal-Halevi | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAAI 2025 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| Learning to Manipulate Under Limited Information | Wesley H. Holliday, Alexander Kristoffersen, Eric Pacuit | Voting · Manipulation | AAAI 2025 | – | ✓ | triple | |
| Strategyproof Matching of Roommates and Rooms | Hadi Hosseini, Shivika Narang, Sanjukta Roy | Coalition Formation · Matching under Preferences | AAAI 2025 | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof |
| Learning Optimal Auctions with Correlated Value Distributions not comsoc | Da Huo, Zhenzhe Zheng, Fan Wu | unclassified | AAAI 2025 | – | – | triple | |
| Metric Distortion of Line-up Elections: The Right Person for the Right Job | Christopher Jerrett, Yue Han, Elliot Anshelevich | Voting · Distortion | AAAI 2025 | – | – | triple | |
| Optimal Bounds for Dissatisfaction in Perpetual Voting | Alexander Kozachinskiy, Alexander Shen, Tomasz Steifer | Voting · Voting Theory & Axioms | AAAI 2025 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| The (Exact) Price of Cardinality for Indivisible Goods: A Parametric Perspective | Alexander Lam, Bo Li, Ankang Sun | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAAI 2025 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| Sample Complexity of Linear Regression Models for Opinion Formation in Networks not comsoc | Haolin Liu, Rajmohan Rajaraman, Ravi Sundaram, Anil Kumar Vullikanti, Omer Wasim, Haifeng Xu | unclassified | AAAI 2025 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| Decentralized Convergence to Equilibrium Prices in Trading Networks not comsoc | Edwin Lock, Benjamin Patrick Evans, Eleonora Kreacic, Sujay Bhatt, Alec Koppel, Sumitra Ganesh, Paul W. Goldberg | unclassified | AAAI 2025 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| Hedging and Approximate Truthfulness in Traditional Forecasting Competitions not comsoc | Mary Monroe, Anish Thilagar, Melody Hsu, Rafael Frongillo | unclassified | AAAI 2025 | – | – | triple | |
| On the Power of Strategic Corpus Enrichment in Content Creation Games not comsoc | Haya Nachimovsky, Moshe Tennenholtz | unclassified | AAAI 2025 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| On the Convergence of Tâtonnement for Linear Fisher Markets | Tianlong Nan, Yuan Gao, Christian Kroer | Fair Allocation · Fair Division Theory | AAAI 2025 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| Understanding EFX Allocations: Counting and Variants | Tzeh Yuan Neoh, Nicholas Teh | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAAI 2025 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| Fair and Efficient Completion of Indivisible Goods | Vishwa Prakash HV, Ayumi Igarashi, Rohit Vaish | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAAI 2025 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| Multi-Apartment Rent Division | Ariel D. Procaccia, Benjamin Schiffer, Shirley Zhang | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAAI 2025 | ✓ | – | ↗ | triple proof |
| Constant-Factor Distortion Mechanisms for k-Committee Election | Haripriya Pulyassary, Chaitanya Swamy | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | AAAI 2025 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| Improved Regret Bounds for Online Fair Division with Bandit Learning | Benjamin Schiffer, Shirley Zhang | Fair Allocation · Chores, Online & Dynamic | AAAI 2025 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| Facility Location Games with Optional Preferences: A Revisit | Xingchen Sha, Shuyu Bao, Hau Chan, Vincent Chau, Ken C. K. Fong, Minming Li | Voting · Manipulation | AAAI 2025 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| Voter Priming Campaigns: Strategies, Equilibria, and Algorithms | Jonathan Shaki, Yonatan Aumann, Sarit Kraus | Voting · Manipulation | AAAI 2025 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| Achieving Balanced Representation in School Choice with Diversity Goals | Zhaohong Sun, Makoto Yokoo | Coalition Formation · Matching under Preferences | AAAI 2025 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| Replicating Electoral Success | Kiran Tomlinson, Tanvi Namjoshi, Johan Ugander, Jon Kleinberg | Voting · Voting Theory & Axioms | AAAI 2025 | – | – | triple | |
| Paid with Models: Optimal Contract Design for Collaborative Machine Learning not comsoc | Bingchen Wang, Zhaoxuan Wu, Fusheng Liu, Bryan Kian Hsiang Low | unclassified | AAAI 2025 | – | – | triple | |
| Deviate or Not: Learning Coalition Structures with Multiple-bit Observations in Games | Yixuan Even Xu, Zhe Feng, Fei Fang | Frontier · Computer-Aided Methods & Data | AAAI 2025 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| An Extension-Based Argument-Ranking Semantics: Social Rankings in Abstract Argumentation not comsoc | Lars Bengel, Giovanni Buraglio, Jan Maly, Kenneth Skiba | unclassified | AAAI 2025 | – | – | triple | |
| Fast Computing of Dung Semantics in Acyclic Probabilistic Argumentation Frameworks not comsoc | Stefano Bistarelli, Victor David, Pierre Monnin, Francesco Santini, Carlo Taticchi | unclassified | AAAI 2025 | – | – | triple | |
| Dung’s Argumentation Framework: Unveiling the Expressive Power with Inconsistent Databases not comsoc | Yasir Mahmood, Markus Hecher, Axel-Cyrille Ngonga Ngomo | unclassified | AAAI 2025 | – | – | triple | |
| Proportionally Fair Matching via Randomized Rounding | Sharmila Duppala, Nathaniel Grammel, Juan Luque, Calum MacRury, Aravind Srinivasan | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAAI 2025 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| DiffIM: Differentiable Influence Minimization with Surrogate Modeling and Continuous Relaxation not comsoc | Junghun Lee, Hyunju Kim, Fanchen Bu, Jihoon Ko, Kijung Shin | unclassified | AAAI 2025 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| Decentralized and Uncoordinated Learning of Stable Matchings: A Game-Theoretic Approach | S. Rasoul Etesami, R. Srikant | Coalition Formation · Matching under Preferences | AAAI 2025 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| A Multiagent Path Search Algorithm for Large-Scale Coalition Structure Generation | Redha Taguelmimt, Samir Aknine, Djamila Boukredera, Narayan Changder, Tuomas Sandholm | Coalition Formation · Hedonic Games | AAAI 2025 | – | – | triple | |
| Are Key-Phrases All That Reviewers Care About? A Comprehensive Benchmarking of Reviewer Matchmaking Systems not comsoc | Sourish Dasgupta, Harsh Sharma, Devansh Patel, Prarthee Desai, Anil K. Roy | unclassified | AAAI 2025 | – | – | triple | |
| Joint Scoring Rules: Competition Between Agents Avoids Performative Prediction not comsoc | Rubi Hudson | unclassified | AAAI 2025 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| Contextual Stochastic Optimization for School Desegregation Policymaking not comsoc | Hongzhao Guan, Nabeel Gillani, Tyler Simko, Jasmine Mangat, Pascal Van Hentenryck | unclassified | AAAI 2025 | – | – | triple | |
| A Vision for Reinventing Credible Elections with Artificial Intelligence not comsoc | Biplav Srivastava | unclassified | AAAI 2025 | – | – | triple | |
| Incentives for Early Arrival | Dengji Zhao | Coalition Formation · Hedonic Games | AAAI 2025 | – | – | triple | |
| Multivariate Algorithmics for Eliminating Envy by Donating Goods | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAMAS 2022 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| Proportional Representation in Matching Markets: Selecting Multiple Matchings under Dichotomous Preferences | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | AAMAS 2022 | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| Little House (Seat) on the Prairie: Compactness, Gerrymandering, and Population Distribution | Voting · Bribery & Control | AAMAS 2022 | – | – | triple | ||
| Relaxed Notions of Condorcet-Consistency and Efficiency for Strategyproof Social Decision Schemes | Voting · Probabilistic Social Choice | AAMAS 2022 | – | – | triple | ||
| Fair Stable Matching Meets Correlated Preferences | Coalition Formation · Matching under Preferences | AAMAS 2022 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| Beyond Cake Cutting: Allocating Homogeneous Divisible Goods | Fair Allocation · Cake Cutting | AAMAS 2022 | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| Simulating Multiwinner Voting Rules in Judgment Aggregation | Frontier · Judgment Aggregation | AAMAS 2022 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| Pareto Optimal and Popular House Allocation with Lower and Upper Quotas | Coalition Formation · Matching under Preferences | AAMAS 2022 | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| Three-Dimensional Popular Matching with Cyclic Preferences | Coalition Formation · Matching under Preferences | AAMAS 2022 | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| Computation and Bribery of Voting Power in Delegative Simple Games | Voting · Bribery & Control | AAMAS 2022 | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| How to Fairly Allocate Easy and Difficult Chores | Fair Allocation · Chores, Online & Dynamic | AAMAS 2022 | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| Facility Location With Approval Preferences: Strategyproofness and Fairness | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | AAMAS 2022 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| Welfare vs. Representation in Participatory Budgeting | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Participatory Budgeting | AAMAS 2022 | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| One-Sided Matching Markets with Endowments: Equilibria and Algorithms | Fair Allocation · Markets & Equilibria | AAMAS 2022 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| Fair and Truthful Mechanism with Limited Subsidy | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAMAS 2022 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| Ordinal Maximin Share Approximation for Chores | Fair Allocation · Shares & Guarantees | AAMAS 2022 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| Optimal Matchings with One-Sided Preferences: Fixed and Cost-Based Quotas | Coalition Formation · Matching under Preferences | AAMAS 2022 | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| How Hard is Safe Bribery? | Voting · Bribery & Control | AAMAS 2022 | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| Equilibria in Schelling Games: Computational Hardness and Robustness | Coalition Formation · Hedonic Games | AAMAS 2022 | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| Coalition Formation Games and Social Ranking Solutions | Coalition Formation · Hedonic Games | AAMAS 2022 | ✓ | – | ↗ | triple proof | |
| A Graph-Based Algorithm for the Automated Justification of Collective Decisions | Voting · Voting Theory & Axioms | AAMAS 2022 | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| How Hard is Bribery in Elections with Randomly Selected Voters | Voting · Bribery & Control | AAMAS 2022 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| Position-Based Matching with Multi-Modal Preferences | Coalition Formation · Matching under Preferences | AAMAS 2022 | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| Strategy-Proof House Allocation with Existing Tenants over Social Networks | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAMAS 2022 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| Tracking Truth by Weighting Proxies in Liquid Democracy | Voting · Voting Theory & Axioms | AAMAS 2022 | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| Social Choice Around the Block: On the Computational Social Choice of Blockchain | Frontier · Computer-Aided Methods & Data | AAMAS 2022 | – | – | triple | ||
| Ask and You Shall be Served: Representing & Solving Multi-agent Optimization Problems with Service Requesters and Providers not comsoc | unclassified | AAMAS 2023 | ✓ | – | ↗ | triple proof | |
| Fair Allocation of Two Types of Chores | Fair Allocation · Chores, Online & Dynamic | AAMAS 2023 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| Fairly Dividing Mixtures of Goods and Chores under Lexicographic Preferences | Fair Allocation · Chores, Online & Dynamic | AAMAS 2023 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| Graphical House Allocation | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAMAS 2023 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| Approximation Algorithm for Computing Budget-Feasible EF1 Allocations | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAMAS 2023 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| Yankee Swap: A Fast and Simple Fair Allocation Mechanism for Matroid Rank Valuations | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAMAS 2023 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| Fairness in the Assignment Problem with Uncertain Priorities | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAMAS 2023 | ✓ | – | ↗ | triple proof | |
| Possible Fairness for Allocating Indivisible Resources | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAMAS 2023 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| Efficient Nearly-Fair Division with Capacity Constraints | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAMAS 2023 | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| Hedonic Games With Friends, Enemies, and Neutrals: Resolving Open Questions and Fine-Grained Complexity | Coalition Formation · Hedonic Games | AAMAS 2023 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| Learning Properties in Simulation-Based Games not comsoc | unclassified | AAMAS 2023 | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| Epistemic Abstract Argumentation Framework: Formal Foundations, Computation and Complexity not comsoc | unclassified | AAMAS 2023 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| Online Coalitional Skill Formation not comsoc | unclassified | AAMAS 2023 | – | – | triple | ||
| Best of Both Worlds: Agents with Entitlements | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAMAS 2023 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| Mitigating Skewed Bidding for Conference Paper Assignment | Coalition Formation · Matching under Preferences | AAMAS 2023 | – | – | triple | ||
| Price of Anarchy in a Double-Sided Critical Distribution System | Fair Allocation · Markets & Equilibria | AAMAS 2023 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| Improved EFX Approximation Guarantees under Ordinal-based Assumptions | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAMAS 2023 | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| Altruism, Collectivism and Egalitarianism: On a Variety of Prosocial Behaviors in Binary Networked Public Goods Games not comsoc | unclassified | AAMAS 2023 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| Best of Both Worlds Fairness under Entitlements | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAMAS 2023 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| Adapting Stable Matchings to Forced and Forbidden Pairs | Voting · Bribery & Control | AAMAS 2023 | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| A Map of Diverse Synthetic Stable Roommates Instances | Voting · Voting Theory & Axioms | AAMAS 2023 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| A Redistribution Framework for Diffusion Auctions not comsoc | unclassified | AAMAS 2023 | – | – | triple | ||
| Bribery Can Get Harder in Structured Multiwinner Approval Election | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | AAMAS 2023 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| Social Choice Around Decentralized Autonomous Organizations: On the Computational Social Choice of Digital Communities | Voting · Voting Theory & Axioms | AAMAS 2023 | – | – | triple | ||
| The Rule-Tool-User Nexus in Digital Collective Decisions | Voting · Voting Theory & Axioms | AAMAS 2023 | – | – | triple | ||
| Distributed Mechanism Design in Social Networks not comsoc | unclassified | AAMAS 2023 | – | – | triple | ||
| k -Prize Weighted Voting Game | Coalition Formation · Weighted Voting Games | AAMAS 2023 | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| A Hotelling-Downs Game for Strategic Candidacy with Binary Issues | Voting · Manipulation | AAMAS 2023 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| Non-Obvious Manipulability for Single-Parameter Agents and Bilateral Trade not comsoc | unclassified | AAMAS 2023 | – | – | triple | ||
| Mechanism Design for Improving Accessibility to Public Facilities | Voting · Structured Preferences | AAMAS 2023 | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| Explicit Payments for Obviously Strategyproof Mechanisms not comsoc | unclassified | AAMAS 2023 | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| Settling the Distortion of Distributed Facility Location | Frontier · Computer-Aided Methods & Data | AAMAS 2023 | – | – | triple | ||
| Cost Sharing under Private Valuation and Connection Control | Frontier · Computer-Aided Methods & Data | AAMAS 2023 | – | – | triple | ||
| Facility Location Games with Thresholds | Frontier · Computer-Aided Methods & Data | AAMAS 2023 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| Random Majority Opinion Diffusion: Stabilization Time, Absorbing States, and Influential Nodes | Frontier · Opinion Diffusion & Networks | AAMAS 2023 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| Node Conversion Optimization in Multi-hop Influence Networks | Frontier · Opinion Diffusion & Networks | AAMAS 2023 | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| Being an Influencer is Hard: The Complexity of Influence Maximization in Temporal Graphs with a Fixed Source not comsoc | unclassified | AAMAS 2023 | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| The Grapevine Web: Analysing the Spread of False Information in Social Networks with Corrupted Sources not comsoc | unclassified | AAMAS 2023 | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| Value-based Resource Matching with Fairness Criteria: Application to Agricultural Water Trading | Fair Allocation · Fair Division Theory | AAMAS 2024 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| On the Potential and Limitations of Proxy Voting: Delegation with Incomplete Votes | Voting · Incomplete Information | AAMAS 2024 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| Collective Robustness of Heterogeneous Decision-Makers Against Stubborn Individuals not comsoc | unclassified | AAMAS 2024 | – | – | triple | ||
| Extended Ranking Mechanisms for the m -Capacitated Facility Location Problem in Bayesian Mechanism Design | Frontier · Computer-Aided Methods & Data | AAMAS 2024 | – | – | triple | ||
| Stability of Weighted Majority Voting under Estimated Weights | Coalition Formation · Weighted Voting Games | AAMAS 2024 | – | – | triple | ||
| Impact of Tie-Breaking on the Manipulability of Elections | Voting · Manipulation | AAMAS 2024 | – | – | triple | ||
| Trust in Shapley: A Cooperative Quest for Global Trust in P2P Network not comsoc | unclassified | AAMAS 2024 | – | – | triple | ||
| Parameterized Guarantees for Almost Envy-Free Allocations | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAMAS 2024 | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| Combining Voting and Abstract Argumentation to Understand Online Discussions | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | AAMAS 2024 | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| An Online Learning Theory of Brokerage not comsoc | unclassified | AAMAS 2024 | – | – | triple | ||
| Robust Popular Matchings | Coalition Formation · Matching under Preferences | AAMAS 2024 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| On the Complexity of Pareto-Optimal and Envy-Free Lotteries | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAMAS 2024 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| Learning a Social Network by Influencing Opinions not comsoc | unclassified | AAMAS 2024 | ✓ | – | ↗ | triple proof | |
| Fairness and Efficiency Trade-off in Two-sided Matching | Coalition Formation · Matching under Preferences | AAMAS 2024 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| A Simple 1.5-approximation Algorithm for a Wide Range of Maximum Size Stable Matching Problems | Coalition Formation · Matching under Preferences | AAMAS 2024 | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| The Parameterized Complexity of Welfare Guarantees in Schelling Segregation | Fair Allocation · Fair Division Theory | AAMAS 2024 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| Gerrymandering Planar Graphs | Voting · Bribery & Control | AAMAS 2024 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| Computational Aspects of Distortion | Voting · Distortion | AAMAS 2024 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| Facility Location Games with Fractional Preferences and Limited Resources | Voting · Distortion | AAMAS 2024 | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| From Market Saturation to Social Reinforcement: Understanding the Impact of Non-Linearity in Information Diffusion Models not comsoc | unclassified | AAMAS 2024 | – | – | triple | ||
| Incentives for Early Arrival in Cooperative Games | Coalition Formation · Weighted Voting Games | AAMAS 2024 | – | – | triple | ||
| Approximating the Core via Iterative Coalition Sampling | Coalition Formation · Hedonic Games | AAMAS 2024 | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| Capacity Modification in the Stable Matching Problem | Coalition Formation · Matching under Preferences | AAMAS 2024 | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| Nash Stability in Hedonic Skill Games | Coalition Formation · Hedonic Games | AAMAS 2024 | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| Weighted Proportional Allocations of Indivisible Goods and Chores: Insights via Matchings | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAMAS 2024 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| Facility Location Games with Scaling Effects | Voting · Structured Preferences | AAMAS 2024 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| Tight Approximations for Graphical House Allocation | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAMAS 2024 | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| Keeping the Harmony Between Neighbors: Local Fairness in Graph Fair Division | Frontier · Computer-Aided Methods & Data | AAMAS 2024 | – | – | triple | ||
| Discovering Consistent Subelections | Voting · Structured Preferences | AAMAS 2024 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| To Lead or to be Led: A Generalized Condorcet Jury Theorem under Dependence | Voting · Voting Theory & Axioms | AAMAS 2024 | – | – | triple | ||
| Catfished! Impacts of Strategic Misrepresentation in Online Dating not comsoc | unclassified | AAMAS 2024 | – | – | triple | ||
| Veto Core Consistent Preference Aggregation | Voting · Voting Theory & Axioms | AAMAS 2024 | – | – | triple | ||
| Fine-Grained Liquid Democracy for Cumulative Ballots | Voting · Voting Theory & Axioms | AAMAS 2024 | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| Approximating APS Under Submodular and XOS Valuations with Binary Marginals | Frontier · Computer-Aided Methods & Data | AAMAS 2024 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| Proportional Fairness in Obnoxious Facility Location | Fair Allocation · Fair Division Theory | AAMAS 2024 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| Learning Partner Selection Rules that Sustain Cooperation in Social Dilemmas with the Option of Opting Out not comsoc | unclassified | AAMAS 2024 | – | – | triple | ||
| Coalition Formation with Bounded Coalition Size | Coalition Formation · Hedonic Games | AAMAS 2024 | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| Bounding the Incentive Ratio of the Probabilistic Serial Rule | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAMAS 2024 | – | – | triple | ||
| A Complete Landscape for the Price of Envy-Freeness | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAMAS 2024 | – | – | triple | ||
| A Task-Driven Multi-UAV Coalition Formation Mechanism | Coalition Formation · Weighted Voting Games | AAMAS 2024 | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| Evaluating District-based Election Surveys with Synthetic Dirichlet Likelihood | Frontier · Computer-Aided Methods & Data | AAMAS 2024 | – | – | triple | ||
| Single-Winner Voting with Alliances: Avoiding the Spoiler Effect | Voting · Voting Theory & Axioms | AAMAS 2024 | – | – | triple | ||
| Robust Knowledge Extraction from Large Language Models using Social Choice Theory not comsoc | unclassified | AAMAS 2024 | – | – | triple | ||
| Online Decentralised Mechanisms for Dynamic Ridesharing not comsoc | unclassified | AAMAS 2024 | – | – | triple | ||
| Multi-user Norm Consensus | Frontier · Judgment Aggregation | AAMAS 2024 | – | – | triple | ||
| Value Alignment in Participatory Budgeting | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Participatory Budgeting | AAMAS 2024 | – | – | triple | ||
| Battlefield Transfers in Coalitional Blotto Games | Coalition Formation · Weighted Voting Games | AAMAS 2024 | – | – | triple | ||
| Algorithmic Filtering, Out-Group Stereotype, and Polarization on Social Media not comsoc | unclassified | AAMAS 2024 | – | – | triple | ||
| Allocating Contiguous Blocks of Indivisible Chores Fairly: Revisited | Fair Allocation · Chores, Online & Dynamic | AAMAS 2024 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| Reducing Optimism Bias in Incomplete Cooperative Games | Coalition Formation · Weighted Voting Games | AAMAS 2024 | – | – | triple | ||
| Positive Intra-Group Externalities in Facility Location | Voting · Structured Preferences | AAMAS 2024 | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| Viral Marketing in Social Networks with Competing Products | Frontier · Opinion Diffusion & Networks | AAMAS 2024 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| Majority-based Preference Diffusion on Social Networks | Frontier · Opinion Diffusion & Networks | AAMAS 2024 | – | – | triple | ||
| Maximising the Influence of Temporary Participants in Opinion Formation | Frontier · Opinion Diffusion & Networks | AAMAS 2024 | – | – | triple | ||
| Controlling Delegations in Liquid Democracy | Voting · Bribery & Control | AAMAS 2024 | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| Fair and Efficient Division of a Discrete Cake with Switching Utility Loss | Fair Allocation · Cake Cutting | AAMAS 2024 | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| Budget-feasible Egalitarian Allocation of Conflicting Jobs | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAMAS 2024 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| Adaptive Incentive Engineering in Citizen-Centric AI not comsoc | unclassified | AAMAS 2024 | – | – | triple | ||
| Selecting Representative Bodies: An Axiomatic View | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | AAMAS 2024 | – | – | triple | ||
| Who Reviews The Reviewers? A Multi-Level Jury Problem | Voting · Voting Theory & Axioms | AAMAS 2025 | – | – | triple | ||
| EFX Allocations and Orientations on Bipartite Multi-graphs: A Complete Picture | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAMAS 2025 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| Harmonious Balanced Partitioning of a Network of Agents | Coalition Formation · Hedonic Games | AAMAS 2025 | – | – | triple | ||
| Impact Measures for Gradual Argumentation Semantics | Frontier · Computer-Aided Methods & Data | AAMAS 2025 | – | – | triple | ||
| Approximation Ratio for Preference Aggregation Using Tree CP-Nets | Voting · Combinatorial Domains | AAMAS 2025 | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| Algorithmically Fair Maximization of Multiple Submodular Objective Functions | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAMAS 2025 | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| Truthful and Welfare-maximizing Resource Scheduling with Application to Electric Vehicles | Fair Allocation · Fair Division Theory | AAMAS 2025 | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| Probably Correct Optimal Stable Matching for Two-Sided Market Under Uncertainty | Coalition Formation · Matching under Preferences | AAMAS 2025 | – | – | triple | ||
| Fair Allocation of Divisible Goods under Non-Linear Valuations | Fair Allocation · Cake Cutting | AAMAS 2025 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| Condorcet Winners and Anscombe's Paradox Under Weighted Binary Voting | Voting · Combinatorial Domains | AAMAS 2025 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| On the Gale-Shapley Algorithm for Stable Matchings with a Partial Honesty Nash Refinement | Coalition Formation · Matching under Preferences | AAMAS 2025 | – | – | triple | ||
| The Price of Anarchy in Spatial Social Choice | Voting · Manipulation | AAMAS 2025 | – | – | triple | ||
| Opinion Dynamics with Median Aggregation | Voting · Voting Theory & Axioms | AAMAS 2025 | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| To Spend or to Gain: Online Learning in Repeated Karma Auctions not comsoc | unclassified | AAMAS 2025 | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| Towards Envy-Freeness Relaxations for General Nonmonotone Valuations | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAMAS 2025 | ✓ | – | ↗ | triple proof | |
| Maximizing Value in Challenge the Champ Tournaments | Voting · Tournament Solutions | AAMAS 2025 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| Computing Efficient Envy-Free Partial Allocations of Indivisible Goods | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAMAS 2025 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| Welfare Approximation in Additively Separable Hedonic Games | Coalition Formation · Hedonic Games | AAMAS 2025 | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| Towards Fair and Efficient Public Transportation: A Bus Stop Model | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | AAMAS 2025 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| On the Fairness of Additive Welfarist Rules | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAMAS 2025 | – | – | triple | ||
| Game-Theoretically Secure Distributed Protocols for Fair Allocation in Coalitional Games | Coalition Formation · Weighted Voting Games | AAMAS 2025 | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| Fair Division in a Variable Setting | Fair Allocation · Chores, Online & Dynamic | AAMAS 2025 | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| Computing Efficient and Envy-Free Allocations under Dichotomous Preferences using SAT | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAMAS 2025 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| Selecting Interlacing Committees | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | AAMAS 2025 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| Why Instant-Runoff Voting Is So Resilient to Coalitional Manipulation: Phase Transitions in the Perturbed Culture | Voting · Manipulation | AAMAS 2025 | – | – | triple | ||
| Boosting Sortition via Proportional Representation | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | AAMAS 2025 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| Temporal Fair Division of Indivisible Items | Fair Allocation · Chores, Online & Dynamic | AAMAS 2025 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| Learning Real-Life Approval Elections | Voting · Rationalization | AAMAS 2025 | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| Eliminating Majority Illusion | Frontier · Opinion Diffusion & Networks | AAMAS 2025 | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| On the Hardness of Fair Allocation under Ternary Valuations | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAMAS 2025 | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| Non-obvious Manipulability in Hedonic Games with Friends Appreciation Preferences | Coalition Formation · Hedonic Games | AAMAS 2025 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| The Metric Distortion of Randomized Social Choice Functions: C1 Maximal Lottery Rules and Simulations | Voting · Distortion | AAMAS 2025 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| Order Symmetry: A New Fairness Criterion for Assignment Mechanisms | Fair Allocation · Fair Division Theory | AAMAS 2025 | – | – | triple | ||
| Fairly Allocating Goods in Parallel | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAMAS 2025 | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| Voter Model Meets Rumour Spreading: A Study of Consensus Protocols on Graphs with Agnostic Nodes not comsoc | unclassified | AAMAS 2025 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| Approximating One-Sided and Two-Sided Nash Social Welfare With Capacities | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAMAS 2025 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| Fairness and Optimality in Routing not comsoc | unclassified | AAMAS 2025 | ✓ | – | ↗ | triple proof | |
| Full Proportional Justified Representation | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | AAMAS 2025 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| k - ApprovalVeto: A Spectrum of Voting Rules Balancing Metric Distortion and Minority Protection | Voting · Distortion | AAMAS 2025 | – | – | triple | ||
| The Bakers and Millers Game with Restricted Locations | Coalition Formation · Hedonic Games | AAMAS 2025 | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| Dynamic Coalition Structure Detection in Natural-Language-based Interactions | Coalition Formation · Hedonic Games | AAMAS 2025 | – | – | triple | ||
| Soft Condorcet Optimization for Ranking of General Agents | Voting · Rationalization | AAMAS 2025 | – | – | triple | ||
| Curiosity-Driven Partner Selection Accelerates Convention Emergence in Language Games not comsoc | unclassified | AAMAS 2025 | – | – | triple | ||
| Rational Capability in Concurrent Games not comsoc | unclassified | AAMAS 2025 | ✓ | – | ↗ | triple proof | |
| Resource Task Games | Coalition Formation · Hedonic Games | AAMAS 2025 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| Indifferential Privacy: A New Paradigm and Its Applications to Optimal Matching in Dark Pool Auctions not comsoc | unclassified | AAMAS 2025 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| Candidate Nomination for Condorcet-consistent Voting Rules | Voting · Bribery & Control | AAMAS 2025 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| The Strong Core of Housing Markets with Partial Order Preferences | Fair Allocation · Fair Division Theory | AAMAS 2025 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| Housing Market on Networks | Fair Allocation · Fair Division Theory | AAMAS 2025 | – | – | triple | ||
| The Degree of (Extended) Justified Representation and Its Optimization | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | AAMAS 2025 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| Maximizing Truth Learning in a Social Network is NP-hard not comsoc | unclassified | AAMAS 2025 | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| FLIGHT: Facility Location Integrating Generalized, Holistic Theory of Welfare | Frontier · Computer-Aided Methods & Data | AAMAS 2025 | – | – | triple | ||
| Asymptotic Existence of Class Envy-free Matchings | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAMAS 2025 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| On the Structure of EFX Orientations on Graphs | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAMAS 2025 | – | – | triple | ||
| Incentives for Early Arrival in Cost Sharing | Coalition Formation · Weighted Voting Games | AAMAS 2025 | – | – | triple | ||
| Tyranny of the Minority in Social Choice: a Call to Arms | Voting · Manipulation | AAMAS 2025 | – | – | triple | ||
| Tackling the Protocol Problem in Automated Negotiation not comsoc | unclassified | AAMAS 2025 | – | – | triple | ||
| Swap Bribery | Elkind, Faliszewski, Slinko | Voting · Bribery & Control | control | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof |
| Prices Matter for the Parameterized Complexity of Shift Bribery | Bredereck, Chen, Faliszewski, Nichterlein, Niedermeier | Voting · Bribery & Control | control | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof |
| d4-conf-aaai-1991-0037 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-1991-0064 | unclassified | ? | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-1992-0098 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-1993-0009 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-1994-0099 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-1994-0175 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-1994-0183 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-1994-0217 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-1996-0085 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-1996-0152 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Anytime Coalition Structure Generation with Worst Case Guarantees | T. Sandholm, K. Larson, Martin Andersson, O. Shehory, F. Tohmé | Coalition Formation · Hedonic Games | AAAI 1998 | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-1998-0176 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-1999-0030 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-1999-0088 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-1999-0102 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-1999-0153 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-1999-0192 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2000-0019 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2000-0052 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2000-0073 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2000-0126 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2000-0175 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2000-0179 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2000-0217 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2000-0223 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2000-0231 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2002-0033 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2002-0048 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2002-0093 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2002-0121 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| Complexity of Manipulating Elections with Few Candidates | Vincent Conitzer, T. Sandholm | Voting · Manipulation | AAAI 2002 | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof |
| d4-conf-aaai-2002-0142 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2002-0143 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2002-0148 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2002-0162 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2004-0008 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2004-0026 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2004-0046 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2004-0098 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2004-0118 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2004-0149 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2004-0155 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2004-0157 | unclassified | ? | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2004-0162 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2004-0178 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2005-0003 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2005-0008 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2005-0067 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2005-0083 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2005-0173 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2005-0185 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2005-0222 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2005-0224 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2005-0262 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2005-0275 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2005-0320 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2006-0007 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2006-0015 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2006-0018 | unclassified | ? | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2006-0024 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2006-0054 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2006-0090 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2006-0116 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2006-0121 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2006-0132 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2006-0154 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2006-0182 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2006-0196 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2006-0235 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2006-0252 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2006-0257 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2006-0266 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2006-0314 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2007-0023 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2007-0035 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2007-0075 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2007-0097 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2007-0100 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2007-0106 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2007-0111 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2007-0136 | unclassified | ? | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2007-0203 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2007-0229 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2007-0270 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2007-0304 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2007-0316 | unclassified | ? | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2007-0358 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2008-0033 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2008-0040 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2008-0043 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2008-0045 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2008-0083 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2008-0139 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2008-0140 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2008-0150 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2008-0177 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2008-0190 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2008-0220 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2008-0253 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2008-0259 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2008-0270 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2008-0282 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| Determining Possible and Necessary Winners under Common Voting Rules Given Partial Orders | Lirong Xia, Vincent Conitzer | Voting · Incomplete Information | AAAI 2008 | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof |
| d4-conf-aaai-2010-0019 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2010-0030 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2010-0032 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2010-0044 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2010-0046 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2010-0055 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2010-0074 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2010-0094 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2010-0095 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2010-0099 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2010-0117 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2010-0122 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2010-0125 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2010-0149 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2010-0152 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2010-0157 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2010-0176 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2010-0199 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2010-0205 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2010-0208 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2010-0248 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2010-0255 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2010-0267 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2010-0290 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2010-0310 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2010-0374 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2010-0376 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2010-0378 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2010-0394 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2010-0416 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2011-0005 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2011-0006 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2011-0011 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Complexity of and Algorithms for Borda Manipulation | Jessica Davies, G. Katsirelos, Nina Narodytska, T. Walsh | Voting · Manipulation | AAAI 2011 | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof |
| d4-conf-aaai-2011-0027 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2011-0068 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2011-0100 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Dominating Manipulations in Voting with Partial Information | Vincent Conitzer, T. Walsh, Lirong Xia | Voting · Incomplete Information | AAAI 2011 | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof |
| d4-conf-aaai-2011-0139 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2011-0244 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2011-0254 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2011-0263 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| Campaign Management under Approval-Driven Voting Rules | Ildikó Schlotter, Piotr Faliszewski, Edith Elkind | Voting · Bribery & Control | AAAI 2011 | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof |
| d4-conf-aaai-2011-0313 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2011-0321 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2011-0372 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2011-0380 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2011-0444 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2012-0027 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| Possible Winners in Noisy Elections | K. Wojtas, Krzysztof Magiera, Tomasz Miąsko, Piotr Faliszewski | Voting · Incomplete Information | AAAI 2012 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| d4-conf-aaai-2012-0104 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2012-0108 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2012-0119 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2012-0131 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2012-0139 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2012-0144 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2012-0153 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2012-0158 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2012-0162 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2012-0178 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2012-0190 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2012-0194 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2012-0213 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2012-0238 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2012-0241 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2012-0250 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2012-0305 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2012-0319 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Dynamic Matching via Weighted Myopia with Application to Kidney Exchange not comsoc | John P. Dickerson, Ariel D. Procaccia, T. Sandholm | unclassified | AAAI 2012 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2012-0380 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2013-0004 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2013-0014 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2013-0015 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2013-0031 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2013-0050 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2013-0068 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2013-0087 | unclassified | ? | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2013-0145 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | ↗ | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2013-0162 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2013-0163 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2013-0168 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Strategic Behavior when Allocating Indivisible Goods Sequentially | T. Kalinowski, Nina Narodytska, T. Walsh, Lirong Xia | Fair Allocation · Fair Division Theory | AAAI 2013 | – | ✓ | triple | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2013-0188 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2013-0193 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2013-0208 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Computational Aspects of Nearly Single-Peaked Electorates | G. Erdélyi, M. Lackner, A. Pfandler | Voting · Structured Preferences | AAAI 2013 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| A Robust Bayesian Truth Serum for Non-Binary Signals not comsoc | Goran Radanovic, B. Faltings | unclassified | AAAI 2013 | – | – | triple | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2013-0230 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2013-0236 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2013-0254 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2013-0260 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2013-0275 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Bounding the Cost of Stability in Games over Interaction Networks | R. Meir, Yair Zick, Edith Elkind, J. Rosenschein | Coalition Formation · Weighted Voting Games | AAAI 2013 | – | – | triple | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2013-0309 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2013-0315 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Dynamic Social Choice with Evolving Preferences | D. Parkes, Ariel D. Procaccia | Voting · Voting Theory & Axioms | AAAI 2013 | ✓ | – | ↗ | triple proof |
| d4-conf-aaai-2014-0002 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2014-0011 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Computational Aspects of Multi-Winner Approval Voting | H. Aziz, Serge Gaspers, Joachim Gudmundsson, Simon Mackenzie, Nicholas Mattei, T. Walsh | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | AAAI 2014 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| d4-conf-aaai-2014-0033 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2014-0040 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2014-0049 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2014-0060 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2014-0067 | unclassified | ? | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2014-0095 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2014-0108 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2014-0112 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2014-0116 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2014-0127 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2014-0130 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2014-0151 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2014-0163 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2014-0190 | unclassified | ? | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2014-0192 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2014-0223 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2014-0233 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2014-0248 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2014-0251 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2014-0258 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2014-0261 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2014-0262 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Incomplete Preferences in Single-Peaked Electorates | Zack Fitzsimmons, M. Lackner | Voting · Structured Preferences | AAAI 2014 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| d4-conf-aaai-2014-0282 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2014-0284 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2014-0300 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2014-0324 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2014-0330 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| Extending Tournament Solutions | F. Brandt, Markus Brill, Paul Harrenstein | Voting · Tournament Solutions | AAAI 2014 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| d4-conf-aaai-2014-0356 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2014-0362 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | ↗ | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2014-0382 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2014-0384 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2014-0390 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2014-0396 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2014-0411 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2014-0412 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| A Characterization of the Single-Peaked Single-Crossing Domain | Edith Elkind, Piotr Faliszewski, P. Skowron | Voting · Structured Preferences | AAAI 2014 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| Justified Representation in Approval-Based Committee Voting | H. Aziz, Markus Brill, T. Walsh | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | AAAI 2014 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| d4-conf-aaai-2014-0452 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2014-0465 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2014-0469 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2014-0518 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2014-0523 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2015-0012 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2015-0028 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| On the Convergence of Iterative Voting: How Restrictive Should Restricted Dynamics Be? | S. Obraztsova, E. Markakis, M. Polukarov, Zinovi Rabinovich, N. Jennings | Voting · Manipulation | AAAI 2015 | – | – | triple | |
| Finding a Collective Set of Items: From Proportional Multirepresentation to Group Recommendation | P. Skowron, Piotr Faliszewski, J. Lang | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | AAAI 2015 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| d4-conf-aaai-2015-0062 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2015-0085 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| Facility Location with Double-Peaked Preferences | Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Min-Ming Li, Jie Zhang, Qiang Zhang | Voting · Structured Preferences | AAAI 2015 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2015-0112 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2015-0113 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2015-0174 | unclassified | ? | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2015-0191 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2015-0209 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | ↗ | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2015-0227 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2015-0257 | unclassified | ? | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2015-0277 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2015-0300 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2015-0342 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| Controlled School Choice with Soft Bounds and Overlapping Types | Ryoji Kurata, Masahiro Goto, Atsushi Iwasaki, M. Yokoo | Coalition Formation · Matching under Preferences | AAAI 2015 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| d4-conf-aaai-2015-0355 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2015-0380 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2015-0392 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2015-0397 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2015-0402 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2015-0411 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2015-0421 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2015-0446 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2015-0448 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2015-0485 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2015-0492 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2015-0504 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2015-0521 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2015-0539 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2015-0565 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2015-0570 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2015-0578 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2015-0580 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2015-0581 | unclassified | ? | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2015-0588 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2015-0667 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2015-0685 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2015-0687 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2015-0704 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| Elections with Few Voters: Candidate Control Can Be Easy | Jiehua Chen, Piotr Faliszewski, R. Niedermeier, Nimrod Talmon | Voting · Bribery & Control | AAAI 2015 | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | |
| Mechanism Design for Team Formation | Mason Wright, Yevgeniy Vorobeychik | Coalition Formation · Hedonic Games | AAAI 2015 | – | – | triple | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2015-0751 | unclassified | ? | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2015-0766 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2015-0770 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2015-0773 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2015-0774 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2015-0787 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2016-0039 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2016-0076 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2016-0081 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2016-0086 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2016-0120 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2016-0123 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2016-0124 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2016-0133 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2016-0223 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2016-0233 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2016-0236 | unclassified | ? | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2016-0271 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2016-0291 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2016-0334 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2016-0335 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2016-0339 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| Complexity of Shift Bribery in Committee Elections | Robert Bredereck, Piotr Faliszewski, R. Niedermeier, Nimrod Talmon | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | AAAI 2016 | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2016-0360 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2016-0365 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2016-0373 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| Multi-Attribute Proportional Representation | J. Lang, P. Skowron | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Apportionment & Districting | AAAI 2016 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| d4-conf-aaai-2016-0435 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2016-0455 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2016-0504 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Frugal Bribery in Voting | P. Dey, Neeldhara Misra, Y. Narahari | Voting · Bribery & Control | AAAI 2016 | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof |
| d4-conf-aaai-2016-0536 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2016-0546 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2016-0558 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2016-0565 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2016-0571 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2016-0573 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| Multiwinner Analogues of the Plurality Rule: Axiomatic and Algorithmic Perspectives | Piotr Faliszewski, P. Skowron, A. Slinko, Nimrod Talmon | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | AAAI 2016 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| d4-conf-aaai-2016-0673 | unclassified | ? | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2016-0686 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2016-0692 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2016-0702 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2016-0758 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2016-0767 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2016-0788 | unclassified | ? | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2016-0804 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2017-0005 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2017-0012 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2017-0024 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2017-0044 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| Multiwinner Approval Rules as Apportionment Methods | Markus Brill, Jean-François Laslier, P. Skowron | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | AAAI 2017 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2017-0107 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2017-0108 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2017-0169 | unclassified | ? | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2017-0205 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| What Do Multiwinner Voting Rules Do? An Experiment Over the Two-Dimensional Euclidean Domain | Edith Elkind, Piotr Faliszewski, Jean-François Laslier, P. Skowron, A. Slinko, Nimrod Talmon | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | AAAI 2017 | – | ✓ | triple | |
| Proportional Justified Representation | Luis Sánchez-Fernández, Edith Elkind, M. Lackner, N. F. García, Jesús Arias Fisteus, P. Basanta-Val et al. | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | AAAI 2017 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| d4-conf-aaai-2017-0239 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2017-0242 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| Phragmén's Voting Methods and Justified Representation | Markus Brill, Rupert Freeman, S. Janson, M. Lackner | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | AAAI 2017 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| d4-conf-aaai-2017-0329 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2017-0352 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2017-0355 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2017-0379 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2017-0416 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| Preferences Single-Peaked on a Circle | Dominik Peters, M. Lackner | Voting · Structured Preferences | AAAI 2017 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| d4-conf-aaai-2017-0493 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2017-0530 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| Mechanism Design for Multi-Type Housing Markets | Sibel Adali, Sujoy Sikdar, Lirong Xia | Fair Allocation · Fair Division Theory | AAAI 2017 | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof |
| d4-conf-aaai-2017-0587 | unclassified | ? | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2017-0609 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2017-0660 | unclassified | ? | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2017-0665 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2017-0676 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2017-0696 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2017-0715 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| Complexity of Manipulating Sequential Allocation | H. Aziz, S. Bouveret, J. Lang, Simon Mackenzie | Fair Allocation · Fair Division Theory | AAAI 2017 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| d4-conf-aaai-2017-0813 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2017-0836 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2017-0852 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2017-0873 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Optimizing Positional Scoring Rules for Rank Aggregation | I. Caragiannis, Xenophon Chatzigeorgiou, George A. Krimpas, A. Voudouris | Voting · Voting Theory & Axioms | AAAI 2017 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| d4-conf-aaai-2017-0887 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2017-0899 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2017-0902 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2018-0028 | unclassified | ? | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| Liquid Democracy: An Algorithmic Perspective | Anson Kahng, Simon Mackenzie, Ariel D. Procaccia | Voting · Voting Theory & Axioms | AAAI 2018 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2018-0068 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2018-0070 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2018-0072 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| Multiwinner Elections With Diversity Constraints | Robert Bredereck, Piotr Faliszewski, Ayumi Igarashi, M. Lackner, P. Skowron | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | AAAI 2018 | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2018-0184 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2018-0193 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2018-0246 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2018-0249 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2018-0269 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2018-0279 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2018-0294 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2018-0360 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2018-0366 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2018-0370 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2018-0389 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2018-0394 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2018-0404 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2018-0406 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Truthful and Near-Optimal Mechanisms for Welfare Maximization in Multi-Winner Elections | U. Bhaskar, Varsha Dani, Abheek Ghosh | Voting · Distortion | AAAI 2018 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| On the Distortion of Voting With Multiple Representative Candidates | Yu Cheng, S. Dughmi, D. Kempe | Voting · Distortion | AAAI 2018 | – | – | triple | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2018-0528 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2018-0565 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2018-0589 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2018-0613 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2018-0626 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2018-0642 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2018-0659 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2018-0671 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2018-0704 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2018-0710 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2018-0759 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2018-0767 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2018-0770 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2018-0838 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| Utilitarians Without Utilities: Maximizing Social Welfare for Graph Problems Using Only Ordinal Preferences | Ben Abramowitz, Elliot Anshelevich | Fair Allocation · Fair Division Theory | AAAI 2018 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2018-0891 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2018-0910 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2018-0923 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2018-0928 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2018-0933 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2018-0935 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2018-0937 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2018-0949 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| Groupwise Maximin Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods | Siddharth Barman, Arpita Biswas, Sanath Kumar Krishna Murthy, Y. Narahari | Fair Allocation · Shares & Guarantees | AAAI 2018 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2018-0973 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| A Voting-Based System for Ethical Decision Making | Ritesh Noothigattu, Snehalkumar `Neil' Gaikwad, Edmond Awad, Sohan Dsouza, I. Rahwan, P. Ravikumar et al. | Voting · Voting Theory & Axioms | AAAI 2018 | – | – | triple | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2018-1085 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2018-1091 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2018-1092 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2018-1183 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2018-1200 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2018-1209 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2019-0160 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2019-0802 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2020-0163 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2020-0174 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2020-0345 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2020-0365 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2020-0483 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2020-0790 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2020-0827 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2020-0878 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2020-1030 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2020-1175 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2020-1284 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2020-1418 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2020-1423 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2020-1499 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2020-1595 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2020-1736 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2020-1790 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2021-0031 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2021-0050 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2021-0057 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2021-0118 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| On Fair and Efficient Allocations of Indivisible Goods | J. Garg, Aniket Murhekar | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAAI 2021 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2021-0123 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2021-0130 | unclassified | ? | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2021-0145 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2021-0185 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| The Maximin Support Method: An Extension of the D'Hondt Method to Approval-Based Multiwinner Elections | L. Sánchez-Fernández, Norberto Fernández, Jesús Arias-Fisteus, Markus Brill | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | AAAI 2021 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| Fair and Truthful Mechanisms for Dichotomous Valuations | Moshe Babaioff, T. Ezra, U. Feige | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAAI 2021 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2021-0257 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2021-0278 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Proportionally Representative Participatory Budgeting with Ordinal Preferences | H. Aziz, Barton E. Lee | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Participatory Budgeting | AAAI 2021 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| d4-conf-aaai-2021-0464 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2021-0467 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| Almost Envy-freeness, Envy-rank, and Nash Social Welfare Matchings | Alireza Farhadi, Mohammad Taghi Hajiaghayi, M. Latifian, Masoud Seddighin, Hadi Yami | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAAI 2021 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2021-0524 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2021-0544 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| Fair and Efficient Allocations under Lexicographic Preferences | Hadi Hosseini, Sujoy Sikdar, Rohit Vaish, Lirong Xia | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAAI 2021 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| d4-conf-aaai-2021-0610 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Achieving Proportionality up to the Maximin Item with Indivisible Goods | A. Baklanov, Pranav Garimidi, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Daniel Schoepflin | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAAI 2021 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2021-0651 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2021-0653 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2021-0721 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2021-0733 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2021-0773 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2021-0803 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Maximin Fairness with Mixed Divisible and Indivisible Goods | Xiaohui Bei, Shengxin Liu, Xinhang Lu, Hongao Wang | Fair Allocation · Shares & Guarantees | AAAI 2021 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| On Fair Division under Heterogeneous Matroid Constraints | Amitay Dror, Michal Feldman, Erel Segal-Halevi | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAAI 2021 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| Fair and Efficient Allocations under Subadditive Valuations | B. Chaudhury, J. Garg, R. Mehta | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAAI 2021 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2021-0901 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2021-0918 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2021-0920 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2021-0939 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| Dividing a Graphical Cake | Xiaohui Bei, Edith Elkind, Erel Segal-Halevi, Warut Suksompong | Fair Allocation · Cake Cutting | AAAI 2021 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2021-1042 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2021-1074 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2021-1079 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Mind the Gap: Cake Cutting With Separation | Edith Elkind, Erel Segal-Halevi, Warut Suksompong | Fair Allocation · Cake Cutting | AAAI 2021 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2021-1093 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2021-1122 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2021-1184 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2021-1195 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2021-1199 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| Power in Liquid Democracy | Yuzhe Zhang, D. Grossi | Voting · Voting Theory & Axioms | AAAI 2021 | – | – | triple | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2021-1230 | unclassified | ? | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2021-1239 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2021-1250 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2021-1344 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2021-1404 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2021-1417 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| Majority Opinion Diffusion in Social Networks: An Adversarial Approach not comsoc | Ahad N. Zehmakan | unclassified | AAAI 2021 | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | |
| Fair and Efficient Online Allocations with Normalized Valuations | Vasilis Gkatzelis, Alexandros Psomas, Xi-Zhi Tan | Fair Allocation · Chores, Online & Dynamic | AAAI 2021 | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | |
| Computing the Proportional Veto Core | Egor Ianovski, Aleksei Y. Kondratev | Voting · Voting Theory & Axioms | AAAI 2021 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| d4-conf-aaai-2021-1492 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2021-1560 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| A Few Queries Go a Long Way: Information-Distortion Tradeoffs in Matching | Georgios Amanatidis, Georgios Birmpas, Aris Filos-Ratsikas, A. Voudouris | Voting · Distortion | AAAI 2021 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| The Price of Connectivity in Fair Division | Xiaohui Bei, Ayumi Igarashi, Xinhang Lu, Warut Suksompong | Fair Allocation · Shares & Guarantees | AAAI 2021 | ✓ | – | ↗ | triple proof |
| d4-conf-aaai-2021-1740 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | ↗ | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2021-1783 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2021-1852 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2021-1873 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2021-1887 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2021-1896 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2021-1989 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2021-2031 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2021-2035 | unclassified | ? | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| Achieving Envy-freeness and Equitability with Monetary Transfers | H. Aziz | Fair Allocation · Fair Division Theory | AAAI 2021 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| d4-conf-aaai-2021-2043 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2021-2045 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2022-0266 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2022-0349 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2022-0370 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2022-0534 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2022-1236 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2022-1385 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2022-1399 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2022-1496 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2022-1550 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2022-1582 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2022-1673 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2023-0052 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2023-0087 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2023-0100 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2023-0119 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2023-0147 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2023-0158 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2023-0196 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2023-0300 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2023-0310 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2023-0412 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2023-0472 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2023-0487 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2023-0872 | unclassified | ? | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2023-0921 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2023-0926 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2023-1123 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2023-1160 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2023-1203 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2023-1322 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2023-1542 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2023-1689 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2023-1763 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2023-1971 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2023-1978 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2023-2057 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2024-0116 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2024-0137 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2024-0257 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2024-0322 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2024-0394 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Proportional Representation in Metric Spaces and Low-Distortion Committee Selection | Y. Kalayci, David Kempe, Vikram Kher | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | AAAI 2024 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| d4-conf-aaai-2024-0599 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| Completing Priceable Committees: Utilitarian and Representation Guarantees for Proportional Multiwinner Voting | Markus Brill, Jannik Peters | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | AAAI 2024 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2024-1289 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2024-1378 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2024-1429 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2024-1498 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| Approval-Based Committee Voting in Practice: A Case Study of (over-)Representation in the Polkadot Blockchain | N. Boehmer, Markus Brill, Alfonso Cevallos, Jonas Gehrlein, L. Fernández, Ulrike Schmidt-Kraepelin | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | AAAI 2024 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| d4-conf-aaai-2024-2001 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2024-2040 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2024-2227 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2024-2255 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2024-2271 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2024-2408 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2024-2565 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2024-2625 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2025-0010 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2025-1076 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2025-1376 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2025-1478 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2025-1653 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2025-1886 | unclassified | ? | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2025-2677 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2025-3036 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2025-3222 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2025-3458 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2026-0027 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2026-0040 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2026-0245 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2026-0317 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2026-0327 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2026-0398 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2026-0544 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2026-0773 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | ↗ | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2026-0824 | unclassified | ? | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2026-0853 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2026-0908 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2026-0911 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| On the Edge of Core (Non-)Emptiness: An Automated Reasoning Approach to Approval-Based Multi-Winner Voting | Ratip Emin Berker, Emanuel Tewolde, Vincent Conitzer, Mingyu Guo, Marijn J. H. Heule, Lirong Xia | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | AAAI 2026 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2026-1043 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2026-1047 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2026-1180 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2026-1194 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2026-1406 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2026-1451 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2026-1556 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2026-1705 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2026-1836 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| Online Fair Allocations with Binary Valuations and Beyond | Yuanyuan Wang, Tianze Wei | Fair Allocation · Chores, Online & Dynamic | AAAI 2026 | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2026-2001 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2026-2003 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2026-2027 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2026-2064 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2026-2124 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2026-2186 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| Fairness in Repeated Matching: A Maximin Perspective | Eugene Lim, Tzeh Yuan Neoh, Nicholas J. Teh | Fair Allocation · Chores, Online & Dynamic | AAAI 2026 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| Existence of 2-EFX Allocations of Chores | J. Garg, Aniket Murhekar | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAAI 2026 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2026-2238 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2026-2265 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2026-2280 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2026-2344 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2026-2425 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2026-2442 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2026-2466 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2026-2471 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2026-2709 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| Fair and Efficient Balanced Allocation for Indivisible Goods | Yasushi Kawase, Ryoga Mahara | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAAI 2026 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| d4-conf-aaai-2026-2745 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2026-2791 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| Exact and Approximate Maximin Share Allocations in Multi-Graphs | George Christodoulou, S. Mastrakoulis | Fair Allocation · Shares & Guarantees | AAAI 2026 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2026-2989 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2026-3013 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2026-3046 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2026-3058 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2026-3163 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2026-3180 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2026-3337 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2026-3491 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2026-3593 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2026-3596 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2026-3600 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2026-3636 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2026-3715 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2026-3832 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2026-3857 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2026-3878 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2026-3913 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2026-4206 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2026-4208 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2026-4246 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2026-4271 | unclassified | ? | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| Probing EFX via PMMS: (Non-)Existence Results in Discrete Fair Division | Jarosław Byrka, F. Malinka, Tomasz Ponitka | Fair Allocation · Shares & Guarantees | AAAI 2026 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| d4-conf-aaai-2026-4467 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2026-4554 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2026-4556 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2026-4680 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | ↗ | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2026-4688 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aaai-2026-4754 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| Diversity of Structured Domains via k-Kemeny Scores | Piotr Faliszewski, Krzysztof Sornat, Stanislaw Szufa, Tomasz Wąs | Voting · Structured Preferences | AAAI 2026 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| d4-conf-aaai-2026-4889 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-aaai-2026-4897 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aldt-2009-0001 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| The Complexity of Probabilistic Lobbying | Daniel Binkele-Raible, G. Erdélyi, H. Fernau, J. Goldsmith, Nicholas Mattei, J. Rothe | Voting · Bribery & Control | ALDT 2009 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| d4-conf-aldt-2011-0009 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aldt-2015-0012 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aldt-2015-0036 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aldt-2017-0004 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-aldt-2017-0007 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aldt-2017-0015 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aldt-2017-0021 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aldt-2021-0002 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aldt-2021-0008 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aldt-2021-0014 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Obvious Manipulability of Voting Rules | H. Aziz, Alexa Lam | Voting · Manipulation | ALDT 2021 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| d4-conf-aldt-2021-0022 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-aldt-2021-0026 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aldt-2024-0005 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aldt-2024-0010 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-aldt-2024-0017 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2002-0039 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-atal-2002-0119 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2002-0150 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2003-0008 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2003-0114 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2003-0253 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2004-0068 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2005-0140 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2005-0166 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2005-0179 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2005-0182 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Junta distributions and the average-case complexity of manipulating elections | Ariel D. Procaccia, J. Rosenschein | Voting · Manipulation | ATAL 2006 | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof |
| d4-conf-atal-2006-0163 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-atal-2007-0013 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2007-0021 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2007-0083 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| Some results on approximating the minimax solution in approval voting | Rob LeGrand, E. Markakis, Aranyak Mehta | Voting · Voting Theory & Axioms | ATAL 2007 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-atal-2007-0251 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2007-0256 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| Eliciting single-peaked preferences using comparison queries | Vincent Conitzer | Voting · Incomplete Information | ATAL 2007 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-atal-2008-0015 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-atal-2008-0027 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2008-0034 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2008-0040 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2008-0053 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-atal-2008-0057 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | ↘* | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-atal-2008-0078 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-atal-2008-0113 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-atal-2008-0133 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2008-0151 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-atal-2008-0179 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2008-0189 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-atal-2008-0196 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-atal-2008-0211 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2008-0215 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-atal-2008-0256 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-atal-2008-0263 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2008-0278 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-atal-2008-0300 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2008-0312 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-atal-2008-0317 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2008-0318 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-atal-2008-0343 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2008-0349 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-atal-2009-0002 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2009-0006 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-atal-2009-0013 | unclassified | ? | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2009-0016 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2009-0024 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-atal-2009-0036 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2009-0048 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2009-0091 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-atal-2009-0109 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2009-0144 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-atal-2009-0170 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-atal-2009-0232 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-atal-2009-0270 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2009-0276 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-atal-2010-0005 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2010-0008 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2010-0011 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2010-0032 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-atal-2010-0042 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2010-0048 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-atal-2010-0069 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-atal-2010-0085 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2010-0106 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-atal-2010-0108 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2010-0114 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2010-0132 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-atal-2010-0142 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2010-0151 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2010-0153 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2010-0162 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2010-0171 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2010-0190 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2010-0199 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-atal-2010-0238 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2010-0251 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2010-0263 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-atal-2010-0264 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2010-0265 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-atal-2010-0267 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2010-0281 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2010-0287 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-atal-2010-0302 | unclassified | ? | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2010-0306 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-atal-2010-0327 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2010-0351 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2010-0353 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2011-0005 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2011-0009 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2011-0057 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2011-0070 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-atal-2011-0073 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2011-0098 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-atal-2011-0102 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| Complexity of coalition structure generation | H. Aziz, B. de Keijzer | Coalition Formation · Weighted Voting Games | ATAL 2011 | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof |
| d4-conf-atal-2011-0140 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2011-0148 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-atal-2011-0160 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-atal-2011-0169 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2011-0177 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2011-0186 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2011-0188 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2011-0197 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2011-0224 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-atal-2011-0232 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2011-0233 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2011-0261 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2011-0264 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-atal-2011-0278 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-atal-2011-0283 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2011-0285 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2011-0331 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-atal-2013-0010 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2013-0014 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-atal-2013-0016 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-atal-2013-0028 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| No agent left behind: dynamic fair division of multiple resources | Ian A. Kash, Ariel D. Procaccia, Nisarg Shah | Fair Allocation · Chores, Online & Dynamic | ATAL 2013 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-atal-2013-0041 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2013-0043 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2013-0046 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-atal-2013-0062 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-atal-2013-0074 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-atal-2013-0076 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-atal-2013-0084 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-atal-2013-0085 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-atal-2013-0093 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| Computing socially-efficient cake divisions | Y. Aumann, Yair Dombb, Avinatan Hassidim | Fair Allocation · Cake Cutting | ATAL 2013 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| d4-conf-atal-2013-0115 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2013-0118 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-atal-2013-0126 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-atal-2013-0150 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2013-0153 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2013-0170 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2013-0189 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2013-0196 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-atal-2013-0199 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2013-0205 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2013-0207 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| Weighted electoral control | Piotr Faliszewski, E. Hemaspaandra, Lane A. Hemaspaandra | Voting · Bribery & Control | ATAL 2013 | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof |
| d4-conf-atal-2013-0218 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2013-0228 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2013-0261 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2013-0274 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2013-0282 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-atal-2013-0285 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2013-0305 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2013-0315 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2013-0325 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2013-0343 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-atal-2013-0348 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-atal-2014-0002 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2014-0006 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-atal-2014-0008 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2014-0014 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2014-0026 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2014-0033 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2014-0051 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2014-0060 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2014-0061 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-atal-2014-0068 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-atal-2014-0073 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2014-0087 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2014-0092 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-atal-2014-0100 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2014-0102 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2014-0112 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2014-0133 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2014-0135 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2014-0155 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-atal-2014-0189 | unclassified | ? | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2014-0200 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2014-0205 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2014-0233 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2014-0243 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Finding strategyproof social choice functions via SAT solving | F. Brandt, Christian Geist | Voting · Manipulation | ATAL 2014 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-atal-2014-0264 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-atal-2014-0274 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2014-0275 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2014-0290 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-atal-2014-0300 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2014-0323 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2014-0324 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2014-0328 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-atal-2014-0344 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2014-0345 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-atal-2014-0374 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2014-0376 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2014-0395 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2014-0401 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Fair assignment of indivisible objects under ordinal preferences | H. Aziz, Serge Gaspers, Simon Mackenzie, T. Walsh | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | ATAL 2014 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| d4-conf-atal-2014-0412 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2014-0420 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-atal-2014-0429 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| Detecting Possible Manipulators in Elections | P. Dey, Neeldhara Misra, Y. Narahari | Voting · Manipulation | ATAL 2015 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| d4-conf-atal-2015-0004 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2015-0014 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-atal-2015-0036 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-atal-2015-0049 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2015-0055 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-atal-2015-0056 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-atal-2015-0060 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-atal-2015-0063 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2015-0064 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2015-0105 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| Sample Complexity for Winner Prediction in Elections | P. Dey, Arnab Bhattacharyya | Voting · Incomplete Information | ATAL 2015 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-atal-2015-0121 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-atal-2015-0122 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2015-0136 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-atal-2015-0155 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| Aggregating Partial Rankings with Applications to Peer Grading in Massive Online Open Courses | I. Caragiannis, George A. Krimpas, A. Voudouris | Voting · Voting Theory & Axioms | ATAL 2015 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-atal-2015-0171 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2015-0176 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2015-0204 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-atal-2015-0208 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2015-0215 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-atal-2015-0217 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-atal-2015-0219 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2015-0225 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2015-0226 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-atal-2015-0258 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2015-0261 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2015-0263 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-atal-2015-0267 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2015-0271 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2015-0280 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2015-0284 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2015-0285 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2015-0289 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| Manipulating the Probabilistic Serial Rule | H. Aziz, Serge Gaspers, Simon Mackenzie, Nicholas Mattei, Nina Narodytska, T. Walsh | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | ATAL 2015 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| d4-conf-atal-2015-0310 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-atal-2015-0316 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-atal-2015-0331 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2015-0332 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2015-0337 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-atal-2015-0348 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2015-0382 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2015-0383 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2015-0389 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2015-0397 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-atal-2015-0425 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Optimal Bounds for the No-Show Paradox via SAT Solving | F. Brandt, Christian Geist, Dominik Peters | Voting · Voting Theory & Axioms | ATAL 2016 | – | – | triple | |
| d4-conf-atal-2016-0025 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2016-0031 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2016-0055 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2016-0057 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-atal-2016-0076 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-atal-2016-0079 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-atal-2016-0089 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2016-0106 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2016-0135 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2016-0151 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-atal-2016-0154 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2016-0161 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2016-0221 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2016-0228 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-atal-2016-0231 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2016-0243 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2016-0250 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| Hedonic Games with Graph-restricted Communication | Ayumi Igarashi, Edith Elkind | Coalition Formation · Hedonic Games | ATAL 2016 | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-atal-2016-0262 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-atal-2016-0264 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2016-0275 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2016-0278 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| Achieving Fully Proportional Representation by Clustering Voters | Piotr Faliszewski, A. Slinko, Kolja Stahl, Nimrod Talmon | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | ATAL 2016 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-atal-2016-0303 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-atal-2016-0305 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-atal-2016-0309 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2016-0315 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-atal-2016-0316 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| Optimal Reallocation under Additive and Ordinal Preferences | H. Aziz, P. Biró, J. Lang, Julien Lesca, J. Monnot | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | ATAL 2016 | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof |
| d4-conf-atal-2016-0330 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-atal-2016-0335 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2017-0003 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-atal-2017-0012 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-atal-2017-0015 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-atal-2017-0025 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| Proxy Voting for Better Outcomes | Gal Cohensius, Shie Mannor, R. Meir, E. Meirom, Ariel Orda | Voting · Voting Theory & Axioms | ATAL 2017 | – | – | triple | |
| d4-conf-atal-2017-0053 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2017-0057 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2017-0064 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-atal-2017-0067 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-atal-2017-0070 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-atal-2017-0076 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2017-0105 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-atal-2017-0106 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2017-0110 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-atal-2017-0121 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| The Complexity of Bribery and Control in Group Identification | G. Erdélyi, Christian Reger, Yongjie Yang | Voting · Bribery & Control | ATAL 2017 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| d4-conf-atal-2017-0136 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2017-0153 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2017-0177 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2017-0182 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2017-0186 | unclassified | ? | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2017-0192 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2017-0196 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| Divide and Conquer: Using Geographic Manipulation to Win District-Based Elections | Yoad Lewenberg, Omer Lev, J. Rosenschein | Voting · Bribery & Control | ATAL 2017 | – | ✓ | triple | |
| d4-conf-atal-2017-0221 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2017-0224 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2017-0225 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| Efficient Near-optimal Algorithms for Barter Exchange | Zhi-Peng Jia, Ping-Zhong Tang, Ruosong Wang, Hanrui Zhang | Fair Allocation · Markets & Equilibria | ATAL 2017 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-atal-2017-0235 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2017-0249 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-atal-2017-0263 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-atal-2017-0267 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-atal-2017-0272 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| Weighted Matching Markets with Budget Constraints | Naoto Hamada, Anisse Ismaili, Takamasa Suzuki, M. Yokoo | Coalition Formation · Matching under Preferences | ATAL 2017 | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof |
| d4-conf-atal-2017-0283 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2017-0285 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2017-0293 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2017-0297 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2017-0298 | unclassified | ? | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2017-0310 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-atal-2017-0331 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| Fair Division via Social Comparison | Rediet Abebe, J. Kleinberg, D. Parkes | Fair Allocation · Cake Cutting | ATAL 2017 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| d4-conf-atal-2017-0344 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-atal-2017-0359 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-atal-2017-0361 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Greedy Algorithms for Maximizing Nash Social Welfare | Siddharth Barman, Sanath Kumar Krishnamurthy, Rohit Vaish | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | ATAL 2018 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| Judgment Aggregation with Rationality and Feasibility Constraints | U. Endriss | Frontier · Judgment Aggregation | ATAL 2018 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-atal-2018-0025 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-atal-2018-0032 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Local Envy-Freeness in House Allocation Problems | A. Beynier, Y. Chevaleyre, L. Gourvès, Ararat Harutyunyan, Julien Lesca, N. Maudet et al. | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | ATAL 2018 | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof |
| d4-conf-atal-2018-0046 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Proportionally Representative Participatory Budgeting: Axioms and Algorithms | H. Aziz, Barton E. Lee, Nimrod Talmon | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Participatory Budgeting | ATAL 2018 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| Coalitional Permutation Manipulations in the Gale-Shapley Algorithm | Weiran Shen, Yuan Deng, Ping-Zhong Tang | Coalition Formation · Matching under Preferences | ATAL 2018 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| d4-conf-atal-2018-0077 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| Stable Outcomes in Modified Fractional Hedonic Games | G. Monaco, Luca Moscardelli, Yllka Velaj | Coalition Formation · Hedonic Games | ATAL 2018 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| Optimization-Based Voting Rule Design: The Closer to Utopia the Better | Piotr Faliszewski, Stanislaw Szufa, Nimrod Talmon | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | ATAL 2018 | – | – | triple | |
| d4-conf-atal-2018-0105 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2018-0108 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| Proportionality and Strategyproofness in Multiwinner Elections | Dominik Peters | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | ATAL 2018 | – | – | triple | |
| d4-conf-atal-2018-0118 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2018-0127 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| Strategyproof and Fair Matching Mechanism for Ratio Constraints | Kentaro Yahiro, Yuzhe Zhang, N. Barrot, M. Yokoo | Coalition Formation · Matching under Preferences | ATAL 2018 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| Interactive Democracy | Markus Brill | Voting · Incomplete Information | ATAL 2018 | – | – | triple | |
| Voting with Ties: Strong Impossibilities via SAT Solving | F. Brandt, Christian Saile, C. Stricker | Voting · Manipulation | ATAL 2018 | – | – | triple | |
| d4-conf-atal-2018-0169 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2018-0170 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2018-0175 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-atal-2018-0189 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2018-0201 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2018-0203 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| Online Coalition Structure Generation in Graph Games | M. Flammini, G. Monaco, Luca Moscardelli, Mordechai Shalom, S. Zaks | Coalition Formation · Hedonic Games | ATAL 2018 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| d4-conf-atal-2018-0209 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2018-0212 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2018-0217 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Controlling Elections through Social Influence | Bryan Wilder, Yevgeniy Vorobeychik | Voting · Bribery & Control | ATAL 2018 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| High-Multiplicity Election Problems | Zack Fitzsimmons, E. Hemaspaandra | Voting · Bribery & Control | ATAL 2018 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| d4-conf-atal-2018-0254 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2018-0267 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-atal-2018-0277 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| Fairly Dividing a Cake after Some Parts Were Burnt in the Oven | Erel Segal-Halevi | Fair Allocation · Cake Cutting | ATAL 2018 | – | – | triple | |
| d4-conf-atal-2018-0323 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-atal-2018-0330 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-atal-2018-0341 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2018-0342 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2018-0348 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| Diversity Constraints in Public Housing Allocation | Nawal Benabbou, Mithun Chakraborty, Vinh Ho Xuan, J. Sliwinski, Yair Zick | Fair Allocation · Fair Division Theory | ATAL 2018 | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof |
| d4-conf-atal-2018-0355 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-atal-2018-0356 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Envy-Free Allocations Respecting Social Networks | Robert Bredereck, Andrzej Kaczmarczyk, R. Niedermeier | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | ATAL 2018 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| Complexity of Shift Bribery in Iterative Elections | Cynthia Maushagen, Marc Neveling, J. Rothe, Ann-Kathrin Selker | Voting · Bribery & Control | ATAL 2018 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| d4-conf-atal-2018-0404 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2019-0059 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2019-0074 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2019-0191 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2019-0218 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2019-0275 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2019-0386 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-atal-2019-0412 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2019-0424 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Computing Competitive Equilibria with Mixed Manna | J. Garg, Patricia C. McGlaughlin | Fair Allocation · Markets & Equilibria | ATAL 2020 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| d4-conf-atal-2020-0057 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2020-0071 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2020-0092 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-atal-2020-0144 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2020-0172 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2020-0182 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-atal-2020-0214 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-atal-2020-0232 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2020-0270 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2020-0274 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2020-0287 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2020-0291 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-atal-2020-0355 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2021-0013 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| Connections between Fairness Criteria and Efficiency for Allocating Indivisible Chores | Ankang Sun, Bo Chen, X. V. Doan | Fair Allocation · Chores, Online & Dynamic | ATAL 2021 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| d4-conf-atal-2021-0018 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2021-0026 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2021-0032 | unclassified | ? | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2021-0036 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2021-0037 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-atal-2021-0041 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2021-0049 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2021-0050 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2021-0052 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-atal-2021-0057 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-atal-2021-0073 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-atal-2021-0080 | unclassified | ? | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2021-0097 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-atal-2021-0109 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2021-0118 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2021-0123 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2021-0134 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2021-0146 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-atal-2021-0160 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-atal-2021-0170 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-atal-2021-0176 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2021-0177 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-atal-2021-0180 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2021-0202 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-atal-2021-0213 | unclassified | ? | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| Egalitarian Judgment Aggregation | Sirin Botan, Ronald de Haan, M. Slavkovik, Z. Terzopoulou | Voting · Voting Theory & Axioms | ATAL 2021 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| d4-conf-atal-2021-0220 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2021-0227 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-atal-2021-0231 | unclassified | ? | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2021-0239 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-atal-2021-0250 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| Existence and Computation of Maximin Fair Allocations Under Matroid-Rank Valuations | Siddharth Barman, Paritosh Verma | Fair Allocation · Shares & Guarantees | ATAL 2021 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| d4-conf-atal-2021-0265 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2021-0298 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2021-0322 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2022-0041 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-atal-2022-0076 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2022-0081 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-atal-2022-0107 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2022-0129 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2022-0132 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2022-0154 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-atal-2022-0160 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-atal-2022-0195 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2022-0198 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2022-0206 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2022-0231 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2022-0274 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-atal-2022-0303 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2022-0311 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2022-0317 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2023-0044 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2023-0099 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-atal-2023-0101 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2023-0234 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2023-0257 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2023-0275 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2023-0452 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2023-0458 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2023-0497 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2023-0533 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-atal-2024-0012 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2024-0083 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2024-0213 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-atal-2024-0225 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ecai-2008-0037 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-ecai-2008-0046 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ecai-2008-0090 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ecai-2008-0092 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ecai-2008-0105 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ecai-2008-0111 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ecai-2008-0158 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ecai-2008-0193 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-ecai-2008-0194 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ecai-2010-0007 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-ecai-2010-0014 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ecai-2010-0066 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ecai-2010-0069 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ecai-2010-0070 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-ecai-2010-0094 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| An Empirical Study of the Manipulability of Single Transferable Voting | T. Walsh | Voting · Manipulation | ECAI 2010 | – | ✓ | triple | |
| d4-conf-ecai-2010-0109 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ecai-2010-0204 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ecai-2010-0231 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-ecai-2010-0234 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ecai-2010-0238 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ecai-2010-0239 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-ecai-2010-0242 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ecai-2012-0002 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ecai-2012-0017 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-ecai-2012-0021 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-ecai-2012-0025 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ecai-2012-0043 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ecai-2012-0054 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-ecai-2012-0073 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ecai-2012-0076 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-ecai-2012-0105 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ecai-2012-0107 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ecai-2012-0131 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ecai-2012-0134 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ecai-2012-0140 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ecai-2012-0161 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ecai-2012-0166 | unclassified | ? | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ecai-2012-0180 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ecai-2012-0183 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ecai-2012-0201 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ecai-2012-0213 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ecai-2014-0010 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ecai-2014-0030 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ecai-2014-0049 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| The Computational Impact of Partial Votes on Strategic Voting | Nina Narodytska, T. Walsh | Voting · Manipulation | ECAI 2014 | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof |
| d4-conf-ecai-2014-0070 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ecai-2014-0076 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ecai-2014-0077 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ecai-2014-0078 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ecai-2014-0124 | unclassified | ? | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ecai-2014-0164 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ecai-2014-0174 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ecai-2014-0192 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-ecai-2014-0203 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ecai-2014-0208 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ecai-2014-0216 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ecai-2014-0223 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ecai-2014-0236 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-ecai-2014-0241 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ecai-2014-0272 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| How Hard is Control in Single-Crossing Elections? | Krzysztof Magiera, Piotr Faliszewski | Voting · Bribery & Control | ECAI 2014 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| d4-conf-ecai-2014-0298 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ecai-2014-0305 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ecai-2014-0315 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ecai-2014-0336 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-ecai-2016-0031 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ecai-2016-0035 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ecai-2016-0040 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ecai-2016-0057 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ecai-2016-0060 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ecai-2016-0089 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-ecai-2016-0093 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ecai-2016-0095 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ecai-2016-0099 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ecai-2016-0100 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ecai-2016-0109 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ecai-2016-0130 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ecai-2016-0168 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ecai-2016-0186 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ecai-2016-0204 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ecai-2016-0260 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ecai-2016-0265 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| Iterative Judgment Aggregation | M. Slavkovik, Wojciech Jamroga | Frontier · Judgment Aggregation | ECAI 2016 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| d4-conf-ecai-2016-0277 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ecai-2016-0278 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ecai-2016-0310 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ecai-2016-0323 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ecai-2016-0327 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-ecai-2016-0341 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ecai-2016-0354 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ecai-2016-0361 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ecai-2020-0022 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ecai-2020-0025 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ecai-2020-0054 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ecai-2020-0066 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ecai-2020-0165 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ecai-2020-0177 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ecai-2020-0194 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ecai-2020-0203 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ecai-2020-0218 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-ecai-2020-0223 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-ecai-2020-0253 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| Fair in the Eyes of Others | Parham Shams, A. Beynier, S. Bouveret, N. Maudet | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | ECAI 2020 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| d4-conf-ecai-2020-0271 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ecai-2020-0320 | unclassified | ? | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ecai-2020-0374 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ecai-2020-0379 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ecai-2020-0408 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ecai-2020-0423 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ecai-2022-0007 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ecai-2023-0002 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ecai-2023-0003 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-ecai-2023-0025 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-ecai-2023-0039 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ecai-2023-0062 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-ecai-2023-0081 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-ecai-2023-0082 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ecai-2023-0086 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ecai-2023-0092 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ecai-2023-0097 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ecai-2023-0102 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-ecai-2023-0146 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ecai-2023-0164 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ecai-2023-0167 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ecai-2023-0170 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ecai-2023-0243 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-ecai-2023-0260 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ecai-2023-0280 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ecai-2023-0301 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ecai-2023-0302 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-ecai-2023-0310 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| Settling the Score: Portioning with Cardinal Preferences | Edith Elkind, Matthias Greger, Patrick Lederer, Warut Suksompong, Nicholas J. Teh | Fair Allocation · Fair Division Theory | ECAI 2023 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| d4-conf-ecai-2023-0323 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-ecai-2023-0329 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| High-Multiplicity Fair Allocation Using Parametric Integer Linear Programming | Robert Bredereck, Andrzej Kaczmarczyk, Duvsan Knop, R. Niedermeier | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | ECAI 2023 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ecai-2023-0340 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ecai-2023-0349 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ecai-2023-0397 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ecai-2023-0405 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ecai-2023-0440 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ecai-2023-0446 | unclassified | ? | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ecai-2023-0458 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | ↗ | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ecai-2024-0007 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ecai-2024-0018 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ecai-2024-0036 | unclassified | ? | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ecai-2024-0054 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ecai-2024-0062 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-ecai-2024-0114 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-ecai-2024-0120 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-ecai-2024-0121 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ecai-2024-0151 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ecai-2024-0156 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ecai-2024-0162 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ecai-2024-0193 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-ecai-2024-0194 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ecai-2024-0210 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ecai-2024-0213 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ecai-2024-0221 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-ecai-2024-0246 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ecai-2024-0284 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-ecai-2024-0289 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ecai-2024-0298 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ecai-2024-0308 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ecai-2024-0340 | unclassified | ? | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ecai-2024-0358 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-ecai-2024-0426 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-ecai-2024-0428 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ecai-2024-0454 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ecai-2024-0488 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ecai-2024-0491 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ecai-2024-0492 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-ecai-2024-0578 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ecai-2025-0027 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ecai-2025-0041 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ecai-2025-0106 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-ecai-2025-0135 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ecai-2025-0138 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| Spoiler Susceptibility in Party Elections | Daria Boratyn, Wojciech Słomczyński, Dariusz Stolicki, Stanislaw Szufa | Voting · Voting Theory & Axioms | ECAI 2025 | – | – | triple | |
| d4-conf-ecai-2025-0165 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ecai-2025-0174 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ecai-2025-0186 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-ecai-2025-0201 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ecai-2025-0204 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ecai-2025-0232 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-ecai-2025-0261 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-ecai-2025-0336 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ecai-2025-0357 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-ecai-2025-0359 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-ecai-2025-0362 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ecai-2025-0369 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ecai-2025-0386 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ecai-2025-0400 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ecai-2025-0444 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-ecai-2025-0451 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-ecai-2025-0457 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ecai-2025-0480 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-ecai-2025-0499 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ecai-2025-0506 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ecai-2025-0524 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-ecai-2025-0528 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ecai-2025-0542 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ecai-2025-0549 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-ecai-2025-0609 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ecai-2025-0645 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ecai-2025-0646 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-ecai-2025-0648 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ecai-2025-0651 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ecai-2025-0675 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ecai-2025-0692 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ifaamas-2025-0089 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | ↘* | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ifaamas-2025-0342 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-1989-0070 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-1991-0190 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-1993-0059 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-1993-0250 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-1995-0052 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-1995-0225 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-1997-0003 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-1997-0017 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-1999-0006 | unclassified | ? | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-1999-0030 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-1999-0103 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-1999-0149 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-1999-0167 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2003-0049 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2003-0082 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2003-0098 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2003-0126 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2003-0134 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2003-0153 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2003-0170 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2003-0171 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ijcai-2003-0202 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2003-0286 | unclassified | ? | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2003-0324 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Universal Voting Protocol Tweaks to Make Manipulation Hard | Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm | Voting · Manipulation | IJCAI 2003 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| d4-conf-ijcai-2005-0056 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2005-0106 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2005-0142 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2005-0213 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2005-0222 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ijcai-2005-0274 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Hybrid Elections Broaden Complexity-Theoretic Resistance to Control | E. Hemaspaandra, Lane A. Hemaspaandra, J. Rothe | Voting · Bribery & Control | IJCAI 2007 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| d4-conf-ijcai-2007-0021 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2007-0035 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2007-0053 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2007-0068 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2007-0069 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2007-0117 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2007-0156 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2007-0172 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2007-0179 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ijcai-2007-0221 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ijcai-2007-0237 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2007-0238 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ijcai-2007-0251 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2007-0285 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2007-0304 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2007-0307 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2007-0371 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ijcai-2007-0387 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2007-0392 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2007-0424 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2007-0451 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2009-0041 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ijcai-2009-0053 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2009-0062 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2009-0087 | unclassified | ? | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2009-0088 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2009-0140 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| Where Are the Really Hard Manipulation Problems? The Phase Transition in Manipulating the Veto Rule | T. Walsh | Voting · Manipulation | IJCAI 2009 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ijcai-2009-0160 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2009-0167 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ijcai-2009-0173 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ijcai-2009-0180 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ijcai-2009-0187 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2009-0228 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2009-0232 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2009-0239 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2009-0244 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2009-0246 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ijcai-2009-0248 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Multimode Control Attacks on Elections | Piotr Faliszewski, E. Hemaspaandra, Lane A. Hemaspaandra | Voting · Bribery & Control | IJCAI 2009 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| d4-conf-ijcai-2009-0274 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2009-0278 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2009-0284 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2009-0297 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2009-0314 | unclassified | ? | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2009-0318 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ijcai-2009-0325 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2009-0336 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ijcai-2009-0343 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2011-0118 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2011-0123 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2011-0129 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2011-0152 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ijcai-2011-0204 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ijcai-2011-0224 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ijcai-2011-0269 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ijcai-2011-0335 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ijcai-2011-0336 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2011-0342 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ijcai-2011-0420 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| Optimal Partitions in Additively Separable Hedonic Games | H. Aziz, F. Brandt, Hans Georg Seedig | Coalition Formation · Hedonic Games | IJCAI 2011 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| d4-conf-ijcai-2011-0464 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ijcai-2011-0466 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2011-0484 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2015-0004 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2015-0021 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ijcai-2015-0032 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ijcai-2015-0033 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Simple Causes of Complexity in Hedonic Games | Dominik Peters, Edith Elkind | Coalition Formation · Hedonic Games | IJCAI 2015 | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ijcai-2015-0055 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| The Power of Local Manipulation Strategies in Assignment Mechanisms | Timo Mennle, Michael Weiss, Basil Philipp, Sven Seuken | Fair Allocation · Fair Division Theory | IJCAI 2015 | – | – | triple | |
| d4-conf-ijcai-2015-0061 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2015-0147 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2015-0153 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2015-0164 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ijcai-2015-0169 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2015-0175 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Possible and Necessary Allocations via Sequential Mechanisms | H. Aziz, T. Walsh, Lirong Xia | Fair Allocation · Fair Division Theory | IJCAI 2015 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| A Dictatorship Theorem for Cake Cutting | Simina Brânzei, Peter Bro Miltersen | Fair Allocation · Cake Cutting | IJCAI 2015 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ijcai-2015-0249 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2015-0255 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| What Do We Elect Committees For? A Voting Committee Model for Multi-Winner Rules | P. Skowron | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | IJCAI 2015 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| d4-conf-ijcai-2015-0307 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2015-0329 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ijcai-2015-0363 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ijcai-2015-0386 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| Online Fair Division: Analysing a Food Bank Problem | M. Aleksandrov, H. Aziz, Serge Gaspers, T. Walsh | Fair Allocation · Chores, Online & Dynamic | IJCAI 2015 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ijcai-2015-0439 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ijcai-2015-0442 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| Welfare Maximization in Fractional Hedonic Games | H. Aziz, Serge Gaspers, Joachim Gudmundsson, Julián Mestre, H. Täubig | Coalition Formation · Hedonic Games | IJCAI 2015 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| d4-conf-ijcai-2015-0462 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2015-0463 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2015-0468 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2015-0474 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2015-0487 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2015-0508 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2015-0514 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2015-0518 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Learning Cooperative Games | M. Balcan, Ariel D. Procaccia, Yair Zick | Coalition Formation · Weighted Voting Games | IJCAI 2015 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| d4-conf-ijcai-2015-0544 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ijcai-2015-0555 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ijcai-2015-0557 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ijcai-2015-0573 | unclassified | ? | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2015-0576 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ijcai-2015-0587 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2015-0588 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| Structure in Dichotomous Preferences | Edith Elkind, M. Lackner | Voting · Structured Preferences | IJCAI 2015 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| d4-conf-ijcai-2015-0646 | unclassified | ? | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2015-0675 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2015-0680 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2015-0682 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2015-0715 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2015-0731 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2015-0739 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2015-0742 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2016-0009 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2016-0015 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2016-0043 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2016-0063 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ijcai-2016-0065 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2016-0095 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2016-0130 | unclassified | ? | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2016-0132 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ijcai-2016-0136 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2016-0143 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2016-0156 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2016-0166 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Computing Pareto Optimal Committees | H. Aziz, J. Lang, J. Monnot | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | IJCAI 2016 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| Trembling Hand Equilibria of Plurality Voting | S. Obraztsova, Zinovi Rabinovich, Edith Elkind, M. Polukarov, N. Jennings | Voting · Manipulation | IJCAI 2016 | – | ✓ | triple | |
| d4-conf-ijcai-2016-0236 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2016-0255 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2016-0264 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2016-0283 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2016-0284 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2016-0304 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2016-0305 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ijcai-2016-0307 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2016-0310 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2016-0330 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2016-0351 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2016-0370 | unclassified | ? | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2016-0374 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| How Hard Is It for a Party to Nominate an Election Winner? | Piotr Faliszewski, L. Gourvès, J. Lang, Julien Lesca, J. Monnot | Voting · Bribery & Control | IJCAI 2016 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| Randomized Social Choice Functions under Metric Preferences | Elliot Anshelevich, J. Postl | Voting · Distortion | IJCAI 2016 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ijcai-2016-0442 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2016-0464 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| Facility Location with Minimax Envy | Qingpeng Cai, Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Ping-Zhong Tang | Voting · Distortion | IJCAI 2016 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| To Give or Not to Give: Fair Division for Single Minded Valuations | Simina Brânzei, Yuezhou Lv, R. Mehta | Fair Allocation · Markets & Equilibria | IJCAI 2016 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| d4-conf-ijcai-2016-0485 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2016-0497 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Complexity of Manipulation with Partial Information in Voting | P. Dey, Neeldhara Misra, Y. Narahari | Voting · Manipulation | IJCAI 2016 | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof |
| d4-conf-ijcai-2016-0538 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2016-0541 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2016-0566 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| On Truthful Mechanisms for Maximin Share Allocations | Georgios Amanatidis, Georgios Birmpas, E. Markakis | Fair Allocation · Shares & Guarantees | IJCAI 2016 | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | |
| Subset Selection via Implicit Utilitarian Voting | I. Caragiannis, Swaprava Nath, Ariel D. Procaccia, Nisarg Shah | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | IJCAI 2016 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| Strategic Voting with Incomplete Information | U. Endriss, S. Obraztsova, M. Polukarov, J. Rosenschein | Voting · Manipulation | IJCAI 2016 | – | – | triple | |
| Committee Scoring Rules: Axiomatic Classification and Hierarchy | Piotr Faliszewski, P. Skowron, A. Slinko, Nimrod Talmon | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | IJCAI 2016 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ijcai-2016-0659 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ijcai-2016-0661 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2016-0669 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ijcai-2016-0688 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2016-0719 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2017-0024 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2017-0031 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| Fair Allocation based on Diminishing Differences | Erel Segal-Halevi, H. Aziz, Avinatan Hassidim | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | IJCAI 2017 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| d4-conf-ijcai-2017-0045 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2017-0051 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2017-0056 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ijcai-2017-0082 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2017-0107 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ijcai-2017-0120 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| Near-Feasible Stable Matchings with Budget Constraints | Yasushi Kawase, Atsushi Iwasaki | Coalition Formation · Matching under Preferences | IJCAI 2017 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| d4-conf-ijcai-2017-0128 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2017-0182 | unclassified | ? | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| Object Allocation via Swaps along a Social Network | L. Gourvès, Julien Lesca, A. Wilczynski | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | IJCAI 2017 | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof |
| d4-conf-ijcai-2017-0283 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| The Condorcet Principle for Multiwinner Elections: From Shortlisting to Proportionality | H. Aziz, Edith Elkind, Piotr Faliszewski, M. Lackner, P. Skowron | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | IJCAI 2017 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| d4-conf-ijcai-2017-0319 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ijcai-2017-0327 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| Networked Fairness in Cake Cutting | Xiaohui Bei, Youming Qiao, Sheng-Yu Zhang | Fair Allocation · Cake Cutting | IJCAI 2017 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| d4-conf-ijcai-2017-0331 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ijcai-2017-0344 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2017-0345 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2017-0348 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2017-0370 | unclassified | ? | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| Fair Division of a Graph | S. Bouveret, K. Cechlárová, Edith Elkind, Ayumi Igarashi, Dominik Peters | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | IJCAI 2017 | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof |
| Multiwinner Rules on Paths From k-Borda to Chamberlin-Courant | Piotr Faliszewski, P. Skowron, A. Slinko, Nimrod Talmon | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | IJCAI 2017 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| d4-conf-ijcai-2017-0447 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Core Stability in Hedonic Games among Friends and Enemies: Impact of Neutrals | Kazunori Ohta, N. Barrot, Anisse Ismaili, Y. Sakurai, M. Yokoo | Coalition Formation · Hedonic Games | IJCAI 2017 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| d4-conf-ijcai-2017-0498 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2017-0502 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2017-0515 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2017-0525 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2017-0529 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2017-0537 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ijcai-2017-0575 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2017-0576 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ijcai-2017-0605 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Cake Cutting: Envy and Truth | Xiaohui Bei, Ning Chen, Guangda Huzhang, Biaoshuai Tao, Jiajun Wu | Fair Allocation · Cake Cutting | IJCAI 2017 | – | – | triple | |
| d4-conf-ijcai-2017-0625 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| Computing an Approximately Optimal Agreeable Set of Items | Pasin Manurangsi, Warut Suksompong | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | IJCAI 2017 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| d4-conf-ijcai-2017-0636 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2017-0661 | unclassified | ? | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2017-0677 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ijcai-2017-0684 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2017-0719 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ijcai-2017-0741 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2017-0763 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ijcai-2017-0776 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Proportional Rankings | P. Skowron, M. Lackner, Markus Brill, Dominik Peters, Edith Elkind | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | IJCAI 2017 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| d4-conf-ijcai-2017-0802 | unclassified | ? | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| Deterministic, Strategyproof, and Fair Cake Cutting | V. Menon, K. Larson | Fair Allocation · Cake Cutting | IJCAI 2017 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ijcai-2017-0824 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Manipulating Opinion Diffusion in Social Networks | Robert Bredereck, Edith Elkind | Frontier · Opinion Diffusion & Networks | IJCAI 2017 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| d4-conf-ijcai-2017-0854 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2017-0862 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Fair and Efficient Social Choice in Dynamic Settings | Rupert Freeman, S. Zahedi, Vincent Conitzer | Frontier · Opinion Diffusion & Networks | IJCAI 2017 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| Multiwinner Voting with Fairness Constraints | L. Celis, Lingxiao Huang, Nisheeth K. Vishnoi | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | IJCAI 2018 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| d4-conf-ijcai-2018-0062 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2018-0086 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2018-0115 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ijcai-2018-0116 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2018-0122 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Opinion Diffusion and Campaigning on Society Graphs | Piotr Faliszewski, Rica Gonen, Martin Koutecký, Nimrod Talmon | Frontier · Opinion Diffusion & Networks | IJCAI 2018 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| d4-conf-ijcai-2018-0216 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| Democratic Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods | Erel Segal-Halevi, Warut Suksompong | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | IJCAI 2018 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| Pairwise Liquid Democracy | Markus Brill, Nimrod Talmon | Voting · Rationalization | IJCAI 2018 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| d4-conf-ijcai-2018-0283 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| Dynamic Fair Division Problem with General Valuations | Bo Li, Wen-Yang Li, Yingkai Li | Fair Allocation · Chores, Online & Dynamic | IJCAI 2018 | – | – | triple | |
| d4-conf-ijcai-2018-0307 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2018-0313 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| Comparing Approximate Relaxations of Envy-Freeness | Georgios Amanatidis, Georgios Birmpas, E. Markakis | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | IJCAI 2018 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ijcai-2018-0353 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2018-0360 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| An Analytical and Experimental Comparison of Maximal Lottery Schemes | F. Brandl, F. Brandt, C. Stricker | Voting · Probabilistic Social Choice | IJCAI 2018 | – | – | triple | |
| d4-conf-ijcai-2018-0404 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2018-0413 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2018-0447 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Combinatorial Auctions via Machine Learning-based Preference Elicitation not comsoc | Gianluca Brero, Benjamin Lubin, Sven Seuken | unclassified | IJCAI 2018 | – | – | triple | |
| d4-conf-ijcai-2018-0466 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2018-0489 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2018-0499 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ijcai-2018-0518 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2018-0535 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2018-0558 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ijcai-2018-0561 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2018-0577 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2018-0616 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| Fair Division Under Cardinality Constraints | Arpita Biswas, Siddharth Barman | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | IJCAI 2018 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| Maximin Share Allocations on Cycles | Zbigniew Lonc, M. Truszczynski | Fair Allocation · Shares & Guarantees | IJCAI 2018 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| d4-conf-ijcai-2018-0659 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ijcai-2018-0698 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ijcai-2018-0729 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ijcai-2018-0732 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ijcai-2018-0751 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| Strategyproof and Fair Matching Mechanism for Union of Symmetric M-convex Constraints | Yuzhe Zhang, Kentaro Yahiro, N. Barrot, M. Yokoo | Frontier · Computer-Aided Methods & Data | IJCAI 2018 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ijcai-2018-0775 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2018-0827 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2018-0890 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Deep Learning for Multi-Facility Location Mechanism Design | Noah Golowich, H. Narasimhan, D. Parkes | Voting · Structured Preferences | IJCAI 2018 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| d4-conf-ijcai-2018-0899 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2018-0907 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| Truthful Fair Division without Free Disposal | Xiaohui Bei, Guangda Huzhang, Warut Suksompong | Fair Allocation · Cake Cutting | IJCAI 2018 | – | – | triple | |
| Reasoning about Consensus when Opinions Diffuse through Majority Dynamics | V. Auletta, Diodato Ferraioli, G. Greco | Frontier · Opinion Diffusion & Networks | IJCAI 2018 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| d4-conf-ijcai-2018-0983 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ijcai-2018-1013 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2019-0033 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2019-0123 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2019-0167 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Schelling Games on Graphs not comsoc | Aishwarya Agarwal, Edith Elkind, Jiarui Gan, Ayumi Igarashi, Warut Suksompong, A. Voudouris | unclassified | IJCAI 2019 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| d4-conf-ijcai-2019-0411 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2019-0524 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2019-0537 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2019-0587 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2019-0590 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2019-0596 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2019-0603 | unclassified | ? | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2019-0605 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2019-0614 | unclassified | ? | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2019-0622 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ijcai-2019-0639 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2019-0645 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2019-0647 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2019-0652 | unclassified | ? | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2019-0712 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2019-0714 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| An Experimental View on Committees Providing Justified Representation | Robert Bredereck, Piotr Faliszewski, Andrzej Kaczmarczyk, R. Niedermeier | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | IJCAI 2019 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods and Chores | H. Aziz, I. Caragiannis, Ayumi Igarashi, T. Walsh | Fair Allocation · Chores, Online & Dynamic | IJCAI 2019 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| Almost Envy-Freeness in Group Resource Allocation | M. Kyropoulou, Warut Suksompong, A. Voudouris | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | IJCAI 2019 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| d4-conf-ijcai-2019-0826 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| A Quantitative Analysis of Multi-Winner Rules | M. Lackner, P. Skowron | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | IJCAI 2019 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ijcai-2019-0897 | unclassified | ? | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2019-0902 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ijcai-2019-0952 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ijcai-2019-1011 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Fairness Towards Groups of Agents in the Allocation of Indivisible Items | Nawal Benabbou, Mithun Chakraborty, Edith Elkind, Yair Zick | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | IJCAI 2019 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| The Price of Fairness for Indivisible Goods | Xiaohui Bei, Xinhang Lu, Pasin Manurangsi, Warut Suksompong | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | IJCAI 2019 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ijcai-2019-1024 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2019-1030 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ijcai-2019-1035 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2020-0013 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| Fair Division of Time: Multi-layered Cake Cutting | Hadi Hosseini, Ayumi Igarashi, Andrew Searns | Fair Allocation · Cake Cutting | IJCAI 2020 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ijcai-2020-0040 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ijcai-2020-0041 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2020-0047 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2020-0051 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ijcai-2020-0061 | unclassified | ? | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2020-0072 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2020-0124 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2020-0127 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2020-0254 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2020-0257 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ijcai-2020-0297 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2020-0312 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| PeerNomination: Relaxing Exactness for Increased Accuracy in Peer Selection | Nicholas Mattei, P. Turrini, Stanislav Zhydkov | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | IJCAI 2020 | – | – | triple | |
| d4-conf-ijcai-2020-0397 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2020-0421 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ijcai-2020-0448 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ijcai-2020-0508 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2020-0511 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2020-0518 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| The Complexity of Election Problems with Group-Separable Preferences | Piotr Faliszewski, A. Karpov, S. Obraztsova | Voting · Structured Preferences | IJCAI 2020 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| d4-conf-ijcai-2020-0592 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ijcai-2020-0622 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ijcai-2020-0672 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2020-0676 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2020-0684 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ijcai-2020-0694 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ijcai-2020-0724 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ijcai-2020-0769 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2020-0789 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2020-0821 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ijcai-2021-0008 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2021-0014 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Guaranteeing Maximin Shares: Some Agents Left Behind | Hadi Hosseini, Andrew Searns | Fair Allocation · Shares & Guarantees | IJCAI 2021 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| d4-conf-ijcai-2021-0026 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ijcai-2021-0037 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ijcai-2021-0045 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2021-0047 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2021-0055 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Improving Welfare in One-Sided Matchings using Simple Threshold Queries | Thomas L. Ma, Vijay Menon, Kate Larson | Fair Allocation · Fair Division Theory | IJCAI 2021 | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ijcai-2021-0063 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | ↗ | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ijcai-2021-0071 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| Two-Sided Matching Meets Fair Division | Rupert Freeman, Evi Micha, Nisarg Shah | Fair Allocation · Fair Division Theory | IJCAI 2021 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| d4-conf-ijcai-2021-0126 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ijcai-2021-0150 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2021-0156 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ijcai-2021-0181 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2021-0184 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| The Parameterized Complexity of Connected Fair Division | Argyrios Deligkas, E. Eiben, R. Ganian, Thekla Hamm, S. Ordyniak | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | IJCAI 2021 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| d4-conf-ijcai-2021-0227 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| Putting a Compass on the Map of Elections | N. Boehmer, Robert Bredereck, Piotr Faliszewski, R. Niedermeier, Stanislaw Szufa | Voting · Voting Theory & Axioms | IJCAI 2021 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| d4-conf-ijcai-2021-0267 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2021-0271 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2021-0300 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2021-0312 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ijcai-2021-0313 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Almost Envy-Freeness for Groups: Improved Bounds via Discrepancy Theory | Pasin Manurangsi, Warut Suksompong | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | IJCAI 2021 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| d4-conf-ijcai-2021-0331 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2021-0340 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2021-0351 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2021-0372 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ijcai-2021-0375 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ijcai-2021-0376 | unclassified | ? | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2021-0385 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2021-0403 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2021-0409 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ijcai-2021-0414 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ijcai-2021-0456 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2021-0459 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| Fair and Efficient Resource Allocation with Partial Information | Daniel Halpern, Nisarg Shah | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | IJCAI 2021 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| Dynamic Proportional Rankings | Jonas Israel, Markus Brill | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | IJCAI 2021 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| d4-conf-ijcai-2021-0588 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| Winner Robustness via Swap- and Shift-Bribery: Parameterized Counting Complexity and Experiments | N. Boehmer, Robert Bredereck, Piotr Faliszewski, R. Niedermeier | Voting · Bribery & Control | IJCAI 2021 | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof |
| d4-conf-ijcai-2021-0609 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2021-0616 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2021-0641 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2021-0652 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2021-0669 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Shortlisting Rules and Incentives in an End-to-End Model for Participatory Budgeting | Simon Rey, U. Endriss, Ronald de Haan | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Participatory Budgeting | IJCAI 2021 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| d4-conf-ijcai-2021-0743 | unclassified | ? | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| Budget-feasible Maximum Nash Social Welfare is Almost Envy-free | Xiaowei Wu, Bo Li, Jiarui Gan | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | IJCAI 2021 | – | – | triple | |
| Picking Sequences and Monotonicity in Weighted Fair Division | Mithun Chakraborty, Ulrike Schmidt-Kraepelin, Warut Suksompong | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | IJCAI 2021 | – | – | triple | |
| d4-conf-ijcai-2021-0778 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | ↗ | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ijcai-2022-0014 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2022-0058 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2022-0127 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2022-0198 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2022-0221 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ijcai-2022-0255 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2022-0304 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ijcai-2022-0323 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2022-0418 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ijcai-2022-0477 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2022-0484 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ijcai-2022-0504 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2022-0511 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ijcai-2022-0515 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2022-0516 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2022-0529 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Fixing Knockout Tournaments With Seeds | Pasin Manurangsi, Warut Suksompong | Frontier · Knockout Tournaments | IJCAI 2022 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| d4-conf-ijcai-2022-0605 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2022-0818 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2022-0912 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| An EF2X Allocation Protocol for Restricted Additive Valuations | Hannaneh Akrami, Rojin Rezvan, Masoud Seddighin | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | IJCAI 2022 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| d4-conf-ijcai-2022-0973 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2023-0066 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-ijcai-2023-0382 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2023-0394 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2023-0506 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2023-0795 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2023-0852 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2024-0201 | unclassified | ? | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2024-0240 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2024-0540 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2024-0943 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2025-0037 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2025-0453 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2025-0711 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2025-0728 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-ijcai-2025-0778 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-sagt-2009-0026 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-sagt-2009-0030 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-sagt-2010-0002 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-sagt-2010-0009 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-sagt-2010-0020 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| Truthful Fair Division | Elchanan Mossel, O. Tamuz | Fair Allocation · Fair Division Theory | SAGT 2010 | ✓ | – | ↗ | triple proof |
| d4-conf-sagt-2011-0010 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-sagt-2011-0013 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-sagt-2011-0026 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-sagt-2012-0017 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-sagt-2012-0020 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-sagt-2013-0001 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-sagt-2013-0004 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-sagt-2013-0011 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| The Complexity of Fully Proportional Representation for Single-Crossing Electorates | P. Skowron, Lan Yu, Piotr Faliszewski, Edith Elkind | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | SAGT 2013 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| d4-conf-sagt-2014-0002 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-sagt-2014-0011 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| Social Welfare in One-Sided Matchings: Random Priority and Beyond | Aris Filos-Ratsikas, S. Frederiksen, Jie Zhang | Fair Allocation · Fair Division Theory | SAGT 2014 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| d4-conf-sagt-2014-0018 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-sagt-2014-0020 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-sagt-2014-0023 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-sagt-2014-0024 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-sagt-2015-0009 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-sagt-2015-0012 | unclassified | ? | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| d4-conf-sagt-2015-0015 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-sagt-2015-0021 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-sagt-2015-0022 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| Stable Marriage and Roommates Problems with Restricted Edges: Complexity and Approximability | Ágnes Cseh, D. Manlove | Coalition Formation · Matching under Preferences | SAGT 2015 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| d4-conf-sagt-2015-0026 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-sagt-2016-0007 | unclassified | ? | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| d4-conf-sagt-2016-0008 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-sagt-2016-0021 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| Stable Matching with Uncertain Linear Preferences | H. Aziz, P. Biró, Serge Gaspers, Ronald de Haan, Nicholas Mattei, B. Rastegari | Coalition Formation · Matching under Preferences | SAGT 2016 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| Tradeoffs Between Information and Ordinal Approximation for Bipartite Matching | Elliot Anshelevich, Wennan Zhu | Coalition Formation · Matching under Preferences | SAGT 2017 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| Robustness Among Multiwinner Voting Rules | Robert Bredereck, Piotr Faliszewski, Andrzej Kaczmarczyk, R. Niedermeier, P. Skowron, Nimrod Talmon | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | SAGT 2017 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| d4-conf-sagt-2017-0006 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Fairly Allocating Contiguous Blocks of Indivisible Items | Warut Suksompong | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | SAGT 2017 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| Stable Marriage with Covering Constraints-A Complete Computational Trichotomy | Matthias Mnich, Ildikó Schlotter | Coalition Formation · Matching under Preferences | SAGT 2017 | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | |
| The Complexity of Cake Cutting with Unequal Shares | Ágnes Cseh, T. Fleiner | Fair Allocation · Cake Cutting | SAGT 2018 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| d4-conf-sagt-2018-0007 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-sagt-2018-0017 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-sagt-2018-0021 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-sagt-2018-0026 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| The Convergence of Iterative Delegations in Liquid Democracy in a Social Network | B. Escoffier, Hugo Gilbert, Adèle Pass-Lanneau | Frontier · Opinion Diffusion & Networks | SAGT 2019 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| d4-conf-sagt-2019-0004 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-sagt-2019-0005 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-sagt-2019-0012 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| The Distortion of Distributed Voting | Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Evi Micha, A. Voudouris | Voting · Distortion | SAGT 2019 | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof |
| d4-conf-sagt-2019-0023 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-sagt-2019-0024 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-sagt-2020-0003 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-sagt-2020-0010 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-sagt-2020-0011 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-sagt-2020-0012 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| Bribery and Control in Stable Marriage | N. Boehmer, Robert Bredereck, Klaus Heeger, R. Niedermeier | Coalition Formation · Matching under Preferences | SAGT 2020 | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | |
| Finding Fair and Efficient Allocations When Valuations Don't Add Up | Nawal Benabbou, Mithun Chakraborty, Ayumi Igarashi, Yair Zick | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | SAGT 2020 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| d4-conf-sagt-2020-0017 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-sagt-2020-0020 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-sagt-2020-0021 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-sagt-2021-0001 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-sagt-2021-0002 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-sagt-2021-0003 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-sagt-2021-0006 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-sagt-2021-0007 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Metric-Distortion Bounds Under Limited Information | Ioannis Anagnostides, Dimitris Fotakis, Panagiotis Patsilinakos | Voting · Distortion | SAGT 2021 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| d4-conf-sagt-2021-0014 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| Approximate Mechanism Design for Distributed Facility Location | Aris Filos-Ratsikas, A. Voudouris | Voting · Distortion | SAGT 2021 | – | – | triple | |
| d4-conf-sagt-2021-0017 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-sagt-2021-0018 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-sagt-2021-0020 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-sagt-2021-0023 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-sagt-2021-0026 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-sagt-2021-0027 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-sagt-2021-0029 | unclassified | ? | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| d4-conf-sagt-2022-0003 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-sagt-2022-0007 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-sagt-2022-0008 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-sagt-2022-0010 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-sagt-2022-0018 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-sagt-2022-0019 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-sagt-2022-0021 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-sagt-2022-0022 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-sagt-2022-0023 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-sagt-2023-0001 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-sagt-2023-0003 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| The Frontier of Intractability for EFX with Two Agents | Paul W Goldberg, Kasper Høgh, Alexandros Hollender | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | SAGT 2023 | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-sagt-2023-0006 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-sagt-2023-0008 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-sagt-2023-0010 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-sagt-2023-0012 | unclassified | ? | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| d4-conf-sagt-2023-0015 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-sagt-2023-0017 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| EFX Allocations for Indivisible Chores: Matching-Based Approach | Yusuke Kobayashi, Ryoga Mahara, Souta Sakamoto | Fair Allocation · Chores, Online & Dynamic | SAGT 2023 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| d4-conf-sagt-2023-0023 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-sagt-2023-0025 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-sagt-2024-0001 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Fair Division with Bounded Sharing: Binary and Non-degenerate Valuations | Samuel Bismuth, I. Bliznets, Erel Segal-Halevi | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | SAGT 2024 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| d4-conf-sagt-2024-0004 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-sagt-2024-0006 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-sagt-2024-0008 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-sagt-2024-0011 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Fair Division of Chores with Budget Constraints | Edith Elkind, Ayumi Igarashi, Nicholas J. Teh | Fair Allocation · Chores, Online & Dynamic | SAGT 2024 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| d4-conf-sagt-2024-0014 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-sagt-2024-0015 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-sagt-2024-0017 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-sagt-2024-0018 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-sagt-2024-0023 | unclassified | ? | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| d4-conf-sagt-2024-0025 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| Distortion of Multi-winner Elections on the Line Metric: The Polar Comparison Rule | Negar Babashah, Hasti Karimi, Masoud Seddighin, Golnoosh Shahkarami | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | SAGT 2025 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-sagt-2025-0003 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| When is Truthfully Allocating Chores No Harder Than Goods? | Bo Li, Biaoshuai Tao, Fang-Xiao Wang, Xiao-Wei Wu, Mingwei Yang, Shengwei Zhou | Fair Allocation · Chores, Online & Dynamic | SAGT 2025 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| Metric Distortion Under Group-Fair Objectives | Georgios Amanatidis, Elliot Anshelevich, Christopher Jerrett, A. Voudouris | Voting · Distortion | SAGT 2025 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-sagt-2025-0008 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| Fairness Under Equal-Sized Bundles: Impossibility Results and Approximation Guarantees | Alviona Mancho, E. Markakis, Nicos Protopapas | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | SAGT 2025 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-sagt-2025-0010 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| Online Fair Division for Personalized 2-Value Instances | Georgios Amanatidis, Alexandros Lolos, E. Markakis, Victor Turmel | Fair Allocation · Chores, Online & Dynamic | SAGT 2025 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| Tractable Graph Structures in EFX Orientation | Václav Blazej, Sushmita Gupta, M. Ramanujan, Peter Strulo | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | SAGT 2025 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| d4-conf-sagt-2025-0018 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-sagt-2025-0021 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-sagt-2025-0022 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-sigecom-1999-0016 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-sigecom-2000-0017 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| Towards a universal test suite for combinatorial auction algorithms not comsoc | Kevin Leyton-Brown, Mark Pearson, Y. Shoham | unclassified | SIGECOM 2000 | – | – | triple | |
| Computationally feasible VCG mechanisms not comsoc | Noam Nisan, A. Ronen | unclassified | SIGECOM 2000 | – | ✓ | triple | |
| d4-conf-sigecom-2001-0028 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| Combinatorial auctions with decreasing marginal utilities not comsoc | B. Lehmann, D. Lehmann, Noam Nisan | unclassified | SIGECOM 2001 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| d4-conf-sigecom-2001-0032 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-sigecom-2003-0005 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-sigecom-2003-0023 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-sigecom-2003-0036 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-sigecom-2003-0051 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| On approximately fair allocations of indivisible goods | R. Lipton, E. Markakis, Elchanan Mossel, A. Saberi | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | SIGECOM 2004 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-sigecom-2004-0042 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-sigecom-2005-0010 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-sigecom-2005-0019 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-sigecom-2006-0001 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-sigecom-2006-0023 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| Mechanisms for multi-unit auctions not comsoc | Shahar Dobzinski, Noam Nisan | unclassified | SIGECOM 2007 | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof |
| d4-conf-sigecom-2007-0010 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-sigecom-2007-0021 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-sigecom-2007-0040 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-sigecom-2007-0041 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| Generalized scoring rules and the frequency of coalitional manipulability | Lirong Xia, Vincent Conitzer | Voting · Manipulation | SIGECOM 2008 | – | – | triple | |
| d4-conf-sigecom-2008-0010 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-sigecom-2008-0016 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| A sufficient condition for voting rules to be frequently manipulable | Lirong Xia, Vincent Conitzer | Voting · Manipulation | SIGECOM 2008 | – | – | triple | |
| d4-conf-sigecom-2009-0001 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-sigecom-2009-0016 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| Truthful assignment without money | S. Dughmi, Arpita Ghosh | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | SIGECOM 2010 | – | ✓ | triple | |
| d4-conf-sigecom-2010-0017 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-sigecom-2010-0018 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-sigecom-2010-0020 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-sigecom-2010-0032 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-sigecom-2010-0033 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-sigecom-2010-0040 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Equilibria of plurality voting with abstentions | Y. Desmedt, Edith Elkind | Voting · Manipulation | SIGECOM 2010 | – | ✓ | triple | |
| d4-conf-sigecom-2010-0043 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-sigecom-2011-0005 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| A truthful randomized mechanism for combinatorial public projects via convex optimization | S. Dughmi | Coalition Formation · Weighted Voting Games | SIGECOM 2011 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| d4-conf-sigecom-2011-0022 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-sigecom-2011-0028 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| Payment rules through discriminant-based classifiers not comsoc | Paul Dütting, Felix A. Fischer, Pichayut Jirapinyo, John K. Lai, Benjamin Lubin, D. Parkes | unclassified | SIGECOM 2012 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-sigecom-2012-0024 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-sigecom-2012-0028 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-sigecom-2012-0031 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-sigecom-2012-0032 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Clone structures in voters' preferences | Edith Elkind, Piotr Faliszewski, A. Slinko | Voting · Structured Preferences | SIGECOM 2012 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| d4-conf-sigecom-2012-0055 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-sigecom-2012-0063 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| The computational complexity of truthfulness in combinatorial auctions not comsoc | Shahar Dobzinski, J. Vondrák | unclassified | SIGECOM 2012 | – | ✓ | triple | |
| d4-conf-sigecom-2012-0070 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-sigecom-2013-0006 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-sigecom-2013-0008 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Strategyproof facility location for concave cost functions | Dimitris Fotakis, Christos Tzamos | Coalition Formation · Weighted Voting Games | SIGECOM 2013 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-sigecom-2013-0026 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-sigecom-2013-0027 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Two-sided matching with partial information | B. Rastegari, A. Condon, N. Immorlica, Kevin Leyton-Brown | Coalition Formation · Matching under Preferences | SIGECOM 2013 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| d4-conf-sigecom-2013-0052 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| Mechanism design for fair division: allocating divisible items without payments | R. Cole, Vasilis Gkatzelis, G. Goel | Fair Allocation · Markets & Equilibria | SIGECOM 2013 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-sigecom-2013-0062 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-wine-2005-0083 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-wine-2007-0024 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-wine-2008-0014 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-wine-2008-0015 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-wine-2008-0054 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-wine-2008-0064 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-wine-2009-0011 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-wine-2009-0022 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-wine-2009-0052 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-wine-2009-0061 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| Approximation Algorithms for Campaign Management | Edith Elkind, Piotr Faliszewski | Voting · Bribery & Control | WINE 2010 | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-wine-2010-0027 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-wine-2010-0037 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-wine-2010-0052 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-wine-2011-0007 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-wine-2011-0028 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-wine-2012-0009 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-wine-2012-0011 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-wine-2012-0015 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-wine-2012-0017 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-wine-2012-0026 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Incentive Compatible Two Player Cake Cutting | Avishay Maya, Noam Nisan | Fair Allocation · Cake Cutting | WINE 2012 | – | – | triple | |
| d4-conf-wine-2012-0035 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| Group Activity Selection Problem | Andreas Darmann, Edith Elkind, Sascha Kurz, J. Lang, Joachim Schauer, G. Woeginger | Coalition Formation · Hedonic Games | WINE 2012 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| d4-conf-wine-2013-0002 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-wine-2013-0010 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-wine-2013-0029 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-wine-2013-0032 | unclassified | ? | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| d4-conf-wine-2014-0004 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-wine-2014-0010 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-wine-2014-0012 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-wine-2014-0014 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-wine-2014-0017 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-wine-2014-0031 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| Cake Cutting Algorithms for Piecewise Constant and Piecewise Uniform Valuations | H. Aziz, Chun Ye | Fair Allocation · Cake Cutting | WINE 2014 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| d4-conf-wine-2014-0033 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Truthful Approximations to Range Voting | Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Peter Bro Miltersen | Voting · Manipulation | WINE 2014 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-wine-2014-0039 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-wine-2014-0040 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| Computing Stable Coalitions: Approximation Algorithms for Reward Sharing | Elliot Anshelevich, Shreyas Sekar | Coalition Formation · Hedonic Games | WINE 2015 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| d4-conf-wine-2015-0006 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-wine-2015-0007 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-wine-2015-0011 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-wine-2015-0012 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-wine-2015-0015 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-wine-2015-0019 | unclassified | ? | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| d4-conf-wine-2015-0020 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-wine-2015-0023 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-wine-2016-0001 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-wine-2016-0015 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-wine-2016-0016 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-wine-2016-0021 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-wine-2016-0024 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-wine-2016-0025 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| The Core of the Participatory Budgeting Problem | Brandon Fain, Ashish Goel, Kamesh Munagala | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Participatory Budgeting | WINE 2016 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-wine-2016-0031 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Truthful Facility Assignment with Resource Augmentation: An Exact Analysis of Serial Dictatorship | I. Caragiannis, Aris Filos-Ratsikas, S. Frederiksen, Kristoffer Arnsfelt Hansen, Zihan Tan | Fair Allocation · Fair Division Theory | WINE 2016 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-wine-2017-0007 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-wine-2017-0009 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-wine-2017-0013 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-wine-2017-0027 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| Sequential Deliberation for Social Choice | Brandon Fain, Ashish Goel, Kamesh Munagala, Sukolsak Sakshuwong | Voting · Distortion | WINE 2017 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-wine-2017-0030 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-wine-2018-0003 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| The Fair Division of Hereditary Set Systems | Zhen-Tao Li, A. Vetta | Fair Allocation · Shares & Guarantees | WINE 2018 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-wine-2018-0013 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-wine-2018-0014 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-wine-2018-0016 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-wine-2018-0017 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-wine-2018-0022 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-wine-2018-0027 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Ordinal Approximation for Social Choice, Matching, and Facility Location Problems Given Candidate Positions | Elliot Anshelevich, Wennan Zhu | Voting · Distortion | WINE 2018 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-wine-2018-0032 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| The Fluid Mechanics of Liquid Democracy | Paul Gölz, Anson Kahng, Simon Mackenzie, Ariel D. Procaccia | Voting · Voting Theory & Axioms | WINE 2018 | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof |
| The Capacity Constrained Facility Location Problem | H. Aziz, Hau Chan, Barton E. Lee, D. Parkes | Voting · Manipulation | WINE 2019 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| Awareness of Voter Passion Greatly Improves the Distortion of Metric Social Choice | Ben Abramowitz, Elliot Anshelevich, Wennan Zhu | Voting · Distortion | WINE 2019 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| d4-conf-wine-2019-0016 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| Fair and Efficient Cake Division with Connected Pieces | E. Arunachaleswaran, Siddharth Barman, Rachitesh Kumar, Nidhi Rathi | Fair Allocation · Cake Cutting | WINE 2019 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| d4-conf-wine-2019-0024 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-wine-2019-0028 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-wine-2019-0031 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-wine-2019-0032 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| Fair Division with Binary Valuations: One Rule to Rule Them All | Daniel Halpern, Ariel D. Procaccia, Alexandros Psomas, Nisarg Shah | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | WINE 2020 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| Consensus Halving for Sets of Items | P. Goldberg, Alexandros Hollender, Ayumi Igarashi, Pasin Manurangsi, Warut Suksompong | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | WINE 2020 | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-wine-2020-0007 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| A Fine-Grained View on Stable Many-To-One Matching Problems with Lower and Upper Quotas | N. Boehmer, Klaus Heeger | Coalition Formation · Matching under Preferences | WINE 2020 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| d4-conf-wine-2020-0010 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-wine-2020-0011 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-wine-2020-0017 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-wine-2020-0023 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | ↗ | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-wine-2020-0026 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-wine-2020-0027 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-wine-2020-0029 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-wine-2020-0030 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| Simultaneously Achieving Ex-ante and Ex-post Fairness | H. Aziz | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | WINE 2020 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| d4-conf-wine-2020-0039 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-wine-2020-0042 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-wine-2021-0001 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-wine-2021-0003 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-wine-2021-0009 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Allocating Indivisible Goods to Strategic Agents: Pure Nash Equilibria and Fairness | Georgios Amanatidis, Georgios Birmpas, Federico Fusco, Philip Lazos, S. Leonardi, Rebecca Reiffenhauser | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | WINE 2021 | – | – | triple | |
| A Tight Negative Example for MMS Fair Allocations | U. Feige, Ariel Sapir, Laliv Tauber | Fair Allocation · Shares & Guarantees | WINE 2021 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| Funding Public Projects: A Case for the Nash Product Rule | F. Brandl, F. Brandt, Matthias Greger, Dominik Peters, C. Stricker, Warut Suksompong | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Participatory Budgeting | WINE 2021 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| Computing Envy-Freeable Allocations with Limited Subsidies | I. Caragiannis, S. Ioannidis | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | WINE 2021 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| d4-conf-wine-2021-0016 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-wine-2021-0022 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-wine-2021-0023 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-wine-2021-0027 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| Approximating Nash Social Welfare Under Binary XOS and Binary Subadditive Valuations | Siddharth Barman, Paritosh Verma | Fair Allocation · Markets & Equilibria | WINE 2021 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| The Core of Housing Markets from an Agent's Perspective: Is It Worth Sprucing Up Your Home? | Ildikó Schlotter, Péter Biró, T. Fleiner | Coalition Formation · Matching under Preferences | WINE 2021 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| The Distortion of Distributed Metric Social Choice | Elliot Anshelevich, Aris Filos-Ratsikas, A. Voudouris | Voting · Distortion | WINE 2021 | – | – | triple | |
| d4-conf-wine-2021-0041 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| On Best-of-Both-Worlds Fair-Share Allocations | Moshe Babaioff, T. Ezra, U. Feige | Fair Allocation · Shares & Guarantees | WINE 2022 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| Strategyproof and Proportionally Fair Facility Location | H. Aziz, Alexa Lam, Barton E. Lee, T. Walsh | Fair Allocation · Fair Division Theory | WINE 2022 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-wine-2022-0017 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-wine-2022-0018 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-wine-2022-0019 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-wine-2022-0023 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-wine-2022-0026 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| Auditing for Core Stability in Participatory Budgeting | Kamesh Munagala, Yiheng Shen, Kangning Wang | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Participatory Budgeting | WINE 2022 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| Core-Stable Committees Under Restricted Domains | Grzegorz Pierczy'nski, P. Skowron | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | WINE 2022 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| d4-conf-wine-2022-0035 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-wine-2022-0037 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-wine-2023-0001 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-wine-2023-0005 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| A Mechanism for Participatory Budgeting with Funding Constraints and Project Interactions | Mohak Goyal, Sahasrajit Sarmasarkar, Ashish Goel | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Participatory Budgeting | WINE 2023 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| d4-conf-wine-2023-0007 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-wine-2023-0009 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | ↘* | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-wine-2023-0010 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-wine-2023-0011 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-wine-2023-0014 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | ↗ | triple proof | |
| The Good, the Bad and the Submodular: Fairly Allocating Mixed Manna Under Order-Neutral Submodular Preferences | Cyrus Cousins, V. Viswanathan, Yair Zick | Fair Allocation · Chores, Online & Dynamic | WINE 2023 | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof |
| d4-conf-wine-2023-0022 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-wine-2023-0024 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | ↗ | triple proof | |
| Fair Division with Allocator's Preference | Xiao-Lin Bu, Zihao Li, Shengxin Liu, Jia-Xin Song, Biaoshuai Tao | Fair Allocation · Fair Division Theory | WINE 2023 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| d4-conf-wine-2023-0031 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-wine-2023-0032 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-wine-2023-0033 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-wine-2024-0001 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-wine-2024-0002 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Best-of-Both-Worlds Fair Allocation of Indivisible and Mixed Goods | Xiao-Lin Bu, Zihao Li, Shengxin Liu, Xinhang Lu, Biaoshuai Tao | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | WINE 2024 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-wine-2024-0004 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| Fair and Almost Truthful Mechanisms for Additive Valuations and Beyond | Biaoshuai Tao, Mingwei Yang | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | WINE 2024 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-wine-2024-0008 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-wine-2024-0015 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-wine-2024-0017 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-wine-2024-0018 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-wine-2024-0020 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-wine-2024-0022 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| Tree Splitting Based Rounding Scheme for Weighted Proportional Allocations with Subsidy | Xiao-Wei Wu, Shengwei Zhou | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | WINE 2024 | ✓ | – | ↗ | triple proof |
| d4-conf-wine-2024-0025 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| Strategic Facility Location via Predictions | Qingyun Chen, Nick Gravin, Sung-Jin Im | Coalition Formation · Weighted Voting Games | WINE 2024 | – | – | triple | |
| Almost Envy-Free Allocation of Indivisible Goods: A Tale of Two Valuations | Alireza Kaviani, Masoud Seddighin, A. Shahrezaei | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | WINE 2024 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| On Pareto-Optimal and Fair Allocations with Personalized Bi-Valued Utilities | Jiarong Jin, Biaoshuai Tao | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | WINE 2025 | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof |
| d4-conf-wine-2025-0007 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| Justified Representation: From Hare to Droop | M. Casey, Edith Elkind | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | WINE 2025 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| Fair Metric Distortion for Matching with Preferences | Jabari Hastings, Prasanna Ramakrishnan | Voting · Distortion | WINE 2025 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-wine-2025-0015 | unclassified | ? | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| d4-conf-wine-2025-0017 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-wine-2025-0018 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-wine-2025-0024 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| d4-conf-wine-2025-0026 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Improved Approximate EFX Guarantees for Multigraphs | Alireza Kaviani, Alireza Keshavarz, Masoud Seddighin, A. Shahrezaei | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | WINE 2025 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| d4-conf-wine-2025-0032 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-conf-wine-2025-0038 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| A Polynomial-Time Algorithm for Fair and Efficient Allocation with a Fixed Number of Agents | Ryoga Mahara | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | WINE 2025 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| d4-journals-ai-2011-0044 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| On the complexity of core, kernel, and bargaining set | G. Greco, Enrico Malizia, L. Palopoli, Francesco Scarcello | Coalition Formation · Weighted Voting Games | AI 2011 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| d4-journals-ai-2011-0074 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-journals-ai-2013-0052 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| The complexity of manipulative attacks in nearly single-peaked electorates | Piotr Faliszewski, E. Hemaspaandra, Lane A. Hemaspaandra | Voting · Structured Preferences | AI 2014 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| d4-journals-ai-2014-0036 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| Achieving fully proportional representation: Approximability results | P. Skowron, Piotr Faliszewski, A. Slinko | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | AI 2015 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| d4-journals-ai-2015-0031 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Iterative voting and acyclic games | R. Meir, M. Polukarov, J. Rosenschein, N. Jennings | Voting · Manipulation | AI 2017 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| d4-journals-ai-2017-0053 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-ai-2017-0060 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Computing a small agreeable set of indivisible items | Pasin Manurangsi, Warut Suksompong | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AI 2019 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| Complexity results for preference aggregation over (m)CP-nets: Pareto and majority voting | Thomas Lukasiewicz, Enrico Malizia | Frontier · Computer-Aided Methods & Data | AI 2019 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| d4-journals-ai-2019-0027 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Cooperative games with overlapping coalitions: Charting the tractability frontier | Yair Zick, G. Chalkiadakis, Edith Elkind, E. Markakis | Coalition Formation · Weighted Voting Games | AI 2019 | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof |
| d4-journals-ai-2020-0098 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-journals-ai-2022-0004 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-ai-2022-0041 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Margin of victory for tournament solutions | Markus Brill, Ulrike Schmidt-Kraepelin, Warut Suksompong | Voting · Tournament Solutions | AI 2022 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| d4-journals-ai-2023-0028 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| d4-journals-ai-2023-0083 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-ai-2024-0029 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-ai-2024-0035 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| d4-journals-ai-2024-0048 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| Drawing a map of elections | Stanislaw Szufa, N. Boehmer, Robert Bredereck, Piotr Faliszewski, Rolf Niedermeier, P. Skowron et al. | Voting · Voting Theory & Axioms | AI 2025 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| The incentive guarantees behind Nash welfare in divisible resources allocation | Xiaohui Bei, Biaoshuai Tao, Jiajun Wu, Mingwei Yang | Fair Allocation · Cake Cutting | AI 2025 | – | – | triple | |
| d4-journals-ai-2025-0087 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-ai-2026-0066 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-journals-geb-2001-0020 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2001-0037 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2001-0053 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2002-0015 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2002-0028 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2002-0039 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2003-0011 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2003-0018 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2003-0033 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2004-0005 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2004-0066 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2004-0069 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2004-0081 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Bundling equilibrium in combinatorial auctions not comsoc | R. Holzman, Noa E. Kfir-Dahav, Dov Monderer, Moshe Tennenholtz | unclassified | GEB 2004 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| d4-journals-geb-2005-0007 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2005-0045 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2005-0049 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2005-0059 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2006-0019 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2006-0041 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2006-0052 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2006-0068 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2007-0035 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2007-0037 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2007-0049 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2007-0052 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2007-0081 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-journals-geb-2008-0007 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2008-0027 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2008-0066 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2008-0068 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2008-0077 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2008-0117 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2008-0120 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2009-0049 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-journals-geb-2009-0058 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2009-0070 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2009-0121 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2009-0141 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2010-0062 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2010-0077 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2010-0116 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Spread of (mis)information in social networks not comsoc | D. Acemoğlu, A. Ozdaglar, Ali ParandehGheibi | unclassified | GEB 2010 | – | – | triple | |
| d4-journals-geb-2011-0036 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2011-0060 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2011-0083 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2011-0084 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2011-0095 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2012-0016 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2012-0060 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2012-0062 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2012-0082 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2012-0104 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2012-0156 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2012-0158 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2012-0161 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2013-0046 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2013-0049 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2013-0051 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2013-0056 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2013-0062 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2013-0080 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2013-0107 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2014-0005 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2014-0010 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2014-0020 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2014-0032 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2014-0039 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2014-0066 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2014-0089 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2015-0009 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Limitations of randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions not comsoc | S. Dughmi, Jan Vondr'k | unclassified | GEB 2015 | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | |
| d4-journals-geb-2015-0047 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2015-0050 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2015-0052 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2015-0055 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2015-0073 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| How bad is forming your own opinion? not comsoc | D. Bindel, J. Kleinberg, Sigal Oren | unclassified | GEB 2015 | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof |
| d4-journals-geb-2015-0099 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-journals-geb-2015-0100 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2016-0004 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2016-0022 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2016-0041 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2016-0062 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2016-0070 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2016-0075 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2016-0079 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2016-0088 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2016-0100 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2017-0002 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2017-0021 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2017-0041 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2017-0044 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-journals-geb-2017-0062 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2017-0069 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2017-0078 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-journals-geb-2017-0111 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2017-0116 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2017-0124 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2017-0130 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2017-0138 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| The stable fixtures problem with payments | P. Biró, W. Kern, D. Paulusma, Péter Wojuteczky | Coalition Formation · Matching under Preferences | GEB 2018 | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof |
| d4-journals-geb-2018-0031 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2018-0042 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2018-0061 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2018-0071 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2018-0075 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2018-0094 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2018-0114 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2018-0139 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2018-0147 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2018-0151 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2019-0006 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2019-0015 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| A stable marriage requires communication | Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Noam Nisan, R. Ostrovsky, Will Rosenbaum | Coalition Formation · Matching under Preferences | GEB 2019 | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | |
| d4-journals-geb-2019-0054 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2019-0077 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2019-0080 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2019-0087 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2019-0092 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2019-0106 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2019-0108 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2019-0123 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2019-0142 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2019-0152 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2019-0162 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2020-0003 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2020-0014 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2020-0025 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2020-0031 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-journals-geb-2020-0080 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2020-0090 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2020-0092 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2020-0100 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2020-0123 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2020-0128 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2021-0003 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2021-0021 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2021-0022 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2021-0031 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2021-0037 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| Slot-specific priorities with capacity transfers | Michelle Avataneo, Bertan Turhan | Fair Allocation · Markets & Equilibria | GEB 2021 | – | – | triple | |
| d4-journals-geb-2021-0059 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2021-0061 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2021-0083 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2021-0105 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2021-0118 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2022-0004 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2022-0015 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2022-0022 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2022-0025 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2022-0029 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2022-0034 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2022-0038 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-journals-geb-2022-0054 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2022-0057 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| The vigilant eating rule: A general approach for probabilistic economic design with constraints | H. Aziz, F. Brandl | Fair Allocation · Fair Division Theory | GEB 2022 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| d4-journals-geb-2022-0074 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-journals-geb-2022-0075 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2022-0090 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Almost envy-free allocations with connected bundles | V. Bilò, I. Caragiannis, M. Flammini, Ayumi Igarashi, G. Monaco, Dominik Peters et al. | Fair Allocation · Cake Cutting | GEB 2022 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| d4-journals-geb-2022-0124 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2023-0002 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2023-0037 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| The cost of strategy-proofness in school choice | J. Ortega, Thilo Klein | Coalition Formation · Matching under Preferences | GEB 2023 | – | – | triple | |
| d4-journals-geb-2023-0047 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2023-0054 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Unique stable matchings | G. Gutin, Philip R. Neary, Anders Yeo | Coalition Formation · Matching under Preferences | GEB 2023 | – | – | triple | |
| A taxonomy of non-dictatorial unidimensional domains | S. Chatterji, Huaxia Zeng | Voting · Structured Preferences | GEB 2023 | – | – | triple | |
| d4-journals-geb-2023-0066 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2023-0075 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2023-0079 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2023-0087 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2023-0118 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2023-0127 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2023-0130 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| Strategy-proof allocation with outside option | Jun Zhang | Voting · Manipulation | GEB 2023 | – | – | triple | |
| d4-journals-geb-2023-0153 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2024-0004 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2024-0024 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2024-0036 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-journals-geb-2024-0037 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2024-0058 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2024-0068 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2024-0078 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-journals-geb-2024-0083 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-journals-geb-2024-0085 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2024-0087 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2024-0088 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2024-0090 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2024-0097 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| d4-journals-geb-2024-0099 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2024-0100 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| A characterization of absorbing sets in coalition formation games | Agustín G. Bonifacio, E. Inarra, P. Neme | Coalition Formation · Hedonic Games | GEB 2024 | – | – | triple | |
| Respecting priorities versus respecting preferences in school choice: When is there a trade-off? | E. Cantillon, Li Chen, J. Pereyra | Fair Allocation · Markets & Equilibria | GEB 2024 | – | – | triple | |
| d4-journals-geb-2024-0134 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2024-0137 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2025-0004 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2025-0016 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Condorcet-consistent choice among three candidates | Felix Brandt, Chris Dong, Dominik Peters | Voting · Voting Theory & Axioms | GEB 2025 | – | – | triple | |
| d4-journals-geb-2025-0040 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2025-0050 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2025-0053 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| Matching with transfers under distributional constraints not comsoc | Devansh Jalota, Michael Ostrovsky, M. Pavone | unclassified | GEB 2025 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| d4-journals-geb-2025-0097 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Fair division with subjective divisibility | Xiaohui Bei, Shengxin Liu, Xinhang Lu | Fair Allocation · Shares & Guarantees | GEB 2025 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| d4-journals-geb-2026-0007 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2026-0010 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2026-0034 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2026-0036 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2026-0049 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2026-0050 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2026-0060 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-geb-2026-0062 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| Approximating competitive equilibrium by Nash welfare | J. Garg, Yixin Tao, László A. Végh | Fair Allocation · Markets & Equilibria | GEB 2026 | – | – | triple | |
| d4-journals-geb-2026-0095 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-jair-1993-0001 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-jair-1999-0008 | unclassified | ? | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| d4-journals-jair-2003-0017 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-journals-jair-2003-0026 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-journals-jair-2004-0002 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| CP-nets: A Tool for Representing and Reasoning with Conditional Ceteris Paribus Preference Statements not comsoc | Craig Boutilier, R. Brafman, C. Domshlak, H. Hoos, D. Poole | unclassified | JAIR 2004 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| d4-journals-jair-2005-0033 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-jair-2005-0038 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| On Graphical Modeling of Preference and Importance | R. Brafman, C. Domshlak, S. E. Shimony | Voting · Combinatorial Domains | JAIR 2006 | – | ✓ | triple | |
| d4-journals-jair-2006-0025 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-jair-2006-0027 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| Negotiating Socially Optimal Allocations of Resources | U. Endriss, N. Maudet, F. Sadri, Francesca Toni | Fair Allocation · Fair Division Theory | JAIR 2006 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| d4-journals-jair-2007-0012 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-journals-jair-2007-0016 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-journals-jair-2007-0022 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-journals-jair-2007-0030 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| The Strategy-Proofness Landscape of Merging not comsoc | Patricia Everaere, S. Konieczny, P. Marquis | unclassified | JAIR 2007 | – | – | triple | |
| d4-journals-jair-2008-0005 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| Complexity of Strategic Behavior in Multi-Winner Elections | R. Meir, Ariel D. Procaccia, J. Rosenschein, Aviv Zohar | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | JAIR 2008 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| ICE: An Expressive Iterative Combinatorial Exchange not comsoc | Benjamin Lubin, A. I. Juda, R. Cavallo, Sébastien Lahaie, Jeffrey Shneidman, D. Parkes | unclassified | JAIR 2008 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| d4-journals-jair-2008-0018 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| Efficiency and Envy-freeness in Fair Division of Indivisible Goods: Logical Representation and Complexity | S. Bouveret, Jérôme Lang | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | JAIR 2008 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| The Computational Complexity of Dominance and Consistency in CP-Nets | J. Goldsmith, J. Lang, M. Truszczynski, N. Wilson | Frontier · Computer-Aided Methods & Data | JAIR 2008 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| d4-journals-jair-2008-0038 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-jair-2008-0047 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-journals-jair-2009-0003 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| Llull and Copeland Voting Computationally Resist Bribery and Constructive Control | Piotr Faliszewski, E. Hemaspaandra, Lane A. Hemaspaandra, J. Rothe | Voting · Bribery & Control | JAIR 2009 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| d4-journals-jair-2009-0007 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| Mechanisms for Making Crowds Truthful | R. Jurca, B. Faltings | Frontier · Opinion Diffusion & Networks | JAIR 2009 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| An Anytime Algorithm for Optimal Coalition Structure Generation | Talal Rahwan, S. Ramchurn, N. Jennings, Andrea Giovannucci | Coalition Formation · Hedonic Games | JAIR 2009 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| How Hard Is Bribery in Elections? | Piotr Faliszewski, E. Hemaspaandra, Lane A. Hemaspaandra | Voting · Bribery & Control | JAIR 2009 | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof |
| d4-journals-jair-2010-0012 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-journals-jair-2010-0019 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| d4-journals-jair-2010-0026 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-journals-jair-2010-0031 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-journals-jair-2010-0032 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| Cooperative Games with Overlapping Coalitions | G. Chalkiadakis, Edith Elkind, E. Markakis, M. Polukarov, N. Jennings | Coalition Formation · Hedonic Games | JAIR 2010 | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof |
| d4-journals-jair-2011-0023 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| Automated Search for Impossibility Theorems in Social Choice Theory: Ranking Sets of Objects | Christian Geist, Ulrich Endriss | Voting · Voting Theory & Axioms | JAIR 2011 | – | – | triple | |
| Cloning in Elections: Finding the Possible Winners | Edith Elkind, Piotr Faliszewski, A. Slinko | Voting · Bribery & Control | JAIR 2011 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| Where Are the Hard Manipulation Problems? | T. Walsh | Voting · Manipulation | JAIR 2011 | – | ✓ | triple | |
| Determining Possible and Necessary Winners Given Partial Orders | Lirong Xia, Vincent Conitzer | Voting · Incomplete Information | JAIR 2011 | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof |
| False-Name Manipulations in Weighted Voting Games | H. Aziz, Yoram Bachrach, Edith Elkind, M. Paterson | Coalition Formation · Weighted Voting Games | JAIR 2011 | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof |
| d4-journals-jair-2011-0040 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-journals-jair-2011-0054 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| Complexity of Judgment Aggregation | U. Endriss, Umberto Grandi, Daniele Porello | Frontier · Judgment Aggregation | JAIR 2012 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| d4-journals-jair-2012-0023 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-jair-2012-0043 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| Sharing Rewards in Cooperative Connectivity Games | Yoram Bachrach, E. Porat, J. Rosenschein | Coalition Formation · Weighted Voting Games | JAIR 2013 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| d4-journals-jair-2013-0010 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| A Smooth Transition from Powerlessness to Absolute Power | Elchanan Mossel, Ariel D. Procaccia, Miklós Z. Rácz | Voting · Manipulation | JAIR 2013 | – | – | triple | |
| d4-journals-jair-2013-0025 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-journals-jair-2013-0026 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| d4-journals-jair-2013-0038 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| On the Computation of Fully Proportional Representation | Nadja Betzler, A. Slinko, Johannes Uhlmann | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | JAIR 2013 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| d4-journals-jair-2014-0005 | unclassified | ? | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| d4-journals-jair-2014-0011 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-jair-2014-0031 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Mechanisms for Fair Allocation Problems: No-Punishment Payment Rules in Verifiable Settings | G. Greco, Francesco Scarcello | Fair Allocation · Fair Division Theory | JAIR 2014 | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | |
| Possible and Necessary Winners of Partial Tournaments | H. Aziz, Markus Brill, Felix A. Fischer, Paul Harrenstein, J. Lang, Hans Georg Seedig | Voting · Incomplete Information | JAIR 2015 | – | ✓ | triple | |
| d4-journals-jair-2016-0007 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-jair-2016-0018 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| Convergence of Iterative Scoring Rules | Omer Lev, J. Rosenschein | Voting · Manipulation | JAIR 2016 | – | – | triple | |
| d4-journals-jair-2017-0001 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| Uniform Random Generation and Dominance Testing for CP-Nets | Thomas E. Allen, J. Goldsmith, Hayden Elizabeth Justice, Nicholas Mattei, Kayla Raines | Frontier · Computer-Aided Methods & Data | JAIR 2017 | – | – | triple | |
| d4-journals-jair-2017-0017 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-journals-jair-2017-0030 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-jair-2017-0044 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-journals-jair-2017-0057 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| d4-journals-jair-2018-0019 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-journals-jair-2018-0023 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| Nash Stable Outcomes in Fractional Hedonic Games: Existence, Efficiency and Computation | V. Bilò, Angelo Fanelli, M. Flammini, G. Monaco, Luca Moscardelli | Coalition Formation · Hedonic Games | JAIR 2018 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| d4-journals-jair-2018-0035 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-journals-jair-2018-0042 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| A Complexity Approach for Core-Selecting Exchange under Conditionally Lexicographic Preferences | E. Fujita, Julien Lesca, Akihisa Sonoda, Taiki Todo, M. Yokoo | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | JAIR 2018 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| d4-journals-jair-2018-0064 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| New Approximations for Coalitional Manipulation in Scoring Rules | Orgad Keller, Avinatan Hassidim, Noam Hazon | Voting · Manipulation | JAIR 2019 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| d4-journals-jair-2019-0034 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Strategic Abstention based on Preference Extensions: Positive Results and Computer-Generated Impossibilities | F. Brandl, F. Brandt, Christian Geist, Johannes Hofbauer | Voting · Manipulation | JAIR 2019 | – | – | triple | |
| Negotiable Votes | Umberto Grandi, Davide Grossi, P. Turrini | Voting · Manipulation | JAIR 2019 | – | ✓ | triple | |
| d4-journals-jair-2019-0047 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-journals-jair-2019-0059 | unclassified | ? | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| d4-journals-jair-2019-0073 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-journals-jair-2020-0003 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Fair Allocation with Diminishing Differences | Erel Segal-Halevi, Avinatan Hassidim, H. Aziz | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | JAIR 2020 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| The Complexity Landscape of Outcome Determination in Judgment Aggregation | Ulrich Endriss, Ronald de Haan, J. Lang, M. Slavkovik | Voting · Voting Theory & Axioms | JAIR 2020 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| Hedonic Games with Ordinal Preferences and Thresholds | Anna Maria Kerkmann, J. Lang, Anja Rey, J. Rothe, Hilmar Schadrack, Lena Schend | Coalition Formation · Hedonic Games | JAIR 2020 | – | ✓ | triple | |
| Strategyproof Mechanisms for Additively Separable and Fractional Hedonic Games | M. Flammini, Bojana Kodric, G. Monaco, Qiang Zhang | Coalition Formation · Hedonic Games | JAIR 2021 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| d4-journals-jair-2021-0005 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| On the Online Coalition Structure Generation Problem | M. Flammini, G. Monaco, Luca Moscardelli, Mordechai Shalom, S. Zaks | Coalition Formation · Hedonic Games | JAIR 2021 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| Aggregation over Metric Spaces: Proposing and Voting in Elections, Budgeting, and Legislation | L. Bulteau, Gal Shahaf, E. Shapiro, Nimrod Talmon | Voting · Distortion | JAIR 2021 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| d4-journals-jair-2021-0026 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Representative Committees of Peers | R. Meir, Fedor Sandomirskiy, Moshe Tennenholtz | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | JAIR 2021 | ✓ | – | ↘* | triple proof |
| Reasoning with PCP-Nets not comsoc | Cristina Cornelio, J. Goldsmith, Umberto Grandi, Nicholas Mattei, Francesca Rossi, K. Venable | unclassified | JAIR 2021 | – | – | triple | |
| d4-journals-jair-2021-0046 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-jair-2021-0057 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| d4-journals-jair-2022-0011 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| Learning to Design Fair and Private Voting Rules | Farhad Mohsin, Ao Liu, Pin-Yu Chen, Francesca Rossi, Lirong Xia | Voting · Voting Theory & Axioms | JAIR 2022 | – | – | triple | |
| d4-journals-jair-2022-0045 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-journals-jair-2022-0068 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| Preferences Single-Peaked on a Tree: Multiwinner Elections and Structural Results | Dominik Peters, Lan Yu, Hau Chan, Edith Elkind | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | JAIR 2022 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| Ordinal Maximin Share Approximation for Goods | Hadi Hosseini, Andrew Searns, Erel Segal-Halevi | Fair Allocation · Shares & Guarantees | JAIR 2022 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| Fair Division of Indivisible Goods for a Class of Concave Valuations | B. Chaudhury, Yun-Kuen Cheung, J. Garg, Naveen Garg, M. Hoefer, K. Mehlhorn | Fair Allocation · Markets & Equilibria | JAIR 2022 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| d4-journals-jair-2022-0112 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-journals-jair-2023-0006 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-journals-jair-2023-0022 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-journals-jair-2023-0023 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-journals-jair-2023-0036 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-jair-2023-0041 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| Improving Resource Allocations by Sharing in Pairs | Robert Bredereck, Andrzej Kaczmarczyk, Junjie Luo, Rolf Niedermeier, Florian Sachse | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | JAIR 2023 | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof |
| Your College Dorm and Dormmates: Fair Resource Sharing with Externalities | Jiarui Gan, Bo Li, Yingkai Li | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | JAIR 2023 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| d4-journals-jair-2023-0078 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-journals-jair-2023-0087 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-jair-2023-0090 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-jair-2023-0096 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-jair-2023-0097 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-jair-2024-0016 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-journals-jair-2024-0023 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Efficient and Fair Healthcare Rationing | Haris Aziz, F. Brandl | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | JAIR 2024 | ✓ | – | ↗ | triple proof |
| d4-journals-jair-2024-0043 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-journals-jair-2024-0044 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| d4-journals-jair-2024-0058 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| Declarative Approaches to Outcome Determination in Judgment Aggregation | Ari Conati, Andreas Niskanen, Matti Järvisalo | Voting · Weighted Tournaments | JAIR 2024 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| d4-journals-jair-2025-0023 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-journals-jair-2025-0030 | unclassified | ? | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| d4-journals-jair-2025-0038 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-journals-jair-2025-0053 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-jair-2025-0081 | unclassified | ? | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| d4-journals-jair-2025-0101 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-journals-jair-2026-0004 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-journals-jair-2026-0011 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-journals-jair-2026-0037 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-jair-2026-0049 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-journals-jair-2026-0058 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| d4-journals-jair-2026-0060 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-jair-2026-0068 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-journals-jet-2001-0001 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-jet-2001-0006 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-jet-2003-0019 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-jet-2003-0033 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-jet-2003-0044 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-jet-2003-0065 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-jet-2003-0085 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-jet-2004-0050 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-jet-2004-0054 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-journals-jet-2004-0061 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-jet-2004-0084 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-jet-2005-0009 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-jet-2005-0032 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-jet-2005-0045 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-jet-2005-0068 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-jet-2006-0002 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-jet-2006-0029 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-jet-2006-0056 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-jet-2006-0063 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-jet-2006-0064 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-jet-2006-0071 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-jet-2007-0007 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-jet-2007-0029 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-jet-2007-0043 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-journals-jet-2007-0106 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-jet-2007-0109 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-jet-2007-0117 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-jet-2007-0146 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-jet-2007-0155 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-jet-2007-0172 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-jet-2008-0003 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-jet-2009-0006 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-journals-jet-2009-0038 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-jet-2009-0052 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-journals-jet-2009-0070 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-jet-2009-0082 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-jet-2009-0098 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-jet-2010-0018 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-jet-2010-0026 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-jet-2010-0036 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-jet-2010-0102 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-jet-2011-0008 | unclassified | ? | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| d4-journals-jet-2011-0035 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-journals-jet-2011-0066 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-jet-2011-0095 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-jet-2011-0112 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-jet-2012-0071 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-jet-2012-0077 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-jet-2012-0107 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-journals-jet-2013-0016 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-jet-2013-0032 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-jet-2013-0045 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-jet-2013-0070 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-jet-2013-0082 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-jet-2013-0090 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-jet-2013-0109 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-journals-jet-2013-0112 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-jet-2014-0014 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-journals-jet-2014-0032 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-jet-2014-0059 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-jet-2014-0065 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-jet-2014-0072 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-jet-2014-0075 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-jet-2014-0097 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-jet-2015-0033 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-jet-2015-0046 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-jet-2015-0047 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-jet-2015-0063 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-jet-2015-0100 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-jet-2015-0119 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-journals-jet-2015-0131 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-journals-jet-2015-0138 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-jet-2016-0020 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-jet-2016-0043 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-jet-2016-0051 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-jet-2016-0064 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-jet-2016-0071 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-journals-jet-2016-0089 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-jet-2016-0104 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-journals-jet-2016-0106 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-jet-2017-0050 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-jet-2017-0072 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-jet-2017-0092 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Stable matching mechanisms are not obviously strategy-proof | I. Ashlagi, Yannai A. Gonczarowski | Frontier · Computer-Aided Methods & Data | JET 2018 | – | – | triple | |
| d4-journals-jet-2018-0051 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-jet-2018-0058 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-jet-2018-0059 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-journals-jet-2018-0096 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-jet-2018-0098 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-jet-2018-0116 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-jet-2019-0028 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Axiomatic characterization of committee scoring rules | P. Skowron, Piotr Faliszewski, A. Slinko | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | JET 2019 | – | – | triple | |
| d4-journals-jet-2019-0032 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-journals-jet-2019-0038 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-jet-2019-0095 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-jet-2020-0040 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-jet-2020-0057 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Dynamic reserves in matching markets not comsoc | Orhan Aygün, Bertan Turhan | unclassified | JET 2020 | – | – | triple | |
| d4-journals-jet-2020-0075 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-jet-2020-0100 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-jet-2020-0107 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-journals-jet-2021-0010 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-jet-2021-0044 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-jet-2021-0047 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| On the existence of Pareto Efficient and envy-free allocations | R. Cole, Yi-Xin Tao | Fair Allocation · Markets & Equilibria | JET 2021 | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | |
| d4-journals-jet-2021-0060 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-jet-2021-0074 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-jet-2021-0113 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| Pareto efficient combinatorial auctions: Dichotomous preferences without quasilinearity not comsoc | K. Malik, D. Mishra | unclassified | JET 2021 | – | – | triple | |
| d4-journals-jet-2021-0121 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Partial strategyproofness: Relaxing strategyproofness for the random assignment problem | Timo Mennle, Sven Seuken | Fair Allocation · Markets & Equilibria | JET 2021 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| d4-journals-jet-2021-0139 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-jet-2022-0015 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Interdistrict school choice: A theory of student assignment | I. Hafalir, Fuhito Kojima, M. Yenmez | Fair Allocation · Markets & Equilibria | JET 2022 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| d4-journals-jet-2022-0055 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-jet-2022-0084 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-jet-2022-0131 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Loss aversion in strategy-proof school-choice mechanisms | Vincent Meisner, Jonas von Wangenheim | Fair Allocation · Fair Division Theory | JET 2023 | – | – | triple | |
| d4-journals-jet-2023-0105 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-jet-2023-0106 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-journals-jet-2023-0117 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-jet-2023-0124 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Strategy-proof and envy-free mechanisms for house allocation | Priyanka Shende, M. Purohit | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | JET 2023 | – | – | triple | |
| d4-journals-jet-2023-0131 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-jet-2024-0023 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-jet-2024-0043 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-jet-2024-0050 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-jet-2024-0052 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Stable allocations in discrete exchange economies | F. Echenique, Sumit Goel, Sang-Mok Lee | Fair Allocation · Fair Division Theory | JET 2024 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| d4-journals-jet-2024-0090 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-jet-2025-0068 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-jet-2025-0075 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-journals-jet-2025-0080 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-jet-2025-0088 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-mss-2000-0003 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-mss-2001-0013 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-mss-2002-0001 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-journals-mss-2002-0037 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-mss-2002-0041 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-mss-2003-0010 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-mss-2003-0030 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-mss-2004-0011 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-mss-2004-0017 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-mss-2004-0026 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-mss-2004-0034 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-mss-2005-0008 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-mss-2005-0015 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-mss-2005-0028 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-mss-2006-0031 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-mss-2006-0036 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-mss-2006-0037 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-mss-2007-0032 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-mss-2007-0045 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-mss-2008-0021 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-mss-2008-0033 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-mss-2008-0038 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-mss-2008-0058 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-mss-2009-0016 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-mss-2009-0028 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-mss-2009-0031 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-mss-2010-0002 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-journals-mss-2010-0016 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-mss-2010-0051 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-mss-2011-0028 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-mss-2011-0047 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-mss-2012-0003 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-mss-2012-0017 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-mss-2012-0021 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-mss-2012-0025 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-mss-2012-0038 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-journals-mss-2012-0039 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Mathematical aspects of degressive proportionality | Wojciech Słomczyński, K. Życzkowski | Voting · Voting Theory & Axioms | MSS 2012 | – | – | triple | |
| d4-journals-mss-2012-0063 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-mss-2012-0067 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| d4-journals-mss-2013-0012 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-mss-2013-0031 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-journals-mss-2013-0067 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-journals-mss-2014-0028 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-mss-2014-0031 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-mss-2014-0045 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-journals-mss-2014-0050 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-journals-mss-2015-0009 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-mss-2015-0017 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-journals-mss-2015-0040 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-mss-2015-0049 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-mss-2015-0060 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-mss-2015-0062 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-journals-mss-2016-0006 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-journals-mss-2016-0028 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-mss-2016-0032 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-mss-2016-0049 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-mss-2016-0052 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-mss-2016-0056 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-mss-2017-0003 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-journals-mss-2017-0005 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-mss-2017-0034 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-mss-2017-0037 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-mss-2017-0049 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Asymptotic existence of fair divisions for groups | Pasin Manurangsi, Warut Suksompong | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | MSS 2017 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| d4-journals-mss-2017-0059 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Resource-monotonicity and population-monotonicity in connected cake-cutting | Erel Segal-Halevi, B. Sziklai | Fair Allocation · Cake Cutting | MSS 2018 | – | – | triple | |
| d4-journals-mss-2018-0017 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-mss-2018-0025 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-mss-2018-0050 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Approximate maximin shares for groups of agents | Warut Suksompong | Fair Allocation · Shares & Guarantees | MSS 2018 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| d4-journals-mss-2018-0066 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-mss-2019-0001 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-journals-mss-2019-0002 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-mss-2019-0013 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-mss-2019-0014 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-mss-2019-0017 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-journals-mss-2019-0022 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-mss-2019-0024 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Gibbard-Satterthwaite games for k-approval voting rules | Umberto Grandi, Daniel Hughes, F. Rossi, A. Slinko | Voting · Manipulation | MSS 2019 | – | – | triple | |
| d4-journals-mss-2019-0047 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-mss-2019-0051 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-journals-mss-2019-0052 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-mss-2020-0005 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Average weights and power in weighted voting games | Daria Boratyn, W. Kirsch, Wojciech Słomczyński, Dariusz Stolicki, K. Życzkowski | Voting · Voting Theory & Axioms | MSS 2020 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| d4-journals-mss-2020-0010 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Multi-unit assignment under dichotomous preferences | J. Ortega | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | MSS 2020 | – | – | triple | |
| d4-journals-mss-2020-0029 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-mss-2020-0033 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-mss-2020-0038 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-mss-2020-0040 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-mss-2020-0056 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-mss-2020-0061 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-mss-2021-0004 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-mss-2021-0007 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-mss-2021-0012 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-mss-2021-0016 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-mss-2021-0018 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-mss-2021-0030 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-mss-2021-0051 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-mss-2022-0002 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-mss-2022-0008 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-mss-2022-0009 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| On maximum weighted Nash welfare for binary valuations | Warut Suksompong, Nicholas J. Teh | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | MSS 2022 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| d4-journals-mss-2022-0027 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-mss-2022-0031 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-mss-2022-0037 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-journals-mss-2022-0039 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-journals-mss-2022-0050 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-mss-2023-0002 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-mss-2023-0015 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-mss-2023-0017 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-journals-mss-2023-0022 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Weighted fair division with matroid-rank valuations: Monotonicity and strategyproofness | Warut Suksompong, Nicholas J. Teh | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | MSS 2023 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| d4-journals-mss-2023-0024 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-mss-2023-0027 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-journals-mss-2023-0029 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-journals-mss-2024-0007 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-mss-2024-0015 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-mss-2024-0019 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-mss-2024-0023 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-journals-mss-2024-0034 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-mss-2025-0003 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-mss-2025-0012 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-journals-mss-2025-0014 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-mss-2025-0028 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-mss-2025-0031 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-mss-2025-0032 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Envy-freeness and maximum Nash welfare for mixed divisible and indivisible goods | Koichiro Nishimura, Hanna Sumita | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | MSS 2025 | – | – | triple | |
| d4-journals-mss-2025-0041 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-mss-2025-0042 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-mss-2025-0047 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-mss-2025-0056 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-mss-2025-0057 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-journals-mss-2026-0015 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-mss-2026-0019 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-mss-2026-0031 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-journals-mss-2026-0038 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2000-0026 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2001-0012 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2001-0024 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2001-0036 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2001-0039 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2002-0030 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2002-0033 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2002-0034 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2002-0038 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2002-0051 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2003-0012 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2003-0060 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2004-0008 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2004-0025 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2004-0057 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2005-0007 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2005-0011 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2005-0049 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2005-0052 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2005-0054 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2005-0065 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2006-0001 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2006-0004 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2006-0019 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2006-0021 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2006-0055 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2006-0059 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2006-0074 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2007-0004 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2007-0017 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2007-0036 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2007-0039 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2007-0051 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2007-0053 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2007-0055 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2007-0062 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2008-0008 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2008-0033 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2008-0034 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2008-0040 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2008-0042 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2008-0055 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2008-0062 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2008-0064 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2008-0066 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2009-0018 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2009-0021 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2009-0032 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2009-0054 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2010-0014 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2010-0027 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2010-0031 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2010-0038 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2010-0039 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2010-0040 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2010-0062 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2010-0072 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2011-0066 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2011-0067 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2012-0006 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2012-0013 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2012-0026 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2012-0030 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| d4-journals-scw-2012-0043 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2012-0045 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2012-0050 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2012-0063 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2012-0074 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2012-0076 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2012-0077 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2012-0083 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2013-0008 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2013-0009 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2013-0012 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2013-0018 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2013-0024 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2013-0034 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2013-0042 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2013-0055 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2013-0074 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2013-0084 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2013-0089 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2013-0093 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2013-0100 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2014-0015 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2014-0023 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2014-0030 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2014-0040 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2014-0054 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2014-0062 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2014-0086 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2014-0093 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2014-0097 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2015-0023 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2015-0047 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2015-0065 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2015-0075 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2015-0076 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2015-0079 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-journals-scw-2015-0086 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2016-0020 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2016-0024 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2016-0040 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2016-0047 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2016-0048 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| The inverse problem for power distributions in committees | Sascha Kurz | Voting · Voting Theory & Axioms | SCW 2016 | – | – | triple | |
| d4-journals-scw-2016-0060 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2016-0063 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2016-0064 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2016-0071 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2016-0083 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2017-0009 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2017-0012 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2017-0013 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2017-0016 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2017-0022 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2017-0025 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2017-0027 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2017-0042 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2017-0046 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2017-0052 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2017-0064 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2017-0069 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| A partial taxonomy of judgment aggregation rules and their properties | J. Lang, G. Pigozzi, M. Slavkovik, L. van der Torre, Srdjan Vesic | Frontier · Judgment Aggregation | SCW 2017 | – | – | triple | |
| d4-journals-scw-2017-0072 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Properties of multiwinner voting rules | Edith Elkind, Piotr Faliszewski, P. Skowron, A. Slinko | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | SCW 2017 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| d4-journals-scw-2017-0080 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2018-0026 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2018-0041 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-journals-scw-2018-0056 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2018-0057 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2018-0059 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2019-0003 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2019-0006 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2019-0011 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| Random matching under priorities: stability and no envy concepts | H. Aziz, B. Klaus | Coalition Formation · Matching under Preferences | SCW 2019 | – | – | triple | |
| d4-journals-scw-2019-0017 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-journals-scw-2019-0019 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2019-0023 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2019-0029 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2019-0041 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2019-0050 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2019-0057 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2019-0060 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2020-0002 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2020-0025 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-journals-scw-2020-0033 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2020-0043 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-journals-scw-2020-0044 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2020-0065 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2021-0004 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-journals-scw-2021-0021 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2021-0041 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2021-0042 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2021-0043 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2021-0054 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2021-0057 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2021-0065 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2021-0067 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2022-0002 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2022-0003 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2022-0006 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2022-0016 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2022-0021 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2022-0031 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2022-0034 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2022-0039 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2022-0043 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2022-0047 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2022-0050 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Obvious manipulations in cake-cutting | J. Ortega, Erel Segal-Halevi | Fair Allocation · Cake Cutting | SCW 2022 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| d4-journals-scw-2022-0062 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2022-0064 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2023-0010 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2023-0014 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2023-0015 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2023-0018 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2023-0019 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2023-0020 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2023-0024 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2023-0036 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2023-0041 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2023-0045 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2023-0047 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Optimality of the coordinate-wise median mechanism for strategyproof facility location in two dimensions | Sumit Goel, Wade Hann-Caruthers | Voting · Distortion | SCW 2023 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| d4-journals-scw-2024-0001 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2024-0003 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2024-0006 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2024-0010 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2024-0014 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2024-0022 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-journals-scw-2024-0028 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2024-0029 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2024-0031 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2024-0037 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2024-0043 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2024-0048 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Monotonicity anomalies in Scottish local government elections | D. McCune, Adam Graham-Squire | Voting · Voting Theory & Axioms | SCW 2024 | – | – | triple | |
| d4-journals-scw-2024-0057 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2025-0005 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2025-0007 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2025-0017 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2025-0019 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2025-0021 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2025-0022 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2025-0026 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2025-0037 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2025-0038 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-journals-scw-2025-0050 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2025-0053 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2025-0055 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2026-0004 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2026-0008 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2026-0010 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2026-0013 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2026-0015 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2026-0016 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2026-0019 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2026-0023 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2026-0025 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2026-0030 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2026-0035 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2026-0036 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2026-0039 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2026-0040 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2026-0043 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2026-0044 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-journals-scw-2026-0045 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-teco-2013-0008 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| On the Power of Deterministic Mechanisms for Facility Location Games | Dimitris Fotakis, Christos Tzamos | Voting · Manipulation | TECO 2014 | – | – | triple | |
| d4-journals-teco-2014-0005 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-teco-2015-0027 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-journals-teco-2016-0012 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-teco-2016-0026 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| d4-journals-teco-2019-0003 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| Knapsack Voting for Participatory Budgeting | Ashish Goel, A. Krishnaswamy, Sukolsak Sakshuwong, Tanja Aitamurto | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Participatory Budgeting | TECO 2019 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| d4-journals-teco-2019-0011 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-journals-teco-2019-0012 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Committee Scoring Rules: Axiomatic Characterization and Hierarchy | Piotr Faliszewski, P. Skowron, A. Slinko, Nimrod Talmon | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | TECO 2019 | – | – | triple | |
| d4-journals-teco-2020-0002 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| The Price of Quota-based Diversity in Assignment Problems | Nawal Benabbou, Mithun Chakraborty, X. Ho, J. Sliwinski, Yair Zick | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | TECO 2020 | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof |
| d4-journals-teco-2020-0010 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| Voting and Bribing in Single-Exponential Time | D. Knop, Martin Koutecký, Matthias Mnich | Voting · Dodgson & Young | TECO 2020 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| d4-journals-teco-2020-0014 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Group Fairness in Committee Selection | Yu Cheng, Zhihao Jiang, Kamesh Munagala, Kangning Wang | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | TECO 2020 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| d4-journals-teco-2020-0025 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| d4-journals-teco-2020-0026 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-teco-2021-0003 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| d4-journals-teco-2022-0007 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| Unified Fair Allocation of Goods and Chores via Copies | Yotam gafni, Xin Huang, R. Lavi, Inbal Talgam-Cohen | Fair Allocation · Chores, Online & Dynamic | TECO 2023 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| d4-journals-teco-2023-0009 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-journals-teco-2024-0002 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| d4-journals-teco-2024-0008 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | ↗ | triple proof | |
| Maximin Shares in Hereditary Set Systems | Halvard Hummel | Fair Allocation · Shares & Guarantees | TECO 2025 | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof |
| d4-journals-teco-2025-0011 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| d4-journals-teco-2025-0014 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-journals-teco-2025-0016 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| d4-journals-teco-2026-0001 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| d4-journals-teco-2026-0006 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| Better Collective Decisions via Uncertainty Reduction | Shiri Alouf-Heffetz, Laurent Bulteau, Edith Elkind, Nimrod Talmon, Nicholas Teh | Voting · Bribery & Control | IJCAI 2022 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| How Should We Vote? A Comparison of Voting Systems within Social Networks | Shiri Alouf-Heffetz, Ben Armstrong, Kate Larson, Nimrod Talmon | Voting · Voting Theory & Axioms | IJCAI 2022 | – | ✓ | triple | |
| Envy-Free and Pareto-Optimal Allocations for Agents with Asymmetric Random Valuations | Yushi Bai, Paul Gölz | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | IJCAI 2022 | – | – | triple | |
| Achieving Envy-Freeness with Limited Subsidies under Dichotomous Valuations | Siddharth Barman, Anand Krishna, Yadati Narahari, Soumyarup Sadhukhan | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | IJCAI 2022 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| Time-Constrained Participatory Budgeting Under Uncertain Project Costs | Dorothea Baumeister, Linus Boes, Christian Laußmann | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Participatory Budgeting | IJCAI 2022 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| Understanding Distance Measures Among Elections | Niclas Boehmer, Piotr Faliszewski, Rolf Niedermeier, Stanisław Szufa, Tomasz Wąs | Voting · Voting Theory & Axioms | IJCAI 2022 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| Distortion in Voting with Top-t Preferences | Allan Borodin, Daniel Halpern, Mohamad Latifian, Nisarg Shah | Voting · Distortion | IJCAI 2022 | – | – | triple | |
| Let’s Agree to Agree: Targeting Consensus for Incomplete Preferences through Majority Dynamics | Sirin Botan, Simon Rey, Zoi Terzopoulou | Voting · Incomplete Information | IJCAI 2022 | – | – | triple | |
| Single-Peaked Opinion Updates | Robert Bredereck, Anne-Marie George, Jonas Israel, Leon Kellerhals | Frontier · Opinion Diffusion & Networks | IJCAI 2022 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| When Votes Change and Committees Should (Not) | Robert Bredereck, Till Fluschnik, Andrzej Kaczmarczyk | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | IJCAI 2022 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| Preserving Consistency in Multi-Issue Liquid Democracy | Rachael Colley, Umberto Grandi | Voting · Combinatorial Domains | IJCAI 2022 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| Voting in Two-Crossing Elections | Andrei Constantinescu, Roger Wattenhofer | Voting · Structured Preferences | IJCAI 2022 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| Approval with Runoff | Théo Delemazure, Jérôme Lang, Jean-François Laslier, M. Remzi Sanver | Frontier · Knockout Tournaments | IJCAI 2022 | – | – | triple | |
| The Complexity of Envy-Free Graph Cutting | Argyrios Deligkas, Eduard Eiben, Robert Ganian, Thekla Hamm, Sebastian Ordyniak | Fair Allocation · Cake Cutting | IJCAI 2022 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| Online Approval Committee Elections | Virginie Do, Matthieu Hervouin, Jérôme Lang, Piotr Skowron | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | IJCAI 2022 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| On the Ordinal Invariance of Power Indices on Coalitional Games | Jean-Paul Doignon, Stefano Moretti, Meltem Ozturk | Coalition Formation · Weighted Voting Games | IJCAI 2022 | – | – | triple | |
| Efficient Resource Allocation with Secretive Agents | Soroush Ebadian, Rupert Freeman, Nisarg Shah | Fair Allocation · Fair Division Theory | IJCAI 2022 | – | – | triple | |
| Insight into Voting Problem Complexity Using Randomized Classes | Zack Fitzsimmons, Edith Hemaspaandra | Voting · Bribery & Control | IJCAI 2022 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| Approximate Strategyproof Mechanisms for the Additively Separable Group Activity Selection Problem | Michele Flammini, Giovanna Varricchio | Coalition Formation · Hedonic Games | IJCAI 2022 | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | |
| Two for One & One for All: Two-Sided Manipulation in Matching Markets | Hadi Hosseini, Fatima Umar, Rohit Vaish | Coalition Formation · Matching under Preferences | IJCAI 2022 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| Phragmén Rules for Degressive and Regressive Proportionality | Michał Jaworski, Piotr Skowron | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | IJCAI 2022 | – | – | triple | |
| On Discrete Truthful Heterogeneous Two-Facility Location | Panagiotis Kanellopoulos, Alexandros A. Voudouris, Rongsen Zhang | Frontier · Computer-Aided Methods & Data | IJCAI 2022 | – | ✓ | triple | |
| Plurality Veto: A Simple Voting Rule Achieving Optimal Metric Distortion | Fatih Erdem Kizilkaya, David Kempe | Voting · Distortion | IJCAI 2022 | – | – | triple | |
| The Dichotomous Affiliate Stable Matching Problem: Approval-Based Matching with Applicant-Employer Relations | Marina Knittel, Samuel Dooley, John Dickerson | Coalition Formation · Matching under Preferences | IJCAI 2022 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| Explaining Preferences by Multiple Patterns in Voters’ Behavior | Sonja Kraiczy, Edith Elkind | Voting · Structured Preferences | IJCAI 2022 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| Biased Majority Opinion Dynamics: Exploiting Graph k-domination | Hicham Lesfari, Frédéric Giroire, Stéphane Pérennes | Frontier · Opinion Diffusion & Networks | IJCAI 2022 | – | – | triple | |
| Proportional Budget Allocations: Towards a Systematization | Maaike Los, Zoé Christoff, Davide Grossi | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Participatory Budgeting | IJCAI 2022 | – | – | triple | |
| I Will Have Order! Optimizing Orders for Fair Reviewer Assignment | Justin Payan, Yair Zick | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | IJCAI 2022 | – | ✓ | triple | |
| Multiwinner Elections under Minimax Chamberlin-Courant Rule in Euclidean Space | Chinmay Sonar, Subhash Suri, Jie Xue | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | IJCAI 2022 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| Near-Tight Algorithms for the Chamberlin-Courant and Thiele Voting Rules | Krzysztof Sornat, Virginia Vassilevska Williams, Yinzhan Xu | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | IJCAI 2022 | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | |
| Maxmin Participatory Budgeting | Gogulapati Sreedurga, Mayank Ratan Bhardwaj, Yadati Narahari | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Participatory Budgeting | IJCAI 2022 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| How to Sample Approval Elections? | Stanisław Szufa, Piotr Faliszewski, Łukasz Janeczko, Martin Lackner, Arkadii Slinko, Krzysztof Sornat, Nimrod Talmon | Voting · Voting Theory & Axioms | IJCAI 2022 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| Strategy Proof Mechanisms for Facility Location with Capacity Limits | Toby Walsh | Voting · Manipulation | IJCAI 2022 | – | – | triple | |
| Manipulating Elections by Changing Voter Perceptions | Junlin Wu, Andrew Estornell, Lecheng Kong, Yevgeniy Vorobeychik | Voting · Bribery & Control | IJCAI 2022 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| On the Complexity of Calculating Approval-Based Winners in Candidates-Embedded Metrics | Yongjie Yang | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | IJCAI 2022 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| Strategyproof Mechanisms for Group-Fair Facility Location Problems | Houyu Zhou, Minming Li, Hau Chan | Frontier · Computer-Aided Methods & Data | IJCAI 2022 | – | – | triple | |
| Approximately EFX Allocations for Indivisible Chores | Shengwei Zhou, Xiaowei Wu | Fair Allocation · Chores, Online & Dynamic | IJCAI 2022 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| Local Differential Privacy Meets Computational Social Choice - Resilience under Voter Deletion | Liangde Tao, Lin Chen, Lei Xu, Weidong Shi | Voting · Bribery & Control | IJCAI 2022 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| DiRe Committee : Diversity and Representation Constraints in Multiwinner Elections | Kunal Relia | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | IJCAI 2022 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| Fair Division of Indivisible Goods: A Survey | Georgios Amanatidis, Georgios Birmpas, Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Alexandros A. Voudouris | Fair Allocation · Chores, Online & Dynamic | IJCAI 2022 | – | – | triple | |
| Intelligence in Strategic Games (Extended Abstract) | Pavel Naumov, Yuan Yuan | Frontier · Judgment Aggregation | IJCAI 2022 | – | – | triple | |
| Mechanism Design Powered by Social Interactions: A Call to Arms | Dengji Zhao | Frontier · Opinion Diffusion & Networks | IJCAI 2022 | – | – | triple | |
| Learning Dissemination Strategies for External Sources in Opinion Dynamic Models with Cognitive Biases not comsoc | Abdullah Al Maruf, Luyao Niu, Bhaskar Ramasubramanian, Andrew Clark, Radha Poovendran | unclassified | IJCAI 2023 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| Proportionally Fair Online Allocation of Public Goods with Predictions | Siddhartha Banerjee, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Safwan Hossain, Billy Jin, Evi Micha, Nisarg Shah | Fair Allocation · Chores, Online & Dynamic | IJCAI 2023 | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | |
| On the Role of Memory in Robust Opinion Dynamics not comsoc | Luca Becchetti, Andrea Clementi, Amos Korman, Francesco Pasquale, Luca Trevisan, Robin Vacus | unclassified | IJCAI 2023 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| On a Voter Model with Context-Dependent Opinion Adoption not comsoc | Luca Becchetti, Vincenzo Bonifaci, Emilio Cruciani, Francesco Pasquale | unclassified | IJCAI 2023 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| Principal-Agent Boolean Games not comsoc | David Hyland, Julian Gutierrez, Michael Wooldridge | unclassified | IJCAI 2023 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| Why Rumors Spread Fast in Social Networks, and How to Stop It not comsoc | Ahad N. Zehmakan, Charlotte Out, Sajjad Hesamipour Khelejan | unclassified | IJCAI 2023 | – | – | triple | |
| Optimal Anytime Coalition Structure Generation Utilizing Compact Solution Space Representation | Redha Taguelmimt, Samir Aknine, Djamila Boukredera, Narayan Changder, Tuomas Sandholm | Coalition Formation · Hedonic Games | IJCAI 2023 | ✓ | – | ↘* | triple proof |
| Group Fairness in Set Packing Problems | Sharmila Duppala, Juan Luque, John Dickerson, Aravind Srinivasan | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | IJCAI 2023 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| Sampling Ex-Post Group-Fair Rankings not comsoc | Sruthi Gorantla, Amit Deshpande, Anand Louis | unclassified | IJCAI 2023 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| Simplification and Improvement of MMS Approximation | Hannaneh Akrami, Jugal Garg, Eklavya Sharma, Setareh Taki | Fair Allocation · Shares & Guarantees | IJCAI 2023 | – | – | triple | |
| Fair and Efficient Allocation of Indivisible Chores with Surplus | Hannaneh Akrami, Bhaskar Ray Chaudhury, Jugal Garg, Kurt Mehlhorn, Ruta Mehta | Fair Allocation · Chores, Online & Dynamic | IJCAI 2023 | ✓ | – | ↗ | triple proof |
| Non-Obvious Manipulability in Extensive-Form Mechanisms: The Revelation Principle for Single-Parameter Agents | Thomas Archbold, Bart de Keijzer, Carmine Ventre | Voting · Voting Theory & Axioms | IJCAI 2023 | – | – | triple | |
| Schelling Games with Continuous Types not comsoc | Davide Bilò, Vittorio Bilò, Michelle Döring, Pascal Lenzner, Louise Molitor, Jonas Schmidt | unclassified | IJCAI 2023 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| Delegated Online Search not comsoc | Pirmin Braun, Niklas Hahn, Martin Hoefer, Conrad Schecker | unclassified | IJCAI 2023 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| Proportionality Guarantees in Elections with Interdependent Issues | Markus Brill, Evangelos Markakis, Georgios Papasotiropoulos, Jannik Peters | Voting · Combinatorial Domains | IJCAI 2023 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| Outsourcing Adjudication to Strategic Jurors | Ioannis Caragiannis, Nikolaj Schwartzbach | Voting · Manipulation | IJCAI 2023 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| New Fairness Concepts for Allocating Indivisible Items | Ioannis Caragiannis, Jugal Garg, Nidhi Rathi, Eklavya Sharma, Giovanna Varricchio | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | IJCAI 2023 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| Optimal Seat Arrangement: What Are the Hard and Easy Cases? | Esra Ceylan, Jiehua Chen, Sanjukta Roy | Fair Allocation · Fair Division Theory | IJCAI 2023 | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof |
| Rainbow Cycle Number and EFX Allocations: (Almost) Closing the Gap | Shayan Chashm Jahan, Masoud Seddighin, Seyed-Mohammad Seyed-Javadi, Mohammad Sharifi | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | IJCAI 2023 | – | – | triple | |
| Exploring Leximin Principle for Fair Core-Selecting Combinatorial Auctions: Payment Rule Design and Implementation not comsoc | Hao Cheng, Shufeng Kong, Yanchen Deng, Caihua Liu, Xiaohu Wu, Bo An, Chongjun Wang | unclassified | IJCAI 2023 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| Deliberation as Evidence Disclosure: A Tale of Two Protocol Types | Julian Chingoma, Adrian Haret | Voting · Voting Theory & Axioms | IJCAI 2023 | – | – | triple | |
| Measuring a Priori Voting Power in Liquid Democracy | Rachael Colley, Théo Delemazure, Hugo Gilbert | Voting · Voting Theory & Axioms | IJCAI 2023 | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof |
| Measuring and Controlling Divisiveness in Rank Aggregation | Rachael Colley, Umberto Grandi, César Hidalgo, Mariana Macedo, Carlos Navarrete | Voting · Voting Theory & Axioms | IJCAI 2023 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| Differentiable Economics for Randomized Affine Maximizer Auctions | Michael Curry, Tuomas Sandholm, John Dickerson | Frontier · Computer-Aided Methods & Data | IJCAI 2023 | – | – | triple | |
| Algorithmics of Egalitarian versus Equitable Sequences of Committees | Eva Michelle Deltl, Till Fluschnik, Robert Bredereck | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | IJCAI 2023 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| Participatory Budgeting: Data, Tools and Analysis | Piotr Faliszewski, Jarosław Flis, Dominik Peters, Grzegorz Pierczyński, Piotr Skowron, Dariusz Stolicki, Stanisław Szufa, Nimrod Talmon | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Participatory Budgeting | IJCAI 2023 | – | – | triple | |
| An Experimental Comparison of Multiwinner Voting Rules on Approval Elections | Piotr Faliszewski, Martin Lackner, Krzysztof Sornat, Stanisław Szufa | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | IJCAI 2023 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| Diversity, Agreement, and Polarization in Elections | Piotr Faliszewski, Andrzej Kaczmarczyk, Krzysztof Sornat, Stanisław Szufa, Tomasz Wąs | Voting · Voting Theory & Axioms | IJCAI 2023 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| Strategic Resource Selection with Homophilic Agents not comsoc | Jonathan Gadea Harder, Simon Krogmann, Pascal Lenzner, Alexander Skopalik | unclassified | IJCAI 2023 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| New Algorithms for the Fair and Efficient Allocation of Indivisible Chores | Jugal Garg, Aniket Murhekar, John Qin | Fair Allocation · Chores, Online & Dynamic | IJCAI 2023 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| First-Choice Maximality Meets Ex-ante and Ex-post Fairness | Xiaoxi Guo, Sujoy Sikdar, Lirong Xia, Yongzhi Cao, Hanpin Wang | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | IJCAI 2023 | – | – | triple | |
| A Unifying Formal Approach to Importance Values in Boolean Functions not comsoc | Hans Harder, Simon Jantsch, Christel Baier, Clemens Dubslaff | unclassified | IJCAI 2023 | – | – | triple | |
| Fairly Allocating Goods and (Terrible) Chores | Hadi Hosseini, Aghaheybat Mammadov, Tomasz Wąs | Fair Allocation · Chores, Online & Dynamic | IJCAI 2023 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| On Lower Bounds for Maximin Share Guarantees | Halvard Hummel | Fair Allocation · Shares & Guarantees | IJCAI 2023 | – | – | triple | |
| Fair Division with Two-Sided Preferences | Ayumi Igarashi, Yasushi Kawase, Warut Suksompong, Hanna Sumita | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | IJCAI 2023 | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof |
| Ties in Multiwinner Approval Voting | Łukasz Janeczko, Piotr Faliszewski | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | IJCAI 2023 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| Matchings under One-Sided Preferences with Soft Quotas | Santhini K. A., Raghu Raman Ravi, Meghana Nasre | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | IJCAI 2023 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| Convergence in Multi-Issue Iterative Voting under Uncertainty | Joshua Kavner, Reshef Meir, Francesca Rossi, Lirong Xia | Voting · Combinatorial Domains | IJCAI 2023 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| Random Assignment of Indivisible Goods under Constraints | Yasushi Kawase, Hanna Sumita, Yu Yokoi | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | IJCAI 2023 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| Truthful Fair Mechanisms for Allocating Mixed Divisible and Indivisible Goods | Zihao Li, Shengxin Liu, Xinhang Lu, Biaoshuai Tao | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | IJCAI 2023 | – | – | triple | |
| Approximating Fair Division on D-Claw-Free Graphs | Zbigniew Lonc | Fair Allocation · Shares & Guarantees | IJCAI 2023 | – | – | triple | |
| Fair Division of a Graph into Compact Bundles | Jayakrishnan Madathil | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | IJCAI 2023 | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof |
| Deliberation and Voting in Approval-Based Multi-Winner Elections | Kanav Mehra, Nanda Kishore Sreenivas, Kate Larson | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | IJCAI 2023 | – | – | triple | |
| Learning Efficient Truthful Mechanisms for Trading Networks not comsoc | Takayuki Osogami, Segev Wasserkrug, Elisheva S. Shamash | unclassified | IJCAI 2023 | – | – | triple | |
| Participatory Budgeting with Multiple Degrees of Projects and Ranged Approval Votes | Gogulapati Sreedurga | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Participatory Budgeting | IJCAI 2023 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| Error in the Euclidean Preference Model | Luke Thorburn, Maria Polukarov, Carmine Ventre | Voting · Structured Preferences | IJCAI 2023 | – | – | triple | |
| Maximin-Aware Allocations of Indivisible Chores with Symmetric and Asymmetric Agents | Tianze Wei, Bo Li, Minming Li | Fair Allocation · Chores, Online & Dynamic | IJCAI 2023 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| Ordinal Hedonic Seat Arrangement under Restricted Preference Domains: Swap Stability and Popularity | Anaëlle Wilczynski | Coalition Formation · Hedonic Games | IJCAI 2023 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| Truthful Auctions for Automated Bidding in Online Advertising not comsoc | Yidan Xing, Zhilin Zhang, Zhenzhe Zheng, Chuan Yu, Jian Xu, Fan Wu, Guihai Chen | unclassified | IJCAI 2023 | – | – | triple | |
| Approximate Envy-Freeness in Graphical Cake Cutting | Sheung Man Yuen, Warut Suksompong | Fair Allocation · Cake Cutting | IJCAI 2023 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| Incentive-Compatible Selection for One or Two Influentials | Yuxin Zhao, Yao Zhang, Dengji Zhao | Frontier · Opinion Diffusion & Networks | IJCAI 2023 | – | – | triple | |
| TDG4Crowd:Test Data Generation for Evaluation of Aggregation Algorithms in Crowdsourcing | Yili Fang, Chaojie Shen, Huamao Gu, Tao Han, Xinyi Ding | Frontier · Computer-Aided Methods & Data | IJCAI 2023 | – | – | triple | |
| Complex Contagion Influence Maximization: A Reinforcement Learning Approach | Haipeng Chen, Bryan Wilder, Wei Qiu, Bo An, Eric Rice, Milind Tambe | Frontier · Opinion Diffusion & Networks | IJCAI 2023 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| Online Certification of Preference-Based Fairness for Personalized Recommender Systems (Extended Abstract) | Virginie Do, Sam Corbett-Davies, Jamal Atif, Nicolas Usunier | Fair Allocation · Fair Division Theory | IJCAI 2023 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| Task Allocation on Networks with Execution Uncertainty (Extended Abstract)∗ | Yao Zhang, Xiuzhen Zhang, Dengji Zhao | Frontier · Computer-Aided Methods & Data | IJCAI 2023 | – | – | triple | |
| Complexity Results and Exact Algorithms for Fair Division of Indivisible Items: A Survey | Trung Thanh Nguyen, Jörg Rothe | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | IJCAI 2023 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| Ordinal Maximin Share Approximation for Goods (Extended Abstract) | Hadi Hosseini, Andrew Searns, Erel Segal-Halevi | Fair Allocation · Shares & Guarantees | IJCAI 2023 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| Learning to Design Fair and Private Voting Rules (Extended Abstract) | Farhad Mohsin, Ao Liu, Pin-Yu Chen, Francesca Rossi, Lirong Xia | Voting · Voting Theory & Axioms | IJCAI 2023 | – | – | triple | |
| Pushing the Limits of Fairness in Algorithmic Decision-Making | Nisarg Shah | Frontier · Computer-Aided Methods & Data | IJCAI 2023 | – | – | triple | |
| Scalable Mechanism Design for Multi-Agent Path Finding | Paul Friedrich, Yulun Zhang, Michael Curry, Ludwig Dierks, Stephen McAleer, Jiaoyang Li, Tuomas Sandholm, Sven Seuken | Frontier · Computer-Aided Methods & Data | IJCAI 2024 | – | – | triple | |
| Endogenous Energy Reactive Modules Games: Modelling Side Payments among Resource-Bounded Agents | Julian Gutierrez, David Hyland, Muhammad Najib, Giuseppe Perelli, Michael Wooldridge | Coalition Formation · Hedonic Games | IJCAI 2024 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| Parameterized Complexity of Kidney Exchange Revisited | Úrsula Hébert-Johnson, Daniel Lokshtanov, Chinmay Sonar, Vaishali Surianarayanan | Coalition Formation · Matching under Preferences | IJCAI 2024 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| Individual Fairness under Group Fairness Constraints in Bipartite Matching - One Framework to Approximate Them All | Atasi Panda, Anand Louis, Prajakta Nimbhorkar | Fair Allocation · Fair Division Theory | IJCAI 2024 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| Fostering Collective Action in Complex Societies Using Community-Based Agents | Jonathan Skaggs, Michael Richards, Melissa Morris, Michael A. Goodrich, Jacob W. Crandall | Coalition Formation · Hedonic Games | IJCAI 2024 | – | – | triple | |
| Faster Optimal Coalition Structure Generation via Offline Coalition Selection and Graph-Based Search | Redha Taguelmimt, Samir Aknine, Djamila Boukredera, Narayan Changder, Tuomas Sandholm | Coalition Formation · Hedonic Games | IJCAI 2024 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| Optimizing Viscous Democracy | Ben Armstrong, Shiri Alouf-Heffetz, Nimrod Talmon | Voting · Voting Theory & Axioms | IJCAI 2024 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| Facility Location Problems with Capacity Constraints: Two Facilities and Beyond | Gennaro Auricchio, Zihe Wang, Jie Zhang | Frontier · Computer-Aided Methods & Data | IJCAI 2024 | – | – | triple | |
| Welfare Loss in Connected Resource Allocation | Xiaohui Bei, Alexander Lam, Xinhang Lu, Warut Suksompong | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | IJCAI 2024 | – | – | triple | |
| Computing Optimal Equilibria in Repeated Games with Restarts | Ratip Emin Berker, Vincent Conitzer | Frontier · Computer-Aided Methods & Data | IJCAI 2024 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| Evaluation of Project Performance in Participatory Budgeting | Niclas Boehmer, Piotr Faliszewski, Łukasz Janeczko, Dominik Peters, Grzegorz Pierczyński, Šimon Schierreich, Piotr Skowron, Stanisław Szufa | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Participatory Budgeting | IJCAI 2024 | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof |
| Randomized Learning-Augmented Auctions with Revenue Guarantees | Ioannis Caragiannis, Georgios Kalantzis | Frontier · Computer-Aided Methods & Data | IJCAI 2024 | – | – | triple | |
| Parameterized Analysis of Bribery in Challenge the Champ Tournaments | Juhi Chaudhary, Hendrik Molter, Meirav Zehavi | Voting · Bribery & Control | IJCAI 2024 | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | |
| On the Pursuit of EFX for Chores: Non-existence and Approximations | Vasilis Christoforidis, Christodoulos Santorinaios | Fair Allocation · Chores, Online & Dynamic | IJCAI 2024 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| Online Learning of Partitions in Additively Separable Hedonic Games | Saar Cohen, Noa Agmon | Coalition Formation · Hedonic Games | IJCAI 2024 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| Couples Can Be Tractable: New Algorithms and Hardness Results for the Hospitals/Residents Problem with Couples | Gergely Csáji, David Manlove, Iain McBride, James Trimble | Coalition Formation · Matching under Preferences | IJCAI 2024 | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | |
| Popular and Dominant Matchings with Uncertain and Multimodal Preferences | Gergely Csáji | Coalition Formation · Matching under Preferences | IJCAI 2024 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| Aggregation of Continuous Preferences in One Dimension | Alberto Del Pia, Dušan Knop, Alexandra Lassota, Krzysztof Sornat, Nimrod Talmon | Voting · Structured Preferences | IJCAI 2024 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| Comparing Ways of Obtaining Candidate Orderings from Approval Ballots | Théo Delemazure, Chris Dong, Dominik Peters, Magdalena Tydrichova | Voting · Structured Preferences | IJCAI 2024 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| Selecting the Most Conflicting Pair of Candidates | Théo Delemazure, Łukasz Janeczko, Andrzej Kaczmarczyk, Stanisław Szufa | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | IJCAI 2024 | – | – | triple | |
| Truthful Interval Covering | Argyrios Deligkas, Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Alexandros A. Voudouris | Voting · Manipulation | IJCAI 2024 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| Individual Rationality in Topological Distance Games Is Surprisingly Hard | Argyrios Deligkas, Eduard Eiben, Dušan Knop, Šimon Schierreich | Coalition Formation · Hedonic Games | IJCAI 2024 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| Metric Distortion with Elicited Pairwise Comparisons | Soroush Ebadian, Daniel Halpern, Evi Micha | Voting · Distortion | IJCAI 2024 | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | |
| Weighted EF1 and PO Allocations with Few Types of Agents or Chores | Jugal Garg, Aniket Murhekar, John Qin | Fair Allocation · Chores, Online & Dynamic | IJCAI 2024 | ✓ | – | ↗ | triple proof |
| Getting More by Knowing Less: Bayesian Incentive Compatible Mechanisms for Fair Division | Vasilis Gkatzelis, Alexandros Psomas, Xizhi Tan, Paritosh Verma | Fair Allocation · Fair Division Theory | IJCAI 2024 | – | – | triple | |
| Determining Winners in Elections with Absent Votes | Qishen Han, Amelie Marian, Lirong Xia | Voting · Incomplete Information | IJCAI 2024 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| Fair Distribution of Delivery Orders | Hadi Hosseini, Shivika Narang, Tomasz Wąs | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | IJCAI 2024 | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof |
| Sampling Winners in Ranked Choice Voting | Matthew Iceland, Anson Kahng, Joseph Saber | Voting · Incomplete Information | IJCAI 2024 | – | – | triple | |
| The Distortion of Threshold Approval Matching | Mohamad Latifian, Alexandros A. Voudouris | Fair Allocation · Fair Division Theory | IJCAI 2024 | – | – | triple | |
| Polynomial Time Presolve Algorithms for Rotation-Based Models Solving the Robust Stable Matching Problem | Sulian Le Bozec-Chiffoleau, Charles Prud'homme, Gilles Simonin | Coalition Formation · Matching under Preferences | IJCAI 2024 | – | – | triple | |
| Allocating Mixed Goods with Customized Fairness and Indivisibility Ratio | Bo Li, Zihao Li, Shengxin Liu, Zekai Wu | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | IJCAI 2024 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| Vulnerabilities of Single-Round Incentive Compatibility in Auto-bidding: Theory and Evidence from ROI-Constrained Online Advertising Markets not comsoc | Juncheng Li, Pingzhong Tang | unclassified | IJCAI 2024 | – | ✓ | triple | |
| Ordinal Maximin Guarantees for Group Fair Division | Pasin Manurangsi, Warut Suksompong | Fair Allocation · Shares & Guarantees | IJCAI 2024 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| Toward Completing the Picture of Control in Schulze and Ranked Pairs Elections | Cynthia Maushagen, David Niclaus, Paul Nüsken, Jörg Rothe, Tessa Seeger | Voting · Bribery & Control | IJCAI 2024 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| Computational Complexity of Verifying the Group No-show Paradox | Farhad Mohsin, Qishen Han, Sikai Ruan, Pin-Yu Chen, Francesca Rossi, Lirong Xia | Voting · Voting Theory & Axioms | IJCAI 2024 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| Nonparametric Detection of Gerrymandering in Multiparty Plurality Elections | Dariusz Stolicki, Wojciech Słomczyński, Stanisław Szufa | Voting · Bribery & Control | IJCAI 2024 | – | – | triple | |
| Enabling Sustainable Freight Forwarding Network via Collaborative Games | Pang-Jin Tan, Shih-Fen Cheng, Richard Chen | Coalition Formation · Weighted Voting Games | IJCAI 2024 | – | – | triple | |
| Mechanisms That Play a Game, Not Toss a Coin | Toby Walsh | Frontier · Computer-Aided Methods & Data | IJCAI 2024 | – | – | triple | |
| Improved Approximation of Weighted MMS Fairness for Indivisible Chores | Fangxiao Wang, Bo Li, Pinyan Lu | Fair Allocation · Shares & Guarantees | IJCAI 2024 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| A Complete Landscape of EFX Allocations on Graphs: Goods, Chores and Mixed Manna | Yu Zhou, Tianze Wei, Minming Li, Bo Li | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | IJCAI 2024 | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | |
| Learning Conditional Preference Networks: An Approach Based on the Minimum Description Length Principle | Pierre-François Gimenez, Jérôme Mengin | Voting · Combinatorial Domains | IJCAI 2024 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| From Skepticism to Acceptance: Simulating the Attitude Dynamics Toward Fake News not comsoc | Yuhan Liu, Xiuying Chen, Xiaoqing Zhang, Xing Gao, Ji Zhang, Rui Yan | unclassified | IJCAI 2024 | – | – | triple | |
| Guide to Numerical Experiments on Elections in Computational Social Choice | Niclas Boehmer, Piotr Faliszewski, Łukasz Janeczko, Andrzej Kaczmarczyk, Grzegorz Lisowski, Grzegorz Pierczyński, Simon Rey, Dariusz Stolicki, Stanisław Szufa, Tomasz Wąs | Voting · Voting Theory & Axioms | IJCAI 2024 | – | – | triple | |
| Strategic Aspects of Stable Matching Markets: A Survey | Hadi Hosseini, Shraddha Pathak | Coalition Formation · Matching under Preferences | IJCAI 2024 | – | – | triple | |
| Budget Feasible Mechanisms: A Survey not comsoc | Xiang Liu, Hau Chan, Minming Li, Weiwei Wu | unclassified | IJCAI 2024 | – | – | triple | |
| A Survey on Rank Aggregation | Siyi Wang, Qi Deng, Shiwei Feng, Hong Zhang, Chao Liang | Voting · Voting Theory & Axioms | IJCAI 2024 | – | – | triple | |
| Voting by Axioms (Extended Abstract) | Marie Christin Schmidtlein, Ulle Endriss | Voting · Voting Theory & Axioms | IJCAI 2024 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| Algorithmic Fairness in Distribution of Resources and Tasks | Hadi Hosseini | Fair Allocation · Fair Division Theory | IJCAI 2024 | – | – | triple | |
| Expanding the Reach of Social Choice Theory | Warut Suksompong | Frontier · Knockout Tournaments | IJCAI 2024 | – | – | triple | |
| EF1 and EFX Orientations | Argyrios Deligkas, Eduard Eiben, Tiger-Lily Goldsmith, Viktoriia Korchemna | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | IJCAI 2025 | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | |
| Argument-based Multi-Issue Negotiation not comsoc | Thalya Fossey, Jean-Guy Mailly, Pavlos Moraitis | unclassified | IJCAI 2025 | – | – | triple | |
| Online Resource Sharing: Better Robust Guarantees via Randomized Strategies | David X. Lin, Daniel Hall, Giannis Fikioris, Siddhartha Banerjee, Éva Tardos | Fair Allocation · Chores, Online & Dynamic | IJCAI 2025 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| Equitable Mechanism Design for Facility Location | Toby Walsh | Voting · Distortion | IJCAI 2025 | – | – | triple | |
| Improved Rank Aggregation Under Fairness Constraint | Diptarka Chakraborty, Himika Das, Sanjana Dey, Alvin Hong Yao Yan | Voting · Weighted Tournaments | IJCAI 2025 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| Distance Preservation Games | Haris Aziz, Hau Chan, Patrick Lederer, Shivika Narang, Toby Walsh | Coalition Formation · Hedonic Games | IJCAI 2025 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| How to Resolve Envy by Adding Goods | Matthias Bentert, Robert Bredereck, Eva Deltl, Pallavi Jain, Leon Kellerhals | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | IJCAI 2025 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| Constrained Serial Dictatorships Can Be Fair | Sylvain Bouveret, Hugo Gilbert, Jérôme Lang, Guillaume Méroué | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | IJCAI 2025 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| Settling the Complexity of Popularity in Additively Separable and Fractional Hedonic Games | Martin Bullinger, Matan Gilboa | Coalition Formation · Hedonic Games | IJCAI 2025 | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | |
| Multi-Organizational Scheduling: Individual Rationality, Optimality, and Complexity not comsoc | Jiehua Chen, Martin Durand, Christian Hatschka | unclassified | IJCAI 2025 | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | |
| Maximin Share Guarantees for Few Agents with Subadditive Valuations | George Christodoulou, Vasilis Christoforidis, Symeon Mastrakoulis, Alkmini Sgouritsa | Fair Allocation · Shares & Guarantees | IJCAI 2025 | – | – | triple | |
| Decentralized Online Learning by Selfish Agents in Coalition Formation | Saar Cohen, Noa Agmon | Coalition Formation · Hedonic Games | IJCAI 2025 | – | – | triple | |
| Inverse Game Theory: An Incenter-Based Approach not comsoc | Lvye Cui, Haoran Yu, Pierre Pinson, Dario Paccagnan | unclassified | IJCAI 2025 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| Not in My Backyard! Temporal Voting Over Public Chores | Edith Elkind, Tzeh Yuan Neoh, Nicholas Teh | Voting · Combinatorial Domains | IJCAI 2025 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| Participatory Budgeting Project Strength via Candidate Control | Piotr Faliszewski, Łukasz Janeczko, Dušan Knop, Jan Pokorný, Šimon Schierreich, Mateusz Słuszniak, Krzysztof Sornat | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Participatory Budgeting | IJCAI 2025 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| EFX Feasible Scheduling for Time-dependent Resources | Jiazhu Fang, Qizhi Fang, Minming Li, Wenjing Liu | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | IJCAI 2025 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| Non-Obvious Manipulability in Additively Separable and Fractional Hedonic Games | Diodato Ferraioli, Giovanna Varricchio | Coalition Formation · Hedonic Games | IJCAI 2025 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| Optimal Metric Distortion for Matching on the Line | Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Mohamad Latifian, Emma Rewinski, Alexandros A. Voudouris | Voting · Distortion | IJCAI 2025 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| More Efforts Towards Fixed-Parameter Approximability of Multiwinner Rules | Sushmita Gupta, Pallavi Jain, Souvik Saha, Saket Saurabh, Anannya Upasana | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | IJCAI 2025 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| The Proportional Veto Principle for Approval Ballots | Daniel Halpern, Ariel D. Procaccia, Warut Suksompong | Voting · Voting Theory & Axioms | IJCAI 2025 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| Dividing Conflicting Items Fairly | Ayumi Igarashi, Pasin Manurangsi, Hirotaka Yoneda | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | IJCAI 2025 | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | |
| Efficient Algorithms for Electing Successive Committees | Pallavi Jain, Andrzej Kaczmarczyk | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | IJCAI 2025 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| Online Housing Market | Julien Lesca | Fair Allocation · Chores, Online & Dynamic | IJCAI 2025 | – | – | triple | |
| Approximately EFX and fPO Allocations for Bivalued Chores | Zehan Lin, Xiaowei Wu, Shengwei Zhou | Fair Allocation · Chores, Online & Dynamic | IJCAI 2025 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| Stackelberg vs. Nash in the Lottery Colonel Blotto Game not comsoc | Yan Liu, Bonan Ni, Weiran Shen, Zihe Wang, Jie Zhang | unclassified | IJCAI 2025 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| Viral Marketing and Convergence Properties in Generalised Voter Model not comsoc | Abhiram Manohara, Ahad N. Zehmakan | unclassified | IJCAI 2025 | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | |
| Asymptotic Analysis of Weighted Fair Division | Pasin Manurangsi, Warut Suksompong, Tomohiko Yokoyama | Fair Allocation · Fair Division Theory | IJCAI 2025 | ✓ | – | ↗ | triple proof |
| Asymptotic Fair Division: Chores Are Easier Than Goods | Pasin Manurangsi, Warut Suksompong | Fair Allocation · Chores, Online & Dynamic | IJCAI 2025 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| Variety-Seeking Jump Games on Graphs not comsoc | Lata Narayanan, Jaroslav Opatrny, Shanmukha Tummala, Alexandros A. Voudouris | unclassified | IJCAI 2025 | – | – | triple | |
| The Core of Approval-Based Committee Elections with Few Seats | Dominik Peters | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | IJCAI 2025 | – | ✓ | triple | |
| Optimal Capacity Modification for Stable Matchings with Ties | Keshav Ranjan, Meghana Nasre, Prajakta Nimbhorkar | Coalition Formation · Matching under Preferences | IJCAI 2025 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| Improved Approximation Ratio for Strategyproof Facility Location on a Cycle | Krzysztof Rogowski, Marcin Dziubiński | Voting · Manipulation | IJCAI 2025 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| Discrete Budget Aggregation: Truthfulness and Proportionality | Ulrike Schmidt-Kraepelin, Warut Suksompong, Markus Utke | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Participatory Budgeting | IJCAI 2025 | – | – | triple | |
| Finding Possible Winners in Spatial Voting with Incomplete Information | Hadas Shachnai, Rotem Shavitt, Andreas Wiese | Voting · Incomplete Information | IJCAI 2025 | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | |
| Improved MMS Approximations for Few Agent Types | Parnian Shahkar, Jugal Garg | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | IJCAI 2025 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| Probabilistic Analysis of Stable Matching in Large Markets with Siblings | Zhaohong Sun, Tomohiko Yokoyama, Makoto Yokoo | Coalition Formation · Matching under Preferences | IJCAI 2025 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| A Little Subsidy Ensures MMS Allocation for Three Agents | Xiaowei Wu, Quan Xue, Shengwei Zhou | Fair Allocation · Shares & Guarantees | IJCAI 2025 | – | – | triple | |
| Revisiting Proportional Allocation with Subsidy: Simplification and Improvements | Xiaowei Wu, Quan Xue, Shengwei Zhou | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | IJCAI 2025 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| First-Order Coalition Logic not comsoc | Davide Catta, Rustam Galimullin, Aniello Murano | unclassified | IJCAI 2025 | – | ✓ | triple | |
| On Middle Grounds for Preference Statements | Anne-Marie George, Ana Ozaki | Voting · Combinatorial Domains | IJCAI 2025 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| Responsibility Gap in Collective Decision Making | Pavel Naumov, Jia Tao | Voting · Voting Theory & Axioms | IJCAI 2025 | – | – | triple | |
| Minimizing Polarization and Disagreement in the Friedkin–Johnsen Model with Unknown Innate Opinions | Federico Cinus, Atsushi Miyauchi, Yuko Kuroki, Francesco Bonchi | Frontier · Opinion Diffusion & Networks | IJCAI 2025 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| Recommender Systems for Democracy: Toward Adversarial Robustness in Voting Advice Applications | Frédéric Berdoz, Dustin Brunner, Yann Vonlanthen, Roger Wattenhofer | Voting · Bribery & Control | IJCAI 2025 | – | – | triple | |
| Control in Computational Social Choice | Jiehua Chen, Joanna Kaczmarek, Paul Nüsken, Jörg Rothe, Ildikó Schlotter, Tessa Seeger | Voting · Bribery & Control | IJCAI 2025 | – | ✓ | triple | |
| A Survey on Bandit Learning in Matching Markets not comsoc | Shuai Li, Zilong Wang, Fang Kong | unclassified | IJCAI 2025 | – | – | triple | |
| Shapley Value Computation in Ontology-Mediated Query Answering (Extended Abstract) not comsoc | Meghyn Bienvenu, Diego Figueira, Pierre Lafourcade | unclassified | IJCAI 2025 | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | |
| Incentives for Early Arrival in Cooperative Games (Extended Abstract) | Yaoxin Ge, Yao Zhang, Dengji Zhao, Zhihao Gavin Tang, Hu Fu, Pinyan Lu | Coalition Formation · Weighted Voting Games | IJCAI 2025 | – | – | triple | |
| MatchXplain: Analyzing Preferences, Explaining Outcomes, and Simplifying Decisions | Hadi Hosseini, Yubo Jing, Ronak Singh | Coalition Formation · Matching under Preferences | IJCAI 2025 | – | ✓ | triple | |
| Best of Both Worlds Fairness under Entitlements -- probablistic allocation of indivisible items -- already probabilistic | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | AAMAS 2023 | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| Probabilistic Rationing with Categorized Priorities: Processing Reserves Fairly and Efficiently | Coalition Formation · Matching under Preferences | AAMAS 2023 | – | – | triple | ||
| Semi-Popular Matchings and Copeland Winners | Coalition Formation · Matching under Preferences | AAMAS 2023 | – | – | triple | ||
| Host Community Respecting Refugee Housing | Coalition Formation · Matching under Preferences | AAMAS 2023 | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| Online Matching with Delays and Stochastic Arrival Times | Coalition Formation · Matching under Preferences | AAMAS 2023 | – | – | triple | ||
| Stable Marriage in Euclidean Space | Coalition Formation · Matching under Preferences | AAMAS 2023 | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| Experimental paper on stable roommates | Coalition Formation · Matching under Preferences | AAMAS 2023 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| Revisiting the Distortion of Distributed Voting | Voting · Distortion | AAMAS 2023 | – | – | triple | ||
| Bounded Approval Ballots: Balancing Expressiveness and Simplicity for Multiwinner Elections | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | AAMAS 2023 | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| On the Distortion of Single Winner Elections with Aligned Candidates | Voting · Distortion | AAMAS 2023 | – | – | triple | ||
| SAT-based Judgment Aggregation | Frontier · Judgment Aggregation | AAMAS 2023 | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| Characterizations of Sequential Valuation Rules | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | AAMAS 2023 | – | – | triple | ||
| Collecting, Classifying, Analyzing, and Using Real-World Ranking Data | Frontier · Computer-Aided Methods & Data | AAMAS 2023 | – | – | triple | ||
| Margin of Victory for Weighted Tournament Solutions | Voting · Weighted Tournaments | AAMAS 2023 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| Strategyproof Social Decision Schemes on Super Condorcet Domains | Voting · Probabilistic Social Choice | AAMAS 2023 | – | – | triple | ||
| Separating and Collapsing Electoral Control Types | Voting · Bribery & Control | AAMAS 2023 | – | – | triple | ||
| The Distortion of Approval Voting with Runoff | Voting · Distortion | AAMAS 2023 | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| On the Complexity of the Two-Stage Majority Rule | Voting · Bribery & Control | AAMAS 2023 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| Fairness in Participatory Budgeting via Equality of Resources | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Participatory Budgeting | AAMAS 2023 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| Free-Riding in Multi-Issue Decisions | Voting · Combinatorial Domains | AAMAS 2023 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| Computing the Best Policy that Survives a Vote | Voting · Combinatorial Domains | AAMAS 2023 | ✓ | ✓ | ↗ | triple proof | |
| Voting by Axioms | Frontier · Computer-Aided Methods & Data | AAMAS 2023 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| Voting with Limited Energy: A Study of Plurality and Borda | Voting · Incomplete Information | AAMAS 2023 | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-00055f69adb8db517dcd31d0e6631ee7b7d36198 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-000b724c98412e6d8e85768d204392078d5ef97e | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-0012fda53bfecb8fc457b05e404a5c772a6c256d | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-00231d271acce2c1e779e66d685a3ba7093c4655 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-0043e17fb6f1bcd1d883130f0ef3de7e6a7d1ca7 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-0049868d186c19e7593481ed3675ea23040d348c | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Comparison-Based Fair Division of Indivisible Chores | Ze-Han Lin, Shengxin Liu, Biaoshuai Tao, Shengwei Zhou | Fair Allocation · Chores, Online & Dynamic | ? 2026 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| s5-005ae5f8223fe3919e21d77de92d4be99195897e | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-005b83f6ac5a47e1e209d3247c25f925f3243879 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-0067a6d129548d20cfcfc514ac1d51113404e437 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-006c4e46b396745053b3c1d2de35b59271c83dd9 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-00755db57a3accef5e5dbe50261e972135c9ed2c | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-008389f22745495526a9ba53061af7b538bcf705 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-008424b1f55149d6925e2b52851189c3e398dd8a | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-008a60551418c61f112a38d6b796e518eb6fce09 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-009935d2823750890276de1e7cac6017b29bd4b4 | unclassified | ? | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| s5-009a4837f60b141267340f0f9e4f92c92b2cfebf | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-009cb460dfd18d4bc6a9b3d462cdd06af744ab22 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-00a39d233916a02f2ad37e3ed5a6d571d8ef66df | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-00a3b60ae05e51608ee16402e77a432889e2c7f9 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-00b2829618c0730ab0274d7154daccd329632280 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-00bcb2e19ceda0bc5dde2bb41cd937df2e1ca26c | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-00c7de142ae4fbd52198f07d599dfe15caeaf568 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Marginal Mechanisms For Balanced Exchange | Vikram Manjunath, Alexander Westkamp | Fair Allocation · Fair Division Theory | ? 2025 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| s5-00d1f9ae48c321977352cbb5b2ace8c7cf44d01c | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-00d52032635e7e271d582c7a3fe62dbf89531b18 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-00eb5d20d4985148e222eef4edc8e2fec2177c8c | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-00ee1190ddb60bc6c23dd51e3c2f1d19fb60c453 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-011c3417b6f70b7ca8c866157259abb0c84beb4d | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-0131f4466b31701acebf95027e7b855ff9b3aa6a | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-013745b7a76ab43c3fc560a562eef5fd0792a6fa | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-0141c4b13066a5218378b15b7dfa78dfb8679432 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-0159f38d6e72e700a8af94bef3920c40e14b50d7 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-01ad20398b4a8c51fec839f042651880510c307a | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-01b3e6fb6aa97f767bd0aca36c7f6bb351d72c37 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-01b57bf3e7096dbf0ed184a28f3d41e8dfdefdff | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-01b731c65cc7b45ccbf1899e3aeb0abd251be937 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-01ba325fe2e2059af68c33830b129b03812e89c8 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-01c2e1d447174701baa0ce974e24ee02af5703ec | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-01cb2d6b538a119861f7a12e849c1f1af5c217c2 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-01d077b7928ec44d1e1507ae82b39dca7b1dfe87 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-01e8ec801fa02639f486fed60ebdf4c4ec1a74df | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| s5-01f7c4c4fc3a9c67a63dd519f87cedee08d9557b | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-0207716d1a81bd386d0fe84c52c8ca105885a196 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-020ba8135f5505a992519b30c1b6ed23da165022 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-020f3921452aa2bd752464d4b54725c6ba2014da | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-021468e8d0d6ca891387159fb57b193665879a9b | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-0220410871413c19848eb45f229708783367ba0c | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-0228b12ee47fe8972ff42bd30c291dca982f523d | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| s5-022b7ca439aba16f42cf8d4a4677e9e5861ff4a6 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-022e86803cb8d606e1adae7cb4ae67d26cf9c141 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| s5-0238359c37a6b1e2d92396c114d336e37301cddc | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-023b1ccf732d457e9284c0fce6697eaa2d5689f2 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Stable and Fair Random Allocations in a Two-Sided Discrete-Concave Market | Kenzo Imamura, Yasushi Kawase | Coalition Formation · Matching under Preferences | ARXIV.ORG 2026 | – | – | triple | |
| s5-0247a39106570df5777e68a60fb747d998904805 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-025f4dc81e8b0863f51a08fe5e179630c3f21ffc | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-0265528e484c5aaaf2f44a93ebf02dd84422fec2 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-0269726e61f5e9ffc0e10e88fc3a2e99da47fa1b | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-026c1c827c8dce50cdb2533f8f745492b61978c7 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-026d0a520996cd3aee1d13f7453bd78d3dab2ff0 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-02b4aeec485586011b8c951eaa39ef05ac8a25c5 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-02b9f0f608452441814f47554ef81fe4666079d8 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-02ba101f85da556d705680569e4c22ee609faea9 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-02ba1fb63edfc02d14e2492216b03342884a3c59 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-02c8577654148ae3ebb8c32c2870c04bb3301553 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-02c87b057ab10189a60710570b29b65a4ef5d7cb | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-02d468e5560a5b360be92857e765794d40ba8bf3 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| When far is better: The Chamberlin-Courant approach to obnoxious committee selection | Sushmita Gupta, Tanmay Inamdar, P. Jain, D. Lokshtanov, Fahad Panolan, Saket Saurabh | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science 2024 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| s5-02e4bcd1e099ed237e3baecbb888c3f9f23c4462 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-02fca0143200f402fbedd095eb33d13dee5e8bda | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-0300f2811ad874937b24c8cab8c76820759c36cd | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-0304ea063838c1c7a9cd3a7610be57c961d93c2b | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-0305e0911d63298fa0c64c4c6a6c6847c4352263 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-030b4bf23a5d20ca255161c2f03a8251cc47e282 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-0310ec9476edf8da4964e8605d5cafd4ab148483 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-031b28db423167b8ffb78a1aa1f44835861171c3 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-031bdbfb74c360ba68341e4c810bd4bdd4e05008 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-0322054be2bc31ce07adf8e5e9eba84ece9e644c | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Temporal Fair Division of Indivisible Mixed Manna: Tractable Settings | Kui-Wang Choi, Min-Ming Li, Nicholas J. Teh | Fair Allocation · Chores, Online & Dynamic | ? 2026 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| s5-032b7b9ac5fed47f75e58e88844a253f237aa181 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-0332d0942faf77c80d8f8fa1a785f55ec99e56ef | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Fair Allocation of Indivisible Chores: Beyond Additive Costs | B. Li, Fangxia Wang, Yu Zhou | Fair Allocation · Shares & Guarantees | Neural Information Processing Systems 2022 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| s5-033ecb0b5dd020a15fe1ee9c82f1eec83fa04a87 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-0340a08a0015d92d391ce83760bc864af50bd991 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-03569e2c692d81ac1c00cdec74d4b4583efe8758 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-036a37fcc563131ccce373004f512101be4516c6 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-037ed04ba9019c184594ff4a40aeab9b8dc806a5 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-03904d71df1c58527f8ec71d64ac1dbff534b96f | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| s5-039736434a608e4e2e5f5fb9d56eb83c33982d01 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Deep Learning for Two-Sided Matching | S. Ravindranath, Zhe Feng, Shiran Li, Jonathan Ma, S. Kominers, D. Parkes | Coalition Formation · Matching under Preferences | ARXIV.ORG 2021 | – | – | triple | |
| s5-03b5fcff4974702d28b2a4533e4035e01e081c09 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-03d12f37e7794607d5eca1397c98a52cbf80abf3 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-03dd027d5a783b03654a0e80785210ce9218c247 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-03e6695eea0a787f264437a6783e1b4636611abc | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-03fa316a42f82aa1c23587b4dfa7e39720ac4425 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-040cea40b902a578f66c1a171f6b855fbf3cd821 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-04148abaa7fa674404bfab5200bef7d0ec4a2099 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-0418ccb509b4105e9715cde5b21ecac8081ec34a | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-042145673620eb3afa182d09a89adc1ce7f50f40 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-04351afe442f9e1ae8bd68172129429101ce53ea | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| s5-04445ea2a359972632d0754f7e89a8c8f52c3159 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-044bec8e2e610763282af6d2119a943651b8882b | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-045351d2bf9180f93ae570dc6557afacfe49bb30 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-046091e2b48599332e7da2995ca5cc48ae39d229 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-04612e9592e01f336f0e99580d1f6e6263d1d1a9 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-0462a9f3a06043fc5b449d2bd8f75b6ba3355325 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-0462cabd47a181c9da1b50167292113db00d25d9 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-0465bb681fab5899276a3623767b830f8d326665 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-046a029fbf0ad6c0ecbd283fde4509f88e7dfadf | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-0476340e2327069f474c30274b09b0edf6111072 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-0479b7e67773d69fa34a5ea5cb0f14562898750e | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-047f36824533f99b04fad833ed1ced94ac5bbc93 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-048d2e0c9c5da222c14decdad18cfe5c1bef37f2 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-048d59992055ccbd1f10a1d279d6dece858c8ab7 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-04987afcdef11518bffd2505b6583c27440491d5 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-04a1e8e0cb18d0e3c22d88dea6cdbc0cf70c9cf9 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-04a708b922419697814b065f7d643f29dbaa3cbd | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-04aae2dbe2e8ef9410c644c6baa5da8df6bbf6fb | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-04ac9477180ae6598b0cbde438b13c01948f47f7 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-04b1d0024c4437263f589920afae509c0aaed41c | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-04b6a020518a52214056edcbe461473b90f8a0b4 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-04bd0c75e8b758b0ebd2e5a5c337e95a8e354284 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-04c15af95aff43162b09edd8d725eaef43e05a52 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-04cc2692670574a2dcd8785c5e72a51b22ff6461 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-04d189a0f7706dcc4c98bf247a557587dcffc3fc | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-04dcf24003fef95e01c6e6a7f19bf2599ed030cf | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-04ded1b17e57e0173ab8f084da5cf40fd6cab51d | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-04ec30e494d203f3331ffce8e7a832397dec921e | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-04ee6e6fd2f4cc8dba4d712917a3122791c854c6 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-05189fcf86a3f09cb6448d1a6db5384375a8518f | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-05324f8463e8890f1c7894ee8f378a7dc9b3f08a | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-05502cb67904e5129d74e4e3c4135f354bd009fa | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | ↗ | triple proof | |
| s5-0553954840db49cd89ee5bdab77049d95d17e329 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| Online MMS Allocation for Chores | Jia-Xin Song, Biaoshuai Tao, Wenqian Wang, Yuhao Zhang | Fair Allocation · Chores, Online & Dynamic | ARXIV.ORG 2025 | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | |
| s5-056f97ecf4e055b9efd0bc8547e70b59d7957c0c | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-0572b5060e761c0f5ab8d616c9726e3296edce1f | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-0574b1cd6351abeb1652b5392a67d3b4db121dc2 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-057bc2c39298bb052934aff82f67197198ce95aa | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-05a52d16677fca48c8137c122c783139ce0cea5a | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-05ae8dc1fb38f441adaf105b1abfefa88baa7b07 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-05b4e4639e52c1f2b8a606d61f3c82ca135f662e | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-05bb480922fcc32c62307084d4904e0b05263449 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-05cbf8989e96b6d535cef31db127e587c9962838 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-05d47458f6a7edc945b9a228b0cdd5c14958773b | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-05d85e486151a1ba4cdb8f5cb2fc6bf3e1e653a8 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-05d9684b41c1d78444ed72d6d6f0193bdd8d506d | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-05f51992c9382c69933801e4faaf41e864d34f64 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Axioms for defeat in democratic elections | W. Holliday, E. Pacuit | Voting · Voting Theory & Axioms | Journal of Theoretical Politics 2020 | – | – | triple | |
| s5-0600cd792a22e24874e636cb976b5ed6d297d375 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-06138524b2654b18a91eb85bd81241977b1c252e | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-06166614815c6d83dfeaccb9b58a7e542e0c95e3 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-061f4ab3d73b8a05c8b158292cb4d7d0ae30a7b1 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-0621e5411b2ef647d8ad1a413f8b35b3772a354b | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-06375f9ba76514f4e98af078d3bcabf813f1b179 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Majority dynamics and aggregation of information in social networks not comsoc | Elchanan Mossel, Joe Neeman, O. Tamuz | unclassified | Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems 2012 | – | – | triple | |
| s5-063c83594255149461ee86383a50a98fca647be7 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-0662374be5a33c06cca0446d97ce90cc74da9098 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-066d9126450f74183258fb0fa4f4d732f55f5cec | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-06768ecff28b5464467b2aab294c8293f468f809 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| First-order methods for large-scale market equilibrium computation | Yuan Gao, Christian Kroer | Fair Allocation · Markets & Equilibria | Neural Information Processing Systems 2020 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| s5-0692c8c620d01fa893fd856e85e5634d5aa7708c | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-06a07ce25f98e721afdc2ff15e6f1a44286707ef | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-06b3f0fd786bc4af86a0402c42015bb067f40465 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| s5-06c1bac4625561902a8d48960fe4d27a614918bb | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-06c2bb4983795b90822d984174a7981be036b441 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-06ca1bdb5f405bac32a90fcd59742a62a4a80f60 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-06d202552973f25af5e2c07e07762d7e16433760 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-06d6158f015da5cb2fe48babf474c20f646945c7 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-06ea4ca2c724745983a40e8a1f7800dfc33da68c | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-0707f8052db84ff1898a6a5fe30813d2fd06b5f6 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-070862f91e0f7414b92be6e12518978daa252bf9 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-0728a192ed0d0c27a29048a1118de82af347dbfd | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-07295d27c789dc8bac965d7926e2b600491c66fe | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-074242f9a4a18fcac3ab726e5dc34566f997df5e | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-074a0fd869bb4b5acbc68088fb6d9313da9937ae | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| s5-075579c4081a8d05c04253a6485b7527697fd183 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-0761e9a4a06ca8314ae67566eb2eedf6676e9703 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-076af9f8256521b1b26ca45d2d5e58967a019005 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-077a77ce6bc0a40c8ada852e709478a212cc2b37 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-079395d2de504eb559d11ea515f663b0d19a1061 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-07a217e124262f868210ea899dfeb082c2ec9df9 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| On Achieving Fairness and Stability in Many-to-One Matchings | Shivika Narang, Arpita Biswas, Y. Narahari | Fair Allocation · Fair Division Theory | ARXIV.ORG 2020 | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof |
| s5-07d40ae2a031e2fbb20d4e8f948931cbdb25ed1e | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-07d731b89a168d932793ab7d45d3273d3a5ae318 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-07d8929027ef19fc13943e0bbcdc12e624815e90 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-07e61517e5dc2bac0bbfdf92d8fbef4ddc86a24f | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| s5-07f537e3397c37e9cbe025f567a0a3ec4bd324ce | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-07f57467dca5fc3fe8236a30f53cffa0702219fb | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-07f86200348ce4e81de001a7a75cbb63537dfa35 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-0802bf796a1e6ccf7a90265ddd578abc4d109620 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-0811810ac0fa0d606fb3d90ae0b23a9bde13cc0e | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| A generalization of the AL method for fair allocation of indivisible objects | H. Aziz | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | ARXIV.ORG 2014 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| s5-082cb1f16b4f91a3e785d011da1e35d8e942b002 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| s5-08312525c0565f16b6a491bdf55c1c6ec33f37f0 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-0837fb6975bb29b103588ff2f8c6063df61c503f | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-085b590377832da8719a527715c3defaab264642 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| Search versus Decision for Election Manipulation Problems | E. Hemaspaandra, Lane A. Hemaspaandra, Curtis Menton | Voting · Manipulation | Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science 2012 | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof |
| s5-089117fa28098586d182a2c499aafc8fac1ac52d | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-0891208b4be27cc2c1d32f552056fb8d9d30a57d | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-08b132e1245051b87e0bd8c4762930ced7a1b1ab | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-08c14bc52c3e6e087c04b303eeb74d2ef3565399 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Stability in Repeated Matching Markets | Ce Liu | Coalition Formation · Matching under Preferences | Theoretical Economics 2020 | – | – | triple | |
| s5-08d0f4a1dade818cb8d88a3b02129e2c58bb3fcf | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-08e1dd89880f6560b110cdd95b20c3cc8aa2ef74 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-09271b8855e671564a030898c93efbfc80069053 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-093002e092422a006233c8f7ab82c7fc1e1dbe3f | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-0935475eb5f5c8a037863cf2af0b081c8e793773 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-094eb3d6360b34b6e5795728780f920b2d808b1b | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-095b1ec7d2986a9a6988ae82147421d4fb20d906 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-097a93c95f50ff17f37b25380567667f054b5078 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-097c12c05d4a0e57a7a5a8ff1f69c33ae3865fe1 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-09978846b845dbca36b92ff5fb587b1493d437f6 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-09abeb0aae8f31586c8119e0f15c21d261e593cc | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-09b9423749875c3e19fe1ae6de5d48a57a2e2c98 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-0a05d08d0ae997bce8db9610df7ebe3d08419ea7 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-0a0697664d045d49e382ddb19021d38da1fc6040 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-0a06fa79e3b2fd5ef1c0fad4fc1e50c49c1561b7 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-0a07284c6b035937f0de4f19123504b317204fbd | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-0a0786aee72e179a8d708733a773e61318cc4252 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| s5-0a200d093d2f8cfaa9ecadbfb9eea2a5323db0da | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-0a21317ed29be35942f003d1cb973ab5f69be478 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-0a326218e2a5285b2b6232a062525e015912e301 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-0a7079df15598237b0d8556282f1eb4ef684c792 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-0a75b98eb21b2b34c240e3368c645523c97a201c | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-0a8a62a3edb4c1f5c01d0b095b7e1017af2ce9dc | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-0a8fd3ad010a1eb2f73036acf1374bc9d6b25e62 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-0a977649985e3d38de82f403729dcd98956348de | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| s5-0aa840e5eb547c0d4ec51dd7c8b0940febf96212 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-0aaf2ae3ea1f1a8666ea4d413bc83caf1e39b985 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-0ab35da8dc30341cfde530885e00cc14e9bd059b | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-0ab40aeb3f0d09a912aba0b31f320e5782512b45 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-0ad99548415bc746b3d5a63b3228040590d38898 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-0af05694fce0ef2aad0eb764640223421cab7abe | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-0afd3e1096ed8e2ec4057ec3ec3722a10c0a834b | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| On the Existence of EFX (and Pareto-Optimal) Allocations for Binary Chores | Biaoshuai Tao, Xiaowei Wu, Ziqi Yu, Shengwei Zhou | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | IJTCS-FAW 2023 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| s5-0b64e958d8c624ac0a8f60d1dbbd34f92699eb72 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-0b71e772d7bfd197fe03e3118b2b887620bcc957 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-0b8f4fb707b2f2e2e4de41bf9c386aa4de478528 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-0b9625fbd182f0dfb7621dc57018b7cac0c0d32f | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-0b9e329df6649d45a9bbc3a0df3f147b9ba37b1d | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-0ba1fdcd5ef574a09e490d1ce73bf84f4800521b | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-0ba2fc6859b02ee4462d68eccf85d63bc22918a6 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-0bc7465ac9535f5444126165f91423eba71d8bc0 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-0bd3d5c41395d83c1fe78b398a5ad19c2e993ba0 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-0bde67c0509208ebf2f9c7ee384b6c2c8aa20d7f | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| Bicriteria Multidimensional Mechanism Design with Side Information not comsoc | M. Balcan, Siddharth Prasad, T. Sandholm | unclassified | Neural Information Processing Systems 2023 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| s5-0bffe4248962f1ff3824b2480e699b2dc71efdcb | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-0c065206e4863299e64147fae6a55ead8b4d1ef0 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-0c279cfa9ed5f4d11f8ab86c7b2bc393e3975b4e | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-0c2fbac2cad34a49dd67b85829c2da35345f48f1 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-0c3116e6ec598d3b17cc7b9008f5b2e7e459dac1 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| A Consistent Extension of Condorcet’s Election Principle | H. Young, A. Levenglick | Voting · Weighted Tournaments | ? 1978 | – | – | triple | |
| s5-0c49968d429cd215fcd728ad3870b208c3bf4b21 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-0c49e4346ff438103f836c6fd454c3d89cd62d46 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-0c4d084cf20e9b8819224e0df583a62bcdef5055 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | ↗ | triple proof | |
| s5-0c5ebfdf98448ec81c7934116c524da195f1709d | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-0c6816087699b63ac936302cb1bc86652bb5ce6b | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-0c6abfbc3644a93e8b4d441634972e9560346697 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| s5-0c7408959ec46bf3b3ced2576985885db6fc2107 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-0c82f17fdf1862014fafe18f46310f67302e69e3 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-0c83e956537bcb3bd220584c775a51a0a3e8fedc | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-0c89cf92ff41c4101eb08d41f7ee9ca8415df294 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-0c908b1e1db8da223b57867f810a85b49eb96482 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| A Simple Model of Herd Behavior not comsoc | A. Banerjee | unclassified | ? 1992 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| s5-0c9ca518b65e5fba55d1602b1ae52347303add38 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-0ca57d922f029eb04a435dea59c85a3d4b270ed8 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-0cb08dcafec46228b48cbbde9e0eaffca6eda6be | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-0cb7ac57fa29e2111d2c4a32bc9dc54a2a6e1f0b | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-0cc3bf4f1bbfe448b8c54b126cf84ab9dafb4312 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-0cd068de120487008eab3a7a38e755c8f4dc676e | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-0cd216c90818406e7fbef722300e7a22acaf9817 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-0cd9cd60920b9ddbef0494a3af6a73131994f388 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-0cdaccb9576b24a3ecff7af5c6a475fd99c0010d | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-0cdb11e0dbf9ec36b19ced3b3feedb5a1c6bf439 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| A constant-factor approximation algorithm for Nash Social Welfare with submodular valuations | Wenzheng Li, Jan Vondr'ak | Fair Allocation · Markets & Equilibria | IEEE Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science 2021 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| s5-0ced6e7307d1ef69a28bb71f06ad6120e74aa2bf | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-0cf3de3bfa77e0678949f7e8180e4a628eab8cd0 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-0d0b71d5a9fbda58c476435a112ec38eaa0d6477 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-0d17b1e1654ffe5ac8f693da24a25e21c5d13bd2 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-0d2df0af47b23e61beba7cea5ebbf532c3e4ca05 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-0d40ec8ebdd7ca018e38e159f674ab570a504039 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-0d412f7b6f59ddd442a200f8dbc4591dae550313 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-0d55df5018c2c2f818edfe27480128d2c837bba4 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-0d75454d85e4527bb151207c6e51d2634b0e6eca | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-0d89665c4ca363c55aeec31ae4423e3b8bf471a4 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Compatibility of Fairness and Nash Welfare under Subadditive Valuations | Siddharth Barman, Mashbat Suzuki | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms 2024 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| s5-0d94dd4ac159081515d07365155d2d43edcffeec | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| s5-0d9727762ad1a0e867c13a33205adde52f5e71c3 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Sharing the Revenues from Broadcasting Sport Events | G. Bergantiños, Juan D. Moreno-Ternero | Fair Allocation · Fair Division Theory | Management Sciences 2020 | – | – | triple | |
| s5-0db98f2554503c45bfd2a8e23f513861ef1d714f | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-0dcc1945394b3ec4afa779963bd1b389b8018dad | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-0dd28ceaa92a45c29d659e4328dac0e25282d046 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-0de26e8ea1d50fcc961103365eff6dba9ab2e03b | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-0df08c69d6ecaf094cbc36a05942944fa0531b92 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-0df611307262e10125c0e4a735bd392612c82c07 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-0df9e65973c81f91464879c9ed7315d264111d65 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Redesigning the US Army’s Branching Process: A Case Study in Minimalist Market Design | Kyle Greenberg, Parag A. Pathak, Tayfun Sönmez | Coalition Formation · Matching under Preferences | The American Economic Review 2023 | – | – | triple | |
| s5-0e14eb4e21e9d4732a5f6a25d55829505443976c | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-0e6608e4e4088e9da4f43794e8e7dafff483222c | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-0e678e9cb3a79819aa8fa2c32095e94ba7eb2b1b | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-0e77fc379ac3202b23e673ec20d8045bddec4fd9 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-0e78d809a77517a28ffb0acff15f78e3ca333fe7 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-0e892aaa55c09d2725e852111c456732ff20493c | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-0ea67c509145da3c654f76f7c01748c248830a0d | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-0eb9a0fde23ca0d1f723deac05d91567ebfb16bc | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-0eb9c6f41a687c428ebd4983d2cb920727a4482a | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-0eba1fd8e25588c7165d1056d821d8052d5e42d0 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-0ee1abb960511e689a9001da6780ca382bcafea1 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-0ee447ea839dd961c61adc2d1c937001f672bb96 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-0eeeb78d018d97350e9eadd0d929dd9cda4b2689 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-0ef2300eac7e229fcc5b506a0f511c6878b1b596 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-0ef90560e38b1cef71ee9d8edd1e9ae99ccb5d30 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-0f0d5f53df5c74b722972932eb09c3a1401317a6 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-0f0d62dfa8a4052a93185789321437551c606b66 | unclassified | ? | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| s5-0f0e00c71cf35009c5f616a87e20a7ef872d68fb | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-0f0fe0ef729d820ea59dc2e0a100f749a4181566 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| s5-0f31ff4672fbb9028d4f2017b942016177982765 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-0f44eb734d88ffa4a5ff58bdf60068a19f696492 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-0f4d04d267df7f124e8a1f1ed81a47e6eec63554 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-0f669de2e78e15ead41015c3e7a5b5b2bfed3faf | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| Computing and testing Pareto optimal committees | H. Aziz, J. Lang, J. Monnot | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems 2018 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| s5-0f7d88d6c7f80d6bf58fe54a4da6be72a6386d8a | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-0f819c007201da13d5574041f09d84d803453966 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-0f8eddaa9ad0077d796380e3888fe8c350967703 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-0fa58451a6e469a71a9963465cc254a8aff1ae17 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-0fa864690c699e89a9a6b2139d84805a97ccd94c | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-0fb30424c99288374d11da24a927331464eca55d | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-0fc87ddd1b2c1770d4ba902dc77e5d852694d963 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-0fcacf43e777dfa0a6c85f37b656f2f11b642c33 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-0fd62cbc8beba4fcaaa30a335079e12144109168 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-0ff4bcc8c1778e0e296f62058568e05cc376ebf4 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-0ff82c673b5e86b62fb282de805b141696f48862 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-0ff86ef854b00b38a7400d23bfb26b6087898d49 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-0ffd20feebfb366634e95a51045b89ae888c8ab0 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-10044a552f78d923a8fdb887e1f68d2b1fdc8b39 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-1029ffecb9d7131d0339af073818152292104822 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| s5-104ee4c8e50dfb1d66634a4806b73879988cbaf7 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-10589e12b427f87e01edf917b856d09d80d93ca7 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-1060a7268e2efdfdbc38e808116e5bf272a10405 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-107a480679e6752de69095a756390213565b113c | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-107ccd1b2c9aa8ee89b5aada6139d9ae81cf8fca | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-108fafbd6ea115dda59f30f3c46d5bb05765abab | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-10a72ed4958a689cf998b592c117a3cddbd58d1b | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| s5-10ad0ec72e110183e78d2031780571f2329b3049 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-10c6205d92bfafa24e3d835328aee66247c371a9 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-10c7fbb850d098394c8d08466feeb5898f949afd | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| s5-10d471142d5619869e3904c55938c8c67c373e9e | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-10d81933954836652e00c0973d3e8097fea7f852 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-10daaa5d1190b6cabf61d96d52331e813fbf090a | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-10dd88313a158bd69644bf7c0b3b0ea856faae3d | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| Budget-Balance, Fairness and Minimal Manipulability | Tommy Andersson, Lars Ehlers, Lars-Gunnar Svensson | Fair Allocation · Fair Division Theory | ? 2014 | – | – | triple | |
| s5-10eb06c3288091dbaa48376c90845db0b0ff4bd2 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-10ecf376a4b065e906fe5f1340cfec739bcbab3b | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-10fc940af60bcd93b8a7f51a9c3f7f588913dd66 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | ↗ | triple proof | |
| Cutoff stability under distributional constraints with an application to summer internship matching | H. Aziz, Anton Baychkov, P. Biró | Coalition Formation · Matching under Preferences | Mathematical programming 2021 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| s5-11553d31fcd9a267228c089c3f381124f90faced | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-1170d6db8044cc8db6f777e332e3e41b10380dbd | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-11719ee7bc457bdd76743d4fa0cdc2490677ac8f | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-1187a4f89f97be026f8bdda3d4b96c856a2ebe26 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-118c9ea459e25e23eaf7f113d57614246d000d10 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-11a4931123ade1105b7ad6e3dc225873520acb0a | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-11afa4a6aebf3fad60d52cc9cd31d79d55fd6796 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| s5-11b28d9b3da64f6950b386dae77c34d2ad5415b1 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-11b89d1dd42fd25ceaa5f9b28d67c89a51c50106 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-11c3ddbd1d4842ee24c967d54838ad17cb890bab | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-11c8b4790ff4e9760c6ef1a6854888caba6ad8da | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-11d21dd8ee8788cc4482c9fc896ff64b5e801039 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-11d67f30554604e0d1616bd6e9439f84e5bd268e | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-11d9ba76da6f64b911e8b5333c04741513593a2d | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| Randomized Strategyproof Facility Location: Two Facilities and Beyond | Hau Chan, Jia-Nan Lin, Chen-Hao Wang | Frontier · Computer-Aided Methods & Data | ? 2026 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| s5-11f940571232f4959617fa71cead9a7a33316933 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-122758a65f48ff677cb33605ee4276b93ac6b87d | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-12362acf404b5ee9a3025b2669beeb54a5a515ba | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-1236710ca5109f668a7c2bc2204fc55496d1c8a3 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-1249c751332351506d36b36717d9fe4c88df56c0 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| s5-124d2733a84367f15d7612f678c19db82fd010bf | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-12514a8fc6a541e27a87ab2c6f9bb12aff08936e | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-1253e6ec21897674442808c62bc892ec850df34c | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-1260d7d23881e48666bcf635e325c932c4127837 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| s5-1261d12fdb4ebe47a5f6e6b71ff75bf06e853215 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Approximation Algorithms for Computing Maximin Share Allocations | Georgios Amanatidis, E. Markakis, Afshin Nikzad, A. Saberi | Fair Allocation · Shares & Guarantees | International Colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming 2015 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| s5-126726f22e8a9ea05450fda1e4b7c061d58453ed | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-1269b6a7e07d78a2b1d13025b0f4d32a98dfe271 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-126c2375c3e3e17ff8405ec5ddcc57177bd21785 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-127d7079cc387625784deb125d456572d09b7a70 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-128dd01a5a404eedac696d954cdf8897a4a2a26f | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | ↗ | triple proof | |
| s5-12a192232dfca3d15f6f13c44792b56f9e1c5504 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-12cafe20c6b844df81021ec971aa2e52a0d5f907 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-12d30460cfea830deb461554c65cd005d38aff21 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-12d628977c000535b828bc11ecdf75c40c8a4238 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-12db9518fb89d67774c9da4dc4d1edad5646806a | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-12dec0585b3d89619830c7b48412901e36048c9a | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-12dfd8248c0216544e1438b01b9f11615108688a | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-12e3ffdd85d4beb12dbd7f383643e3145a5eebf3 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-130d18d1d455336e1a5b06c85784894bb67d87ec | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-13122e2ff3cbba90adaa588fe9ee9a810001bb49 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-1338fe86b66926b560151ddcfbeff1cfd7c2cf8d | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-13413b175e5308153ace753600909175ad6460a5 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-134a4dd936f34ae8f730fe6fc19dcdaca156066a | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-13786a84db1296cf7803fa6f517fbe83ece3bbe6 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-137c4ce2695f7f9ddae5493bfa154b37e47ba0fe | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Revenue Sharing at Music Streaming Platforms | G. Bergantiños, Juan D. Moreno-Ternero | Fair Allocation · Fair Division Theory | Management Sciences 2023 | – | – | triple | |
| s5-13ad37ad79cb51a5fe01d0838ae661cba63588a8 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-13b4a0f2d4b091f79d08cbf8e20ee7ed0b65b1c6 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-13b9090d9407824f65a16a11822f47aa3ec13694 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-13bf7bb97c909c6198448c425427a1a9a5ba9037 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-13c0c43f68b9d2c98d18b53957bdbb3e66d239f3 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-13c0d2294d9ee7a8646fb04b6ad78fef3c095e7d | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| Maximizing the spread of influence through a social network not comsoc | D. Kempe, J. Kleinberg, É. Tardos | unclassified | Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining 2003 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| s5-13fa0c7f1117b62175f14d50c4bb06afa5e91c3c | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-14058ee766260645337cae4c077582e193ad2204 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-140690380900a5ed0ef7bac678cd7f4d80f8a795 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-140dc651fd1e5a56cf6c48bc350b36774b290ff8 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-1421c6ee0fe4a6b98e19a293d2ac3df86e95a653 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-1445caa954b4f330e18cc57561a650a9c98044a4 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-14464d3c3c965c71eb4d06e6843967bb0c05e6f4 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Weighted Committee Games | Sascha Kurz, Alexander Mayer, S. Napel | Coalition Formation · Weighted Voting Games | European Journal of Operational Research 2017 | – | – | triple | |
| s5-1466b12de71b0c1b4f5e9e422eb419be03260df4 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-14770a763760e7f2232c8b7302330a404fac5303 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-147c591a06d48c225e9b55520be0ded218cbd526 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-14836423d24908a3c93465daf0a18ed11425fd23 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-148382514cf717d3d4b2e9f71fb8b36ab340ab72 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-149d59e53976d8b4f2a22b84aabe1f42cc1efd79 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-149f0b290f433da86d3b27c7692fee6cd065468e | unclassified | ? | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| s5-14a208aad655ddb6c07bee74fc3e09dd7b52d9ff | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-14a609c8f325e31c4c9caa6789d2c2b261ad063a | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-14aa0a4116fbdd3683603b960d82798f5a5a1188 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-14b1d3605f677ba5d7f6c03bc8f2bf4ddfe84a8e | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-14b2180362d62889406710f2b3a89f18b3ac547a | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-14b3e707fece366055fe6cbb604f6b68c65f2ee2 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-14b81e9d9efb9f2eef09febde687b5d5b1524bae | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-14c3cc633c77d3178ffc10dc9cab8eb9868bbf79 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-14de8576cbdc1017c8d8b281fb664e3900022c55 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-14e1fb1e90fb5f9a06eeefa0e9ddac29c6574f38 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-14edf01002c2130224297877c10c75d238ba8fad | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-1507e58cd14ff9e03703e91c8b0779045650dcf3 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-150b61f2c07c2c84a36253bfd17220627490eb91 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-15107cf1befa544bd31e38a0bf005360db0d410e | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| s5-151d8c26a20a3acb1007b8cf91bea89d54788271 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-1535d0a235e9ce0ecd768939ac9b874b55a98efc | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-153b5bf5c14ded780ed1c6fb1ac2dfaac97573b2 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| Complementary cooperation, minimal winning coalitions, and power indices | Zhi-Gang Cao, Xiaoguang Yang | Frontier · Computer-Aided Methods & Data | Theoretical Computer Science 2009 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| s5-155c98d646057e9c47f66f1dc223b0221bf38b13 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | ↗ | triple proof | |
| s5-15609c2ba2aac68d68457bd0f99a952040ad4e36 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-1565bc13f1a606f5dae51a11ab1e64f69103462e | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-156825aaa886d59a0f0ec5b2961bc413a8560d3c | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-156d924c99fec9bf23cae6ff78f39f03a92af537 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| Beyond the worst case: Distortion in impartial culture electorate | I. Caragiannis, K. Fehrs | Voting · Distortion | Workshop on Internet and Network Economics 2023 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| s5-1578ed99cc5008d2707ca23b6ac598cf9f84a2a0 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-157ea0e96c5ac84552bb83b3e9eb0245abeb9f6a | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-159061f6d41abf9711dbc53a66227f08f947054b | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-159140a8c389906622a633eea6fafbe422645eb8 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| s5-159625c17461509f28a0424679e6c9def54e7715 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-159f77fed583d5959778cb9c4132b7f091afbb9a | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-15a2393c4f061deb6295f32a73d0655af606cb38 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-15a253d96a1a60ea7a3c2eb011bc4a7b3e26bf83 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-15b6565c2f8b1ec94209dc2fe067b5351d357069 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-15bda460ff2e57194e5e910a099b319db878adc1 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| Metric Distortion Bounds for Randomized Social Choice | M. Charikar, Prasanna Ramakrishnan | Voting · Distortion | ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms 2021 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| s5-15cedcee55d0ed4f4587a60d91dbdd9042688fe3 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-15de8aafdb817a29f4f17ba4777be3ff372f5633 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-15eebd9eb3dcebeb05bb5e4aaeff904d648243b1 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-15f7ab23bfe488090c82a376cfcc319b678dac16 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-160210fa6372f25f767948973e9a3f94e547669d | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-16050397eb17023dd65f1b3ebf4fbe81a354344b | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-1624465987212450f27ad3196b45d65f78ec724a | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-16319e045268faf46d99bdb0dd58c25209e343de | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-163f9e0bc0f45e1c4dd19b329c780a600e437659 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-165bbac84204700f9867a0b476e960c4c88912a5 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| Approximating Nash Social Welfare by Matching and Local Search | J. Garg, Edin Husić, Wenzheng Li, L. Végh, Jan Vondrák | Fair Allocation · Markets & Equilibria | Journal of the ACM 2022 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| s5-168620e40f260cbbf6e681bf4cf63bad2b6b3ad5 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-16957fd893cab41c9772600d198f784f8f7c87db | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| s5-169cb9219c2f15ba4d8fea40dce4a136f08f53b3 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-169fc8f8718b6028933ecccc1088ccb6d3b4ed42 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-16aaf2259eb62d11cd3786eea566a9c45f046fb5 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-16af9b87dcf79300c225b7ce8874ffdb5edd5a68 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-16bc8eb2f06abb4e75d2b970cec64007a16cdc14 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-16c5c40da34901eafc8e3b486c969929cf9bcbb5 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| The aggregation of propositional attitudes: towards a general theory | F. Dietrich, C. List | Frontier · Judgment Aggregation | ? 2008 | – | – | triple | |
| s5-16d6f2cfff2f808bc633d16b437fc7d929b74f4b | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-16e478a065d5037628d25066eb154bf701d79ffd | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-16f009efc3fc952b904087ac3fd8e4f7a1fe3cda | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-16f9f898027bbb61de53a8ef27329614fa848a28 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Polyhedral clinching auctions and the adwords polytope not comsoc | G. Goel, V. Mirrokni, Renato Paes Leme | unclassified | Symposium on the Theory of Computing 2012 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| s5-16fed02a178a3a19d442999cb09a2bde07705b7b | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-170fb36a1690d99e76047d786e473226446453cb | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| s5-1717c70b191bd00fb21d39131b350cfe9bfd96dc | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-171be0d84f4cbec0e5a697b539a5e799b7e8b61b | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-17349fb06d7f810d9bd1aa9074a8f95bc7e8a302 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-173a8e52183f13ce1d47dddacce61e6c208887a0 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-1744a466140f608a68f588f075544e16de3326cb | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| A combinatorial polynomial algorithm for the linear Arrow-Debreu market not comsoc | Ran Duan, K. Mehlhorn | unclassified | Information and Computation 2012 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| s5-1752194686d45c1bb461478e36751859785cf6c6 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| s5-175e6dc1267b5c8c90bb4451d2e851161aebb6b8 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-17613f23f3e83cdb08d8f5bd6d851a69f790a509 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-17676e6600009dc08c29fc276f11c24edf127ba9 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-176ce665320312b3ddb3bdac6521ee534c11bd0a | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| Spending Is Not Easier Than Trading: On the Computational Equivalence of Fisher and Arrow-Debreu Equilibria not comsoc | Xi Chen, S. Teng | unclassified | International Symposium on Algorithms and Computation 2009 | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | |
| s5-177c1fc296517f072328bacece9292fce38b2e5b | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-177e4c1f240c790669367eee29ed28f2208b4f33 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-178c195f0214be4a0a7a2162fd54c0c0bfe66c18 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-179e990c9421455306623ab9f3fc863bc617e1c2 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-17b97182f1dab986d6fb0bac9781f7bb7f8d1c66 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-17ceccbe7403f77fdbbb6de22d85479bfda79227 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-17d4966d11af20c9b8ec312298f2a7a05740370e | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-17e254deab9e7865ddfb6711ce8b10818f9a290d | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-17ecc1a20d4b13749a86af5e583774b7257085f9 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-180d7015fbb6ae6397dff24e16cee1707091f63d | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-180da64c06d7a1429537f48a2802bb91615f808a | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-1814e5d3f985f08e24372609c9315c7f63402ef2 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-181a7e2487207de155332861e42b744c5748f398 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-182174c2879a03a86ad7b6895038056255db6014 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-18245a1fe67fc8d4ec98f57ae2be5255140f00cd | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-182896e74a972a49516c98aef226fef3c00f3d05 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-183d7209065496a57e3bc8dbe5cd08a274486b50 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-183eafc1edbc1e6b84ddd754eed0e0abf49afd89 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-1843b9435a533d761a7efff6838dc6b7190ac3f5 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-184e5f3aab2d671d69d87eb4ff1d6ca123d0e719 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-188808c58ac7e1c3128e5e8ea857b07d39667834 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-18975df65e5150ac434d96061975dddf57be349b | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-18a0487a408426be4e824367a6a41ac853a6fe1c | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-18bc8677127273ee8f8ebeacf7f359d4678e53bf | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-18ca73a5d8d86a7a9ad99ecd564b232f49e56492 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-18d2b75df212f21c94c890190a69cf4a341d5a97 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-18dced485206700d7d3d9aa4021fb2dd072ff879 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-18de824a7a2d92802190b450cbfc9692004bbd8f | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-18f10a274346db7c0bef08f61574e38129646cae | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-18fd1590ed679b886f11929d3a1dabae02dae19b | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-18febaca1605a15d8b89abf4baf1625c4a3fd9e5 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-19092706fb217f5415c69b433ad564f41f277401 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Best-of-Both-Worlds Fairness in Committee Voting | H. Aziz, Xinhang Lu, Mashbat Suzuki, Jeremy Vollen, T. Walsh | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | ARXIV.ORG 2023 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| s5-19189d33bc337863c7a709e13d967b40e4fe28cf | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-19251f5b1d2bcfb839612f47918994808c816c87 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Approximately Optimal Mechanisms for Strategyproof Facility Location: Minimizing Lp Norm of Costs | Itai Feigenbaum, J. Sethuraman, Chun Ye | Frontier · Computer-Aided Methods & Data | Mathematics of Operations Research 2013 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| s5-193d8b5b5b71112331a6636d50f51fb44aa0d579 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-193e11bb8ddd0a6d114e7e4263aa36db0009ef8b | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-1949331b124d86077cde20f0aa3ba714355cfbe6 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-194d8f110073ed640af3314b37bcc1632c35b682 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-19529f1c9e65d6962c2ed485e74c6e60cc01a2e0 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-195d727dffd486d9262e00d2f5868460571851a1 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-1969965e3202e780de48eba96c834bcc80a23c46 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-196bb123edd2639e6e08d0b213ef13ad3e3b48fd | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-1977f90644ff89885befad9d69a9e3f3164c2cde | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-1984a2df11759ea686ac0a00cd90460d17402651 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-199aab4a6aeb50a60ca9abd1cabe35a5664ab472 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| Competitive Analysis for Online Fair Division under Multiple Fairness Notions | Tian-Qi Chen, Z. Tan | Fair Allocation · Chores, Online & Dynamic | ARXIV.ORG 2026 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| When One Good Is Not Enough: EF1 and Pareto Optimality Are Not Compatible for Submodular Valuations | Simon Mackenzie, Mashbat Suzuki | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | ARXIV.ORG 2026 | – | – | triple | |
| s5-19aa8ebf802dd3c4c64f1d81e7ad3a71ed8ab968 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-19b8d0c00bec014f56d2309d5f2321cd35292b8f | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-19b9dd6f839a543daee8a0105a40f9c5d9a124fd | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-19bec15eb20843e008701e78f56516341ac935db | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Envy-free matchings in bipartite graphs and their applications to fair division | Elad Aigner-Horev, Erel Segal-Halevi | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | Information Sciences 2019 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| s5-19c4a15c88860e8c9e54db1e253125883311eb13 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-19cfeacb1008e373195fbe89ac268bbdec756b32 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-19dd886774714a668b168e4e2909cc98751fd769 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-19e3918f9db55f50a83f4b50ce4f5275ab504e19 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-19e8706edd14a79179be9ecec499cfc2150cfeee | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-1a00b048b2c844d19aaf0d87f78d28cb96be05c8 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| s5-1a1c22a011ee624c0f14b084d73ca2cfe2c53901 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-1a28d70f010c6a1428311907d51bda3a7dc725ed | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-1a8227b0e8d8233d73eb0d3be4af4c833b49e780 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | ↘* | triple proof | |
| s5-1a856729fc870ebb65bac354e662aaadcf5588b3 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-1a8c926370703327ed3cf3a889d6d7dbf1c86ab4 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-1a97f3f6c6e66992bca1230df1514d751372b6b9 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-1aa0eca3dc23eba24db83f7590a9cf12381afc3f | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-1aa226525c391e0f9892f0ce128e24dd09c36668 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-1aaff38971f765fcd1135ff7c92468219878e819 | unclassified | ? | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| Social Welfare in One-Sided Matching Markets without Money | Anand Bhalgat, Deeparnab Chakrabarty, S. Khanna | Fair Allocation · Markets & Equilibria | International Workshop and International Workshop on Approximation, Randomization, and Combinatorial Optimization. Algorithms and Techniques 2011 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| s5-1ab3a6ba8e7c5b606e3ffd163ab44755c73ce3fe | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-1aba6f68f70609531ff51418dc9b47d43bc19ded | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-1ac0ac035520ebce4f333cac7eb902b11327b909 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-1ac1bc640f75e597a790ce7c22e3278f59d363b1 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-1ad1f0dad4d9e9f0f951da12c130a4fa14d067f4 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-1ad7730a93185974399f6508cd2035b56a2544fb | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-1ae1397796367f5c5f1c0d3ba06d3c2cf325de96 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-1afa4b33f22f7a804e4c2b29bc3c0a82b20cc757 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-1b0db606dc8d496f579c7098021f2595b54db4a0 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-1b18a993c5fb0f27ba7a13baa1ed239ba6531a0b | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-1b19c0c65ad66b1178e7892d835219007a0beac2 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-1b1b7491585160a76b8c4a3250a36c6277d21232 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-1b27793d77ce75cfee5a701eeb8db42a67dfa9c4 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-1b2c2249ee663d20679e5c0a62bdf90f00f23aed | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-1b30d6f9dbafdc57717152552f37540904078349 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-1b341138c70dd3c0937e5429e2e1a25275b21cac | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-1b3cafc762507abcd595ab84499a466dfdbbea63 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| Communication Complexity of Discrete Fair Division | Benjamin Plaut, Tim Roughgarden | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms 2017 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| s5-1b46671534d95274f3f9424cc0cdccbda3fcdd5a | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-1b52ee0635c5cfe1ba3f6d629876764512e1f469 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-1b6ebd87a5e23c6046798a5d80cfadd3012ecf91 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| s5-1b790b66686ff236a4d029e4493bd7fc3115ba5e | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-1b82a202229c81efcd62dbfd83c9c6bc94c745e9 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-1b8871d91d90cd782bf9fa156371beef96d70921 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-1b8aee95b27f23ff1fc488e8c8e5ca8c00ddc62a | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-1ba3267737a7289be85e6f6a26d0279ab636b7e9 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-1bb471019f67748c9b3a3ceedc3ab1c25fb17fe8 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-1bbcec2a863e791659c6a0c4d6884300a7f116c6 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-1be4bdafbf0b8fc0cda670c1529e8f20887d8022 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-1bf009b1686943adce2eebe4542d1efd372ac67d | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| s5-1bfa01c7df10d1504908043b1e6c6e618aad8f89 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| s5-1bfedc9f7c941474778f7d3c31a5a230220420d2 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-1c034bfa0bc66668c1b7f8c09b70c0e4aac1f41e | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-1c12a96e94aec86065aeff2e591ef05f92586e12 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-1c157cdd6bc71eb1cb69c586ec562a1c60f700ca | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Perpetually Fair Assignments Via Balanced Sequences of Permutations | Terrence M. Adams, Erel Segal-Halevi | Fair Allocation · Chores, Online & Dynamic | ARXIV.ORG 2026 | – | – | triple | |
| The geometry of manipulation — A quantitative proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem | Marcus Isaksson, Guy Kindler, Elchanan Mossel | Voting · Manipulation | Combinatorica 2009 | – | – | triple | |
| s5-1c3a14620f448551be967ec90f85e2745fecd746 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-1c402f83e87e767671f81cfdd0ae86c99382e809 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-1c5421caaf492f8550db452fede485b0d5571ab1 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-1c63629ab5e037ab4ee1844ad39dead615af564f | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-1c7f16779b6734bdfd57bd86753bd34cfd368bdc | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-1c93777e1dc90f497c886edc742f63c7265b3407 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-1cb7e6050a7adb4c65b402cd39d40dfc0ed5e145 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | ↗ | triple proof | |
| s5-1cbab0a0ba56e94dd677495ddb3796baf69c7ab0 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | ↘* | triple proof | |
| s5-1cc4c9c80c6008acd92577fa213cd4bad4c02a5f | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-1ccd4958161e99f0d104f58732de84f9521e8d07 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-1cd6315b55094dcc0d0fdd3ebc07b3fca76b3e60 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-1cf25a92a64692029cf473bc00e182644861181d | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-1cf6f9568e35f624486438ecfd0a411f5326996f | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Probabilistic fixed ballot rules and hybrid domains | S. Chatterji, Souvik Roy, Soumya Sadhukhan, Arunava Sen, Huaxia Zeng | Voting · Structured Preferences | Journal of Mathematical Economics 2021 | – | – | triple | |
| s5-1d06d0a6868bb37e60235cc02b7fcbb42e91249d | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-1d1025fae462f275775d5a6b956d87dd94c2548b | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-1d1d7c78a10237b6a38210d56a83f7c95a2303ee | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-1d2179cc3c65f92bfd5c713ccfcabbec9d3a48ac | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-1d2f945d43ea5be1c92d13500734de4656005cd9 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-1d3c406919ab9e4c7555440f3513bead3dca6034 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Simultaneous auctions are (almost) efficient not comsoc | Michal Feldman, Hu Fu, N. Gravin, Brendan Lucier | unclassified | Symposium on the Theory of Computing 2012 | – | – | triple | |
| s5-1d5241cd078c7b3501cd405f2367a924f355bc39 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-1d5556c37f8e7d7426fe5040d1c5f09b6d950e11 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-1d5c992d8d25033feb163d8c8d3d5648f93e5e32 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-1d7c63216adfc2c36fbf256760379dca6a3c23e2 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-1da035ddece3361cf866a07908a8daf2ab2eef29 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-1da5831424c3fff56a617610737148904d567712 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| s5-1dad08e809f4865c3f0bb9a1386a532cddb6be9d | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-1dc351d29f330a71b279c9b9e06d3be852d66884 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-1dd3fc7b2ae6e4ea4978ae2b60d484bf72c48c0a | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-1dd4a46175db8c5fdc19fda1ef9d7afc730c439e | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-1de553135a4fac073fd752dea5ec9bf70c9765f1 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-1df6856a0c5c877ec39056bb97ae728f1a177b42 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-1dfbacb8761d34f893097e8e24caf84607b046e6 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-1e0ddc43d969c3458d97bb510e43cbc53d2d58df | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-1e209db8818bd55def447c10ee3b5a4c448e3bf9 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | ↗ | triple proof | |
| s5-1e23495b97fd5f0e462c94848b3769f8c8d1e87e | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-1e31ecfcf79dbc494802a63e253944ca8272d0fe | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-1e322240348565940a3f8531051202cfd22e0d54 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| Aggregating Sets of Judgments: An Impossibility Result | C. List, P. Pettit | Frontier · Judgment Aggregation | Economics and Philosophy 2002 | – | – | triple | |
| s5-1e496b6b7c148d3566b17d3a802de69c624463f3 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-1e4efe31b3b463880b1c7ff966094d1e09cec7f1 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-1e52cc616acd8e686f9a38f8b19457e95e2003f4 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-1e59945cc35d58787aa6e96003c0765b059ce209 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-1e90471936c3f6e4f89dcde6b85c7ef7fe10dca5 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-1e9625db8b164427b877c65f53e73ba6a5b974fc | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-1ebc35160ea38f31ba5df5e386b3c39714cab8dd | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-1ec507cd178f6fd5730d70a0506f82c7a591071b | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-1ed0152fa32bfa0a97020ecdb79a83fb4f40b356 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-1ed2ac1639c1343896710a73c59466b098b9af3d | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-1ed37b3a1bbd112b06cb442c3febec48db6ae834 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-1edcee836b58378abc0abd141c86d70053d05e11 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| s5-1f0df5be75a43105ec96487a2dccbf4d952ddacd | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-1f21e563790556d0ea9fe2c3c868cab6572fd594 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-1f3cb667ace7c63abdeb72bd8b91851053e08dd1 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-1f3ea2e0a16d57038e69aa0049a9c8663f03d29c | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-1f4d09aab67dda17b3628f44a19c89a1f8889bfd | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-1f4f578ba24aa5db9e33f268997e90923de3ab42 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-1f4f8a45ffdfca53a300f93d3e00bebdde79a65e | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-1f5393c40fcf8ebb1f3ad60aac855739ca903490 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-1f61d9e90c1c5bffbd8306d7e08d5ca12f8112d3 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-1f728bf0c682e09d7c86daa9ffbc39aa33a8856b | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-1f72efed14c5310e144a32b7c438352f6c709771 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-1f8df8f0a2d40903da19c1f368212fa1832d3cf8 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-1f90a23ded1909f9188b05e66420e3072374e81a | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-1f94ed9eb467e1a68559079d45cdf61aa5051d35 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | ↗ | triple proof | |
| s5-1f990e189eaf986902ca43920076612fda4f8ed0 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-1f9dde41df91b240896196e74596b6c14dc4d7e4 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-1f9eb577f7e3c99990550d388a20ec7c70fede6d | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-1f9f91cd7bc4c2d1edfb5f388723414588d0f811 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-1fb6240b62f2c18ac1e16c8ef2a8600a35713105 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-1fbc327121e590c61fa973bba7379ad36fe66279 | unclassified | ? | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| s5-1fc708a12d4ac232d194a378b6aa1ac868ca571f | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-1fd0f22f3dccc6747963b9d68cc67c09e915bf02 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-1fd31d5132f3038eab8f8129e4be76b45b01d7ac | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-1fd6373e1d541a6a2b226d7fcbb1863404c5d4c6 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-1fecf5ea373fa0a04eb494269a0f95f6b92077de | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-2024f4c08b3174c101794caa8ae7fa78ba55bbdc | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| Unravelling multi-agent ranked delegations | Rachael Colley, Umberto Grandi, Arianna Novaro | Voting · Incomplete Information | Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems 2021 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| s5-2033123ea2e3c4a568140f1365e60c687a387a59 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| s5-203682df96fddfa96b8dc003502949479dcbb126 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Almost Envy-Freeness for Additive Mixed Manna with Entitlements: Deterministic and Randomized Guarantees | Ze-Han Lin, Shengxin Liu, Biaoshuai Tao, Shengwei Zhou | Fair Allocation · Chores, Online & Dynamic | ? 2026 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| s5-203ee415b837660086f230bf52f976f9f54608bb | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-204303cd8c2ce54073011222f951c82dc2616ffa | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-204e6df985688cf8a00bee31263abdc39c91b8b2 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-204ef3053e685b1c32544b1b74ba33c1014c6d3e | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| s5-20627794998bad3e91369e0604c2aee5c6e36531 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-207f105b748c43160daea5ffbd1680b7f861b43b | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-20871d17673416538ac0871642b78d19d929f1b9 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-20cf99a702d0c4f272311befea893ab6064277e4 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-20ef75c158e0cd263ca0c8e53022bb95e195c7b4 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-20f4edff439d8285f54cde8ce8bd3f68c8d156aa | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-2104ebd9f615651bf55485b768da20a7ba70ba13 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-210da971a2f8a01296058183d286f1bbcfde67cc | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-211292184c266c6f1401bee004c7771c81485d0e | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-21249ed8ca5810fead7818dda9e84ed400184840 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-213816dc724d5e305a83b299cfa09ab7f2c8c7f8 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-213dee1cb32d8f3863ae9644f52a1fb615c48077 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-213e6483f59dd7c8ec493d238b733c397bc27d60 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Approximate and strategyproof maximin share allocation of chores with ordinal preferences | H. Aziz, Bo Li, Xiaowei Wu | Fair Allocation · Shares & Guarantees | Mathematical programming 2020 | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | |
| s5-21536e32e2cdd2faa7a28178a09ee18731e5c081 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-2155383a5967d192687b02b7ed2c19e5870f2e58 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-216d09ea9562cf19030c815c34e600ec1bc99e87 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-216fb7c715253f2d9cf0a3497ea50f8ae61dafc7 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-217768268f6a8bf97e630f1a5c1e0ac9d1ccaa81 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| s5-21791e558f7f0ca4e06f90b1724191dc68e8b03d | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-21886a4270eea364b4a2ce4599b9f1474f24e2cd | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-2197467885eb1c9fe45098397c1cee060c67f1a7 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-219d076fdbf5f2c636881f424e3e3dd34eafb339 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-21a464e9e9b67f4c0569026bd253a6cc5c368070 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-21a5ae62d18f9b3b0763e5fe2df56b19b0519e13 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | ↗ | triple proof | |
| s5-21ab29b8b9d03202c0b8d57f41b1531b5b51ea1f | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-21ac4e70465617382e74ce8f67ad6fcd5899d9b1 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-21b13b3def2b22c9e420bd75b7a443538c0f8ba5 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-21b3a6b9ab9db2a9df583016910ac20c7cfad60f | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-21b62aff66b0b82ddefb71743b2fdd7b5ce85f78 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-21c2f1de589a69084f53700ca3def7e114122a3e | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-21c7403e7be2265131891e391b289fcb2079280e | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-21ce7e0aaa620604ac1e0fae6c41b8334818acc5 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-21d18288d4e96f943245018d94a22f8e54d9631d | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| s5-21d1cc650ff188af0d2e6d5eb135221e4b2b401d | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-21ea17782f108d24032bd0948dfe736b6e7065cb | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-21ea24cf24ae5a270285a0d24b1b241ec331011d | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-21ee60a7d57a2f2575a289c297a32e13aa6203da | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-21fc224d8648c3bf8fc1d8a0fe6d9b637cdd99c4 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-220500303d94b4ed05fc1633881ac120f30b3900 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-221ebb6ce71a9c0fe072a9dacb7d3e7525745501 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-22253ab3c58fb23a8276a8be9afb1fb2ed686bee | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-2240d95fe51d4d352c30e7fb74ecee69a98807d7 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-22780a98fe4f3a14a99d8f9ea20fbba750cef0c8 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-227a6b5062f839e0e333f4c9f039802151fa1f16 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-2284788cd74b775547c662eb20500122d49249b1 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-22847d7cc79d548677da8a04cca060c3e41951ff | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-22981484c99d3c4d0e732e4d331e1a177e3da8e4 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Market design for living-donor organ exchanges: an economic policy perspective not comsoc | Tayfun Sönmez, M. Utku Ünver | unclassified | ? 2017 | – | ✓ | triple | |
| s5-22aa3ccde9c1642258748c4f2e31481a568d80b8 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-22b7c35349e5740488570c3712f7e1f0a6fb047b | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-22bac9a9f0654f46ef400fe5656a32f547e8a7e1 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-22c1e0e6a647cf3f302430a3fec97bc2138cec53 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-22cca202d015c098dacc63d5b5f81ff1575fa313 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-22dde3e1ac8e37a69779fe9bb5dbd9b1c812cde8 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-22e59efc5bd94b46bdf5b6652b23f086acbf8888 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-22e688855ccd9ef17e72b6c506a2c0c90bbf64b3 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-22f8e3e72a8779d6145c4deef4c4bcbacb496c9b | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-23045aa861da62b35d0068923594375bfc70d1de | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-23062b6e4bf9a9ebe006c3e1c7d6eae3c60527ca | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-2310d6e334d4022d42ab29b292242a56b273b002 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-23156c962049df6562ffde6ba3249cecc0f70aa3 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-231b4bcf96bc50543a04cdc471593226d1dc842c | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-231f0d8f4fee10d8fb69c8a2fa997a1df56a2455 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-2321a4514c1ec771ee1d741b0ab24c4216e02f20 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-2322a9616b069e2d0f27e736ff688840194332dd | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-232bcdfc0aad1591f6183b30330ec087226f6253 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-232ff6b630d61ecbba8c6e96cd90c189e8ccafb7 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-2331ab599ffc21f97cf2892b8b99890a51a78868 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-23347e61d6daeb7c0f7a24e8e03ae75f0f2d6bff | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-2336bb2dc9548beae0bcd1fde21452857133da3f | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-233dbac59c58fbd9bc05b1db2166680a1e092035 | unclassified | ? | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| Proportional Allocation of Indivisible Goods up to the Least Valued Good on Average | Yusuke Kobayashi, Ryoga Mahara | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | International Symposium on Algorithms and Computation 2022 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| s5-2357b10d40d3bcbea673c592e068b143eb552829 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| Fair Allocation with Special Externalities | Shaily Mishra, Manisha Padala, Sujit Gujar | Fair Allocation · Fair Division Theory | Pacific Rim International Conference on Artificial Intelligence 2021 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| s5-23653a3e70bd57b4f00471b874bdfae9e5098dc3 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-23682829e8c4f8568585773892017be3b76ed9b8 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-236b144b64acd23a959231a3c141c57886559383 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-2370cde061fecf673d8a49b0d846e63789394bd1 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-23710ae57e6aee456205bd4b39f3fcf5b1f2b49b | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-2378e7adf1390c1a2c614ddc562e974deab40527 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-238e8182e63aa26f80af84fc5c05d3300c33961a | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-23a60188d0e4832b7728160fedd2b725d45d51ba | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-23aa9e2374768354b7be14cca5bc9f731ef1b43e | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| s5-23b5776828c190e24790c41560e93bb8b8fd0fad | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-23cb851decf1a5d763ea1cbd7f878147b4c66b2a | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-23e1ec44df44c27ff308d5658a55cd458efb836c | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-23e20d1a382835da2f3396c5cc4cdbc60c740946 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-23ee9d23b57ddc3bfcfdd098ed1bfc458d471c4b | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-23f9a3bb0051a064ae3fff8f04b24460c9fd94ff | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-24008a9c0625a2a70c92c447f26ed859279722d2 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-240d28119a662e01fc2ceb19c39b2739140e59e4 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-24174db4a87423c306d7c490d30c8f037d0a05b6 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-242268f7b5080ca08d53f2c12b666631add4d288 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-2425aa554a2240a039c58a6088f7554f6970b9ee | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-242d46e28f819ed19857316e02d66b9234698507 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-24377857b52226184c22a38f237b7a7a5319ade9 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-244693ddd678f3c8c80649ea7c2419c31ac7907a | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| Algorithms for Competitive Division of Chores | Simina Brânzei, Fedor Sandomirskiy | Fair Allocation · Markets & Equilibria | Mathematics of Operations Research 2019 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| s5-24537e08806e7147f9cdcf7b81da57720c4b9e19 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-2453ea0e918ff660a82234405c2fd193ef9715f8 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-2455bf8e2461eefbdb1b1ec71ed1cbdfd6b71c25 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-24643921df415cf898f941e5d83819d2f7e61946 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-2473baf02a3860900fa4a20c5d63d115c918dcb6 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-247e782865a719e54f72af6fdbdbff6453c1e7f2 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-2487a4f64b8ea6e760a72427687990e42f344d53 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-248cac348b3aa23d5b3d9a4c4320c82d81055de1 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| s5-249289edba7b89853e8bfbdc2a0b98afa6bd21ce | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-2495805fd8835a0234726ee365899894cd897004 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-2498d696e46de67ffa5ddd7657c649c911108097 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-24999e926a32aa4942b94ee789b4b70cfb918f46 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-249cc3165a916f3b99cc2bd4f6c807391d507552 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-24a7da471a5b896298ec65bf7cce46a2c1bc579f | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| s5-24baef2f3af9601f7530859e82ded3212d3e765a | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-24cd98209e8c6203eecd8088802ab6ba118d8cdb | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-24cef9e158b34e25b7c66ee8a0bc55111517e15b | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-24d60a3ebcddf7e93efff6c8b65d195beff3c7e3 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-24d61717a1970d0d1de04d7fd81c58438f114342 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-24e0ac444a26197cf7fbc2fae6c908970dfc9c57 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-24ea525200999202f1304f07595ab7db5bfaa7ab | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| s5-24ebd3bc9fe7549bee58553484f7fba8263dc1d8 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-24ef1d1f969bc02b48c1992db9c301ffdf577f6c | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-24f13afce39561d0da60a8de552aaae13c2f3c07 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| s5-24fae8bce2740d219940ef3cefc3c4894eca949e | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-24fd0d5c0368efdfa0b8f7c97e4e1acd6d878ee6 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-24fdb10fd3905142dca0286bb464b17e031cab42 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-250409306a6d74c3aa0663bcae8fe6b2c9bfa7d4 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-25158941f236aae031a0d6b9c8f8be53b0a6f65d | unclassified | ? | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| s5-2519c45302b3232b3e4a5038ea91538d7b438c8e | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-252e762236617ae5e431b9dc079240b4ec03644c | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-253d2ae442ba5340c868a4326717c1fa7b36075e | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-255181daceca72edc139f0c4b6e7fa0a3b01147f | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-2553dabbf7a13c1303d0c5352af715e3d2d9f1df | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-255a2fab297e13cbb3722f2a38ffa889d66731c4 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-256efd37e336cafeea72a5a2f7a30ffa9a1f71fc | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-256f799e4049ce06853a6a2db9117dfcbca56e9b | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-257c28b673b3b96d39699bf420257796f61944c0 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-258fcc76469581bd55558af985a26b109162610d | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-25963cbfd33e56d05a36f7fc3080aa136a6c0389 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-25a04dba7555334471059696cd6bed54b2698d9a | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-25aabb2bad6e91053bbb29f7de2a46770127f6cd | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-25b112ed217204a2c01502f1c3fbf1a7e331cdc1 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-25b7b8e77ea60440fd7b334018a9e15a6dd0be8f | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| s5-25c21c0d78beeb4e60da8d9eddbb24b6e84887f7 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| s5-25c8d7abbeab4ec018618c4c8202911d01386dac | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-25d94b7a5da7fb0ee2a3cf45495629da08df4204 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-25ee54d0a6cc517ed602adcc5ea6028e6432d7be | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| Opinion Fluctuations and Disagreement in Social Networks | D. Acemoğlu, Giacomo Como, F. Fagnani, A. Ozdaglar | Frontier · Opinion Diffusion & Networks | Mathematics of Operations Research 2010 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| s5-2602d0e71c9be7093a3cf83ff2f1c2e719fff8ed | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-260baea8e6c95cabbf2b8b28a7ef6552ad21b0e2 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-2610b07b8130e9b442cf08043a36e71d8fb181f8 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-261286ac1c4fed2d583dc5d86665c94aa24238aa | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-262a4d5f8de0e96fa34c60a90e43685e1f801904 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-263376ef1929a30356564e2e89f7229b4a4aea21 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-263710134b179de02ccbf0a0fb8d5202050c55dd | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-26398309cd443679b505d6a7fad2e1aaa9a4f66f | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-2640f2395f15fdf4d0dd84978114e5d7155296b4 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-2645244644c65d85931451ab12f2eb5564de2291 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-2650f3c31dcb4b65770aa38e0cccd5bfe30b1dd1 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-265344e57c9069d4a0880e0b0cfb0dadc0c42b88 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-265b8279ace4481f7d88db8963b83072f84fcec1 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-266228379330029c5deaaf4f8acb6239d2599908 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-26626b034724bae27360b08abb5af768e7468916 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | ↗ | triple proof | |
| Binary Voting with Delegable Proxy: An Analysis of Liquid Democracy | Zoé Christoff, Davide Grossi | Voting · Combinatorial Domains | Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge 2017 | – | – | triple | |
| s5-2664294fe461b8921348ff4e327bed707aaae7ec | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-26649ec3893c050b50f65bf8dcb60c2f15c90388 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-269c4078ffcb672126857335431e061fa046b7ff | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Using multiwinner voting to search for movies | Grzegorz Gawron, Piotr Faliszewski | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | European Workshop on Multi-Agent Systems 2022 | – | ✓ | triple | |
| Nash Social Welfare, Matrix Permanent, and Stable Polynomials | Nima Anari, S. Gharan, A. Saberi, Mohit Singh | Fair Allocation · Markets & Equilibria | Information Technology Convergence and Services 2016 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| s5-26a74af74b775fb9071aa7cf113ca68c4f44ccc4 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-26c914e9d6f5436e1a3170491111b293d800364a | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-26cc9e13a7a76e3cf5f9885d08cdafabd6fbd7ec | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-26e422b1e69f311eeaa66cff1dd20d90ec41c8e9 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-26e998bcdd12eeffea5ccf617f2acfbc1665ef25 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-26f5b6eaa4a00de0111294c888e3abab8f99e9eb | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-2707b0a3e02c8f7514f220549c8f92947858f5c3 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-2707b84fc439c2e66d6f0006fa69d25659178fd8 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-2710e9372363f386136cba144e3afdd0d1a9fb6d | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| s5-27178fb073f4db6861be7fb9443c28492c8a0dd1 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-2720fd2dfa5331320fee3f4d703fa44b0d00aaa9 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-272dfcd3f512d880fd650e82e2ade1553e95b1c7 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-27373543efb1ae2fe6da96a0b63aed1490d79340 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-274a86ced6e742036f0e10ecf46fe5840cb778b7 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-27520ef6bdb271fbcc09887fc5545e07e7cc4d29 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-275241cdb5aa9be924f84107d5f1c90610ceabd8 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-27575a9ca4a4e32caf75ddee45889ae3111634c9 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-275b073c92a55749561b7c1e22da849f6bd744fb | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| s5-2765a4a4ea9dfe57b5a00ff075112a3121a89fa6 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-276e54cb0fba1fbcb1161f28f96d05d09565fcdc | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-27ad5f781b04401dd0ede41a3e597e63e502c2d9 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-27b202e16a6140611a1ac59c37645a5d6d44a37d | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-27bf6059a5fca436507bc3312981dce0660988ea | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-27bfb0ce18c9e39a340803926c7070308b0c0ef0 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-27cc125b239a9f198c254298fb6566848b028d23 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-27da3d9348d8f64b7eb9bfc7bfdca3aced9fee13 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-27e62dafc9ab82b601cea2f62909503c9b05113c | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-27f3a0868f5d9038e1bcfe3c59eb2d4704e0c49d | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-27f6cdf98d1b7d1bb012462630b1231cae7c0312 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-282d02d56c03749a250916e5e761df93e7d4b506 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-28532d0a54a5f0f9576b27e36c4e80ecf4024a83 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-286cd017c47bd1a2348cd6bfeb973fa85c8182b6 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| Assignment Mechanisms under Distributional Constraints | I. Ashlagi, A. Saberi, A. Shameli | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms 2018 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| s5-28845cf078aad2fd76cced34cc36a2bee0d19ee2 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-289810aa8d3f356c2b86a547ba0cfc4cec6bbb21 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-2898d53e26a1cc95c05c59eef9c009628d3535bd | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-28a5c7247dd2112b9d79d944a82abaf23de9854e | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-28c1413da61a52a27bf39a57ee9002aeb3233b48 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-28c8aee738a6acb29a894e09ba3e71628fc711fc | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| Sum of us: strategyproof selection from the selectors | N. Alon, Felix A. Fischer, Ariel D. Procaccia, Moshe Tennenholtz | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | TARK XIII 2009 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| s5-28dc46ee23a2734761a924770de3f629272330d9 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-28e7db81a0e79a4d85bc8ddfefbdea3f9b43126e | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-28f6d03540c6b5dae38a4a2b910cdcbde1dc4201 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-2908719c3784c6022b761d500cb7bfc0913d7ac7 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-29097b59ca1aeb4a3bac890d6c81dbd0b005bac6 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-2915279985f44390a4c99b0d3792535381a9d48a | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-292887dfd96468206f841390fde22848494a5c43 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-2933471e92de8f7f3ca972e8bc31512d1f6f9b71 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-294e5cd8209874c7968a5705145f3453751b6f67 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-29563760349638baa06cd2e8fb520ad78da47b06 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-2961747a907f456edf9ee26c20ec901135bc426e | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-296d94d74ed0b92af24e4066252ef1d5fd7e4615 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-2979b1a395d1c4907b3db57c98a2377dec8bef2f | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-297c83e9439ad54d93b284beb80aa2f1f7395fb2 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| Improved Truthful Mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions with Submodular Bidders not comsoc | Sepehr Assadi, Sahil Singla | unclassified | IEEE Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science 2019 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| s5-29ae705fd3340c2ae8753d9f930884dabe778f25 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-29b337f8eb29ef5d40a9cf613fe6bd15c9befbb5 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| School Choice And Loss Aversion | Vincent Meisner, Jonas von Wangenheim | Fair Allocation · Fair Division Theory | Social Science Research Network 2019 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| s5-29cdd42201b5352fca406b3887da9c70272e6c41 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-29d54eb2c615b8b85836da2ddce4b76383f9921d | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-29ddc8e758a20f179cfb3f3c75ab698f69c4153f | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-29f0aafc8167582d7ac2e3d1c584151ca1b5105f | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-29f57e361950006fb65150073ec21e026b4aa3d7 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-29fc54fe097dbaa191842bd33cdae1e9f640258f | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-2a0231389291710b110a176b95c9a4cb67efc39d | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-2a02df0687fb96f6752f735507fdb2947a0801cd | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-2a1dac3868e88f9ae27a9e28cb97d008f75508b1 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-2a20dc3cd7bbe7205c81da52dc76440ec5a09c36 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-2a26aa75d8dbe9937fdaedc1edbb5bb81438b758 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-2a2a005dac5a4350072fd76b7f91977935f1314e | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-2a2a5f855193551d09bf67e2d583fd92ea939361 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-2a3236dc48058a8965cdde2645fc4d1bfb188167 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-2a3686246ad4b060d41c1e99f39bca21eea704f0 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-2a3e7def66cc6014c612b586a21fdab2a8413eed | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-2a49cf0372b3356e9dc5b4288d3a6f64a6edcbc3 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-2a53f1a1193ce29cda2c3580a3987551377b30ae | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-2a59d386fec7a4c9b91aeed13dd14ac10cdc8ee0 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-2a938899a03056b25212c81d4062e5fe3172660d | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-2a9e1a39a4b26a1744e7fb369fc06ecdae03582b | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-2ab95be72748c4811670b7ccb3c5528d2c6b62ec | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-2ac95de27715a840cd549213aaa13afb18fcbc27 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-2ad0d3f5c13890f0214082b4b23718b9197b98bf | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-2ad94007278bc48f79ca0e763afd0ae6a919598f | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-2ae5444462c93f7cb2cb7907ce53d254b912c37b | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-2b231a6aab8774e030b9aa212ea787f28d4988d3 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| House Markets and Single-Peaked Preferences: From Centralized to Decentralized Allocation Procedures | A. Beynier, N. Maudet, Simon Rey, Parham Shams | Frontier · Opinion Diffusion & Networks | ARXIV.ORG 2019 | – | – | triple | |
| s5-2b689876e1981ac9d1051b342bc5a7120729444a | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-2b7219225cdff1b8d51aec0dd9a89faa6087a74d | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| A General Theory of Proportionality with Additive Utilities | P. Skowron | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Participatory Budgeting | ARXIV.ORG 2026 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| s5-2b7c3bcbcae4b87daaf6814817a2157285ebd51d | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-2b8842b3d5aaedf81c50763fda306e070d60d8e1 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| s5-2b8c513da53dcfacd4acd9831a931bbb07651247 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-2b9672525b288b19e11f3dd3cdfdcfe7c412406b | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-2b9bc62d3f189951bc5907733505281ad916d8d6 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-2b9dd1adcab19448bbeb8a6ac2f142f8da6f2cfe | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-2b9f7323311eed089b1848a2f7e3aa7ef9505089 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Efficient Matching under Distributional Constraints: Theory and Applications | Yuichiro Kamada, Fuhito Kojima | Fair Allocation · Fair Division Theory | ? 2015 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| s5-2baf4ebbbf00870c9ee8990cb001b7fd49692ac3 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-2bbd73b0ccbae5db240a4c4df602b6c6fdf3ac31 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-2bccd0d11495c6164bcb7e70f9c5f8bbc5793ae9 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | ↗ | triple proof | |
| s5-2bcede6897006287e3173a4d3fa6438bba3694cf | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-2beec2fedbc181a5a7d9eedf1b658a71e06eed08 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Rational Bargaining: Characterization and Implementation not comsoc | Philipp Peitler | unclassified | ? 2026 | – | – | triple | |
| s5-2c1242ffcf1668d7ea1418ec52b0357855fc4778 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-2c171fe79659f511f7ee7d1eea4750e159c2b110 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| Stable Voting Rules on the Edge of Optimal Metric Distortion | Zi-Yi Cai, Moses Charikar, Jabari Hastings, Prasanna Ramakrishnan, Kang-Ning Wang, Qi-Lin Ye | Voting · Distortion | ? 2026 | – | – | triple | |
| s5-2c1da633cedadebc589f698128d9d1d895055b5e | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-2c28be76dddcbd6cf7b9d493998bc7aed6b9d526 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-2c2c48398dfaa1d61f02fea244548a8c5d03da21 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-2c2c8d1bc46f4b7997aa210036bf445822607f28 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-2c30cbe73eb4d0edca82c361f99899d3d4eb0d90 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-2c31758db3d38dce303cfaaf7542baf46fe5550f | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-2c35c35a72052df9d24f3499f8fa3209197f8319 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-2c35ed962baa8e4b783dcf2748e317417eab247e | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| Fair allocation of conflicting items | Halvard Hummel, Magnus Lie Hetland | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems 2021 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| Elections Can be Manipulated Often | Ehud Friedgut, G. Kalai, Noam Nisan | Voting · Manipulation | 2008 49th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science 2008 | – | – | triple | |
| s5-2c3d02ce8780cc6648caf4ee996d9628c6388751 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-2c4b2f27c44ff7482000930f2303c1e097679da4 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-2c591af3551a6f84084b954181e1d8a3266151cf | unclassified | ? | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| s5-2c5ded5f5ba455710c7a03db7c5c5da8ba156e6f | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-2c5fe07ced40642da9019d64966e8475c49615e4 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-2c6450f51859d63f82ecf1cd19d642b27e8f83dd | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-2c7130419073b7cd969b8a8427051b60faf41203 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-2c7a3673ebc7f614e1ccabb9ac9d424f1b3be570 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-2c7baf5837e0d370f97fc654c6d571f42be83f0a | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| s5-2c7f54ddc7f333bc579e5cc95fce12b007ff2902 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-2c9c4b848f1fbe19853c25c65f933fdb892b4a36 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-2cb062ffe038c17d996c03b8c8df1685ac7e8d06 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-2cbc47ec35a11bb3d02dc051b68a4f8c64015381 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-2cbcb12044000a5e0f181fe62d56717898eea8f7 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-2cc7e84fd1ea56f2a83168cb284b56b0b65b074a | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-2cf947f8da58d00fb035401a2d7d98feaf1e6f41 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-2d02de79fbee57ef8624e2ad582fa37ecdc5cbdb | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-2d035dbab914158819119500705ab3ffe46a1526 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-2d0a8afb099cbd1afb8d4635d4fd0813f94cf4f8 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-2d1ef4da44e41567d799d2cc9868c10717e5179e | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-2d25d9b4f5d851102f23828286a1f2ad3d4fe74e | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-2d2b01e1d1a5b077bf37f7c76f927282fe27f836 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-2d2b386f7eb59d68cf8a24b95cf44d43b326e696 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-2d2dc7311f99a5893710d3ce91fdf24e1e5b0d74 | unclassified | ? | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| s5-2d58616caf8cde66907e4cb1aa2b39ec6ddeeb84 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-2d592457c6d2cbe03a27aa6c6fe13c28896f7bf0 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-2d640b71406c068487c573cc0aef0366576fd141 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-2d676565193cd82f6a47589e1aeb6c469ab37605 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-2d7573316bf9502a1182df554b3fd8da5f64e39c | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-2d784b1486cd1c5fd51e0ce94804ef830f5cb84c | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-2d7a852e378b54556aa81cb02d0e9b96ffb872a7 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-2d9c8c35b3e97f84daf1d71e3c666e31ea666438 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-2d9da65e1a2078365d7e1b31fedc863423f51ef1 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-2da14cd350d62c66fc8acbba69b0e1c896187861 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-2da9bbc69d1cb08bfc88b558c87224f92bbc5a2e | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-2dac8d70182fcdbba8a547692aeb3ff78dd18ebf | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Condorcet domains, median graphs and the single-crossing property | C. Puppe, A. Slinko | Voting · Structured Preferences | ARXIV.ORG 2015 | – | – | triple | |
| s5-2db7bf75897f4260ee0425ad04bcbae36871820a | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-2dbd9981068a66277f055154a5776690847c03c4 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-2def8f0af6049d15e68208385f26c12255782f5c | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-2df19ac56c53f71b7059209203e853cd684aa851 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-2df54b27ad9d882325a91cdaa21689b40583dca4 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-2e0dd7f5c4659b681fdddf903b20b21662465667 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-2e194016306c0e66bec1d213e74e5a3a88d7f5b4 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-2e233887c293aa5be2926a4f6e8a1ae87ee0be5b | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| s5-2e255b35f10e8499b1f254cac7d8191219242e29 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-2e27e012d92e49c7e82f8dc1ddbb4a9d9e2d7a6d | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-2e2e19d521769edb6723ea3aac5bb1ddbf7552f0 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| Assigning Course Schedules: About Preference Elicitation, Fairness, and Truthfulness | M. Bichler, Sören Merting, Aykut Uzunoglu | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | International Conference on Interaction Sciences 2018 | – | – | triple | |
| s5-2e3a7c0c77b62301fff70621de5a613f1822b741 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-2e4871ed96697a38a19143ca733fd53a388cae28 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-2e7150810fa4377178aee8d8f928eee931289231 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-2e7fb63200a59e8ec958e29ec56c844d4aeb2605 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-2e842649f39bb42ba41b5816f7196afd62091235 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-2ea7651ca3c784079d37a12a0f8bfee759215f67 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-2eadd26889d869a31b494907ea89d15c1d08ac38 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-2eadd3cacf90d006d384c4073d58b3fc6bd91792 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-2eb103bbf291b1ea873758fa15d33ce1a26a6893 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-2ec5caec2138bf3bad6352887f4613eeba9304f5 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-2ec9572632fecd7e70bcf86f209ee23f5f297ed8 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| s5-2eec2a45f1103d36583e6577b88b40cad9d234ff | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-2eedef172b126be51d96d39e8a9f7facb18d29cb | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-2ef211c4199ae249592eeddb66745001bb8268be | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-2efed6e2b41522f5ce78816f04bb5157fff7330e | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-2f02bcea6e615c0157ab2225a0f99aa4a9b8acb6 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-2f05c7aa860f19d4d2dde8eee78540c19ec504a2 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-2f0b2dae640b6ed5da71641b30621f0d93b24f3d | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-2f0ca04bcf3e3ca02825baa3252256ffd0266ece | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-2f16f56f955e9fc5700dca88a76734bb9cbdfce0 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-2f1a9587c3eda53b2f422d73a911198d57b59f8c | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-2f1c75e1bc0b2617b8407460c3a484d7da9d5547 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-2f20179dc62f8a9597d6d7daf3bf401aaeb93ec4 | unclassified | ? | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| s5-2f2b950f53fff6dd49c1dbc0d2c77f7bb8bc9236 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-2f2e04205f4e8c92127cf9c364109a0abd1f2e62 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-2f445e56ebd9ec6454633368044ac725f5abb320 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-2f4724d4c19fcd5561d0eaa2b21ef90a2b7878e5 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| s5-2f6a9892f7f2ed40154e9323e233cc29fcbde9d3 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-2f75c250b36435ef657665e305aad5a45d435564 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-2f8636755a0e882085c8a4f547267c9f8f43efb0 | unclassified | ? | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| s5-2f8fa734790768dacf6b4d5a3252308a6467ea81 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-2fae892e0284bfc9c6afd2331c6baf2e53dafd6b | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-2fb5954f31b6314c2acb2067c069f45f08d81d63 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-2fc564aad72de1fb297bf9070c3ff19e42cbf931 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-2fd49dc7564924586e3a72172394f09424cea317 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-2ff01e4a3031ce9a4d7483f1e8835198c63a9548 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| s5-2ff72a826fbe2aa274fa92e3bcb66a57164c0ef2 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-2ff8bccd7a8d972c9422ddd1f2b31fe2ba514d65 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-2fff93bf9ad3d0a61e106b866da8a19da8f3ea21 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-300395e7547505f9ce77f56f8bdc15bef6ae0258 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-30048abc06704a454db66b43ecb43c64748e2c6e | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-301152b629b986f6aff900b2ac86f95ecd7f5a37 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-3014d959eeec2344ea822b5ba9d86b3a9cc53f2d | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Maximum Weight Cycle Packing in Directed Graphs, with Application to Kidney Exchange Programs | P. Biró, D. Manlove, Romeo Rizzi | Fair Allocation · Fair Division Theory | Discret. Math. Algorithms Appl. 2009 | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof |
| Whoever Said Money Won't Solve All Your Problems? Weighted Envy-free Allocation with Subsidy | Noga Klein Elmalem, Haris Aziz, Rica Gonen, Xin Huang, Kei Kimura, Indrajit Saha et al. | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | ARXIV.ORG 2025 | ✓ | ✓ | ↗ | triple proof |
| s5-30225c90de1f322724837b229536aab044b5c0d7 | unclassified | ? | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| s5-3027eee732e6638fdad8dca20f1a84ea68b9d0ca | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-30479e2e5a8835fd7b6bf5a10bd8b61e075975bd | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-304bba393f8aebc0430a2a26d6d0fa711efd892f | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-304cf2851680cf880a0881790cb12772416cf403 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-304e735b1d057abfeffd80f32a6e47c0ee4cc211 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-305972f5e926a05f6ec19a7b45c39258480a7487 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-306421d98edae2f92ed4a7577fa13a95f8d3c3dd | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-3066728393d1b6e43fe611a6c5c9524c4edd9748 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-3066aaf3f9fcfa868c48d01c22cc558ca2f1c5db | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-30708cc3dd4c8ccb2ba479858c6527bde9955928 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-307400c854abb56d622db30318d36340b69d2986 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-30759bec8a5917fa9978f060d2aea9cc82c850f9 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-30875e68e71801d52571a53b7073889e9df68b57 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-308cc25913708df7596ee961f59fb66234a34ce6 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-3090834a5477db311b711a1041f426887a73723e | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-30a206ce8a596a59f8423016484acca55d65a960 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-30a61c7bd2de89bcfdb34a46500455344df00e51 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-30ad50afd89218a5ca92c1b7da893f77dabde89b | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-30aeedce1b22db0dec275b4172ec32b34d9c92a0 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-30b707c50ff865ed2607708616be291e551e0093 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-30ca37b91a7280617987ed3d112d7a35e58f2fe5 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-30cb0028fb5a59685c5e8d2092082b027e66ab7a | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| s5-30f5d6a85bdc4f3d16102ab65e36f609d1aab39a | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-30f78615e6a0fef22204318c596a5118bc6aa2ad | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| s5-30f7bdf55fb336853d2c4d83859b7c53042bea70 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-30f905ef13c03069404e255212097d2fa4535417 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-3102bb83c40561231843780c6b201e65f84b1c6a | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-31149f793e11abb368b6290a50f9bc5f14151687 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-31190a8c8da534ebefc1534bf09887d7f6d15b2d | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-311e36b1a42c80732ca5c098174f792324297cba | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| Mostly Sunny: A Forecast of Tomorrow's Power Index Research | Sascha Kurz, N. Maaser, S. Napel, Matthias Weber | Voting · Voting Theory & Axioms | ARXIV.ORG 2014 | – | – | triple | |
| s5-3160edff3c49f00811f575e0bb185b83065ddd57 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-31654c91e86f0d1db3661f769922b287078f8580 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-31658dcca48c7e7852441d03eeddd5ceb79c21df | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-316dbd4cea1640c1c19b941a4290d58740bdc943 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-316e8079aa69fd2504110321aadfbb5c554c85f1 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-3183be7e07e96d79c17bddf3a2cb9198a9d765d7 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| s5-3187b88c4bcac170fce09e075b767a39f6d7f605 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-319941ccdba0f6aa3abaf8b3bff244c140e8d071 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-31a77f9c24fe28a20112f1d613b6b47a739b448c | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-31abb6bc6166f1094c23d7855d5e1dd3cd6a7b8e | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-31b07b8f87fe8be116357c51770d45ce0c414c83 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-31c60c7ab48c581e9e2bd952aa7fd8e9f78726ec | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-31cf2849a647974dfe841705d7d9ac052b9ebf3e | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-31d26c443521c5cb0fd355072fe94db7c0f3a370 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-31d6ab94f5459c7db8e02f02dec75c2b4328552d | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-31d9b4f87b9f434724dfe316149089b68b52e75e | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-31e2bb1796302a23331a299641a98f7b8e225965 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-31f7089fba7a0885070da493d169971ac1edb5d6 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| s5-31ff8111c35ec0024a1a6293196ae6f32c4245f3 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-32149bcc761a48e967225ba495c1f8e6d92bf738 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-3215978e6019b86b7dcb0eb496ff8c06a0fdb370 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-3237460bd95106d53ffc6ee738fb46a5c790959a | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | ↗ | triple proof | |
| s5-324b63f5c3257b2a1f4385b39bcb73cad146f7b4 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-324d0dee14086a7d9593b1c258ab7493b0ee1a9a | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-3254f46b17ac361e6c6cf87c1db1fea0cb8ebfea | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-325612aeac421309435948d103a651c25cb3a236 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-32650f8d8db66dd7a390e80f575ad20c14613d91 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-32775d394917247c01205d81521fdb0dcb5272c8 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-3277ec04b596f33c1234a91050acc058dddae996 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-328e9bbe66dcf0283be2e6dc1347cbc984ecb36d | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-329794553b77050a0e79374e62c7a02dd1b81f01 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-32b73c5561dc570ecd504755d4cbaf2060ea8e4c | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-32d601122378adf8e667a10f15b5abc4f3b33606 | unclassified | ? | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| s5-32eddadd61d898d8e0977e72a8a83ac24ca49fc8 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-32edddf8291db0fe6ce46a978e221664a67f61cf | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-32fb57210444a3cf2ae4c9a0fbd93147b970e0e0 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-32ffa010d79b57859bd5407aed49c8ffc9da3143 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| s5-33093461593b355d2e68dd8c3027f6eaf8b46861 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-330f2a6248605a77ac6848e84329c929e4e5242b | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-331585a96560e1eb66843f75fe0ad565f7991330 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-331f48d1ca1e8fcd54b9f8af149a536f6224971a | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Firm-worker hypergraphs not comsoc | Chao Huang | unclassified | ? 2022 | – | – | triple | |
| s5-33361d6e1378714a5f720256e22091304c0611d2 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-333fa9fe4fdb721f9f8b53fb18835f9e942ef1db | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-33530d4bc9f05173b38a91c8d3abee2bc24d02b1 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-3384a9daece84c4de33d708519823e33897a7502 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-3398692fafafd18f02bf4bf1b6d33d469ee4005d | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-33b8d170af38999d7086df63acbd176d8efb24d8 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-33c0be902f79c439fe98269b3651a5cc34c580f6 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| s5-33c4f9d4271c8706bd0da6d65f337b1cd370ca7d | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-33c9239a06e34cee97c7db46f15da747f92ae98b | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-33d89adb382881993deb2acf7780272fda027046 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-33e61a428138b1a1573dd17a89ea0645f090b94b | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| s5-340acdae64f5acc57407b26c10ef3b636c8c6dcc | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-340d4d20d0126a03aa7c03e8bcb91447d5cd6557 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-3412a4596d688d4c258c329ef07bd41c211a75ff | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-341ab6bace61ad91da4b9f7e378c079a0ae0dc72 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-3435b5b6f6cb1d2413c64151a720e2e7f671b898 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-3465546faa2917483cfa58209227ea858ab495bb | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| Shapley-Scarf Housing Markets: Respecting Improvement, Integer Programming, and Kidney Exchange | Péter Biró, F. Klijn, Xenia Klimentova, Ana Viana | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | Mathematics of Operations Research 2021 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| s5-348266aa238df89fed2a700e2da343d909098b78 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-34bae368a9bbc2f212dd480eee63fff29109aa9b | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-34be66957ffea76479e80693c6673b09f25876c3 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-34cf40c2cfeb0173a59a3313412af6ad3dabc183 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-34d0203e306abba082d4d23618a38389dd8acf96 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-34e9e6875c2dc87e4a016a57efe908072f5f6beb | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-34f0c7f4eebd1dfe625f7b7055065c8830cf8b8c | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-3504e03e117ebfe5604a94b930867ea6164964d7 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Expected Frequency Matrices of Elections: Computation, Geometry, and Preference Learning | N. Boehmer, Robert Bredereck, Edith Elkind, Piotr Faliszewski, Stanislaw Szufa | Voting · Voting Theory & Axioms | Neural Information Processing Systems 2022 | – | – | triple | |
| s5-350a4ff0b3e51ecf18bb72304a4fb36dc572bcc2 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-3520260ffe9572cae6cb3651d193c2d41b083bd3 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| s5-352cf6d145c816bbcded67d4d6a0adc02e7a71b7 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-352f6dec1b2e18690179f048d1e1e0044ee6b21b | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-3538df2d804201f4a27972b513180979823ba71a | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-3539b771d7cb76add24a8590f737239e87229416 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-353d3ac026fa2def9b99fc5970a4e5726f8d7540 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-353f06d9642c7b8937e3c3827f20826ee1af26a9 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-355311d3bfae41f98430c224257bea24eeb68db5 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-356657e9b2908f38a9bcda09908ae19906327251 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↗ | triple proof | |
| s5-3573023d4cdaecfcf45aea26e941b36d1a012f5c | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| s5-35901289cc670c3317cfafa4c030d78101e836cf | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-359ba00e7941acb54fcc199582f2f2b127a71bb9 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-35a8732c0c685e815eb6b4019fe0cafd33305f5e | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-35b60c85ea3ff5f3cea15d4d18108575dff21968 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| s5-35bf0a24e65cb4e3efdac44f52ff3f553b3c610c | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-35c7144b75d3e3d169b27288b27d18a0109983c8 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-35c9b041b484ca469cd5afeb927d16846bc9907a | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-35ca1f0dec9b45eb76ae6559f4f9d9f915a8b8bd | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| s5-35d389ffec0eea9fb523350d49fba1ef622ff297 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-35d53e646f1d3e5ace868046833deb7cef9352ff | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-35e5619e9931c18c4fa12f6f152c53b5f707b5f4 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-35f5c40e4784f21fc583b23697a8384df3a78098 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-35ffcb3e81df0dc7464d3692abdcbdbfca9435d7 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-360873519b834e9e08411f5079dc0e6fca2976f3 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-360b44f25126ac474f56ae7538092d8c52dccfff | unclassified | ? | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| s5-360ce40cf6c02a23982fdf3c703e9c79e4ba2c47 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Constrained Pseudo-Market Equilibrium | F. Echenique, Antonio Miralles, Jun Zhang | Fair Allocation · Markets & Equilibria | The American Economic Review 2019 | – | – | triple | |
| s5-361def93dce37b49d81da0dfacc85aca99f637cd | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-36390d3298cbd194d0cba14d3666c9c2f12d3e45 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-36461bd9617c16899891d79ffdf2e5153539f7c5 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-3646e627582ab60e9e8cb78b52668f2f4b5740de | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-36518d81c8bf561e2087e31853f893be82e6d99f | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-36574a309d24f01af1976f99e4b2c2f028f566c5 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-3665420ba6908a74d43620004f141c6c9a3c2a75 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-3674f8ec71d5f5ba342384814e3a694a69be4945 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-367e210f105645ab78f6f5ccc2f926a02655d361 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-368ab6605c335876086050879195ec1686f427ec | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-36970365f94a77ca07275f48b5e5cf32012ee181 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-36c0d4b5c1acba8a2851f9d62e73b11bef7a5cc1 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-36dcd2357c2f72a856b14d68c776ad6370a4db89 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-36eaa55050a98747d5e0947b13af4a3bc9edcf2e | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Approximate Core for Committee Selection via Multilinear Extension and Market Clearing | Kamesh Munagala, Yiheng Shen, Kangning Wang, Zhiyi Wang | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms 2021 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| s5-36fd0ff6ba6128e12fc787391d9839bbec3ab381 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-37092c003d862c5b6642af9add63bdfdd6a29af3 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-37146bfb9956b0649265ceb7b06350a814663673 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-37243075994cd3ff132bcf812bcea9b16b1f473e | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-3724655cb171e5b80aeec13237aa18127a6f46eb | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-372a9667041f948d3e78bc7404f67532028f4821 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| s5-37426c2a3a3b5316b45f9402c0b4ec396c673181 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-3745008871e33f1eee56920e15b5dd30b90043ba | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-37480edaa3a6bcb14805dee4c5bf4144770e2551 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-3749af47da3267b794e2c47b78499a674596a0f5 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-374b979adb717ff815e4adb7b801758fc29f017c | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-37717970ba8a8a4d8fc65b5fe4196cbc0846dd8a | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-377cf29447a8bcd4478615c9522ebec134457504 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| s5-379101b2f4c15b8dfcb9165da8443174683cf837 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-379372c16c524dd9534869a81f0161e13da153a4 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| Online Fair Division Meets Reordering Buffers | Georgios Amanatidis, Giulio Giaconi, E. Markakis, Nicos Protopapas | Fair Allocation · Chores, Online & Dynamic | ARXIV.ORG 2026 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| s5-379eba4e87c549276b987930c7f4dd761bbe1966 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-37a0034b9e81e28d86ddf4512db452549e21c37e | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-37bc0e44f5b9db28b57d291acd6d036b725134e2 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-37bfffb1e73bbb29827ab754109ded82007a4bf5 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-37f1a05ab8ba5a7f4af15c9c53793a9d592c3659 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-37fc466f732f6d9189a8e59d43f06bd3a694efac | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-38068fbd6f75ac009835ef5d50eb09cabd979a1a | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-3809aabbe2620b9cf466f8a8b272409ef6485c55 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-380d6a75c3f54b52d4996ab0861d4692c2ccc58f | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-3811e2fe2958077f49de9ab3ada2ea2485e1fef8 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-38318cbd45462125bea9aaf367b59bd2e7f2fbc2 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-3838f82cf96447b9967bf2cb8eeaa7493621ff72 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-387273e8905463fd165bf2eb170c1cf2773dc6fd | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-387abce1ec780cc887545d7c28254d2c1dcd5432 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-3886953ea9c59c0fd0de537f51669cf02be0dae1 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-3887c5bfebc570b15c01afdaa0802a17498a9dbb | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-388b65549101765b653252508eaccf50bfea3f9d | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-3898d02850fb4dd10ff5fedd89d80050d4fa7e47 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-389f4a3c298def7d3ca92b701aa3908e1f74bb2d | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| Fair Division with Indivisible Goods, Chores, and Cake | Haris Aziz, Xinhang Lu, Simon Mackenzie, Mashbat Suzuki | Fair Allocation · Fair Division Theory | ARXIV.ORG 2025 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| s5-38bbbfb6a5052e999aaa4bc11ae5c0f937688e4c | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-38d551cd04d2083de5f773031807766d20edc5b7 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-38f0a168efed701a541ff9faafc11e5e1d96bdf6 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-38f5605f90696c6d7c41deab5bd8c7679dbbb025 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-3909a92d441d4bf9ec777066a0c1ab8549b66bb1 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-3909de038003df15bbd40df1477c67a81a17ca2c | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-391484253c7b2605a36456ba7cc58b074fb1ced3 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-3915f7082698f0c6455ba38b406b6a4e87249cf3 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-392b7c9c3d37bc13c74f4fb72a1d991f6c2bc1f9 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-39465635bce93b0c8382b4274760da96c28803eb | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-3961f2bfd748a66f6bc6576f43eaa54a7567e838 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-396594763495b7667e06547e2662e45257db9b5e | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-396ddf01bbbd0cce5a84ca93177d507c7a4bd256 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-39713cd4e5eb455f093f8a43f7fe6e12ac0bf366 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-39798c00b535beed8e94e4bfc72485d3d41ce95f | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-397a0e9a2ebbf6480cf6193a06b2cb748dfd5457 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-3980119a7d3af8ea7e21d523f58f68955631243d | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-39902d9460c9e090ecf23c984465dc561164f467 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-399e750dad40703104dd5544f200605902621ba6 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-39a3477c0517aa0a1aaf62f6b427b9da33d1f587 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-39ad981ab2de611aeb539a8ced90026ad5df5939 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-39bd0706fc8c8ab41738adfc7dba080fd8895b88 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-39bd3c643165c2e21e34eb409ada63ecf658fc21 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-39c5cfc0ff6660a17364cb4af1eb071d6efa463d | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-39d269f22db5e715015e2320e1e77ced70ffa082 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-39e20ef3cd94245d6694e42a1d0bc543da359281 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-39e392a582b8bf5f5e47066336632d1593a792b0 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-39e927fb0d1910cf51b04afb48fc00966d1bc632 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-39f3f45318e2b0d7fdf06951c1202ad4f61558d3 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-39fbde21eb56b43bda3602e534ad5b0b76c55683 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-3a14dbd92529ab28783bde285f5be2b5c18896f3 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-3a1d8b9f194420ea69ddd48cfa61a41290cf4063 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-3a1f5fd0eec65ba57a6facd3f6cad4b04b1bcc00 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Mechanism Design meets Priority Design: Redesigning the US Army's Branching Process | Kyle Greenberg, Parag A. Pathak, Tayfun Sönmez | Fair Allocation · Fair Division Theory | ? 2021 | – | – | triple | |
| s5-3a316d07ae978379a9e6742e4cb7fd890de2ca22 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-3a4192b0e9d640d36b38533310b554ce0c452682 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-3a60050921d6ed89587f74cad1ce5035b24865c3 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-3a67cb6f31056e93dc222395076567fe9f242f1a | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-3a8527dd6b606c6eff77426d9f3c56a11431624a | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| A quantitative Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem without neutrality | Elchanan Mossel, Miklós Z. Rácz | Voting · Manipulation | Symposium on the Theory of Computing 2011 | – | – | triple | |
| s5-3aa3f6b6b47f44aeea8d77029b9a2970166ea215 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-3aa74fb39908040367c50785c1a4e9551bc75f2e | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-3aaa2c657cde433efc43821dd11357affa0c3fe6 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-3ab2517eef1ee668d2a2359c7ea4572561a4cff7 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-3ad94f7b4ce35e4769b12378f6b50cba6205369f | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-3aec7dd6c1ee890f99ca202dc3db04def3753895 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-3af39a276bab0d665543b31c0cc6b849fc51ba8a | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-3b09af956e8e89a0ee45dc370dd1df6327d8c4e6 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-3b165207db533d53e98773fcdf1978793c15667c | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-3b27ad74ae6128f7b59c98026406d90bdaa1c98b | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-3b2f45b117bee8644fe65086b774e6b0dda3c5ec | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-3b3b934a9e1167946d143e01888b755210aa9497 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-3b3d6172419975a1e5c60f016ea2734cf592623f | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-3b6549d51264a04dc32c941343b333ff282bd06f | unclassified | ? | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| s5-3b6ced8671d821ea61b042eda831ac0954a55149 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-3b7d3161e3d1151b6c5bc718f80e1e450fb75c04 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-3b8738cef281f1c8a95e9a2ee2028123d8b6cb68 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-3b899ef7178b36837d3ad5d8cf293ac24597b419 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| s5-3b9fd03f51226913679bba3c96bdf817649bd8fb | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-3ba4b9fe03d6cbdd01fdd078806b4be243ad4712 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-3bad102479f4e8127edf2728c25be4827e5c2ad6 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-3bb339cb3b507b923498c6a18fd7101b71ff7ba8 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Incentivizing Evaluation via Limited Access to Ground Truth: Peer-Prediction Makes Things Worse not comsoc | X. Gao, J. R. Wright, Kevin Leyton-Brown | unclassified | ARXIV.ORG 2016 | – | – | triple | |
| s5-3bc0f8f5c3610135052f0ac5679cc261fc6b3a47 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-3bd0248d5ff9ba8afd64f6b21d8721429ffe6660 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-3bd4f1b402cca333bcad3635d51684e4bbf23263 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-3be1185aad9f0864e97f5e27309884fb2cc4e9bb | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| s5-3be3acd60fbc93939c529fb032e4417ba31269af | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Integer programming methods for special college admissions problems | K. Ágoston, P. Biró, Iain McBride | Fair Allocation · Fair Division Theory | Journal of combinatorial optimization 2014 | – | – | triple | |
| s5-3befc99ce0a0ee1d3c647a5c3f1811deae6711b5 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-3bf3f7b8514647b90e4896d5b18351f194891507 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-3bfc4442e16c93e49a0105f3c42ee6dfe615159f | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-3c0ea34a56f18e2971726b85ee6849129cfe8981 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| s5-3c1264e530434dc5d2e0ae94c9125bc5954b9701 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-3c30df69b66fbc0e8d5b657423f858ef4031bbba | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-3c343360be8cf8983886ef01af5ba773e4b9445f | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| s5-3c4dd70d59f55319f0f395258db288dc02b2ad1e | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-3c642cce7ad4c2771d3b7e6bbeebea2c1c7e750d | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-3c64ba435cbcf04832a76991ead0b66919d4367b | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-3c987314d5413dc9abc380e6c13a223eff8be4c1 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-3ca43ef797447a7d230957fe6d0d186b6d21de18 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-3cc8c53552fecad2358b821c63bd3f50ee5bd330 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-3cf4034bef053515bd003632fae95ff443fd2bc4 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-3cf77ae43bf5d47f5484314e4a70e8d643a87260 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-3d0aa6a42bab890f27e28b8e2899323be95d10e2 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-3d0e62418747203de46544c31bc87ba69c6dca0a | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-3d1bacda956fb29bb3c7269c1a95ed4967886f29 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-3d1eaec331030565239033564662450e39cec991 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-3d224faf2658bc3ef12ccc41086dee713dfb1991 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-3d3a005752161dde7f528fc4a0a05dd1510e74cc | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-3d45645a15258b4baf2829dfa8ee03967d5b6b8a | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-3d5689968157ae13ce1fa0f99de84bc3290c5241 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-3d5aebeda52865a4e31434601baf167d9c956471 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-3d628542ded3a1fe791d89ae9b872e24aa141d2c | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-3d65d78b2b2ed73822b663a3c8fb6a8b7d8b5264 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-3d6b58ed5aa088e9f8852f3c5b623017d77711ff | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-3d6ec94ba5495c73923296e2c7c74c742caaedbc | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-3d9bbedd26678812d66d700cb9be7389244b9eba | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | ↗ | triple proof | |
| s5-3daac10a18c8c6a120de1f11cea5fb619106c451 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-3db8ba8d53990382e78a91de6b598463758c6060 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-3dca77f1a79b848fcfca08be75f826c4a4d7e651 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-3dcb1c075630addea09dd01a8a8f60e5bda220c1 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-3dd064c9be3b87b7c2cac193cbadc47ba1e64342 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| EFX Allocations Exist for Binary Valuations | Xiao-Lin Bu, Jia-Xin Song, Ziqi Yu | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | IJTCS-FAW 2023 | ✓ | – | ↗ | triple proof |
| s5-3ddaeb3b74ccd58a041a3dfa93b0a7e95d678f44 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-3dded7a3f7b1b8f1555a5506fbd1104daf5181d1 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| Efficient Fair Division with Minimal Sharing | Fedor Sandomirskiy, Erel Segal-Halevi | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | Operational Research 2019 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| s5-3def23f73db8926da57930549fef93b56a59d5c5 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-3dfd2cdf84eb402ffe8e3133b4e9402490bc3af4 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-3e04ba72b380a3c30c26e75dea8961a63b4558dd | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-3e19845320e8b0c24e43b22ae5a914ce3c39e7db | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-3e45e554959abb0ae60d38d277ebcca1bbc7b1ca | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-3e65f5300a833a74a8b4d081f718c1cbd9cc0b8f | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-3e7204203119e2aea52bc860f1e9ba3270577f3d | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-3e7d259deceedf5674e3a7b14f0abc486e03ef3d | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-3e8989e49f1d05c5c740a2ef85217c261b8fe4ac | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-3e89ecec482a8be03ba20bf5c1656de8e5197cf5 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-3e9b0b89854e0a197bbcad6c8c6187d142dc5579 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-3ed621f4e16ea9002cc17eb4e35e24150ba7fc75 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-3edd833a1837d3b9ad45c02f3875a811be263b0d | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-3ee34abaf887fde1b408f88314c8ec7d75457392 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-3ee705a23dd63bf5902599cd8e8e4485fc12a223 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-3eefd3b4d1ba0b3824930556fae7796b688d3695 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-3ef6f010217f3e913fbc72153c5b18cb77213327 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| Strategic Behavior is Bliss: Iterative Voting Improves Social Welfare | Joshua Kavner, Lirong Xia | Voting · Manipulation | Neural Information Processing Systems 2021 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| s5-3f00f39538addcaf7ce9aaac2d4221f259d7bcf7 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | ↗ | triple proof | |
| s5-3f0908a507f09ed28d3532cc6e0509f88645e20e | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-3f0c531e5cd0c04b7c0c6d77e606ea92c19d7edd | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-3f104ae2217f59d16ec07a97097edde9dc2aa76f | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-3f20edc750a28eaea716b894ee7f96eca391178f | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-3f2410aca1b017a2236c5f9281ab250a5556a00c | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-3f2d42b302076ca80b55072d67c5abef3ab17bcc | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-3f4e66cd95893248561110352c29f07e8d0e2b2d | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-3f4e7b469a28e076cbdb3460d5068232f957c117 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-3f562dea2d5c9e1b08dd3aebe0cbbc79c04244d1 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| School Choice with Multiple Priorities | M. Kitahara, Yasunori Okumura | Fair Allocation · Fair Division Theory | ? 2023 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| s5-3f6f57daa635c17481d3dc03a66cb26ae3acb0c6 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-3f771416f4cc8f696ede137e2ad212b656ff5f3e | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-3f83d606c744f618c4ee868f3bec486b516f09f6 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-3f83f2c32fb3e59d70fb4da2941c005ff750011b | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-3f8f8d72380ecf3ff0d237692a7b6b607cd95273 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-3fb57ec446d612a1586e2d950032eab4adc25452 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-3fb658b632fa1b0d5dccf1f010a732ad389d525b | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| Common Voting Rules as Maximum Likelihood Estimators | Vincent Conitzer, T. Sandholm | Voting · Rationalization | Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence 2005 | – | – | triple | |
| s5-3fb6e5eeafda53b550ec18464b058695b671d797 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-3fcf41093d0dd8a8dba73af00e06e493ca45979d | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-3fd25f787b778f36fd439ef77351e37583ce1b89 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-3fe4be62b6f400e8f7b36116f23006ca4a741c9d | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-4004efe718940417c95e8c9c0c9c8c8b9ac7c202 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-402c9e3c20fa5e39e6b9d5aa5c3edb0f52540ac2 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-4048c8f30152ce1598ab649e2a1ca2ceb17875af | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-40503435faee7d3a2ad8615dc4f77ca286c6349c | unclassified | ? | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| s5-40680fecabe3c8c8d3b9579990d2b732523a5014 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-407c3b5e380b7a0cf9ee8de3b05d5a790dd34525 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-408f70bac5f552a5e5839e881d7e3b797b616ceb | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-40988ad87299b4d015e9d2105982ccbb91b7ccc9 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-409c5df938b6d0d3ee11c458ecd367691488d7fa | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-40a8f984f65aa052d2f398bbe93f4639edb30c64 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-40bcf88503f4ae45bca327a43349ae31dbf8150d | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| s5-40c1fa9104d9560b7247c37f4b79ce52a86a82dd | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| A Note on Approximating Weighted Nash Social Welfare with Additive Valuations | Yuda Feng, Shi Li | Fair Allocation · Markets & Equilibria | International Colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming 2024 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| s5-40d3fd00052e83ef7e6d854b452ceb32d1845773 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-40e924143ed50ac43f414d05febd65fa05409ea3 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-40e9dbacae5c6aab177d2063b5727d1127e0f6ad | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Report-Dependent Utility and Strategy-Proofness not comsoc | Vincent Meisner | unclassified | Management Sciences 2021 | – | – | triple | |
| s5-40fd4ac4cb8e8d725bf5409209fa9acb4ea2a2f0 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-411b8475ff7ff2d7052b5d3ba9e4917f14e85cb5 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-41243d3cdd53fcf6fe42313f5dd4734937a1aa4b | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-41315ba3a469a40d15de210f976f527225443ddb | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-4145678ee0fefe0e92f80ae50dd19e0da0150c91 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-414eaad45db5405e979c085b38645f2dc02ceb45 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-4153ea3e0ccdef894976e5960042b03e8c7d2809 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-417300d0a918b7c76240be6a17480638216bb3ce | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-4189b7865c94e2c3acda204aa1eba6d5136e920c | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-418d3eb5c0290f8009676fce5a329e669b28c575 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-419e5d4fd07d2c00c8f4483656cfc80b46403e48 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-41a89ff7101bb4f4b74c9896ba7f8193c0cfce0a | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Two-Sided Fairness in Many-to-One Matching | Ayumi Igarashi, N. Kamiyama, Yasushi Kawase, Warut Suksompong, Hanna Sumita, Yu Yokoi | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | ARXIV.ORG 2025 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| s5-41bb5f94d31322a936f289bd5d7d62a217a52962 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-41bd40c99062192b0c77d55e27bebc3fb586f80d | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-41bf5a3ef9af28771e5d751e3c9f670cde581b90 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-41c19d17c1c40b9dba7fb78dae13870a3983cfc0 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-41e43a7a987aacb899663f7413bf60669365f0b1 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-41e84122adfbf0edb37afcc61f6e550cc41c69ed | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-41ec84afb38169f1340b0e3c896988ec13d5c97a | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| A Probabilistic Approach to Voting, Allocation, Matching, and Coalition Formation | H. Aziz | Frontier · Computer-Aided Methods & Data | The Future of Economic Design 2020 | – | – | triple | |
| s5-41fd4b63b6bee24cbe901296096987f319f231ab | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-4206f07b0d1dc237fd2d7cea3f580d210029e94f | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-420cd509c883b8ea2465940ce208c8a53232891d | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-4210f43f48b1c054be87635e78f49ae423ce2ea7 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-4220fa77695a562ab5cb4ccdd3edc9cab8ffd608 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-42274a217a7e87195491497eb22ad152bbc2827e | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-42327b890952c86bc4d9327e3504c3efd28d8d6c | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-4233859b46aaa84e7fcad94cb031b387b9e9a798 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-423eb143f58b0bb4981479b7631acc6982f7e079 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Parameterized Algorithmics for Computational Social Choice: Nine Research Challenges | Robert Bredereck, Jiehua Chen, Piotr Faliszewski, Jiong Guo, R. Niedermeier, G. Woeginger | Voting · Bribery & Control | ARXIV.ORG 2014 | – | ✓ | triple | |
| s5-4259d17839286127adc940e66a0a54f8ca50bec3 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-425d27916ef851d8ca493d05143ef1ca809238ab | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-4263988cc00ba6a7b6ed9a61c14aba6be21de19f | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-427457eae69d23fa597b10eb8d6330a7bc61fba6 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-42758e75c74e0dd9266c1c0c5f876aff5a184768 | unclassified | ? | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| s5-428a0cc9a29d3874e6ad2eb1c9115414cb5f0803 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-42aa01b9183f5cdaebf51f3aff5ecea8a566930a | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| s5-42b27d489cba74124397bf5e5cf0be7ae7d88a10 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-42c50d8063af3f5d8df3ab866f037fb22ddd5f2b | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-430121cfb71f601eb79a96a372317a0aeb4452b6 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| s5-43021b9f2e1b3a1a78a5e09a32f8c883d41a0500 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-43074b2c10cae92a595b6c39a878907afa7c6fac | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-430c2378b53ed314d8d9195a7394444d76ef79e0 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-430c96e99ab9bb7bf679ea8d53f30bee8549cc82 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-4310a6c612f036b2091b20aebe24ad52ef1edb35 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-4315843433e8a778bf17cce3990b28ea754f2588 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-431fc54a0378b3876f0293c6d70560e4687154eb | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| Stable matching: An integer programming approach | Chao Huang | Coalition Formation · Matching under Preferences | Theoretical Economics 2021 | – | – | triple | |
| s5-4333a9974fecaa79744d524f6231518a4921df00 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Utilitarian Distortion Under Probabilistic Voting | Hamidreza Alipour, Mohak Goyal | Voting · Distortion | ARXIV.ORG 2026 | – | – | triple | |
| Improved maximin fair allocation of indivisible items to three agents | U. Feige, A. Norkin | Fair Allocation · Shares & Guarantees | ARXIV.ORG 2022 | ✓ | – | ↗ | triple proof |
| s5-4353dddce40115dc7c98de47336c07f89590c8d0 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| s5-4359db42496b21b54b2f20d74d8aa2280e5e1194 | unclassified | ? | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| s5-436681b801da68922569138f7243d1f8cf663716 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-43709be711bc71645964e612f6ea8399eb43a1aa | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Fair Interval Scheduling of Indivisible Chores | Sarfaraz Equbal, Rohit Gurjar, Yatharth Kumar, Swaprava Nath, Raghuvansh R. Saxena, Rohit Vaish | Fair Allocation · Chores, Online & Dynamic | ARXIV.ORG 2024 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| Revisiting EFX and fPO Allocations for Binary Chores | Ze-Han Lin, Xiao-Wei Wu, Shengwei Zhou | Fair Allocation · Chores, Online & Dynamic | ? 2026 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| s5-43848b80384d3a29d855176cf267bf44107dfe34 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-438743adf21f07d55286f9748016b5689cc87dfa | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-438d94e137d2a0ff2992d99b0f761116dd946b15 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-43a1e8c0a16a0894d311720a989e050c10f80cc4 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-43a2c7439dc2c06f004d3d73ab1ee00074e600dd | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-43b6377d9ff8df0ad17312a0384e5cd83084a671 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-43c52d330c53d704dde589a37a354b2faaf1f587 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-43d105e43b62b087d3f8ad5216cf32fbc7ca710e | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-43d4471e1d27f048e61bdc8af28562ae8b4b1788 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| s5-43ee5583e3bcb9ba2308e2c8a9ca738c2f9c8b96 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-43f84d7b96d335a79daf5f933ba886fac57a5b85 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-44005499f7f63056df617cb34a8b98284d276a14 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-4401048c172ba3d85a4a7225dc1472ef32a9c14f | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-4406398fc82e5e1364333681d6e97d5325d58104 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-440683a4738c5b9faa0a03277657ddc9a0ca2d7e | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-4411054f65d9441222aba62ddd3e89f83b4ce124 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-4421634ae09bb11fa1623d711e042f63e96b22d7 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| s5-4429738d78517abca91a22fae3536e26886d25ab | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-443fe20ec0b71e618bb45ec4cf997b4ab0e848c1 | unclassified | ? | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| s5-444c9ce01adfe8e29dc7760f3b314e0776dd283b | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-445008c610f4feeae3b4612404f4a5efdcf4746c | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-445a9a32fb7b5a020b9064571b99e3d49f95fe24 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-4463146c3f4b1e2663baf63a0e99ca70efa83ca4 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-447332838a705adb8d9817da1a5ca90d8f216586 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-447a095eefa20d6e882920f3a16fdcc3ceae1abf | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-447afb218d2d9c8a50ae1c695b430ccddd5b36c5 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-4487af406fb28fc559ad4f75dc10cd1918d814c6 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-44889c6ba7beecc1e4522bd6f36ce3a700e68039 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-44afed102f4d75c8260057c27c5058cba339f444 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-44bfd3278d6d14ca77ed85c34cb41b340c2166bb | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-44c3dac8a017a7f686e3ac9f2e199b2b203ffa71 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-44d271601825564a96734bc3796464dc3d811f05 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-44e6d8cd7bc972aff7614df643dd7ce0c29164eb | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-44f60cf82c55fc10373736a8537410baeaedfd38 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-44f840d60e1174d64d5d2c791f95e4a1795a1ed4 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-44fe453d2727ffca9c5c34a358c42b7080fa6e81 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-450bf4e997bc0cdc01e24ebaa11eb55a4b8198a5 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-451128339d29684fc2ffd277b6643fac311c327c | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-45188c946d964b6d93023dd5e4e2cf9ac3b2ae06 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-45288a65588605149609495a4b8836b635e833a5 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-454e57f3076a3ca42b5079ee2e2eb750f82d2c8c | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-45506b41d69e7627fa3c2b8b16942661ffa7da70 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-4551a918f672aaad7df459d509b49cb8ec697ed5 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-45569eaf6a51097635b4fa693101c08ea777a906 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-456350c4e0902ace126822774b411e820c9356a8 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-45641a223fb91e5d6d3626cd0405a73bb008293d | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-4564b2563e48bca9b3d3543e9cbe98b367091d7c | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-4593b8a0fef8e197ddea07206b69947929a2c0bb | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-45ab419d8d03807ad46e2cb379719fa3f8ea3522 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| s5-45b17048c9c7cc97a39f91149c5bf19d0061ed68 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-45b8836876139290df504ddfd0511986dfee1ee2 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-45ce88b02e2d6f16342f6f20e88f580ebf3e9c7b | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-45d42242d96c416b80f8e7e2135c6affb72df73a | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-45dca296d7e322d8cd6e826159f84e46b8c49e8c | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| How hard is it to satisfy (almost) all roommates? | Jiehua Chen, D. Hermelin, Manuel Sorge, Harel Yedidsion | Coalition Formation · Matching under Preferences | International Colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming 2017 | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof |
| s5-45f4c860cc69fb6a5e176535fa0c7f97a8c89a0a | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-45f759c3d7c2becc27f2e1bcf086d5e61bce36e8 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-45faa8dc35a680843ae093eeae23e3b47010233c | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-4603882c6c0d0f433c2c0b553c52de7d0b66005d | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-460cd4914056ae542116db72ae5274d92b805e06 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-4620452dfb282cf717869e1f9a0c90b21ceeacf2 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-4621e82a364472bd22e56197e634ff25677bce56 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-462ec5298bbf4c76cba5cb29991d4930b593894f | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-463fda02ca886d76ab37e4e85d319d570bf6b547 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| Heuristic and exact solutions to the inverse power index problem for small voting bodies | Sascha Kurz, S. Napel | Voting · Voting Theory & Axioms | Annals of Operations Research 2012 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| s5-46485be819e53546ed2fe39ec7c822fa0c3efbd7 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-464db4d958107195adb8df0ed35541923dc1dd1f | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Bayesian Combinatorial Auctions not comsoc | G. Christodoulou, Annamária Kovács, Michael Schapira | unclassified | International Colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming 2008 | – | – | triple | |
| A polynomial-time algorithm for computing a Pareto optimal and almost proportional allocation | H. Aziz, H. Moulin, Fedor Sandomirskiy | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | Operations Research Letters 2019 | ✓ | – | ↗ | triple proof |
| s5-4678ee9e8ba50621e46662085ad75bb1492fdb77 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-467b6661e37cf18634f4fadddd52866c5d48cdf0 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-467d7355a1e25706f5e575b6cc2e3afef195e775 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Designing Random Allocation Mechanisms: Theory and Applications | E. Budish, Yeon-Koo Che, Fuhito Kojima, P. Milgrom | Fair Allocation · Fair Division Theory | ? 2013 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| Epistemic Pairwise Maximin Share | Michal Feldman, A. Fiat, Yael Nissan, Tomasz Ponitka | Fair Allocation · Shares & Guarantees | ARXIV.ORG 2026 | ✓ | – | ↗ | triple proof |
| s5-469770d12bcd9ae5583d1f8e8402ae72502e9302 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| s5-46a3aaf745a357f0e2f3425e9bd5f4051cbc93bf | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-46cc67961d8451b8f45a965eea45e1d7d35fe876 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-46e108979b44b064ea89370a8a10b8c0cbcb69b7 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-470d8410c2701c25326db8f58d2320c8e44761e3 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | ↗ | triple proof | |
| s5-471186f3608faa833a36b9716ba335c43325c447 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-4722ae15017533237ca90150bc2a7bf870d96161 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-47252efed2b15ca69ed9ade3ec60c0a79f72e209 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-4741f67cea88994626e1ec4937869f70cd916fd2 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-47519e7f864ef580f920e9f3a76d54f14bf51c67 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-4776830a53071c23836f32d26fe507676f8bf438 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-47a688460a384e96e9df0e359973f6551a8bdbad | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-47b23619a06eba4a440b47610560a080a8d56d13 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-47c68c0d0a021b65769b58a18586cc49f592fb76 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| s5-47c82e04d2e9e74ce404c2808e74110b6a7f7160 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-47c91518fdc10ad2995b5c6e6be64ba368b537e5 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-47d00f3a0ba57ecea7985fc7cf8f63fb81a5ffcf | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| Output Agreement Mechanisms and Common Knowledge not comsoc | Bo Waggoner, Yiling Chen | unclassified | AAAI Conference on Human Computation & Crowdsourcing 2014 | – | – | triple | |
| s5-47e1e50f46641d505c29c980d622deb4e2ad8575 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-47f8367ad9c45900d0012f12fa562d71a0fdfdbd | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-480c675d6a6b33933ece52bb7ef92aaa32fa8fc9 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-48135c8379876aed52e21e10ff96c626674a4d94 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-4819110c01673be3ecb8d11084cecd2f2e27d433 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-4819356f6ccf230b6f6c5aa4dfd0f4eebd23072d | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-481bc5bc6b51b6e7c3c05fc068a83d76c766aa31 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-482b0b008b35fadbf17f0c83d9a51826bbe96f7b | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-483f4b76b94de0f15156d316b62d12eac1b28eff | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-483f9b7d3efc16cdbe4ba8b3781be0794e70da01 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-48537a4e97f8883a1f04cc4fa4551340d6234715 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-486ff3decbd2db140ed75504396afe9b7fe586a9 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| s5-487ddf40c34f240ee137b202ea5caaf44b7c189d | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-487fe5d905958788bca6b9f314d8ad40201694fa | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-48821ef37bc3225d0e55b97f1c12a1282bebe6da | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-4882a1808dffa8ea57d74741566da8aca541dc5b | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-488557bf9cb282bf6d07f2bc59c265d067ff4af3 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-488d962cbaa513a13e30f5ad12c2a6c50583051d | unclassified | ? | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| An Axiomatic Analysis of Proportionality Notions in Approval-Based Multiwinner Voting | Chris Dong, Jannik Peters | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | ARXIV.ORG 2026 | – | – | triple | |
| s5-489145a54bf93344887b6815772e1ff22f64694e | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-489445beae757aa8bea04d19e1347b1fef8e26a7 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-48b246c4cb4988df73f0180131f444cbeb2c9c3a | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Control Complexity in Fallback Voting | G. Erdélyi, J. Rothe | Voting · Bribery & Control | Computing: The Australasian Theory Symposium 2010 | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof |
| s5-48d88b396af2d12b0befc5e74c40c956a9eb870a | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-48dcb1abb2e1ed768e730d605ac8757f7e472816 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| s5-48e6fdbf54864e25da790c159720a991c049dd4a | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| s5-48e7c8e01dfa7fd65e99898ce84255f01a5d9962 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-48ed03de1d25416884dbfb898e12e962c4c28078 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-48f0a7d13c89744f2430a543aff3a2083be03239 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-48fc8b6c7783e1ae8bd1063786f2c7f8571c102a | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| s5-492de6abef88803746d1e38e417a3c0807d250b4 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-49435d7e1917cbf55ceb73ffd50dffb76736df5f | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-4943ac6ea52b09e79317901246cd8e7d93f0b149 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-495216a993fa69243908cd14e0d5b5b01e3558c6 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-496d3f003d4650019af88f508bec27650c4a1b07 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-498722ba5033f6187eef38cf0eb99e5aabaa73ca | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-499f7d41f9426dd9a544c9121dbb4951b3b97f79 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-49a65fb3a9e9ee9f65584124bfb053d8626620bd | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-49a801c7d75b734b29123901ac61f4174f9750ec | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-49cb6827cb83d65382a4ef483bad56889ea80d7b | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-49e839d733c971c3b7366538721f8b7cd02c4fc1 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-49e96af0190412c5b84803f306faef189656944e | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-49fc58d62181b5bd3463459669d638a65c5f3df7 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-49fc86b9fea443a12a8d4c3a137bf6632f2e3a17 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Truthful and Almost Envy-Free Mechanism of Allocating Indivisible Goods: the Power of Randomness | Xiao-Lin Bu, Biaoshuai Tao | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | IEEE Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science 2024 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| Streaming problems as (multi-issue) claims problems | G. Bergantiños, Juan D. Moreno-Ternero | Fair Allocation · Fair Division Theory | European Journal of Operational Research 2024 | – | – | triple | |
| s5-4a1ea264e13a68c229417800c7bb694983eb11aa | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-4a2716078eb50892c06ac6ea4d420bfca53b86c2 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-4a34c7e69706e9ae8dd44c96b10ed3563f5dd5a9 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-4a3b9c33d01058ca2a83da29bf31502ad31b9b9f | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-4a44e39f81c724f9f0b677e114a0b58c10c829f5 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-4a473f60c1d34fd22f0a75a64d008cdbb2c493a1 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-4a4a63155a178070c1bef1563f5c810ecd28d55c | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-4a4cd51647a7cce35614b3fa551ef37fd34e1edb | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-4a57dd550ba0221afb9f5afe1fc14058b64ba08c | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-4a5e9e14c7c8c52f5c3828f375fa6d3713ec878c | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-4a5fc890f783a8aa4e8eeb3ab09c6b3e78c95afd | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-4a6e8158ed31e68c625d13caec58b17ee9dd4cd9 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-4a7675f7f76c33ca56929b50ca8c0685397b1c24 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-4a821b0c0c69677be85e2c6e787a39411e0ba947 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-4a8d42c20aeaf05175db84857444d59898bf09de | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-4a9284f2d28e212d7bd731025c39217115b9a5b3 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-4a9ce4a56ef607f0c024bd52c9f8e678c6c76007 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-4aba97ce2b9cc85eb2bbc80393c123138c9310fd | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-4ac4149524c5474adca2732c74aacb43fdbaa79a | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| Normalized Range Voting Broadly Resists Control | Curtis Menton | Voting · Bribery & Control | Theory of Computing Systems 2010 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| s5-4ad8b20df88554f2c131d9b5cd3e101c66497ac8 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-4adfe02b8dc5e54b9cceda2bf2ee1754ddb01e96 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-4af2670560511d196d41eefb2cfa88085dea84f2 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Simultaneous Ordinal Maximin Share and Envy-Based Guarantees | Hannaneh Akrami, T. Reichert | Fair Allocation · Shares & Guarantees | ARXIV.ORG 2026 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| s5-4b046dbff2ade2705dc9d388c7a92dff65c3bb91 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-4b164d91aecffda07a0f408b65240dbdd8ea4dcf | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| s5-4b20dea63a0c08d7ab54cced4e326d2c6a018159 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-4b211768c947d5a7a0ac67ac3062a3732374ce99 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-4b2ed4b2ba1bfdeb5f8fe91de32c79cea906e6fd | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Tournament solutions based on cooperative game theory | Aleksei Y. Kondratev, V. Mazalov | Voting · Tournament Solutions | International Journal of Game Theory 2015 | – | – | triple | |
| s5-4b4f7e4120d308606cbe62993cfc3754a919c327 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-4b597be7e710d09ebb30e1f4804dad1cf679a3c0 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-4b61e887ea6a56381ddb2d1d50d547b7d5857f3b | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-4b6cdc42646dbb946b6a4033f87f648427c56551 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-4b71ce84a354e111d959e85e4d5d88796ff1fdce | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-4b749bcbc5051c8c205be6fb7ab0916f46795e23 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-4b74b8fcdc5e059d4d3060d5169135bbdab9c2a0 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-4b8b17a7151e41554a12b1901ff7c09c0a404f8c | unclassified | ? | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| s5-4b8b1d7d70f72c396536742a324372b6687a063f | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-4b919999cbb9e97647a3a2a22459e0d7ca3e7d96 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-4b921849b67315a44e24eeb7fc0d3edddf38eaef | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-4b94207366c23c5f54ffbc44f299c8044bc67f07 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Tuned Models of Peer Assessment in MOOCs not comsoc | C. Piech, Jonathan Huang, Zhenghao Chen, Chuong B. Do, A. Ng, D. Koller | unclassified | Educational Data Mining 2013 | – | – | triple | |
| s5-4b995f411c730e716bea53616a487fd428409cae | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| s5-4b9c51485d2172a157dbbddc196aab0c1f69292f | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-4bb649e8db62fae2d3ff5db33534bcaade2ab9b9 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-4bc491b080406967b39d7a16dceec2d942cd8c5a | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-4bce27de01d9a613ab064f1a5a75d879dc878816 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-4bd1cd2ed7928e775f946bda83087b8eae8d82cc | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-4bda0c0b9d4917e8ad20cc6bbf7e1272cefa7d15 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-4bffe377c63fdabef41fc0d278fb0eb5b127215e | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| s5-4c0b4aaa4fb258fcd2b977e9a70466b34a63e6f7 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-4c37a72a445bd2b03de756fa465d8098b0402e6c | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-4c398cab5868a22119f2e90bac855d6cada6de1a | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-4c40aef30464f35cefd73defe1f8e0236fccb414 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-4c5032f07e82028d85b54ac63713994d97ccd92f | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-4c697bf40e3dc9b060642d8bf623f68ac85ad7e8 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-4c6cf100b455b3cfc77d72ca1e87b7d3812ea849 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Breaking the 3/4 Barrier for Approximate Maximin Share | Hannaneh Akrami, J. Garg | Fair Allocation · Shares & Guarantees | ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms 2023 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| s5-4c732c69662ec4b0831be022c6c9f34a95741cca | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-4c7cb4454fb1b404ce6a1b07195ffd788c051652 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-4ca54f1b0774ce1d426f119df90ef3f81279bc07 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-4ca85d74a82dc31371d10f716e321f0b248ecd7a | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-4cb1f592cacfbac8512dc510b1fb5d2c917b8a83 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-4cb83cf871559e9636af360a10bdc980db6c462d | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-4cb987ea4df4fc4097ee0b45db61848ffd64ef12 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-4cded1a5218ac3fb4057691a86776b688da33067 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-4ce8f86e2ec191ab5b79c63f7a904680b088a8c9 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-4cf48a478fbb12e17dd484cf3ea5738e9ede7091 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-4cf70bff81fba113eec1686867421d7f4a1aa4b6 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-4cf71014cccf67ba3029347df3aa21a8b0c7f524 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-4d164c39dd453b8156f8d0ada0386198dcd2c297 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-4d1e224f946a95595d20b7eb40a093f5102789b6 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-4d46585ed70b074ba304703bc8eeba661b4d47e0 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-4d46a52d2ef3be710a08d0027d0fc6256ea896bd | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-4d57faf9c5dbeec42ae70b4d536702a85e4b7ad7 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-4d5a9aee28d8e0df7c4f331c0596472074602835 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-4d783d1664d60bf86d645656c9e15e0933b0c4cd | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-4d7d405b99694dbd982825f37fa75c61c778b1ab | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-4d86e9797867be80e5bbf3cf4b6bbe0de965b500 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-4d89ee505a902a034b1ce59b8a0e9412abda5e42 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-4d8e5336526612963548b81577604207368b6d89 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| s5-4d92ad37effa4395e1058de3422296c2184193ee | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-4d957b95f332d1cc88757b2e7d62001ddae090e8 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-4d97edd36ec0d5d59203d16c8382e9bd6d4f9559 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-4d987ab8ea9ffcd34e55a890f17d4e6da1f25e66 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-4d989ac98cfecaa252cecab68332d29b663a8340 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-4db23a39fd63ff395ded18dddcd2108fe8b37863 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-4dccf6800dcfa70584fdec8f576ef48334b29741 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-4dcd5630717c4d2270e7effc07a2284d0b57032f | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-4dd1d14d3d2543db3455933eb652d5fb88142847 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-4dd85b20960211fa675c568a364805b25e47ad7a | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-4dd9b06b15743976827a5fad650addeb64ffa1f1 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-4dddc179275a8374a8adaf7ee10ded3d4f2f8833 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-4de00d8d97a45053b3bff4c3bfeb33b5f9209fa8 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-4de93ac1fd613d715e8d5bd821e910f6d156922b | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-4def2471241402bae554f322dc854b82fe5b3a2f | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Hedonic Games and Treewidth Revisited | Tesshu Hanaka, M. Lampis | Coalition Formation · Hedonic Games | Embedded Systems and Applications 2022 | – | ✓ | triple | |
| s5-4e03b0d74923ba14946d0c6873819cad279f5903 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-4e0a637b2c3a3eea685dc15256641f53e71b6d74 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-4e23b33715e6effc081a6e0cf7d318568ce791b7 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-4e2d0a6aacd02d1ba409ff421cfc3bf9cad7958f | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-4e4a8bd35417078030ce76d0e2dfffa99c4adadd | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-4e5976a5d24e955240cc0b6c55f0505c24788c9e | unclassified | ? | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| Distributed Agent-Constrained Truthful Facility Location | Argyrios Deligkas, P. Kanellopoulos, A. Voudouris | Voting · Structured Preferences | ARXIV.ORG 2026 | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | |
| Almost EFX in Hypergraphs | Ioannis Kakatelis, Thanasis Lianeas, A. Sgouritsa, Minas Marios Sotiriou | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | ARXIV.ORG 2026 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| s5-4e6aa67204a4d7ced30ced3c1cff74c095e9abcc | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-4e70e69e5886e862440abcaf4e429cf0fd67b990 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-4e71bfd23c21fcbcd67f6d3f3ab1e2931429528e | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-4e71f9c8b1c17ad70d28f3f311ea412ce38619cc | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-4e72041afe0df6ccc1769583d9865a82da3125a8 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-4e72fd8a104fc52437151f812487fbc3ed4dec30 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-4e7e54d1a7b029622fcd1b710c67c773dbaabda7 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-4ea2336b016b531d8b7b0587eb02721f057327a2 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-4eab467d24b169edd663a62a8aee6465c2e56257 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-4eb35b29ab78e0c694d2afe622cc4be5462eee21 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-4ed071d10da0a7aaf5f9b4ee5376249db3e9f635 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-4ed5b101d652ff90cfa05ec80f991b7c631e0190 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-4eeb90056e09d5afeab72390f8defb78e2a4b439 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-4eeec65f42eb34a985f05cab4bdcf91b51e67135 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Influence in Weighted Committees | Sascha Kurz, Alexander Mayer, S. Napel | Voting · Voting Theory & Axioms | European Economic Review 2019 | – | – | triple | |
| s5-4f025878598be183e617af33ebce677ec9aa292c | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-4f2704ad353551b8bfa60e15123e6ee402bd2166 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-4f31ec694d4b3857cfbe294b8be0f4cf633d24a4 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-4f648056391b4218e964e4e5da07ea079fdef507 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-4f6cef1fc31161bce8ad058953d576193b6b4f22 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-4f893549cb71806f5a8009af74921594c038b709 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-4f9512e80b4d39d57bfcfce81b29c1eef7002309 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| s5-4fa9b0f9036c50ce80422fa10c06e3452cf713e3 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-4fb386513a1b078c37fe7100ba344bf460680291 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-4fc14be9082f68c6e72407da0bb29f2afeeda9c2 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Dynamically Stable Matching | L. Doval | Coalition Formation · Matching under Preferences | Social Science Research Network 2019 | – | – | triple | |
| s5-4fefaa345e013d2c2d83484fe7461b413f0b658b | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-4ff166adb529445b0165cb91aef3845983f08a5c | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| Randomized Strategic Facility Location with Predictions not comsoc | Eric Balkanski, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Golnoosh Shahkarami | unclassified | Neural Information Processing Systems 2024 | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | |
| s5-5017685ef5b016d738f69806ba941c7cb5c72efc | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-501fd7e3cfb9bdcd7025426034bf3bc100a34246 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-502fffac6add71f332580d92515fc9abdd25d3ec | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-50379e1e3b7f2447e25a9e6472e318de3e43a36e | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-5043f5d70eaf0e96b8c10542bfe257fdb3473610 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-505f080102577caf342b83dfdc123c130279697e | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-506020b895de9858bda6ed5a04521919b9835564 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-506c2f34e5b8ae02700655dca2a04d1c188aae8c | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-506cf98bb942d028d1edb4eecdeb448d0856de7f | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| s5-50865b88d7e76b75fb8a03576280a9e0df7c5718 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| Tight Bounds On the Distortion of Randomized and Deterministic Distributed Voting | Mohammad Ali Abam, Davoud Kareshki, Marzie Nilipour, M. H. Paydar, Masoud Seddighin | Voting · Distortion | Neural Information Processing Systems 2025 | – | – | triple | |
| s5-50a68ac8d5bc9fdd196ac18e21664b70ac2fd394 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-50acc5ece7159fe1a61f829ff8d85e0be10d1374 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-50af82081e5601ea780b31ec357fe4b76bbf447b | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Computing stable outcomes in symmetric additively-separable hedonic games | Martin Gairing, Rahul Savani | Coalition Formation · Hedonic Games | Mathematics of Operations Research 2015 | – | ✓ | triple | |
| s5-50bcdc604726e73c53d71ace8c5b9af2cd5d5f1d | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-50c541cd5272d8f230018b7403e49037bf499779 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-50d3237d7efad7a79996457ee249dc4f546a1ebc | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Characterizing the Top Cycle via Strategyproofness | F. Brandt, Patrick Lederer | Voting · Tournament Solutions | Theoretical Economics 2021 | – | – | triple | |
| s5-50e4071823f8c6f1f8538dc7d5c68080b6117c0a | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| s5-50ea79a809bc3c97dedc3db4d574b40c5fe8598b | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-50f001efefeea1452d4f2e0b7e683fdac6d953cc | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-50f29630ebcc9c6a1b68288f24fe2b49e884c65a | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| s5-5100d619fa621f456f5f91f7d76a8fd8a4dfc03d | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-510a3358b646945d45bf04ff771fc29ed3fb9b4c | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-511b71ab06d750775ee72da454d1a625e06bf782 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| Online Market Equilibrium with Application to Fair Division | Yuan Gao, Christian Kroer, A. Peysakhovich | Fair Allocation · Markets & Equilibria | Neural Information Processing Systems 2021 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| s5-513de5f9d9fff412a9d0f576015d2dadac6323dd | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-514bfd2d61a0268d50cdacc96ffca91b70847e52 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-5151c9c7f5faee16a8512fb937816132356267a8 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-51537f751a831e009c5ffa1eb05414eaa989cabf | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-5153a7ac3a36435df9f5ec54335c3227bbb3f5f6 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| s5-5177f218e04654eff7bea07c5f4acc69c92e8006 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-5179c0367734256dcad0c5720ef3b68b8ec9a808 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-51a13bec0cf5ae1270d2443d7e94cea09bbc1e4d | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-51a549d013385b01bea35b8f439a96555de54fa4 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| s5-51ac7f084185af16db851b16e640671d446aa716 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-51bfd35c5887fb20e057565062b5060e21f8a8f3 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-51de462919d6b579473668a74da76cbf06c0cf68 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-51ef1110047a85e3583f7086b8fadee16c63cb2e | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-520416a73b1220b0f032378cc039ab6646dad470 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| s5-521fdc5864d8fdbe26e4abd22c912e132faaa384 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-5228091448b417863e003474c8848588b73d6ce0 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-522f8ae2a4e7048a8999814bc70720de04dda52d | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-523b0c489d2d23a15dec71b820ad0d65afeb7d66 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| s5-52505d2f295717cb548fe34f285608eabddc415a | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-52576df0f611e12784945a7c50e726fe2d131647 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-5268014556eb7d444350baf801041524b0543ea5 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-52899569f75e501b8c68bdbb7216572a608851d2 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-52a3bf2be1434808ea1c6092756ef6476fd5ecd9 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-52c4ee29b1dafd3938711b3fffd8c651b9cad405 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-52ce59af49152ac59893a5f00b67d78cf573e6f0 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-52d448ffc4256dc23a7bdc5df154d62587bd6dc5 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-52d4a52de42491c2bc2c2414e959f9fde5be105f | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-52dc8779657151fec5db871a7d7396e68c1d0883 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-52ec87677254c1f1cc61c6b383e703d246d6ba93 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| UCP-Networks: A Directed Graphical Representation of Conditional Utilities not comsoc | Craig Boutilier, F. Bacchus, R. Brafman | unclassified | Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence 2001 | ✓ | – | ↗ | triple proof |
| s5-5305f701529e0e8f8d041e2bc43f3f9ae2e7c31b | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-5313b017ff859954b836a45c296e1d0afdbc74e4 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-531407a9697a33203a96b32590bd05d45c711eb9 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-5315ae8ff13c4b0a46a0e9c28bda1d014c651599 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-531a7252adddd2784e712fdc456982f040d2d02c | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-5321777e87fe156a1909e26e2710404ef11c064a | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Maximin shares under cardinality constraints | Halvard Hummel, Magnus Lie Hetland | Fair Allocation · Shares & Guarantees | Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems 2021 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| s5-532d1df50bbc3ed939d17b01ca07b426ebb2ce90 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| How Many Vote Operations Are Needed to Manipulate A Voting System? | Lirong Xia | Voting · Manipulation | ARXIV.ORG 2012 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| Lecture Notes on Voting Theory | Davide Grossi | Voting · Voting Theory & Axioms | ARXIV.ORG 2021 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| s5-5392721b447e1005c3685d11462f04b3eab660ad | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-53a5588f9166b06f07220b8b4ebe71b0f6474f3b | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-53a87b5e86f34f52b148ee0056b2ff87b834b03d | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-53a977fff4e24aabababda80c36919342b530336 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-53b756329cd4f5855fb0f2f554b4a0581715d8fa | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-53bd3cb100be213780b1a64dfe7d6c9ffa6b72be | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-53e6d06d27017dc5b69e9f9b8ba3da6bf6636bb2 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-53fb956d55851d30a0eb4963b1bc14cdb61b057b | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-53fe120ff3de87a68f53149df16697d2e4b4b472 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-540022867b13dd4965fc96201403698dd318cf95 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-5407ca4522da51dee717209ab031c32a36404e41 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-5427bdfba8a9cfbf1b210a004180293a0b279839 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-543c5d93d832406d186ff1d9fae4df9a553b6349 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-5450e7ca196361db58e8158658af2044fb778b70 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| Game theoretical analysis of Kidney Exchange Programs not comsoc | Margarida Carvalho, Andrea Lodi | unclassified | European Journal of Operational Research 2019 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| s5-54656c32c7807188db9ae6f4246217dcd3c807f2 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-5476caad3df79df4dbde029c5b0a69b14c5b5ca3 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-54810ff019aa45707b2299c8b78a78d7b771d8e9 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-548df1dccacb02f2b687c9ef28542e45646effca | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-54922e21b7b3596590becd0484fde3e82bce7554 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-54966c75960ceb1c17d0ecbecc8e9808d101d49e | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-54a7a9798ce643beab96ae8f048bad966d43c428 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-54adfbf9246aaa46fc8e61832c123b423363f13f | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-54bb9e292c2d8df656b54843eecff4982643a070 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-54c215e448deb59380162aa552bd916425e51616 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-54d129cb50ddb9d36143f19269b1e7824c2b5356 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| A Little Charity Guarantees Almost Envy-Freeness | B. Chaudhury, T. Kavitha, K. Mehlhorn, A. Sgouritsa | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms 2019 | ✓ | – | ↗ | triple proof |
| s5-550b7c7a69e04585bd29767baf51c2f4817ec8aa | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-551de7661ad23ab7dfb20807fb7820c14b847d30 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-5522d5e482a0aedd212788de13193bec8c42ff30 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-552c6eadfd70e503034d2bce0b17ce7fe4131a11 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-553b56f5b785047cd78110d186c995b5bbb3c4a0 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-5540c6ae4bb9a0fa896c2cf19a2e68555400c83e | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| Proportional Participatory Budgeting with Additive Utilities | Dominik Peters, Grzegorz Pierczynski, P. Skowron | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Participatory Budgeting | Neural Information Processing Systems 2020 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| s5-5558e00746cc572ce0868338bb51068be9683998 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-55788630f35ca722079c3f08d16c50693b29dd92 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-55cdf1e7d51b80aeb6a95014c40acc8a68705aa2 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-55cea6468433a6ca1c17edadede74327779ce73e | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-55e1080f26babd618cdea1ea53f79bf825d8373f | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| s5-5607036cb1342bde931b1b75715cf9990b1b25aa | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-56162274806bd352085d84208ddf1694c9ae435a | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-5617bc264393f7781732e9124720cf2751d48664 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-561c2e9f1468845d1ec3f7f13bbb3b473f379a8b | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Characterization of Priority-Neutral Matching Lattices | Clayton Thomas | Fair Allocation · Fair Division Theory | IEEE Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science 2024 | – | – | triple | |
| s5-564ab06d999d62b4b36c876c531d1d34783ba0fa | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-565d71303cb2f5c74868ea16d99ad2d3748478b6 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-56699393dc391a02973f1665768c9d1852612ee9 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-566c8fbfc4aad785eae70853ef7c03865cc7e28b | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-567585a3a1618caaa1a753b672ffec6a965fce09 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-567aca2dc0b85d271e5a1b4b2a5f8e34a947486b | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-5686111b9c6106b06efabb9aabc68b7e9655f613 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-568e8a7cdcaf6dea977f4fb4b37fe96b82dd524a | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-5693c24c9b27143d44a32de7ef6a9f0433f4a585 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| Sublinear Approximation Algorithm for Nash Social Welfare with XOS Valuations | Siddharth Barman, Anand Krishna, Pooja Kulkarni, Shivika Narang | Fair Allocation · Markets & Equilibria | Information Technology Convergence and Services 2021 | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | |
| Dichotomy for voting systems | E. Hemaspaandra, Lane A. Hemaspaandra | Voting · Manipulation | Journal of computer and system sciences (Print) 2005 | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof |
| Measuring voting power in convex policy spaces | Sascha Kurz | Voting · Voting Theory & Axioms | ARXIV.ORG 2013 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| Representing the Insincere: Strategically Robust Proportional Representation | Barton E. Lee | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | ARXIV.ORG 2018 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| s5-56ba44b3c9f79bbde2400eaf9517f69ec3e71fd8 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-56d51fff21d63d5f40a9c77b9ce5090bee9e5779 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-56d52d1211723e352532a11e7763a5b5334ee933 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-56d9a4815f3c34edc6ef55850ec0275127b49564 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-56f40b427d76d24000addd0aa4b52caf22effceb | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| A Truthful Cardinal Mechanism for One-Sided Matching | Rediet Abebe, R. Cole, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Jason D. Hartline | Fair Allocation · Markets & Equilibria | ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms 2019 | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | |
| s5-571725245abc2ea9559848c402edc109c9fc0e21 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-571fdb1cb854cc58a50d3c6e79844c5f5333243c | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-5720dd6f0a99f1a09eb6891cc4b79ddb01e5d5f1 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-573e58c67278b9e6b80681378e6da3b8b2a56438 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-5741d670a327b064370a6e5041482edad2ff80a8 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-575bc5862586a322b39e8d093960d6cd2afc86f7 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-57687c07512db150a3f9e5111843f2b221bd03c5 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-5768c3b8b8a767f40fc59a29dee57d16cf3e8f1b | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-57757eb0d81156ae59ed5c191c102011cdf82ca4 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-579fc25a226c7c23d6f58ddc8b5ffb303ea8d69c | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Limitations of Best-of-Both-Worlds Solutions in Approval-Based Multiwinner Elections | Jiarong Jin, Xuanxuan Liu, Biaoshuai Tao | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | ? 2026 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| s5-57ae10ad9d8e13dc897e21872a7f131efa2b0dbb | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-57b302e56e8a336900340c968e6ad10cef45ae28 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-57c79a8751f5fcde658e78d2722d412d57e1e550 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Equitable Division of a Path | Neeldhara Misra, Chinmay Sonar, P. R. Vaidyanathan, Rohit Vaish | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | ARXIV.ORG 2021 | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | |
| s5-57f941de4bc70b8e09c931b27840e228baf81186 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Core Existence in Approval-Based Committee Elections with up to Five Voter Types | Patrick Becker, Matthias Greger, Dominik Peters | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | ARXIV.ORG 2026 | – | – | triple | |
| s5-58138c417557bb50487f31bb00544a5ef7e03e6a | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-581ad3b1d6b18f6c1bc8095f12e4b9d84f4efedf | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-581d6612456218c7fbeb34492e201d52bb476c20 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-58476ca1d62c4d6502c209d795888e5a59848b75 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-584e39333212e0000eb1aed42a8bf9641fb39757 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| s5-585064159ef473a308b60299ad79acb4cd9cc7fa | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| s5-588b981e13da200d03f03eb9bc4116a512946021 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-58ad302d5b642ae148dee45a145260b055e951cb | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-58b09061ff57782e337265c45a3196a45d283cbc | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-58b4aee59e8f7c1e3ee209d1fe9a14025e40a0de | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-58b7f0a2e76d779cccc9e5a88c353b6321ec5fa0 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-58b9e2a16b161be802cce6e76bfaff1cc5c07b8e | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-58c3b68b109d2b27605ccb3783a79f41c836edf0 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-58c4afcde348e365b0830ea161193d1074ce361e | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-58d28c471d34c71d2254933bf4a28464afe5df8b | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-58d9d646c889c82628245095de740e486f47e9d0 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-58e09d454ebb0b079f0cc16b5797c5827ddda6b0 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-58e2235b177235aef2d1adc71cdb24df91cc495e | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-58e39b31e6c8660b4a0143101ceb43f1e9fb1e57 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-58eca9fda2e8f1a54d173710ae879005c918df32 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-58ecbd3aff7eb856e8b5fda163577f41bb920d48 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-5900b31228a8c9cbf26d361185cf689ccf8198cd | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-5908e495b8557e36e29012638dc592b7813076bb | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| Existence of EFX for Two Additive Valuations | Ryoga Mahara | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | Discrete Applied Mathematics 2020 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| s5-59279901dbe476185c97602124ddc54f4d36d94a | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-5947da18fdfab9df1e3b619c2e09a6c08069564e | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-595bf7bc95135a49650f535c1d313e421097e1a8 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-596b014c3177fee2b6f5509b74d88a6c2067e73c | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-59819c7867896e0e1c094dba2ab14aafbb553ae2 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-598997cd62f24334a6a786b1a986fca8c90b4fdf | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| s5-5989cba51085ef2f4b0029072396472daa1d9a81 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-598dc593bdccb6cdafedd1f796cc773b0c839d77 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-59a791efec4b024f60b6875d59f6cf96ff85bcab | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-59b11283cbabe15bc5d1be5cf6a2f164f93b4f4f | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-59b76e76f40983f0055c5900b607b9f4b9e46fda | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-59cf64731f910b25b229f796577dc278bd0a6dec | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-59d012a02cb12496823bbb6e7501901e19445de4 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| Prophet Inequalities Beyond Utilitarian Social Welfare not comsoc | Daniel Halpern, Abhiram Manohara, Alexandros Psomas | unclassified | ? 2026 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| s5-59e307204ec3ee066986620b981d9f9100828940 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-59fbefeb601ee81d82bc6390c0d2ebf4e3645b43 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-5a06ff2dd0bdc8246b780da078bdb9673b01132b | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-5a19ba29fb1de188437a9dabc106574ad2958350 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-5a211c8a5049b9b0aabac4d1a58da91e112bbb0d | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-5a28d1d2bc9537fb7d8133f0cac98d39530840a4 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-5a2bc72fc1f41379e67d90f0e137e7b579a1df6d | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-5a2c8aafc79cf27c959227f9afb7fbacd5bcd8e6 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-5a3910cd56541f78641d21be830ae9a6b9a1c207 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-5a3b7e91c7161c2576457eaa1a260fb6aeef118a | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-5a3ceb0a9b310ffe7a549165cd7824546f5c5441 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Proportional Approval Voting, Harmonic k-median, and Negative Association | Jarosław Byrka, P. Skowron, Krzysztof Sornat | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | International Colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming 2017 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| s5-5a5dbf17de6c6a6e093cd89fa58efa8298b69ec5 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| Weighted Envy-Freeness in House Allocation | Sijia Dai, Yankai Chen, Xiao-Wei Wu, Yicheng Xu, Yong Zhang | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | ARXIV.ORG 2024 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| s5-5a68bdcce208dd7359a1c43dda315182e1cff99f | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-5a731a590fb9e0622bd9c627c3653ed2b0685437 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-5a81be089e18a7f0e34db19050720152d65ae231 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-5a84bd1d4baf32f3e5f24b539ba5a6ab72f575f0 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-5a8e4164d2caa26e28c4b87acb298ce495a19050 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-5ab8b8e29cbf02fb1ee9a7ecaf4b7a03b352c698 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-5abf0d4d8e4c77bcf8b3ea9f5eac522462f478d6 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-5ac0ca56c6969db7c9138131623af0aea5c5d7b8 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-5ac7133553ad0764655d551d47715e9798bfa31f | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-5ad5a3567a2494d1abf35ef8bf4dbcf40b615ce3 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-5ad67ea60db5cd8486e0c9e11c960c3db8bba7d1 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-5ad7ae3af5e4d448e94fdffc8f53928b6ee32ce8 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| The Smoothed Possibility of Social Choice | Lirong Xia | Voting · Voting Theory & Axioms | Neural Information Processing Systems 2020 | – | – | triple | |
| s5-5adc38019c73aa855e9685575e0092187564a42e | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Envy-Free Matchings with Lower Quotas | Y. Yokoi | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | Algorithmica 2017 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| Bringing Real Market Participants' Real Preferences into the Lab: An Experiment that Changed the Course Allocation Mechanism at Wharton | E. Budish, J. Kessler | Fair Allocation · Markets & Equilibria | ? 2016 | – | – | triple | |
| s5-5af91f2430d4acf1a62907e46409b3d6ed6546e6 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-5afd970985875f8903a4f19764eebed370f18ce3 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-5b0b19828c6451d88e5d0cc9fdf7384b505e7c7d | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-5b12eba66c7ac3ddbbd288e5c4c8000244f8a5ae | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-5b1799d29a5b0d980a515848902346f8f3e4d8d4 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-5b337da143b8080b5c87e290815cce3c7316dd7a | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-5b389965cbd0d7e0f999c9af7a5ffb3f0042fbd1 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| s5-5b4514d2d7ea2379f2b801194d4d63b075bc3f4f | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-5b45fb562c146788c79323ef1244c58010f1b6d3 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-5b5829dd99dea1854306bb44e0a4869233d40bba | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-5b6300814123be1a413cf9b7103448771e598d5a | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-5b724ddad6d5060dc0065f17612aa3d2c47c1af4 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-5b73df3145f91d8554ddbbd59f7b7a4dd58b0a37 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-5b78154527bbe4bdfe907178c637c31c2b8694c8 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-5b7e9ee6cd9f54cc247cd48f74c4558dcbb3f481 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-5b82f5465490de2f5905d15788104eab994ba4ec | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-5b89921d9b50e7f2dcb2984f106a1729879b846f | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-5b915afb88bc9faa656334c7b603da241a3f1a62 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-5b982162661747cf37f3f2e2b256dd0c1365c0f8 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-5b9d5092f892b9f7cac0c19bbfc1395ba4630769 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-5ba370134d80bd4e00a8a0bf8ff1dc801cdb79fd | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-5bb97bd235ce656ab75bdc6f78db37c51aee4245 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-5bc10e2eeb0aa73f927238f09ed0754da14516f6 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-5bc72f14d900a971a1ba2c20c41a03ea755600e1 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-5bf1def13a26b2238222fb7c48d66a1ab1d569ea | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-5bf23e8a0de9fce2fb2f8a7bbc38963ef8feb60d | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-5bfb79ec6c26bc444d259ac6f19e7e52940e5c02 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-5c05d6a3ae339a23a6e71d4f45183e6cb7fed60f | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-5c07d58301ef4536bf3c9b0c72765292235857c8 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-5c0c757b87af95652020c4df81b39dc98ae0ad89 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-5c10a7d2335818918937b539c887151b5de48dec | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-5c118efe83daa360480626d35a978df2740123f8 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-5c1a4f076536d73d615e683b9b7a96437d588768 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-5c1e8c934b501e504ae698f55590ee3546a8aa96 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-5c1fe5fe46835f4343603501d34a174b7a620072 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-5c26f7b6f2103ebc4b271af47cda3c4b0b8dc06f | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-5c39d903b98ec2b8696e88a0e99c43d83d487061 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-5c3edc64b4fddf64c33fef0e5a96c036afbcc7d0 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-5c54343f43d4420fe668cc01417e888ad059ab43 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-5c68dd991d699b707962f7bccc249dc7f6b795cd | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-5c7dcebd85c36050ef471d6bfb93b2af80d1de1a | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| Envy-Free Cake Divisions Cannot be Found by Finite Protocols | W. Stromquist | Fair Allocation · Cake Cutting | Electronic Journal of Combinatorics 2008 | ✓ | – | ↘* | triple proof |
| s5-5c8304ac7d6feec64374cf40121af7856727eea9 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-5c841bb8ce2708d530702fe13aa10bf9859c6134 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-5c883fde23f2576df09a1c1f9ad5dea455ca12b0 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-5c88c268483161a3cd36884940221f214172a7c4 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-5c8cbc4f8c1f04849c9eca716411226924133c73 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-5ca2fb0b432edd6a2a2e8b789fa2b3c3c1d13a20 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-5cc058029bbdb38006e86357b71fb04f74b6bb84 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-5cc6740eaedba21cf1898ccd156f5a2313f940cc | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-5cc9de17b2ffc9c5003cd161d402b27b8b88a8a6 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-5cd6a6fdccd3e56596b4f4dcac778e0fd902d99c | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-5cda3dfe294becf4f3dd4ff79221e15edbb4ad10 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| s5-5ce1c21fe123fb28c1fae928eb71d9271b1830fa | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-5ce27365e876af318949bbeae580f630f09c5cf2 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-5ce4a5f264f36bdc5eccbab89c0962669097bb5a | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-5cfb8603b11c412f66319a9a0b03d2b14e08a0cc | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-5cfd79dd756d227e51c97ddbd32a80d4087950a5 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-5d0b0fb58cc606e90956578706f3e7bed1da7d94 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-5d1dbf34ccab8a4e339900599c90bdffb1793312 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-5d27a23a66a48bd253a46f9f2b20baf7501e7442 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-5d2c56837fe45715d123f880df4477a7e323054e | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-5d2e913a3320b7b26395661457cc96f0a10367fe | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-5d380fbac1fed322825d20d1280320c83a950c9e | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-5d3ad2d178f01cc7e7ed817d790bcf0e663463c4 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-5d402a7437b1af52ea1e2e9b7771d1152e82a218 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-5d50aa33a153222d43c888a7978aafa4a0826755 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-5d510da7c5d1b2a268c8a7b1c42ac51c4664b3f9 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-5d52be41ba8962d9be81491f243c6e3e83422d85 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-5d75acfcb9d3d602f4012728e16684a79b466068 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-5d995eb845a951807462d688f254a078e9ff3d9d | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-5dae07a51900e5726beb85518a050c3b5d9e6814 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-5db52019afdc325646d7caddda4831593d8e4592 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-5db54fbca0ca34a5bc546046aa8aeaab02076179 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-5db6afcc92470c66859a8725c39f816ce5b06cb2 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-5dbe4c72d3fee844d7f90f98f927f502f03fa5fd | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-5dd988bcb237195e5511337d65b55617bc19fe32 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| Equitable Allocations of Mixtures of Goods and Chores | Hadi Hosseini, Aditi Sethia | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | ARXIV.ORG 2025 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| s5-5deee7ca9f002b7ae672446e367417d67a2af337 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-5df03ad9ef90a29ca49b9951ebf0f44dedb70c62 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-5e1c97d27076e33058ba369c2eccb3f2e596fcf1 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-5e1d7d830f3293a43b2688755ee6f42a603f114f | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-5e2a42c9d2ad920322683e2c1e0555bc3c8d3af7 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-5e2e3fd2bc12eebf6dfe4a460d762b32c951c24f | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-5e30951ecdcc4d0de0892cfda305cef966e65816 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-5e37d34dfc7441cbdc9289072aa1b6c90e3ffeb9 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-5e401447fa065f60e9fcd3cbb8a3e67388cea82c | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-5e440dc05ad96965d1f8a8ea5c6919711f7101f9 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-5e46812524c81c7ff9c0a670743d5aa72c1cbb2e | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-5e4a2bb0acdc0e0ab576216b72f1ec60000f3d9e | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-5e4f8372307734a8d6fb68c9fd1c429932cf20a4 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| An FPTAS for 7/9-Approximation to Maximin Share Allocations | Xin Huang, Shengwei Zhou | Fair Allocation · Shares & Guarantees | ARXIV.ORG 2025 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| s5-5e567597eb78acd027cf20b9c1667b1857a6bdf7 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-5e60f4d465b5546c5f84e06b3010f91cdd5b328e | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-5e72e3066aea447a691d432e8f74050ab787bf6c | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| On Allocating Goods to Maximize Fairness | Deeparnab Chakrabarty, Julia Chuzhoy, S. Khanna | Fair Allocation · Shares & Guarantees | 2009 50th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science 2009 | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | |
| s5-5e7d5b7ac641006df3cd7607df18121119fdff85 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-5e7f1928bbcd27aeff4200f9164d0ae7ac00feb7 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-5e8601a9007999f5f9a9744398533c02a2501275 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-5e8ad8c897fad1832ea7eb1d9c9f216cd9c17f98 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-5e8ba1f690cd43d2fd829f140045e1d6eeb8f99c | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-5e9da77b9bccd3992cf10e82947922d96956fc35 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-5e9e45b9795ebee43048ca055a89c423cf08768f | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-5eb15677be2ca9654cd60b5c62669e9078e51811 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| s5-5eb811654b28b9ddaada05ac1cc65518fe733849 | unclassified | ? | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| s5-5eb980478c5004ca07156600604622a68324827c | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-5ed2424dff0a9af420c57ae1080880265359b8b6 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-5ed96ab011f37bbbf07655ef604b1a5a80728d13 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-5edaab1fa078a5c468e3fb26d267ca49be32e70e | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-5eece571cdf61fb3a5557b55912230ada4c328aa | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-5efd87fb158918a67076a9f5b36e77737ac876cd | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-5f0234631d472e29542141cae64088ac2e138784 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-5f060a6df01b7b37d83ed63c3f318bfc8a5a3ed4 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-5f0cc764e1181cdeab6822ced50a69cee64fd702 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-5f1bf23a7ec853da24ab930c1b49a146c0bc24a6 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-5f28f1f75931f87ab26978231094446156c9f4c2 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-5f3e296f238bcb6cce476a59a5baa36d5a37befb | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-5f5e59221940a9d7a5938f084fc8ab7746cb3db3 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-5f650f8c879eb4cbb54d56aa30ad00e44aff98bf | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| An Improved Combinatorial Polynomial Algorithm for the Linear Arrow-Debreu Market not comsoc | Ran Duan, J. Garg, K. Mehlhorn | unclassified | ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms 2015 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| s5-5f717f9ccbd11d121d1c4a8853cce448cc5543d6 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-5f7d267944e8b2f1f450972c1d61a7f439237940 | unclassified | ? | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| s5-5f7f73ea06706e5dba95f359698a8cec45aad9e0 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-5f8cd0e78b10b4035dfe21fd5bcaa0bff9693207 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-5fbbf23e84a06c28857190dbad9b68109cb47f12 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-5fbe8ebef366101a81fd57d2a94bcbdaaef74e6a | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-5fc115749d242409af0a1a1ab04b8bb5741b7d16 | unclassified | ? | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| s5-5fcad0563b2267f52fc5688eae9caa59f45662b7 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| On the Existence of Fair Allocations for Goods and Chores under Dissimilar Preferences | Egor Gagushin, Marios Mertzanidis, Alexandros Psomas | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | ARXIV.ORG 2025 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| s5-5ffebd0599890b8c0f838f4b32ec29150a8a5839 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-5ffed7342fc938ab2536a88717547f4c29de5554 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-6002d09bbc9268d02b5c85c4de9895ceca3d76bb | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-60091ff254c46840558678629652a453795cc941 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-600b6313a1bdcc384aa3886ec00959556742ab60 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-60220c0f05cabb7a7beb94bf18afdce98d0dfb30 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-602ac350de93cdfadbc261c3d4f90b9e096cc203 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| Combinatorial Auctions via Posted Prices not comsoc | Michal Feldman, N. Gravin, Brendan Lucier | unclassified | ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms 2014 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| s5-60599879c8911f40b36dbe97c97abe16942e0d86 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-605bea9b6121a8aed8a14f17a952d33540a0b5e1 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-606f6d75b1902e7e429656074448dc8116138ddd | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-607a4af9ec922ee204fd32d4f24e703a7af46de4 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-607b7af4c26bf4ac71fe702b6021a944156883be | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-608dbe48d68033781cdb20c8598f045d751cf525 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-609a395f4934f8ed8e6143205be1e403840ede9e | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-60b047a080ed8764280279f10be19c8784eaeb37 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-60bd6c034402b321aa824790df43c18428e75251 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-60d01672b433efe5db570cd94af15b711a502e36 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-60d54549d1caa914f7df142e397b41ffd2c64640 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-60e68577635b5060b0f8ff77b21409e3767018d8 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-60f31a6ee0cc6e492291207b7de0c46e587b919d | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-60f615a3178130e4dbf0af8559751590a045bd4e | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| On Fair Division for Indivisible Items | Bhaskar Ray Chaudhury, Yun-Kuen Cheung, J. Garg, Naveen Garg, M. Hoefer, K. Mehlhorn | Fair Allocation · Markets & Equilibria | Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science 2018 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| s5-6104b1f367d5311b2a491948c6a1b6455f23a146 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-611aa40cbf39d0c76e6216a6386bd7706d3f0874 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| Combatting Gerrymandering with Ranked Choice Voting: An Experimental Analysis of Multi-member Districts in the United States | Nikhil Garg, Wes Gurnee, David M. Rothschild, D. Shmoys | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Apportionment & Districting | ? 2021 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| s5-614802c3d0f5e1a5f0e9b7611ed34b011f04ace8 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-615372c10cd7b9f319dbec66d97ae1cd9e4b1650 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-61592a4e5932648a9e662032bb6a934ef507dd8f | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-6164f72fd9e32336288bfe498c681193e8179e10 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-617e12617d81522620caee4584b1246bfb7f454a | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-61867d7b8bb1338558e47185fee51297d21f84a5 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-619abf3aa2bb83157ee69c5145d9abaf2b5d1e00 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-61bcc1286b228eb7b9487e7f916f98a8df9ac650 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| s5-61c7d5674e27a3bec00e50916978b39303a463e8 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-61ca6178c1b403f165a254eec781449d0f0b49bc | unclassified | ? | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| s5-61d866f63f1f65b1b49e71e767ffc4b4385ffad3 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| Uniformly Bounded Regret in Dynamic Fair Allocation | S. Balseiro, Shangzhou Xia | Fair Allocation · Chores, Online & Dynamic | ARXIV.ORG 2022 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| s5-61fc1f88f6c9b13eb5194d8a74633a8315236dd8 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-621600e70982c41f9b6f0f0075abfe6fb8192a20 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-6229aba7857459f9b88bb7360c701bd2b5e93ec2 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-622e710009aba3ed133cd72c3432965cc62d81a9 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-62301843a85bf7276783b0dda64b8966e81bdb44 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-6234b5c32af28df2eef3f39ed7948839f6f17bb4 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-625016f325a2b5b0b2bfd58ef179e2495c81b001 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-626bf02133c674f500d91761268957fe4786ec95 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-626ea74978e69caebd264d397f85697fe9041287 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-62a855a27df633aa4a9919b9b5d20b4a0d80a1cc | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-62a889919c58bb1fde0da2eaf4385126b7342938 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-62ab9ea626ec6c6302db0a1244c2fa69f6ca0b59 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-62c877a344469a71e7c3483bd17fb92491a7b0d4 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-62cd328c3c6bdf64f0c22f04ea2a4dbf64774f7e | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-62e85725797a4b965f1d2cdf2acf2750f8871082 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-62e8dd9dee50733738e437ef2ab39743e2f2edd5 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-62f0911d226e0a0c86bfe213e5f2fb7b0ce79ea3 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-63141403ca9c1650045a6bf3c7b7342add3fe257 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-631ca5198dbef3cea8c0efbdcd9b57533e9b28d7 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-6331363245292c63785fef3325743a475cac80c6 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-633bced97c852e3c8122bde04c8713630679563f | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-633c26b7edbe7c5376924bdae31cdf2f1ba74786 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-6361787633932f1184e074911d9f6c697428bc97 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-636bc85bb01862f846d1c0d869c090386ab44c21 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-637a6c5a66db808277c9adae69b91742207433d6 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-637db0b27398295a1023230be832b39112b1be6c | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-63996dca94c3464860021ae0d9a31ce386eb8eb0 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| s5-639dc250c859d02a6e633eb1fd2782d3e89fdd46 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-639e71e26392844dd21e2d0027b9df40cee45d60 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-63cee2a8925a6b7604306baf3cdf015b9a031096 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-63d21b4941dd0ad47c7f65a85bb9899987231e7a | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-63d9041c6d99282341fe8acb5520f47489b5af2e | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-63e12638ed05fe2c67dae0ce7a11be89b2e80458 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-63e315534dcc4138a5029fc15af512953c1b56f0 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-63f346826da0bc14e631cdf9f44fe3f05b2d64ff | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-63ff67cdb45e2e2a1064651b1543f304df997d19 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| s5-64133b85ece5088f4e3a6eb7b1da1c0ba316ec19 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-6447dcfa3ef430d626923acc3c770e61d03f7a65 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-64556ed44bb3e13ad507d63e03aad93bd744d22d | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-646ce2c0ee7416a1251bf5c81fd5bd1479614f1b | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-646f3cc86c6d5707fe90c3aec94e2331f4472461 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| s5-64725fcc73523fb9ae4f9420425986718ebf66a4 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-647ac0cd44cbdb3427486b4236eeb3aca73f4f8c | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-648add24807df6f8f0ead803dd46560653a15346 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-649e2d975302d597b9ea170db9de4a31c2e23f80 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-64a9cceb4a505c2535382868fab224d52a731859 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| s5-64ad5202726488065c264791df481cd6b7ac6ec9 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-64b7cfea08171e57d4e6a1bb046e39e7a829090a | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| s5-64cb74adb0b744593d52fd344a65dfc55c45f0a9 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-64e4c35a9b405e8c7e5695e47e0d6fd73d7766ba | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-64f00551b719267e0b1a785755bcd9be88a3bc6a | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-64fce12682d8bd95955edb3ab3b780e29dc17fef | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-65083a0e94374ab2de4a9732b01d15308b0f21f2 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-653706ea97e54ee1d088d8158f86b1b685a2bce3 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-655002ecf3491bda27118b270cd202ba45d6add8 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-65555a1caa449ef5573f3607dc2572e5286a85b2 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-6555822d070c17b5426df49c58a5a2fabd9e3caa | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-655a8cc6cd216a49b13aadae33681d58660b9d0e | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-656376a9fb806ff5b0da62eb23d6368de13b08ce | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-6576622439bfd6af556adae9cbcf05030808f75c | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-657dc0eacc9c208f6b8303b6f3fc94a23a6386cf | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-6582c47e1a0f51964ced225cbc6a3d7026f149be | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-65852a8e50b6efa4399f3287661af066b95b10cf | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Informational Size in School Choice | Feng-Ping Di, Yun Liu | Fair Allocation · Fair Division Theory | ? 2024 | – | – | triple | |
| s5-6593101c559d9f9c470fb185bad1b5b4ca1d5030 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-6599e858d70eda8bbfa6373dcf8bdf69f6408719 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-65a0f931cee4303f7618d767eb943fab410efa43 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| Representation in Peer Selection: A Liquid Democracy Perspective | Davide Grossi, Grzegorz Lisowski, Georgios Papasotiropoulos | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | ? 2026 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| s5-65df88a86e1e36e319f4abf90b5a489dadf9748d | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-65e8c65f8f24c957c4cf40c50ec9f60574b1ece4 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-65f0deab917f0bf7f9e1fb5c3a79cfd01509b406 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-6602b1f782d4260bccbbc22c6269b1f6cd1ef074 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-660a884edcba3ef8e43a8ef6116434210da1e45c | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-66111858f481afbb94bdbf14e906d2a772502b1a | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-6638ae7d255dd5f3e748fb4b27c01aaee15fd3a2 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| s5-66479c5125f659fa1bd100982ef6ab92fc564555 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-6649c3ce189546ca2ff924d62bb0db7e9801f332 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-664d625bb5b1af6d6309262647fba255281063f3 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-6659352383eb7501c2057d202755b936a38fe060 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-667b3b95aef51cfe73ff4f05cc3d7917c41335ce | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-6680e6dc3a478af56d2a224b30b66d08ea57c3a3 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-6696343756f3e6ca44c76d41b45e2ff337b61302 | unclassified | ? | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| s5-66967a7dcbaf19d1388a18824498a449ecb7e526 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-6699907f731a6f6ea00d51c8d834373d1df6de0a | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-66a141c1a171a04fb8643d21ed9eeea140bedae3 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-66c58003e714686a2d1af4527770f62b2e3d6502 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | ↗ | triple proof | |
| s5-66d563ada59af0bc6c70b7dbf820ec2c7aa09549 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-66ebe0657c5f7da8c300edad87aa1268bd7f8ab1 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-66f2ad7b5d1358b80aec65963390ca50ecd056fb | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| s5-66f8a64aa545924fe71f4c43b85d6fe556ef3646 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-6719c97444f8e7b153bfd6db2018e2a479bfa55f | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Existence of Fair and Efficient Allocation of Indivisible Chores | Ryoga Mahara | Fair Allocation · Chores, Online & Dynamic | ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms 2025 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| s5-6724cd8be8b25e0470c72a6facc947289fc92b75 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-67250a944ad7407b8ee01bb1c191efa9ab1fc83e | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-673b60a310b3c67270a089dc2a3577e26b1cdc52 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-67415e58c9c650721787f92e58454459985f6ba1 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-674d51160282708c0b878ff73cf0e31e8186f838 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-675033db3b12168556e57fb62e33c6696adadc3e | unclassified | ? | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| On the Complexities of Understanding Matching Mechanisms | Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Clayton Thomas | Fair Allocation · Fair Division Theory | ARXIV.ORG 2022 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| s5-6772e1b650ddab740cfc0204d78e6e52eda3c14e | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| s5-677821f6473cb21878fc8ec6f027718016eb880a | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| s5-677b621de19336b7119d9a823f39972759ec9c56 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-6788df279d2563ce929b4dfbd992e010a2f25eaf | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-678d3d9f456d297c765425bc0f55ad6516a373f7 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-6796efcdc10fbf5a2869f2d31534a7e4ffbe5af6 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-67ab6d1b3d45c411fc1420d84e45238758ba8b3a | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-67b5c3684edd02590b6db185f3386a5a6f0c79fe | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Adaptive Priority Mechanisms not comsoc | Oguzhan Celebi, Joel P. Flynn | unclassified | Social Science Research Network 2023 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| s5-67d716eb2a2ef5cc4fcd715b1a37a28666e6d602 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-67db72509e641c4e276d636b0dd86df4bef48bf4 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-67e8ae34b54e2b905e706adce5812bf2e80c5839 | unclassified | ? | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| s5-67f0f7dd2b9070fab5437e19f40fd848134994cb | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-67f7f8b9b303f03811782e73bc5bb549a5424872 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-68093bf65d895a3fed4227818f016c5ed881e0cb | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-680aec77c5df3b701880125a96a9cf76d82f71fc | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-681333664fe75899d1402c79a089599234b2f4fa | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-681e2e92f2fa4e93b911ebd0ac5c3175fc0dbbf2 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| s5-6821b09552c3db50d835008d7b4a872a530c3de5 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-6842c97d218f8a034a170be82e4b57ebbac6484a | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-68477fde521d6cb91ff1994ff10bf329744cc2f8 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-6869e31b16c3b191caa5ca6b7aa32d336b91b7c6 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| Facility Location Mechanism Design: Breaking The Deterministic Barrier | Zohar Barak | Coalition Formation · Matching under Preferences | ARXIV.ORG 2026 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| Non-Manipulable House Allocation With Rent Control | Tommy Andersson, Lars-Gunnar Svensson | Fair Allocation · Fair Division Theory | ? 2014 | – | – | triple | |
| s5-6880d80f8c3fbfa6773e37cb68d67ba9a8b8286b | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-68970fcf44cb6330b8d20ef700c6929e6178db1c | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-689f21f39603432a75d652fbe858ca429f3e6cd5 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-68b83ca140f53627da320827f39702bff3da8421 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-68bf9e1a614357bc13c434768c6902f5410a423a | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-68d3f73f48805bdcef68d45cf4401dea6bac7f42 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-68efc98dc3190a64d96a63cb9953d5e67ce7b952 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-68fc9071a87191cc4f0a25407939b272b1768643 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| One person, many votes: divided majority and information aggregation | Laurent Bouton, Micael Castanheira | Voting · Voting Theory & Axioms | ? 2008 | – | – | triple | |
| s5-690ac1de125a10b105482fce3f31105f704e4ffb | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-692627b036f6d8415b76242b13c9179fcd901fcb | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-692cc38c88da78b7127f5a53c5a15a2f5dcb6f6e | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-69512a0f73bd855a24a4c9c96fcd4a2264e833ad | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-695452556d228eadf82f1b0afa1e35b83fe53d05 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-696e76e26066ecd6aa10b2ecbfa63bc40e75be96 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-6974707c8f0554c967a42e9c1b3158ea87cc6df8 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Approximation algorithms for combinatorial auctions with complement-free bidders not comsoc | Shahar Dobzinski, Noam Nisan, Michael Schapira | unclassified | Symposium on the Theory of Computing 2005 | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof |
| s5-697c796ec952cd98181e508b2a277f29b65c2f63 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-697d93214e44ff05e6377f93143e6f1b20cfbacf | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-6982a945616780a4ca5b2f0fcd104472830f95fe | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-698cdf92150d735df09bbfd31c41be9bbe3bdd9f | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-69973bb7b4889fc6aa816b1a997264610b3a9feb | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-699d061011e5bf4ad95511f64c216261ecd855d5 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-69cdbb6212c08ac239ba7e8d35e7a141cadf80d8 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-69d540355a803ee90b25f3fbbbd8ed1c2c0ee818 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-69dcb1a8260f40acc7f1829c374bbf9a1f68c506 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-69ea77571e18bce41ebbf3efd7f71d5b187cca7d | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-69f3d8c84d44ebe182c4a87b7988cff072f382c1 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-6a05e59849d9d4abc9e483cab4a28ca349d8f438 | unclassified | ? | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| s5-6a335d1ed015694ed12ae837d3158352e8e8d3d8 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-6a3abb282230cde07e5c1d4291878e573ce04840 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-6a53947c264d25847781ea9eeb11c0fc9cb1225f | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-6a6c9efd2422f2187d16c51488aa7b31591464db | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-6a79574ff9ba7768d042ed996e143feab7aece4e | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-6a7da45c4b981a65ae71ee192544c6ce82b13ce5 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-6a85c1f7ecfb716e0c453ee6edd9583d02b3c467 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Approximating Nash Social Welfare under Submodular Valuations through (Un)Matchings | J. Garg, Pooja Kulkarni, Rucha Kulkarni | Fair Allocation · Markets & Equilibria | ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms 2019 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| s5-6a9cdecdf4734434df6cbb265287acd067ba7411 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-6ac3248c82cedc302aa43400b6282616e1a24bfb | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-6ac7262028d905ad97bbabce37c610e5d84e4c6f | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| s5-6ad0fa1a9b1e438650addd9c9677ced4e8cb4fb4 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-6addce67b35ac741f7037444e36c7f5c1463bc22 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-6af69396d2e79d22d0420238532960a7fc0056f7 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-6b08709f591b90b915654d4b5288bf99530e7b2b | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-6b24f7aac2184676d681f721bce6e7f73dd2129f | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-6b32a17efaef38a05510a8e7b95186a5cbd8b01b | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-6b34498066fb9c6d8cbe1d1bc8b70e933823c0fe | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-6b3b31ca7f585bbd8ea73f115e6fffeca7f39bfe | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-6b43405e46790e117b1d585c7bf4080afdff5e60 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-6b4c787087c3b4f6aa85134a3b9a4813fd095c06 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-6b58db4f0d469eca5c2ede7753ef2064228ccd0f | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-6b5d1dcc34b5951a492955e61ce41af4147e11a8 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-6b69173858effd76e6b380bd20ba1958992054c9 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-6b6f86a0a2018433b367e9d8682797b53f3f0289 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-6b710171a71c2e9e3f7d345dde70934b26606d9e | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-6bb7d204819eefac98a44126af5812108cf4ea81 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-6bb925f1f7705e9008b7d7fd5168d35247d887ce | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-6bbd79a2d93a33b669f25c4921ba361c6ea7735e | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | ↗ | triple proof | |
| s5-6bbde3a88fb5ecfba1bfd7e3c5b58a4c54a4d4c8 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-6bc7bcbb461d8438a1e3468927aed3f66019abf5 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| Multi-agent Online Scheduling: MMS Allocations for Indivisible Items | Shengwei Zhou, Ru-Fan Bai, Xiaowei Wu | Fair Allocation · Chores, Online & Dynamic | International Conference on Machine Learning 2023 | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | |
| s5-6be5ec7736ae5ee4b42b38af36e136ffab3f3882 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-6c11fd96bfd905048b2ef6bd0e59773bbba2ac2d | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-6c193fe87c83f76343fb571846009fc5e5047089 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-6c232f7fec39215bf5d968ec145ffecbf45a435a | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-6c2efcb92a1d0724e0be5d837272252890979713 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-6c3cd6a96c2de814485e1af08f2d8b320c7a3ef5 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-6c583c4e06897feae1b1ee0731e1bf02a3e17249 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-6c6c8656c5e0998d2c60c68a3c079e7e52de0e5e | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-6c6e80d9c20c2c6247db0b8a2237fb862ce153bb | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-6c740533a8cb5aa573ee9a4f824f1ea2a6d8e9d6 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-6c7e6d50b16cee7d10165725ff53f80385a3dfb6 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-6c8c6e979e2fa2c38b89c14d597af818549fa810 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-6c8e9347857fb198965817186485f2459fae4a68 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | ↗ | triple proof | |
| s5-6c915896f3434a28f4926b11210b5e96e27ce959 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-6c92fcfa1b85d1845508877c66535bf4ac262604 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-6c9ec41e40d6cf561f6db378dc910440b2ca0467 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-6ca108fb1b55e3d8b1307fecf54827658c2f63e2 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| Existence of stability in hedonic coalition formation games | H. Aziz, F. Brandl | Coalition Formation · Hedonic Games | Adaptive Agents and Multi-Agent Systems 2012 | – | – | triple | |
| s5-6caf3f5cc0cbbe9f2a650661161872d2669ff869 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-6cbe5748a1b644c79734dccc6f864a984d7d2ca5 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-6cc597299d2e2fb18f434fdcde89a542fae49e8f | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | ↗ | triple proof | |
| s5-6ce9c1d9112656f37ddae58a26305490e920a399 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-6d167c30630cc641d1a6b341ae9c1d8f4ea889a6 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-6d1981fde25e9a3ab0e190f3994725616efee36e | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-6d1db22a4a5995323c9911058d694c231d4a15f0 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-6d24f313fa269bd78c8f19d1cbc029707f78fd6d | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-6d2bc1b635a7f20d98501a9af627f6328a0771cf | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-6d2eb530b7e0943637cb8dc334ae1473002828ac | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Guarantees in Fair Division: General or Monotone Preferences | Anna Bogomolnaia, H. Moulin | Fair Allocation · Shares & Guarantees | Mathematics of Operations Research 2020 | – | – | triple | |
| On proportionality in multi-issue problems with crossed claims | Rick K. Acosta-Vega, E. Algaba, J. Sánchez-Soriano | Fair Allocation · Fair Division Theory | European Journal of Operational Research 2022 | – | – | triple | |
| s5-6d3cd16cb6abddeb6c5b4436868cf7418c51d231 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-6d440e0e6aff0008141750138175f5e1ac25c7ce | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Quantile agent utility and implications to randomized social choice | Ioannis Caragiannis, Sanjukta Roy | Voting · Probabilistic Social Choice | ARXIV.ORG 2025 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| s5-6d557e475193bee763b683f89c84827287e30c85 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | ↘* | triple proof | |
| s5-6d58616105fc3a9357c2d7d82efb1900114a7035 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-6d5b0364a1a736f067f1a60961a7f38891d817c9 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-6d5f9ebb3d50287072919bd584b0a3f160298437 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-6d6c8feff02b953e5f845034cfa013d19936d2b4 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-6d6ef9362a39c4dd19cc02e10e93aba05d9751b6 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-6d86bf3f896b3664864ce6a2418a18619278433b | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-6d9157367e78d88418026ed3910f456315cd6f93 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-6da3db6a82707ff209e329cd3f2d71e8264bf0f7 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| s5-6da5d3430722a91b6c054622e0558f4c326ab3cb | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-6dc49fffcd5a009e789a27339168010f635af4a2 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-6dd52348b1ba1fdfc7835618089535d9fac7c730 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-6ddb8a4abacacd89d4dbc6670fe82f8e3069a891 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-6ddde4d0f39c24ddb9e87c6047129327b17bc1a3 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-6ddf36b360d93142733b908b3dee319cf48594df | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-6e149cb03a6659c41f440840fe2edf98ab0ed66a | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-6e153e1a171202255ec798a084f9e1e64679b3f2 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-6e1a06973a7bc8731c802510966ea701589fee0b | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-6e2219a8b1f99fdc2749be8dfa52cfbbbd5fcbd9 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-6e23472df3036404a249a921cd0b5c8c290db8aa | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-6e3a0e8da4831dc9bb2d6b184de646cd7b89614e | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-6e42f37131587a82a9d00a98dd3fe8a18c91019c | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-6e439a5888293c7057d40d35eafb677061c96cb1 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-6e5f0762c013011021261a291c76ce9cb6608ad5 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-6e66974950839f0302ff3ee27d5646203a4f68c2 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-6e6df077b63344023a4f19444e0cbd77c8c6a78a | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-6e7594c7d8de01a01cec7f7540b7fdbfbc125da5 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-6eb90f332d3a19dc38f7ac6b9fb242979611a269 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-6ecf9a090a17ff092408087de941017fad8b898e | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-6eda1f039e3cac827563c806b16c4b0d61510091 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-6edb1e71fd624f88c4a09b021146ddef28609b60 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-6edb40a08a69cff8aa9933df049d4e5ed68385ce | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-6ee5197da1e64765e6193b23a13c626c3aa4e369 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-6ef37e7ba0b2310d545b2a9d182e747cda75a2ac | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-6ef6ecc3318597f7f0311c29bb86f864a7682d2c | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| On the hardness of bribery variants in voting with CP-nets | B. Dorn, Dominikus Krüger | Voting · Bribery & Control | Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence 2014 | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof |
| s5-6f18dfe2eaa0f39bca6c5890dbc49c10ad798635 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-6f2cd1b36ab25e0bd8c603da3812e9ed252715d9 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| s5-6f2ebdc8e4af049f4f75353d99a40af9a30380ec | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-6f33b6087bc4e5d61d326a38e3e3e5d6f0bead49 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-6f41179498d316140a2a07df053e011d5bd1a841 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-6f45703dbaefd4c1856f80cef23a1e45e8b08de8 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-6f4675bf1d00d876169525b6b32ce9a94415a817 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-6f4db0b94445fbb4f36203bad971f8a86f0607d3 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-6f4e53877ff444817ce9cc383e6050fdaf2dd220 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-6f549315df3637c90f18717da705d4c1ffbb8765 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-6f63f3f9493102982c11d0ead14f0df1af48d5ba | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| s5-6f6b2450b6530701f89ecfa4afbbed0f703f7a11 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-6f6e8cd8ec36fb702be8a4770534d0c36cd0e4fd | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-6f71ce5225b7953ab6ce4dd6cd244f181e08b79c | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-6f848d911e8b3db65f49ddeba854cbff263172df | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-6f97e586dbeed9f9b4a65bb23f4fab20ad0adfa1 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-6f996c054d9826d62d1d05c6ddbcb1a960d51227 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-6fa23841b1f433a340a094a32c9484463cf56386 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-6fa64bd45b06a5d86350516df2c2e420d4e7295d | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-6fbffee83168dea70cec1e4d342816f62502baca | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-6fce7e22a0dd78c0896fb7215a8872c5beff2892 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-6fd181b0d3b7a3d225020ea08f130b578f5b57cc | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-6fe324099ab11e25bbd1cce4a09f68d2188ae095 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-700c87ac28205983fd74caf546d5a78b6073e213 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| On Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods to Submodular Agents | Gilad Ben Uziahu, U. Feige | Fair Allocation · Shares & Guarantees | ARXIV.ORG 2023 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| s5-702573bcb5f63c29fd31d24dacd5371fc0f36e16 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-70260e3d16775efc1467e31a2f7d549c65fab247 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-702a6fcac4eb04b2831f4455bd18a4f789ed1c5b | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-702b3e60468d066e7ed421b8a696b2b9140b7ef9 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-702b3e830fcccba36fcfea324d7e366cb407df73 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-702f197a2f44a969e82bbfe3b17188651d5f8e5a | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-7035ce7a162c0bc547118383cf3dcc79ae7d3911 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-703c6c21ce6908cfe70b57e826cff0b43ebaf630 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-703cff99bee499fa010252f4e44b795c2a1e4fcb | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Fair allocation of a multiset of indivisible items | Pranay Gorantla, Kunal Marwaha, Santhoshini Velusamy | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms 2022 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| s5-7052260424e26a645cfc902df6eeb16c1640503c | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-706aaa3fec9f85b4a29ae32a7cf8e8ebc5fd642d | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-706c962c85b944256da2ff78020bc1f3de24ee30 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-70776317591cecac217f5877574a912dc7b2d3fd | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-707c5fc80f916ac910ad25ade37f2e092421bbc8 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-707d4933589dab090cbebd748a3d1badc03c21f5 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-707d7fc7455f088e44b05b8ac91b8dab44a1be78 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-7080accb812b57fd227ae99fc82d61ded0bf7d32 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-70866784fd5a1ae8843e80e093c3981350b26aa5 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-7093176c2274248707f0c05b72cd50492dd871cb | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-70a7baaed07ffc3797fc34a4f70cc3edcfc670df | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-70a95e21713c0c740ef33dd0fd0d02450d12829e | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-70aa5c2057d1ea1cdc57159bbb9bc13e832d1ef2 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-70d0f0156b3b79a4a364da0d5c1331f1a0eeb7be | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-70ddc86e149d895530be4ba6833ad33980441a8e | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| Probabilistic serial mechanism for multi-type resource allocation | Xiaoxi Guo, Sujoy Sikdar, Haibin Wang, Lirong Xia, Yongzhi Cao, Hanpin Wang | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems 2020 | – | – | triple | |
| s5-70f8d76e21b756ba562f684a4ce4ef15f4b100a5 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Phragmén's and Thiele's election methods | S. Janson | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | ARXIV.ORG 2016 | – | ✓ | triple | |
| s5-710e65a50ae0c79ec92bc4782ca99afabe1014f1 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-71225742a93968ff5b4dc7b7c69ad960bfd5b6c7 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-71320dfe55b432558abfbf44bdabaa1693bb5251 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-7134e6d60e7dd32e605d3eceb90473c4fafbf544 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-71364568af8c85d11f7b25a98781d1e4a5888a33 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-7136c5bfa0c124efba20dee0be8778f0632bfc5b | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-7143718fec3f30532a349b89b87424a68c87d5f5 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-7148e70da8ff225e5fb0de41106cbe62503e89a5 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-714e0db7b6f8ad6f91ae0f7f8591347949bbaff7 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-716be4b57e04a358291aab0e171530aab50cf185 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-718054c892eadf2128f74c8421942cc0b2089211 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-718dad07429d613a3cc083a8979448a7106607ca | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Leaving No Ethical Value Behind: Triage Protocol Design for Pandemic Rationing | Parag A. Pathak, T. Sonmez, M. Utku Ünver, M. Yenmez | Fair Allocation · Fair Division Theory | ? 2020 | – | – | triple | |
| s5-71a93f9af7cde535364becb40854e1a9edf559b1 | unclassified | ? | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| Distortion of Metric Voting with Bounded Randomness | Zi-Yi Cai, Drew Gao, Prasanna Ramakrishnan, Kang-Ning Wang | Voting · Distortion | ARXIV.ORG 2026 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| s5-71b1d1f7b501e267260d4e2c455db2e69260b013 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-71b7e535bb71a6fcd616f9a7256e43e9e0701417 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-71b8e234f3aebeec87132337eb523e26f28851e7 | unclassified | ? | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| s5-71bf4bbc6cc77f78f351a4075e053323df1a7651 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-71c1e65cb7be44ba07ccd41a1e8464b68c726bff | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-71c867d0b65a0ff36d42bbdfef3496366391d3d5 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-71cb91fe3ab55d6568c3a6fde625dbce3ba4a961 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-71d2d07df6feb35c892b1dde212d7719410a5895 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-71d9896f6bee405b7580d3a48fdf721f16fe1bce | unclassified | ? | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| s5-71dd5b4e05b62d71148326e1430c63af73902a06 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| Two Algorithms for Additive and Fair Division of Mixed Manna | M. Aleksandrov, T. Walsh | Fair Allocation · Chores, Online & Dynamic | Deutsche Jahrestagung für Künstliche Intelligenz 2020 | ✓ | – | ↗ | triple proof |
| s5-72139dd71877b192d624df770be6b5468f2837e0 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-7215e9ddcb5eeb5a2a3e80cf115f32ace0540b39 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-721ca3c845a99e93f9adc7d7bb070aab61f25c98 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-7228bf4d503c752335938f85b0fb9f1b52bb3f9f | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-722bda1229b32ab3f322c31aa1be05d3a527cefc | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-7245abb3e56d03d3b0d039257e05ea8532bd7768 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-725f2bb557edf11f7919c847a9505a9f84b7e20b | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-726ad36660d95ac9d47183dd563e648697621fff | unclassified | ? | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| s5-726ed923a3ec9fac0283607858489f2adf826d51 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-7275e0f368cd021d7ce2051b97d315ed2a1248b0 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-728dd5de1008ba013435f01fea73cf00043d263d | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-72923a8310bdca3d86db73ae8d0a5b928823ccf5 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-72aaf0b0a2255da9d9e3935f33bbb8bf59607834 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| s5-72b68877b10f166453e287a401644d28ac8b564b | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-72c66b8d83d50dfb47ec58da9d8c6b446e601fff | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-72da735993b225a7411ae53abf8a2098603eaed1 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-730c3cf36218408b97507ea3a6c5bd3e7189ecdb | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-73118407b174faa91aa4b7cce77f72d305354883 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-73172b6e8bfc2149fa9b31a8785a7ddb8cd44f20 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-73298359c3e6fe7dfb1909ae47502d7ec02f8e19 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-732ba08ebfed9493b209500ca3073967c0f829e4 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-735103a664cad2f71ecece0947a06d383c454d40 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-735ded968c31e1ebc6b9575efc6f9b6fd1cca2f5 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-735e7e64b8f227834277e5cbe2d1a45f671e0b0d | unclassified | ? | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| s5-73624ad520fdc656c3bee52a72b895d331db042d | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-7365179c4f0663907106c1af934c9e3c19d4b759 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Competitive division of a mixed manna | Anna Bogomolnaia, H. Moulin, Fedor Sandomirskiy, E. Yanovskaya | Fair Allocation · Markets & Equilibria | ARXIV.ORG 2017 | – | – | triple | |
| s5-738644ec2fa936ba2373832646c20d5654dd4e25 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-738f23e104363025c5d2e368d6b8739b4aee6e95 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-73a2e09c7bc734fd5c6ccafba01eb932132aa824 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-73c3176204ca71d21684276dbff963155fbd6938 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-73c6997a51f04e244a04faa8ec1f8099a2ba180f | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-73cfdcf548b6ea369fa63996bdcc11ea0beaaaab | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-73dbe44f5ffe2c034d0446a93c4fcc2b3f84c168 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-7402da7182ee277e3e6fecefa3532d2d1919433d | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-741b0ee7e1aeef4d886c23a66ac44b91fd9cd637 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-742fa13bb5490b30a28c12011b8c712ffd8787dd | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-743f335cba02bb4ee398baf2d0ab1ea177e10c5f | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-7468f3c7a607a37a46b166ba7f7480c8cb41adda | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-7469a3e24c6e3424015c054efacd11510298b0fb | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-747185f4105c9df0c54009b0c3b15e50754ce2fc | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-7473ab8f3a69fb6db2a8c73d1d3b172882acdfca | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-74831ed654b8fcccd43a630e9066305490fea99c | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Group Strategy-Proofness in Private Good Economies | S. Barberà, Dolors Berga, Bernardo Moreno | Fair Allocation · Fair Division Theory | ? 2016 | – | – | triple | |
| s5-748c274f22cc265e8dada9cdd4e75e111eff3cb8 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-74901bc66fc8b028e600ce7a1314b82961b78bfb | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-7493a4d86eda1f20cef885d93fdf82e16b2c0379 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-74a45384229d5bdfa5809bf07135ac7ffa5a63aa | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-74a70bb05b6bbc44ee5c1b291dafa7e0fbc7d861 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| Optimal Subsidy Bounds for Goods and Chores: One Dollar Each Suffices | Xinhang Lu, Simon Mackenzie, Mashbat Suzuki | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | ARXIV.ORG 2026 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| s5-74adcda1ccbd67221a28a2dc1420164c0d834e34 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-74b6336aff785586ba67ce320a6dcdb936131fe5 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-74d37098e53a70c3dfbd06b0be7bbfbb06c835b9 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-74dde76f9734a76982c2fb4d2545c49ed32f2de5 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-74e79c8f91c1a984256413192abbae8c33f427fe | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-751ea833c5deffe2a303e197b03070006b3b25f8 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-754206b5c1d1458bed3825c81052f34789ff4186 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-7546ed2da4de747df642031deea4ee8b4c4a8d5b | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| s5-754979c7578c97cb0c4268c103cf454fb5a0ecfa | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-754b9bcc79b32c17e3d119a58ef8d31c45ae18a5 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-75708aaf6149834a79acd12c0d090f8b4fcefb45 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-7587a5f98fa9189681c09246dd1e7f979db96a30 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-758831573bf453f6ef000e60f952666871dc6a94 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-759d36c6a9fdaa791799423ad0330eefb8950402 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-759e7e8d925a039fb056ef5f7a699b0592e5ec50 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-75a288c8fe36c8efb196ff64f10ce1fb982795f6 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-75c1488f05003dc2117972aff8c306a11be76fb2 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-75c730d378ec60a6ca652db6900f308b106f30dd | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-75e1dc3573b8a6296ed879444e9dcdd2b06765c0 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-75f0b91e51bd7d73a264ea12e34cfb32fa856adb | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-7604d8315518c1354e61c8d4fceb1069ce29c1d7 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-76396d08a1199d28307b12164ac0ad825ba6da2b | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-765d0b416e6cc6e4f8e8099ad914fe9346b9be31 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-766f6765994a73096caa3ef6dee3198d8d006e22 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-767a92ba73da9f0feaf9f27baa4be55b9899005e | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-767d2e074a68fb16927b1476f6d58676f87fe3af | unclassified | ? | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| s5-76960108c44f9645e40e5b926ff118a2693e13ea | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-76b5f96b62ee2fbe80470040f3be2cd58407074b | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-76bff2d49cb5e704e3278424604190788741369c | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| Closing Gaps in Asymptotic Fair Division | Pasin Manurangsi, Warut Suksompong | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | SIAM Journal on Discrete Mathematics 2020 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| s5-76c7dafcfb53df88141e4e3cb5a78b7c956347f4 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Approximating Maximin Shares with Mixed Manna | Rucha Kulkarni, R. Mehta, Setareh Taki | Fair Allocation · Shares & Guarantees | ARXIV.ORG 2020 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| Social influence and opinions not comsoc | N. Friedkin, E. Johnsen | unclassified | ? 1990 | – | – | triple | |
| s5-76e401e85cdbabd99134608256795ef19d4a93b0 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-7700cfb8eac100a31ff6047d390c642814bca3ec | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-7710d626b22c94305bff73ec55a86c72ba3efc34 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-7735aa98821dfa0b9c97ab7b45accfa6917632c3 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-773fdb24dc089aae1cc9e1e37e385458be211b50 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-7755e42422f7a09e13fa81d14a5697e010df59f7 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-7761d1aa4356426c01564d11eea92e7cffbaeb70 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-776517cefe0cc9e2f74d11cf9a890b8ce94de752 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Balanced contributions, consistency, and value for games with externalities | André Casajus, Yukihiko Funaki, Frank Huettner | Coalition Formation · Weighted Voting Games | European Journal of Operational Research 2025 | – | – | triple | |
| s5-777296cd1b07a3a75905886304ce6c23d23495f3 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-7774bbec09bc7e043c4d2409c8ea4ce49e7b5978 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-779d4fd3693951785ad1e364e0d6a19088745e5d | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-77a4b497fb4c64b5205cb0f9b733efebeea538e5 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-77ad11feb8081cc00b690e700aca0ac0397d7488 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | ↗ | triple proof | |
| s5-77ad2301223b3d25569578b666c5b518c460e768 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-77d2df21ace5617115549d50c71aece9e311c451 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| How Many Votes is a Lie Worth? Measuring Strategyproofness through Resource Augmentation | Ratip Emin Berker, Vincent Conitzer, Eden Hartman, Jiayuan Liu, Caspar Oesterheld | Voting · Manipulation | ARXIV.ORG 2026 | – | – | triple | |
| Wisdom of the Crowd Voting: Truthful Aggregation of Voter Information and Preferences | G. Schoenebeck, Biaoshuai Tao | Voting · Voting Theory & Axioms | Neural Information Processing Systems 2021 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| s5-77f9069aa8e194f703c22918635197751b07c673 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-77fe2bda9cd5df33a12257980ebf6cc370625613 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-782752920c15f5db38891b56c6c5cccb1ab8ce37 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-782e7ff46dbf9a21de82e4e92f8ddc2b6b3b7442 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-78336cb7ccabfc4434b38e455b53fb48c4e5693f | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| Competitive Allocation of a Mixed Manna | B. Chaudhury, J. Garg, Patricia C. McGlaughlin, R. Mehta | Fair Allocation · Markets & Equilibria | ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms 2020 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| s5-7842f51808c79473578ee1e298085ba014929c55 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-78442f6b6a56c6d874ddd6eea1f2603530e5f783 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-785bb5e6c1cfd48b50ed7e54f7fb2e3ad082e552 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-7863486a6581a3d069f0af2c31a1b9cae3768f3b | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-789e1c58964f98f67471fe3552ed9934f24d10ff | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-78b36b3b384388f5e49ccd291f75dbb28c4acfd3 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-78b7c37e77a2faa79b8ac87df863eb959523e162 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-78b84675ae9fd85f45f0f4f582d1332e641aa49a | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-78be0c01dbeea71aa2fa1b54160efe409eae5fb1 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-78dc0f7645afbf078697e1b81be90ab518a35b0e | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-78df227aaac518d6dd74d19cffae119a977ba21d | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Parameterized complexity of multiwinner determination: more effort towards fixed-parameter tractability | Yongjie Yang, Jianxin Wang | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems 2018 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| s5-78f9ad993a5b08c448cc8872942ecbe8f60feef7 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-79032b17f6b7645395dd16cb251699302100eb78 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-7904d4b5e6fa28f4a3316dcb4abab360b0cb5ab1 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-7916cc171af98a8215da40489e7e6aa6e253bdd0 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-791a27cf4db98bf6c33c0f36894d4e1ef8d96a41 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-792e7b1ab90f11f2690c69ee1d63bfb044c7e380 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-792f3474833377f535c5e72cab8498c81767bb87 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| Algorithmic Stability in Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods Among Two Agents | V. Menon, K. Larson | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | ARXIV.ORG 2020 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| Minimizing Justified Envy in School Choice: The Design of New Orleans&Apos; Oneapp | A. Abdulkadiroglu, Yeon-Koo Che, Parag A. Pathak, Alvin E. Roth, Olivier Tercieux | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | ? 2017 | – | – | triple | |
| s5-793b0905086520f6926f494478dda1f48eb96f73 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-79454ff9cfd1d86c413460bab96f129c9e5ee617 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-796f66929ba4102767d802a1e6470c62151ea556 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-797bf972c2003b21e39378d294684bc8d42db2d6 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-797f12cbbcadfd7a2bd1d76995e6b976ef4c9590 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-798cf8be4adb18e19039dbb970c4f4d419849992 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-799ce721a4d4cb3d2b918d3a0de00c3bbe4fbf0e | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-79a4e48be147234f28adf41180717dc7b36ca776 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-79ab9c584da21ba01b45c8e994a6d407fc147177 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-79b090ecc2230df3329fe7730fb9e21de29b1799 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-79dd7b168b17fba3c901c3521481b08e325ad99c | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-79e482231f9e18b275ddaf589b2d575fe7bf9d53 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-79e5ef311652c1dd88c1dd3255d5e63f68cfffcd | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-79f8abd220ffe420c487afba7bd4f9de5a7ab893 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Complaint, compromise and solution concepts for cooperative games | Panfei Sun | Coalition Formation · Weighted Voting Games | ? 2019 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| s5-7a28bae543f2f095c34166389000796a5188f35e | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| s5-7a30240651c334694a101354b6342d3f1a05fada | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-7a34199bec07e56eff6fe4e479efd63aba6df565 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-7a42fb1abfd09e315541b7f2921dde583b9977a2 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-7a4a679d5ec2cafa957d91209b93369c14f4eaec | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-7a5f4f253ee395f5fd86690c3edbde11f2460608 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-7a7a05d9ac8697e1e200606ff1f483922e857bdb | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-7a7af1e400a947a132e66ad6953aecafe677ddcb | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-7a9292f69ed1007c23cf02fa2af2143115860d2b | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-7a98b0d9b5a27c13447d1f910d007be3bbab5418 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-7a9af907b74818156c4165b25357bb9c1497bdbc | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-7aaf9fcfe12de177ee59bffd22c6ffc248b1cc2f | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-7ab1b970d2d9ea4d940e491207cb32ed868a0f93 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-7ab580df66ec5f1a9483b56490c7f19b32a255cd | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-7aec0d6dbd2ed676c828e2231f239e57c70cd38f | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-7afdb63625c82969daed3ec3871dd413c9fdf36f | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-7b05d3ad570b85ce31a45a0e5e823eab8874455d | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-7b068c2c22ac8566e142db16b0a148374abf5ae4 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-7b4878c7c2c60e6d4b1c70758ff44d0cbb02db0a | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-7b5a9a2f48d160609cf09d7105da41c798cf48fa | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-7b6857f6106b9be20c5912c88c0d265bd808eef3 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-7b6e13603059af8d1752f40aecc2289787c01be1 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-7b7307dca026bb1420781e9f0b508d1723ce58a1 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-7b7bce250d70a64d10d712df248dfc28ff2b3154 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-7b7eefad6f332e23f5da7d3fe5791bee1c901388 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-7b83d1e58b2f90e05d1a191ee92f7cfdfb1d4613 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-7b8932f8f9eb74afa38332221409a184a9c7817f | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-7b8e8ce5e2c01bea91212d269ad7be4ded9040f2 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-7b93f55540bfe9add6eea62c47fa867e590b8460 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-7b96a156c1baf2fdcec9ca998bfae4fc5ec59add | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-7b9ced8b51a615419f47bdd707b21c71875d34f1 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-7bb018c732ca7deb633b2f5a7d7567a94078e115 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-7bb93d337e7bdbd7c043569a240aaeb2b00848b1 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-7bbca48a8ccd252a22df6c0664e2bbdc1d7d73b4 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-7bc9a5a3743ae8f3d5acfe6cefc37542eea163d1 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-7bcccf31186c3dec6c18b34d4996440edef42be4 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-7bd47fe2930379f1b379c5567e65a0127d02d7c5 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-7be6d52f38fc6c8e4dfa4534b36373ea176729fc | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-7bfd7a856f1a98f0d6b2e61b773d5ddfdb632ccb | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-7c070f99e7cfe1ed5343841b7ed45d62d25d9c60 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-7c0e217de443363ed6114b33a81605957dae69e6 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-7c3842822d756d2c9aab393e1fa4de57d6b62b16 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| s5-7c49c874fd09addbee645d510454c288ee838b76 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-7c6df3796b42a171b2958d7d493bd90ae550e222 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-7c71af562c8f1cca108b6c5c7f1473c37032e223 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-7c76c1f7095625aa0d9ba7b63dc7651325a3eb3c | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-7c8c7208809f644bcc95db5300e823c2c695aa39 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-7c94407d25a21845d62a4ed7b1df7ddcf249a0e1 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| s5-7c95aa97881d1203430c213afc4ee22ba466f349 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-7c9b74bce332ea4f86d84a2322ab4dc6a8fff273 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-7ca70e4779de1477d53a4ebffc152f53665dfc48 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-7cb2b63808ede9f1912c54fd511dfe4af1b24bb7 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-7cbac06e7fbaf2533c90754a356d48fbcbe5bc44 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-7cbb05fb33ec5e12c5fce4a9b16d5097b627e4d0 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-7cc1744b9cfbeeec0ae80d39c38d5836e8aa72c7 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-7cc2f85fd44c7775acab200a6cfbf81879ee1eed | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-7cc6b67f2d2bff4faaaa483330fa03fcbd48d7c4 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| A Simple Polynomial-Time EFX Repair for Cancelable Valuations | Hannaneh Akrami, Arash Ashuri, B. Chaudhury, Kurt Mehlhorn, M. Soldatov | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | ? 2026 | ✓ | – | ↗ | triple proof |
| s5-7d1278a9124a68f33f45607a9e40004a45fc0a6b | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-7d178389ff7e197a8d6b8bfc3a47029f817d1511 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-7d3dc50ac1e127caa733d4c3fc3ae4dd3befba6a | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-7d3ecdb3cf413d664b7e89259ac12453da29bfed | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-7d41dfab0fc0ffa03803abfdcf23ea54aff3864f | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-7d4553cde7a7053e1f85fb9557219a58dd4f0958 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-7d45d07c0f15238f04b2d7fec3abcd20279aaece | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-7d46820df83b1c44fefd0629fea23dd336bbac60 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-7d57f88e89e750090e29a63cf106cc03a06979cb | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-7d594da3fb477d5443a0a8d8b058d575bc14ee87 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-7d68befb1de02456eeb76a943f7ce574a2dcd26f | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-7d6fb8cba73c6ef337997baa8ab3039e5fc0c087 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-7d710c303d2639cf9a9a4db3509254e6b366c26b | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-7d7d66a9fd2078cd9d9c8401d3ceb542778b3fa8 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Fair and Truthful Allocations Under Leveled Valuations | George Christodoulou, Vasilis Christoforidis | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | Information Processing Letters 2024 | – | – | triple | |
| s5-7d973aa37867d9b7c0c7aa60e6b35b7b95fb9d75 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-7daf283755b2639efcdb4cd0a892941339468299 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-7dc683de5002609a8cc092ecba5e56a5a62cb84a | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-7dce98e3bc30c39af59a1ebfdb4fa14b76b9f024 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-7deb29f5dd2cd0992db6ee87fe8b1bee3049ec20 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-7df07e47237b13aeec8d08eaf3efbb91181b71e0 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-7e17cb3f51cfafa105bdef423838996cbc242b59 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-7e4088c8fe372eb50e2d3ac184502c490e699202 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-7e4336894d028416ca9c822e1a7f9377dd62145e | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-7e513320e71c9367f5756883c2c1fd4765b52caa | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-7e560dd59dc704537bd67daf5183a5c7f9d34157 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-7e570434a243f04367a4d10cfe90bb0861b3bb18 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-7e778cdd858e522535b64117244b63c400d7843d | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-7e77a1d926318adc0184768ac827de9f415a245c | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-7e78bb597c240c32a94dc71a5ad9cc9e491efb16 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-7e97ad7a69a3d6f0a38aba93e9cf61f9e6c730b2 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-7ea771fbb7c15edfb95f571a7bc29c78eb265385 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-7eb1a0dcda060def1e0e7f4dc22439291c3b509f | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | ↗ | triple proof | |
| s5-7eb32f8abecfa508efa57fb69b88046ffd202241 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-7eb670a769b2ea4c2be9068c38a426aa39541f6a | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-7eb719bc4fb274c7927bb9d9f81cea392a0b5f28 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-7edeef56129e481429f97b86bdaf9e26c6f4447a | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-7f08d9247881f03463a058f2533724f37c8eb5fa | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-7f115d15c8e65ed790c7387dae62f263de198214 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-7f11bf4498a44b535a57008fcf9f008bccc3c333 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-7f17cb76993b45c58b35a936351d5a8a7c839b2d | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-7f26ca63d5a1f849f6aa6822f4986471d1de8adc | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-7f3bcedb7508d79d33f94f34b4f8e8bb68677c7e | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-7f3fa73c2c2f7199fd98204ac39483144bca7cbf | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-7f40557411039427769e7bc54309fd498d04e918 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-7f4a5e9f962f51421f5c38f93af667cb66b5f703 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-7f52044b025fbb15a6a94ab9521f6f22f95620f9 | unclassified | ? | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| s5-7f537af3a9686d6166d7d6dad01787f5ecf67ba9 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-7f5f6b69afdfa30eac9a84ed23fc6f9c5b793658 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-7f72eae5e45f95c5bcc88f65b67965844a40f8dc | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-7f76dce5f766dca714d47bfa98f31806262c53ee | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-7f7e65e4b230f4bbcb4d6b52222bd705de88af47 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-7f9f64404e9ddb3a9c91c2bf697c4a438bbe0149 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-7f9fab4b2cd4f55b535fa4023f9793a4ea696235 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-7fad4f23fdf6d152ad83b3d5694acc1c93453ff1 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-7fb25a7a71e883f18e6ed6de19bc0ac450165d94 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-7fb34c31ca1eb2c63c0b1fb1669ea74c1c51764e | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-7fb9a672a181afb8ee9946c4891cea803f46bbb9 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| On the structure of stable tournament solutions | F. Brandt, Markus Brill, Hans Georg Seedig, Warut Suksompong | Voting · Tournament Solutions | Economic Theory 2016 | – | ✓ | triple | |
| s5-7fc19c0010e0a54aecb7a92dbde15dbdf230c78e | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-7fc1f66f6fe1bdf7f832b63a1537eb84b30c275d | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-7ffa1176f07bcd294d9c9e34100d02ff4fce4351 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-8009370307e3da1bdd6c1a2cf65f4a3d35fe44f5 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-800c6ab88296b53cce4a8b2c877252a5612a1a5b | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-80129db8e3720655892ee27ac8674a66418bf702 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-802af989769cbb82db8488e418111def20dfa87c | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-803a5c6dc2e7117592a8f2131aa981af25737226 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| A Bargaining Model of Collective Choice not comsoc | J. Banks, John Duggan | unclassified | American Political Science Review 2000 | – | – | triple | |
| s5-806938bddc59916fd5799669db96c4a5fd66cf23 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-80895d0a1fc2ea5d0e9ac053c182aa12c8b0b15e | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-80a720e07cda5f08d1523ad6e490c3a32e342a99 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| The Power of Share-Based Notions in Proving Envy-Based Fairness Guarantees | Hannaneh Akrami, Ryoga Mahara, Kurt Mehlhorn, Nidhi Rathi | Fair Allocation · Shares & Guarantees | ? 2026 | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof |
| s5-80b0bddcfb8dcd2d1231d7e0928e2a6f9bce2987 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-80b6b5009730a34002395695d3fed5b5dbf01a61 | unclassified | ? | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| s5-80b73ec0b7682014fa4b7fafa90d49bb87f27320 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-80ccab4ae8e2a467dd0895eac924cce7d447220d | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-80db32a030c6678f5bef1278999984fd8197877f | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-80e8ccae3217aeeacbc20726d6ed4c32eb89b0e1 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-80ee6de7412841dd6b38aabf2b9fe5409fcb2f72 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| s5-80f5faf29e0c6b9f3252ad3f8e0504dd1ca6127f | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-80f88707dca9fc991703f746d385a8d56cc69c79 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Position: Social Choice Should Guide AI Alignment in Dealing with Diverse Human Feedback | Vincent Conitzer, Rachel Freedman, J. Heitzig, Wesley H. Holliday, Bob M. Jacobs, Nathan Lambert et al. | Frontier · Computer-Aided Methods & Data | International Conference on Machine Learning 2024 | – | – | triple | |
| s5-8104f6b5b7d4d0656acccd5a12681c77d21b67d7 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-8106afaea5533631ce25f163d18bbf83598ad6fa | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-812b400f6ab7490e93575fb5f1a2abf08b70021a | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-813a8669c0a5df02fb6b6f91dd376e74d0e13907 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-81402b5b043f20fb0f962f705ac44324c7a3bad1 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| What Pareto-Efficiency Adjustments Cannot Fix | Josué Ortega, Gabriel Ziegler, R. Arribillaga, Zhao Geng | Fair Allocation · Fair Division Theory | Journal of Political Economy Microeconomics 2025 | – | – | triple | |
| s5-816c45779e88225217b8f40fa18e700d49be91cb | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-8176857133709b2574fb7bd7d59038a6bc72680e | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-817d89bb61aa6deedb74fb4046887efcce723022 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-818683ae493a0671dd1debb46919c58b077b4de0 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-819c580b6c935475d19b7728393cc28166adedab | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-81aa524b7aa0b4853ee73c5a4f88d3b920e5e732 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-81aded822416a17b5b90d1ab01fc20b8e141e338 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-8201746be327ae94a7a2bf5904b73318c6e4f73a | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-820943c8a0c2a4e26a1494f678cb3f152b380e11 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-822445bdd78a1d39b4678ddc82ea40f1e0a020f8 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-8251f323f1c90e2428b32c397761249f78367392 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-82598a1de1e0d41750e7e51b88b800c2c02a3957 | unclassified | ? | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| s5-825a12f97ec523c12d3d2084390900e615c2b1af | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| The Nash Social Welfare Function | M. Kaneko, Kenjiro Nakamura | Voting · Voting Theory & Axioms | ? 1979 | – | – | triple | |
| s5-826bbd00f86a4727fa09d8d019771d08dccf0e5b | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-82742bc1c42d82b85df9ac1b5e3125a246d6d881 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-82a1804e7211a6e85d4b1ad6f3122ad95092522e | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-82a9a1c7eae90cdfafea5e585ae7af95931aa6d2 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-82acd193956064be75e256cfc173f2b1c02f7767 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-82adbab855d4591ef8bf52307e0daf8ba7f98069 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-82bff5937ed3cb4478d0fdeb18d3c97aa1a36ea2 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Online Nash Social Welfare Maximization with Predictions | Siddhartha Banerjee, Vasilis Gkatzelis, A. Gorokh, Billy Jin | Fair Allocation · Chores, Online & Dynamic | ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms 2020 | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | |
| s5-82e746534d7afd2d7a1fbd7a14a1405b8d053cd4 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-82e8fa4b6cec35289c68011138f15ff0164d5b77 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-82ebc7a23807d6d5fdb64eb94a55bf8000d7135e | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-82f14155911ece20ed02c8b075b7fec218fe664c | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| s5-82f55edfdb06b9ff5baba2696083e8d11f5fe376 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-82fbee44379db54dfb4958f9e321f8853e59781e | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-8301a4376ba98c0ede3eb297ba6001dfbb023028 | unclassified | ? | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| s5-83081b0dc59a775d4faee157fb7052c5396c28c5 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-831b42e3a42084c854ef125874a8a02723824e35 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-832fe02959555f9e896488d2513d249203042516 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-83372b9e3b695e2a7c89642117f10cf448e67701 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| s5-83462f68d858ed6840247244aa8a6c0fec962172 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-8348e934e53e376480383686366e355f991f0f37 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-835c0022337fcfcaff0690139a0a6ca3d28a851f | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-835dd601a0b323bc2321077ee8ea891016d8298d | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-83743bdd90a8d08ec03d8a7a3a5edc447113f0ec | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-8388921f1ac6c35260bd0e76b848ec1a1923268f | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-838b7dde7b62a664a56253f4da5b30bf8b45c8d2 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-83a711d3492509f7f7f8ede83f9b6ff3016eecfd | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-83aff16b92fdd8faf949ee422180e0235d1300e8 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-83b6c76bf58155d11d0ad891ffff1f565f8895d1 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-83d6a0fff0c9a10228bb905744427fd9b0fe706f | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-83e36db00342e0370fcf202954f868cb42fa35bc | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-83e603c892908279a4cf35286fa0440ada9d4243 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-83eafdba199d504c5fd6abd0d5e7cbe730bd68ee | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-83f6dd71c0a63b0a34d6c661f9df98cff57c4f08 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-83f8250f249ccb879e76cde53613677883c9c9f7 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-84034a2e81e8519632e1db980263f963599ef620 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-840a4b2238e9d4440194d65dcbec288687688b5f | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-841404ab2b5420bd07984d2d5b7fb723f1c956a1 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| Randomized and Deterministic Maximin-share Approximations for Fractionally Subadditive Valuations | Hannaneh Akrami, Masoud Seddighin, K. Mehlhorn, Golnoosh Shahkarami | Fair Allocation · Shares & Guarantees | Neural Information Processing Systems 2023 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| s5-8448e2e195c5938e1f4f0b703712e769d7339f93 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-844f3a062055f30a59377324d64d0ea1601fc2d0 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-8452861e1ab76f255f77eac166e2520b248aff0a | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-8471ea4585a0af3c13e887ae2ffc6eb8fd2c9871 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-84727d2523a97512a7af674ab9726d0e64126783 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Approximately optimal mechanism design via differential privacy not comsoc | Kobbi Nissim, Rann Smorodinsky, Moshe Tennenholtz | unclassified | Information Technology Convergence and Services 2010 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| s5-849adf2d4a6f273bdb9740044083f10e0b2852e5 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-849b5efd0df5e6fffc7f256951cda893d24c23ea | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-849ee5b49f2e14f31f015da808501e49354f468e | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-84a28f8e9b1d23b7c152ee67f384755c3e762ba4 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-84a653fa94e52b1b1ef3238c4e51e636476cdc64 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-84ab6a41bb0980afafe9039fb4a71aec5d7fdbc2 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| Cake cutting really is not a piece of cake | J. Edmonds, Kirk Pruhs | Fair Allocation · Cake Cutting | ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms 2006 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| s5-84bacf8a84e26fa9a3712b0882146566f7f78a17 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-84bb28d2d1faaabaed8e9eb30c7ab19579617a39 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-84c3f0aadda43ec81da9ea2a76e8d9a303f7d2b2 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-84cca57729fae45656e3f76543c3f993f7b96173 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-84cdd3599e769ae874feb03df890ba4f0ec9d710 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Epistemic selection of costly alternatives: the case of participatory budgeting | Simon Rey, U. Endriss | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Participatory Budgeting | Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems 2023 | – | – | triple | |
| s5-84d74e1b931d4b907750098b3d10d581d14ccc3a | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-84df1a8a8277a79014bfdc1b9c4e113b146b2b36 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-84e05f1d76b4b33f849e5cb7ed16a17e4f875c92 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-84e61f28d0f15bbd02152b152677ecc5f08e45ea | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-84f9ceba7d9f333b6de471b97ef6b97d5444cbd7 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-84fa3b45af74ead0243096c5c3f715b04c389ef4 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-850d5706d15077ddc65901ff789fcbe6eab0f2fe | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-852579120cebe8a7e4d7e1496b9387ed0d7c3b56 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-853383c31507329d27f51fe1b9f18640e487bf82 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-8535d2480ac1f4a2067c533af645d9c8c177c985 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-853bea4e4dbab4c21ca1a5d93af8ad1df873567b | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-8542b0673db1e973971cc40f4a11dd0dbc2738f1 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-8556991a42fd680e2e97addc14ad3ce0a62e99e8 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-855a483d4cff1e0eb61be83a144bb620a292be5a | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-8563754f804d720ef97c9099a927d5039a30596e | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-8588b90ad01ad0e92aabab237153cb0f14c1083b | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-85b2c95b69e63e023c1da39ffd4cf49b05711947 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-85dd53a76f0e58752a6e23785a8b32f78a6ba199 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-85e5c587edb9ae9eb4009d0b70bffa84bd7609dd | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Social integration in two-sided matching markets | J. Ortega | Fair Allocation · Fair Division Theory | Journal of Mathematical Economics 2017 | – | – | triple | |
| s5-85ebf34a026092660ad763ec9ac0682b6d7af39b | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-85ffa4408515c7a275cda4a934ed22cacb6e6ed5 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-861238df0c2ed56c8ce402e52d55c1470a0644fd | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-8617d48be345ca8ddcb1d71d1b66e6426b66b6b4 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-862b0ad1388f119be10d62db33a4164060ddbe76 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-862bc7d611d7733b52509bf138ccfe7e0103a05a | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Fair Division with Binary Valuations: Characterizations | F. Brandl, Warut Suksompong, Nicholas J. Teh | Fair Allocation · Fair Division Theory | ARXIV.ORG 2026 | – | – | triple | |
| s5-864f043f205c85a14260b6db8848284793984df7 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf Indices Revisited | A. Laruelle, Federico Valenciano | Voting · Voting Theory & Axioms | Mathematics of Operations Research 2001 | – | – | triple | |
| s5-86923b58b70131e2ed2d8e2463f27a49e49e72d8 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-8694002428831cb987fa8b3c2b380a0560860f1b | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-86bbe5ad339c1407070d857765c6d12baab278bb | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-86bd9d1cc0287f256520c486b2962c3f6c0cde8d | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-86caf2703bb1ac6544e6f4af6eda1ca918a5d045 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-872df35e5eaf902a7c871145acf446f266426df3 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-8733ebc7277079acc58bb61fbb3b5a081595ee46 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-873829ccd4f7d08ab03fb52d81b64f0fba64152c | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-8768ff584257e841fc05777aa33afb61fb080947 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-87735b8862f0b9b6ae3b55b21f5a0ff259a4fb78 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-879fdcf4208fd315ce997d3fec952df08ceed058 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-87a3753164c78d56a92744c8bd014972408c174f | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-87c63358bc5b5547bf4d41144ea8743c29e1106b | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-87c86e41105ce389aff0a342cfbc28e10f59310a | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| s5-87cd24c5a56277a5b591133a2238edb566e6189d | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-87cfaedc42fea80c3af18622af5fc633512ddeec | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-87e3570f3da43e889b1fca8152fccf5aa2e26a46 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-8805bfe923e715964fe024d8e75cb1071cb9746a | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-8814e9a9dd3e1e56b8e2905dbbdd3ed636429b46 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Ex-ante versus Ex-post: Egalitarian Facility Location Mechanism Design | Zohar Barak, Inbal Talgam-Cohen | Frontier · Knockout Tournaments | ? 2026 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| s5-885b503e42339eb54a526343d7f5794136852321 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-8861b81642fb722df9741e520f90c2e992e36107 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-887cc6732e15aee20fbf11daa7a554d4b942d3d5 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| s5-888382c1b557cf095ded34718c3a760d9c7771a8 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-88928198aabf03c7a20d7558f7bf2eaa341a6b6a | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-88b04abb19dc4da2a2ac2c3b67157bac70e7ea47 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-88b1779f98ce17f69e5dadb26f84551064058b50 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-88b3cdc2371d1881fd8ee7a41ad0fa4c70e1e9c4 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-88bd9b666ddba72fc0275378f764ec3a7179a855 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-88c3f869d4d51c5f8814e6f9061c52c7493134d5 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-88cd0d72c06d20d7bc105af466910064094a4196 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-88d149749056b19fcd06c562ad298bcec28a7c82 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-88d5488f51f2ca72a3d8aa459bcfb07461c56b44 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-88e49060020a8b78f2a06b6268cf8390c72ec358 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-891d130e841526767cbe9d676f5b663a422572f1 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Bayesian Vote Manipulation: Optimal Strategies and Impact on Welfare | Tyler Lu, Ping-Zhong Tang, Ariel D. Procaccia, Craig Boutilier | Voting · Manipulation | Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence 2012 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| s5-8929e98018216bd19a7c9978a2b59532244c10c1 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-892d47efc8111e5eab2f3d3e766ca5f747583ca2 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-8938e37d885ae9c67f2d84f227951bbf2ff7dbc8 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-8958f45c68835cb61d3c834f2308b1c2dac094e3 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-895b2b9f8d5620b5188098f6a63fd132d772cc75 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-8986ece7ca2c0c037c3fa5538992d6f62a9dbb34 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-8998381a541efe6ab211ef915f5b431a466479bd | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-89bf316b01fd2be123ff42ce85a4da3cf9307160 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-89c3415eea22c8f0ae21faa0bf12c62a3161dcdc | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-89c741fb48cce06bcc9f670463debcdd855382b4 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| The Complexity of Manipulating k-Approval Elections | Andrew Lin | Voting · Manipulation | International Conference on Agents and Artificial Intelligence 2010 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| Optimistic and pessimistic approaches for cooperative games | Ata Atay, Christian Trudeau | Coalition Formation · Weighted Voting Games | European Journal of Operational Research 2024 | – | – | triple | |
| s5-8a160dcd1046b93118d79f8af23ad4f2ad0281c5 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-8a1850bec8fd23db9f8c85e53968f0699d4a52ad | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-8a1bc55539a2c3d22e4356c069819d9e53736b75 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-8a1e5cca6586d821967842e2bac7eea5f67b7881 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-8a203dc98c3d64afa242fe867afaf2399a5d2b82 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-8a2ac8e1408aebbb06df71c0585a05c0aac90c49 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-8a30c692755180af21312f5360cf017f65c1776c | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-8a37c207c063d23cdd3b83a84b265734fe00c2b7 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-8a40e447b18d44246867f6bc71416c4e2e4e9794 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-8a4feaf078b368e5d478792fc23d2b233acd0590 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-8a5219dda8a465567c692666b61d36875600c593 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-8a68345a86c0a254fb6f7fd39e3f1eb933727839 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-8a873fb4038122a3737fe8db1db174a0b483ff8d | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-8ac27641dad760109afdb188a1d3c13c8417281c | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-8ade8e5b5b4598ef85f15789206489dcc8ae5e56 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-8ae41fffe5e88cdea5e3b4b6ca0f60ee554d107d | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-8aeca2507c9489db71a26dd8686d39e30f5a7426 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-8afc7811c8c7f9af52b4578730645b7ad881800d | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-8aff927fee9418422b4fb715f43fc13a42b820fa | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-8b006691d5d51ec0b9a6ec8773fa2a5f4f3780ea | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-8b1682d25678dbdf429ba525e5989684e3ba7186 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-8b28775296c184233bdf802325ee3f6e107402a3 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-8b328ac625580c3afe04223836cfa8161d0e79d0 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-8b35bd738714e5ed94d9a0886080bca8fee0ad23 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-8b388470a9df108783292b749d0f61dfb621e582 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-8b3960807f8b5b8dd0b0293d1a31262846a1eb4d | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Communication Complexity of Combinatorial Auctions with Submodular Valuations not comsoc | Shahar Dobzinski, J. Vondrák | unclassified | ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms 2013 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| s5-8b4633dcfa02c46aea89192b703b7e915f6a4b87 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-8b56d6a7e594b2a47c89f94184ac5dc36934696f | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-8b5ae5d66ec89db8343e1be75554a0973055a702 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-8b5e14c2c8a084a8b29ae403695b0f9dae759abb | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-8b65d60ab7af0bd5c093910cba11b7ddd10155ba | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Fragile Stable Matchings | Kirill Rudov | Frontier · Knockout Tournaments | ARXIV.ORG 2024 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| s5-8b8d95dccd1d742989060c42d8bacc8ffe359341 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Cooperative Product Games | David Rosales | Coalition Formation · Weighted Voting Games | ARXIV.ORG 2014 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| s5-8b9cbbf81f2b7a7986a90ce68a8bbf4a95419bfc | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-8ba55d147ebab046da41c1e0221f060214b29a6b | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-8ba8b3a20b717bff8081c40ba9c2c1c5fc387a40 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-8bbb22f3f3f6c8d092948e0ac45719fd6f6e2929 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-8bbbec52ae0d700517f369c22824eba247ec0855 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| s5-8bbf9eb1ec9aad5f8fd7561cbcaec8bbcc263675 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-8bc1e8824a938fed18e182c938c834b0a483ae85 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-8bcb64c787f3f480eb6a61fe63d2e643e4c2ad4b | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-8be2aceb9a4dcd25e4d324a7ad967b31f3f31f9a | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-8bf883c29c2049cfd4c3fcefa9c013a479bdfbba | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-8c0bc902e354feb63923d553c416a239612321e7 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-8c0c60d9911164e639942a29439720e798b12bb3 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-8c11e087774b41d3205409abe027424cab88d2df | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-8c1e730961c43cd59dcdc32169baa1884eadc442 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-8c25151fc1afca7df346bc2aa251e6bd7eb7dbc4 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-8c26ea09b667892007acacc8d20db32ab920febe | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-8c2910adc1be5c599b66ffbe6d48736e97e319f1 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-8c2d0da852518100288cb4cc2f66a2fcd542479e | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-8c329e02c85c8d8f6d4dfc82f7df3d8ade4235c1 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-8c33c5b34d2eceae3acd59a1f073eebefdf90fcf | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-8c365f30f4b989f5c21a3b1baa539b7cd64ce466 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-8c43958fabb1f804dc7d6589fe4a621c10392b94 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-8c58d6ce71aaf350c3b6d74ba84573ec9972ab3b | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| s5-8c76ac662240a3295c86867fb243d73b58a263c7 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| k-Majority Digraphs and the Hardness of Voting with a Constant Number of Voters | Georg Bachmeier, F. Brandt, Christian Geist, Paul Harrenstein, Keyvan Kardel, Dominik Peters et al. | Voting · Tournament Solutions | Journal of computer and system sciences (Print) 2017 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| s5-8c7e8d554b813b28f2dc8653a4d9ff9af2ec53ba | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-8c81d189828a55d413689c808b9897dd8ef1be1c | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-8cb13b7088312af742db0acf3cbfc7c01a5da8f9 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-8cb7e0e0591a5ef32f21801e7c528498c02f3011 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-8cbd5b85c1603f50d3cf35f1afde579403a3faee | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-8cc986b5bc77f686432583fb4ba6e438911b7752 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-8cca3f59db77da035b80c8fd9f10f5a0b79e5041 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-8ccc9c5b861516dc495011466f8eeafceb80ec9a | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-8cce4885d56efc7f0a5b1a34dab3451c6ee09005 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-8cf12564ec9ff436f31954d0947c60f917be5756 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-8cf864f118238e92c20ee033c834b4bacf42170a | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-8cfedff2c0c59599d2389a0935a7e26363d8b0f3 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-8d00197e159695d93796a97e8a625d7f1f3ad099 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-8d026f2a9c1ebab44853890dc4fa7f505bfadc6c | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-8d04c9ab6c9a6e4a44a00fe9efac485b8a8937b9 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-8d0784f91267edf49acbb694176fc2b2c35f11f9 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-8d0ab29980b34353c177d4c28473630884f5dd18 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-8d0eca563b2077455cfefc71ad08546b0cfb2fe7 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-8d251f4da2e3e0c40d401a4c8274f1b103f45a45 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-8d279dde2fc60b6598c5a2ea79f16f62357aa312 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-8d341ce5b0704f469028a55553b103ed089128b5 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| s5-8d37fc8d222b4e5fb9c0d6d7c992bfdf2f289b41 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-8d47a47277deb884a83f38551f870d805d8c767c | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-8d487d076b7b863eb37e73028ed4a5e311c0fc53 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-8d59744dce00b2029aaaa02e24d2d9cca7fc25ee | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-8d5b97bff4572f8008cfb29cedcabbd3d6220604 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-8d5eedaed2c73079a02d9a8da270bab61422001d | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-8d72d4d291320ea6bc69af909ef21706b125e274 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | ↗ | triple proof | |
| s5-8d7dd56cbed9a0f80414987391af6412cb93c484 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-8d8329e576e082ff034f06fde30a84b79b7c44bb | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-8d86f736dc42aaad5b4e8bea91a4b3172362afc5 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-8d98ee76c921b49b12a2f628c965708dfd3f8cac | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-8d9c6f80dc7041c58dc218024fb9dc2aa73ffd73 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-8da7f7eaa057d37d8b51001cff2c8ee6a4c1917f | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-8dada4c0ae5e0fb7403012dd07f2c9e0e7876496 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| An experimental investigation of preference misrepresentation in the residency match not comsoc | A. Rees-Jones, Samuel E. Skowronek | unclassified | Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 2018 | – | – | triple | |
| s5-8de0810c1992ddd8af814da5fbf39d3a10f2167f | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-8de4dc3b5067432158ded8f4e02f07f10dc96001 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-8de63da10d5204629f9599b17b265194ee6ea3c3 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-8def6de1b3435ed9622635f32678fd6bd9781084 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| s5-8df25a63c89bb111537604f11d27132bd91a4c27 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-8df772ff15cc7985366664bbf694d7f96275a510 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-8e08a29ead2aa8eae22094aa6cf0d65f3f2936cb | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-8e0c01d58add69a18d8fb5e3b57f74ef228d50c9 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-8e3f0be63ec824d9bdf4a12d1faddb5384df8f95 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-8e3faab35ec88874aa0c90376b6feb5d32fff7c2 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-8e6a64a850b79973e10c003b4e62e2ec53803a55 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-8e82640631e777c89635d5ce0a2e938c1f4cc718 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-8ea424013f95a5a4e84590b34ce8a7e4e1ea0ea2 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-8ea6d0f98423bfaeffa6c1acae59913a41263cc2 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-8ea7e651c9edb6efa882f3ba011e0cd62de99c02 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-8ecb3f5796cb47acc53b6747099ee4aa0ddb573e | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-8eccd69a7b96ca049b5142333cc23d8f6a714a1b | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Legislative Bargaining with Reconsideration not comsoc | Daniel Diermeier, Pohan Fong | unclassified | ? 2011 | – | – | triple | |
| s5-8ee308fb41e83859ab4f306e37f336bd22659d87 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-8ee97fb73a72d95e405a37ad7a33fd3b22bb5a8d | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| s5-8eefcb446d03acb13fd10d42ef9b0f239346c523 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-8f092ae60ab41034ec37c57294beed179b3049c5 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-8f13ddd6142814987a355ebaa8ffd7d7830559c8 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Constant Weighted Maximin Share Approximations for Chores | Bo Li, Fang-Xiao Wang, Shi-Ji Xing | Fair Allocation · Shares & Guarantees | ARXIV.ORG 2025 | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | |
| s5-8f3d71b4139c9dcbd089a6cc61a6668871b893e9 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-8f4b522d5079cbb64fcbb01ea78f4bb67e73ddce | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-8f5fa68e00aeb954ba201ed7fd68edf3fe1df7a1 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-8f60c8194907339aaf46b6ff8f6d467e04d25220 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Proportional Fairness in Clustering: A Social Choice Perspective | Leon Kellerhals, Jannik Peters | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | Neural Information Processing Systems 2023 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| s5-8f676247635ee5e250487107f1b1ad30c372733d | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Online Fair Division with Budget Constraints | Saar Cohen, Nicholas J. Teh, Paul W. Goldberg, Michael Wooldridge | Fair Allocation · Chores, Online & Dynamic | ARXIV.ORG 2026 | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | |
| s5-8f6f361c20c8badc0459c53066b769bfa405dab6 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-8f71b994a13d070cf7e38f07cc9900c38aa36452 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-8f8a4c034ca6fb0c55d7c57acd78c446b03b0de2 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-8f8ed9894fb310b9d6dbbdc8816ac4b6c0c405b1 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-8f970d969ab72dd6cc37f669a13d043031b7c0c4 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-8f9c9d2f397c26936f5b67d227f5469fd4c8e05d | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-8fa65d5ce8797aa90bfe94c41c6cbe76545305f8 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-8fc116d5b8794f796912b7d87b1745cc8768b865 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-8fc2b1f44801027523d17320b39f31a8fce108c0 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-8fc6012ee96856046866b5e56f99f2f0552f338c | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-8fd82c4d8e6b980b2992a3b2b526e888b78a9413 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-8fdceefdfd87cc3b61cbf6cb75b045be75ec1660 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-8fdd2dfba4d13cce4f8adbec735d67c642e35f14 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-8fde582be2f8b40e05e34a0aa28c97ce246bc325 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-8feb62b85e48cf08a5568bed2348c3841a32a894 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-8ff09a7d3a9dd46b994ba06cd3d03258d6f41600 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-8ff80edbfe8ddd2ee69a9ff43814720189456c85 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-9001798295f9d68268a7ac5d3d127022dba107b8 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-90036ff1d03218845ba20f60aba037f84a2f460b | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-9007ee181117f022b432d85c5a37f24f9b6a4c50 | unclassified | ? | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| s5-900de53d63e7f13a84ac45c2ee2aa0a3dd9b5578 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-901532dd196a71f1977793fd6b608b4961a46fb2 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-9021e98b169beff6fac8f7b8cca83cbf2fea4608 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Closing Gaps in Online Fair Division | Tzeh Yuan Neoh, Nicholas J. Teh | Fair Allocation · Chores, Online & Dynamic | ? 2026 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| s5-902455678ebc1e8e8ab8dfbc486b41703b6022e0 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-9028e3256d4baf83504bcefdcbaf91bfc3fa08be | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-902fa74f6fa9bce7131f7407f56e069ff445fcff | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-9050e84296d3e7ae508517c9d740eaa96a3f65c1 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-905bc770b90afefd7c4e928be06aac0683491c55 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-90608fc7129fe442b8261cfe10c8cdd56081c8b9 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-90627068795f378de087c3ad18539e81b1a82fb7 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-907fe1c62f73697edf33258fff9ff72b87402fca | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-908e7c7780e267ae81a107ffc99ba32ad197c0dc | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-90a4706ded92ef8aebf7e9f00b07f69641d64fcc | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-90af4c7692ac49ec7885b16e2e0ab2b76db9f08b | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-90bcb30a06f0d90bae3c689c53ae3982df3119aa | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-90c91b68ceb9ec60047eaceaba80cbf253b9a70d | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| s5-90cc1f4df7db3c6003fde8c7b9b05a8dbd7c71fe | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-90ce3726fa8433c25616b9edd0cfa184958b75c2 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-90d3afd605aa6b5e983ae28aecc67e14d33e8427 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-90d8dd154a21b954fad50c12c6164164e099eaa8 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-90e0faa16b471d5a6baa9028d9552249e0e30d9d | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-90e6f05a9a52d03154dd05b2482a37d5cf79b776 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-90f43477a44437b7f08a1312b6bbdc2ed498c561 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-910f38cbd21391e6bb6a809d7d1ee5a5d1179097 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-9112c54dacb3addeaf1f5d85a0cc6230044eb48d | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| s5-913bf02cbec35ca19c34acc398106f8c6dc882b5 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-914a19b4c586727dc2cc6a61203fd5be1e1f2fa6 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-915ee7be9865767b9b06e76086d0a7d9e1ce916d | unclassified | ? | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| s5-9168edfc6ef2ea54d64c60d5ad984fd2c26a3f29 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-9180d15968e78279c9f352956eaf8f22014e60a9 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Fair and Square: Cake-Cutting in Two Dimensions | Erel Segal-Halevi, S. Nitzan, Avinatan Hassidim, Y. Aumann | Fair Allocation · Cake Cutting | ARXIV.ORG 2014 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| s5-91d4d72e2c51f5b6e498c9e06020f8384005f4f2 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-91da513db42de2df03bb2e4bd3e4f0f29f417996 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-91dd931ad90ceb9185457ed45a1398da6069a749 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-91de6c74bd1825c2541159d50cf0d5acdb5fa6b3 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-91dec754e37a7be684dd4fc06a9e0881a25e0e8e | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-91dfb500aab5dafedb93b6b096f98cbe78dead31 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-91e2139fd8bf7d8d89f94251130b8302e3fbca10 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| s5-920a65c121d5d10abf6ede34c330a37361e2d9d8 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-920ccea23b8fdae717e630b14682e479f00463dc | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-923f3137714c096107edb6bf656b1e1220194d0e | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-9256d14ff775ca2b0bd9660434725d8b93e4b167 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-9259d5cdd54dc1ab779c3ac75fc2505c0558ea11 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Lotteries in Student Assignment: An Equivalence Result. NBER Working Paper No. 16140. | Parag A. Pathak, J. Sethuraman | Fair Allocation · Fair Division Theory | ? 2010 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| s5-928036a4501ad75b2878ae87c9c3fed23da8fb2d | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-9287809809827066310e321a0e9de948b8e0c7eb | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-929d614854dedbefd7c1e88cfc7ffe56a9c484f9 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Paired and Altruistic Kidney Donation in the UK not comsoc | D. Manlove, Gregg O'Malley | unclassified | ACM Journal of Experimental Algorithmics 2012 | – | – | triple | |
| s5-92b47564a43dca4aa39a19ca81209de186163fbd | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-92c1f5d70aec65ba42f14f5745766df4569be452 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-92c4242d1bd5c5db020c083096af2757783b658f | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-92da7e1dfbcf6877fdc23390aa8840466683cf9d | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-92e7baf0f01d0bc12f42c7555cb949fa02165abb | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-92e8db3275dfdf7e45a77022600da38903077f32 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-92e96fc41155b5ae7c45e4a6fd2be90c04799c6f | unclassified | ? | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| s5-92eb6bd861f6c627f3a0210d87ed5530bc16c0eb | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-92f3779ef78a98945137d5f28d67376fdb65991b | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-92f98f3ddeb5e3f0f627c7cb422796ab7451cfc2 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-9301dc21193777aacbdf3720002774d9ff13be4a | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| Mixed Integer Programming with Convex/Concave Constraints: Fixed-Parameter Tractability and Applications to Multicovering and Voting | Robert Bredereck, Piotr Faliszewski, R. Niedermeier, P. Skowron, Nimrod Talmon | Frontier · Computer-Aided Methods & Data | Theoretical Computer Science 2017 | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | |
| s5-931f159bf555ad07ed5a86b077d8a829db6f4143 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-932585ce5abce3965480369c3f1bbf139692cd22 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-9335a2c592c5ce3fa9aa0d308f019cd1239e482b | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-936e62c75836243883692617b33cc388cc2cf84d | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-9370c56737194662ede0c185f804c552478ce0ad | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-9378d0fc2ea93b9a3359c5b0acde1119713949c8 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-937b5b53c8672b519027c99c3ff023b684daf4a9 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-93816530f7211205dfd8a3c3cabf8adcac7bf14a | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Dividing Bads is Harder than Dividing Goods: On the Complexity of Fair and Efficient Division of Chores | B. Chaudhury, J. Garg, Patricia C. McGlaughlin, R. Mehta | Fair Allocation · Markets & Equilibria | ARXIV.ORG 2020 | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | |
| s5-938dd2067852fafa0a49fe4a0ac694e4e463a6cc | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-939c5a68f1acb9e0ecce00e222d090fa40136b38 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-93a019d7e9e500458b240d0e280ccf5c95023117 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-93a0b5d2166de38bdfba1632fdc2a95f15189b45 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-93a9752881b04ec281828e872e34b5ac042c5341 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-93ab68200dcadbf50284849ede7282a65b2dfa29 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-93ae839d813af86bc913b8844e4191daa73eb25f | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-93b8256394f8b95f40abf7c366cccea46bc17d01 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-93bb78cdb1e844fcd42b0ebd7848c386338f10a2 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-93bc4604fce5138f66889eec6690daf2b88f4475 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-93e1bc7b76e8889d54270aac61d9aaa8f5bf267f | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-93e274007d8d42e92d368ff277ecf0f37e71d620 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-93ecbe454ed80034c989a53417c673327e360229 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-93efdd81367c9e521c1a651425ce424eae17923d | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-93f44ee64e216fc17c81d364f9f89f6f2d77e94d | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-9404d2fe70a5d7109b55295b73c21a59b14f89f6 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Secure Implementation in Queueing Problems | Katsuhiko Nishizaki | Fair Allocation · Fair Division Theory | ? 2012 | – | – | triple | |
| s5-94401e279bed0ab3bb93608342209bc3a8e265ae | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-9452dce5729e565c7c0afa650edd9cf2722d15dd | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-945712ffdd78f05fdce5c4f61b904f30178b706b | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-9462643790106965de0d70e0b06bc532d0f3b828 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-94747d8f83e1708b8a28717318df784b54c560a6 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-9477d553a7cd232de7313c17fadfe3f1727aaa20 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-947f03354d116eed144a6eec9e59bd5b258c7b24 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-9485438befb2e125d38b4d8cc4bd1e72b747da64 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-948819222f2c925c1c699b0f1fbda5acf453a42e | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-948a77a42b114519c913d3ddbd5d1933097e2078 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-9492e677093227257e8b2213c72d711a519d7738 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-94c073faf928534a83b86903a2e49fe85c142327 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| s5-94c1c845ca2d5dfeed2d941574cfd80c1043d951 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-94c5a10eb5f48ed909b366f42b97d520032f910b | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-94c99e6e4510254e427203a3b6adaeca7871c5d2 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-94cd1efb290fee17b70db768c90f5537e5920dda | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| s5-94eb146760ba91de31e7fd4cddd3d8840f416ea4 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-9513dcb5d19a314bc9733c5e126c34cfca275c02 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-9515a721b4e8270e76875194d2b06df75e0a4a21 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-9515c90ef3f0cdd29768e8daa7bb3918134df5de | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-951ce9c55a2b8042a109bec17ce1a3fb41e40aad | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-95214c772e77c83f0a739dbc5f0eb3b7c836148c | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-9523d0b4722f17764adfd6ea5229e805f69dcada | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-952ae5b02997a0496d349c836a6cd176f61718df | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-952b3e13c192e263f9b408702d6297138c2e95ca | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| s5-9534cad46eea5f0ba23be0962fa6ec457ee3aa2a | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| s5-9534f9a3a8130436e90d02a5bd6fd141d3523088 | unclassified | ? | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| s5-955fa943d2b806944dce08e92e0ac903bab30c69 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-95608e8c447d436dca100ed8e6e1f705be1fd59e | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-956bfcc326b794c208c963959a0337f10a2d03a5 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-95819a8ec78784a69d317cc4b0b08d1fcc11e20a | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-958e72815522af53ea21aba9593f082dd0cbfb6f | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-959dbde7d4fe04274bf164a4331a02f0d96cbadd | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-95b20bc4d07a1925fcfc808460c09ae59e0ee687 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-95b37b2b7c13cd55e48ad0f244cc0a849c35b0a5 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-95b42d531afd978ca52a1c2f473726e72a6a2ec7 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-95be6765dae0161cd0656bf4498eeb9cdb48e320 | unclassified | ? | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| s5-95cea936ae82bd4e65ba2ae255e6ed7bfcdfa2fb | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-95e4e2f84e6d11a88c531a02028e2970196be647 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-95ec3baeead692333072c2e48995a7143e22464c | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-95ee674a03ad23eaaf4837121fc8aea30d885088 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-95ef74f3d40ab11163f41edaa757b71de4550a52 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-95f1f69082ce5bcb7e45cb7337b4325ad2635e3d | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Control Complexity in Bucklin and Fallback Voting | G. Erdélyi, M. Fellows, Lena Schend, J. Rothe | Voting · Bribery & Control | ARXIV.ORG 2011 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| s5-961cbe7a842ba2fa061750c26015dceeefb28415 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-961d7d395003132cf748198b0271398ad15abe4c | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-9628df2771541b7c24af62f12bb36dfa7f0e391d | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-96360187c0516724e355de59ed4d53a3bfbe3619 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-964b13a20a76266a033580001eb36d68382a0de4 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-965f63e8b170effce04b9b1dbc6e9dd5131ef6e0 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-966d70e799dc03432bba8f2dc4c80f0d1375fd13 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Two-sided matching with firms' complementary preferences | Chao Huang | Coalition Formation · Matching under Preferences | ? 2022 | – | – | triple | |
| s5-96703d4fe433905c7a55346dbe163a154fc8ebfb | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-9674cab85ff60cfe5473d692cb21a73ce24a4932 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-9679919834d37843e2d263313ede71ef7f87aa23 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-9690c0cc8112c847caca7effd24c603ac20ecf80 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| Proportional Representation in Rank Aggregation | Patrick Lederer | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | ARXIV.ORG 2025 | – | – | triple | |
| s5-969592251df2b7f64e33a5397d17c6dc7cecce22 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-96a606cfd3948f0dd66dede8a2a79bda88bb5b6d | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-96a65a2cb555916b49c6761aefc69ac8d62d6fa6 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-96af5e22fd71431508dfa13321956b8e9da04cec | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-96beb7610a294a7682a37d6e9d33e5d7ae3c99a8 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Strategyproof Approximation Mechanisms for Location on Networks | N. Alon, Michal Feldman, Ariel D. Procaccia, Moshe Tennenholtz | Voting · Manipulation | ARXIV.ORG 2009 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| s5-96d9b51a4a33c1d51185525b9662c610af2eae69 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-96dd805a32711ba94d843650694413cee1115ad6 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-96fe2b5e8735bde76b32a7e7ec27a1e0bde56478 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-9704402e9c1980dcee67f70fbea92b48ebe61d0c | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-970b38afde3ac47cb4a043a0ffbbd812970e5fa5 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-9724eab65c7f7b055fd3357b4500afabfe232e9f | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-9725e0eeb9570cf835f36aa90abe61d6fbf02f71 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-972c2c1f19e4e69856e39ec309e2eb7630e80986 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| s5-973a0ce3bea105be4e4fe7e67e943b5673c24b1b | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-973dc80db998baa0119e9964341f5d6e2736c066 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-978a6286dd14bc6ac26b644ccb692be057e910b5 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-979b38b3e2be49b726273e1aa24aa9a65ecc83d3 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Tight Efficiency Bounds for the Probabilistic Serial and Related Mechanisms | Jugal Garg, Yixin Tao, L'aszl'o A. V'egh | Fair Allocation · Fair Division Theory | ? 2025 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| s5-97a94d069aad55098f01a3ad0b9e15edf672dda2 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-97b5422abbcb144028761082696b3f4cfdd7ecae | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-97bae7411b27c75415189eb8ae97076aecf15555 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-97c0b40a63f63cbfcaf912710e3f2771effcad45 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-97d0be0070bab81ae6eab8ab586f2918e3e05093 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-97d1a029178c8fc9d9896b4a621e7f53e9de1f66 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-97dcced2033bbc98f4de2e4ceab5b5966adaceb6 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| Maximally Diverse Stable Matchings: Optimizing Arbitrary Institutional Objectives | Gergely Cs'aji, Zhaohong Sun | Coalition Formation · Matching under Preferences | ARXIV.ORG 2026 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| s5-97f78a8a80d10978ddf52ea2c144bd0e065e6640 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-97f9728a006fb98c70674cadb10b3e344b8569b9 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-97fb39fed36ed3b4104ada6384bf453465508e9f | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-98299be14b647ddfaabacede843a693bac72a6c8 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Voting Behaviour and Power in Online Democracy: A Study of LiquidFeedback in Germany's Pirate Party | Christoph Carl Kling, Jérôme Kunegis, Heinrich Hartmann, M. Strohmaier, Steffen Staab | Voting · Voting Theory & Axioms | International Conference on Web and Social Media 2015 | – | – | triple | |
| s5-9842ea22c360ab673075b89630a20db02556a9d7 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-98503d381829394d6c7c8d16f83d28cf74fba6f1 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-9855d4c8e4d8d3c0bedf76b824eba82b50bbba1f | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| s5-985b89615e88db346bd6733112f7fef68ee2fbc7 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-985e3df07e3f8a3634ef5b31cdb24cba4180d0ea | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-985e80a9813cec5eb30d87f4746bbe7df6ceec3b | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-9860ad3bce0875ae44d04a7352dc6b0ae9f837af | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-98641d485b762fe01b43c0fff3d033551a6173c6 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-986a554d4111b72952166f5410782d3cb43075c3 | unclassified | ? | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| Interviewing in Two-Sided Matching Markets | Robin S. Lee, M. Schwarz | Coalition Formation · Matching under Preferences | ? 2009 | – | – | triple | |
| Shortlisting: a Principled Approach | Edith Elkind, Qi-Shen Han, Lirong Xia | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | ARXIV.ORG 2026 | – | – | triple | |
| s5-988eb2b9c7e40c4d3fd654661ddd55b1eca25888 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-98b2d4614129c1e1008ceebf578625c7e27dd672 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-98b7de8306933a930beb7777a58ab4f65d89945b | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-98bffc80b5463d9d366f9207496d79ff8b928604 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-98c2088fed88bc905a05c14853350f8eb16a367b | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-98c26a44cf5f567e0ddc122ddba8a56c624d9540 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-98c93ebbf873dc15a13201f6885c1fbc3b8016d0 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-98f5db5914855922f5ea76c7552c0ed16d31f3c0 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-99000ce44ffa7898a490eebdbe710945e4296eec | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-991a9f68587228515feae3fa787ef27b8191289c | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-991acac7fd60e2fc5db5faf2f6b0f3ff4621ea68 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| s5-991cccd691c37d681090220da275ef21936e9cab | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-99257febba932a756d85b511735b65c140eb276a | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-994e2338e800abf4900f05ef8b04c71f2add0601 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-994ff983a8619dd99e6407b92fa98b04a47a4c07 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-99545d6f3f155ec87cdb6be2ddb230181e516a39 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-9955f9b0e062a85f5878b033140f7860f669cf00 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-99578a9f46533d257ec6da26ab40dec1e84c9ad4 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-995a19e836ac4e1506b4d2431108ee9c15ee5d22 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Incentive Compatibility of Large Centralized Matching Markets | Sangmok Lee | Fair Allocation · Fair Division Theory | ? 2017 | – | – | triple | |
| s5-99acc8e5a63896d831c5f305c60c5e1f384667a0 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-99b94c529cc74b7d03ffab2486a5bd5a93d786be | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-99ba8eae9a40de202cd004aa4e1ddd93678d7cc3 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-99be7aada9f2e5400ceba30d102d98c5ea582514 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-99c0f1194f99dd3c6586f39c945b6cc8cbb43d67 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-99c862a22a433f126c41fb78ce24d32a939661cf | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-99da3e60eb9124c179877f5fc0e0c74de4351bf3 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Predictability and Power in Legislative Bargaining not comsoc | S. N. Ali, B. Bernheim, Xiaochen Fan | unclassified | ? 2019 | – | – | triple | |
| Composable and efficient mechanisms not comsoc | Vasilis Syrgkanis, É. Tardos | unclassified | Symposium on the Theory of Computing 2012 | – | – | triple | |
| s5-9a1eb2afa7fec0c35bd75be5b633372372878d6e | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-9a2046fae562373dbb7553731cb1359d2dd794ed | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| Classified stable matching | Chien-Chung Huang | Coalition Formation · Matching under Preferences | ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms 2009 | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | |
| s5-9a515686f4260d4ddb727ab7796f13d4b6a2d481 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-9a539c21178816ea18e2c081d9631cdec63f4cfe | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-9a5a790979735b2533fa22458feeb1bba534aabb | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-9a6fe090ae2d92bf97e3ae5f7785a75d5b6b3196 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-9a78a113a4657bbc21478007816c2f72047d2c95 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-9aa1d8fdb17cca4b027577bc566a1d8e61a4a198 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-9aa5974f162b33087a0c6c2ed478a364cf22f7b5 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| EFX for Additive Chores: Nonexistence, Pareto Incompatibility, and Bi-Valued Existence | Wentao He, Biaoshuai Tao | Fair Allocation · Chores, Online & Dynamic | ARXIV.ORG 2026 | – | – | triple | |
| s5-9ab2cb7ebc32cf4b9fe1d2f25f597d63580198e1 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-9ab2fc4f1d6db2e657462b6653d3a052cef415b5 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-9ab83ee27f58a82b7f0e1208d0e8694a5771ff27 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-9adf4ceb9485f2081dbd1ac7cea12a1a3239f484 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-9ae3a1d126dc30fed667a87ef146418a7a922ce3 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-9ae892230f4e15bae1f80c76cdd90670f77391ff | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-9aed3985b8351ac5e9fb297f973e284915835560 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Biased assimilation, homophily, and the dynamics of polarization not comsoc | Pranav Dandekar, Ashish Goel, David T. Lee | unclassified | Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 2012 | – | – | triple | |
| What's the Matter with Tie-Breaking? Improving Efficiency in School Choice | Aytek Erdil, H. Ergin | Fair Allocation · Markets & Equilibria | ? 2008 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| Broadening the Complexity-theoretic Analysis of Manipulative Attacks in Group Identification | E. Junker | Voting · Manipulation | ARXIV.ORG 2022 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| s5-9b47218d5a47c854194f82cfc39d5f23964e6f98 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-9b4ab9fd5523966b3e93eb8b14f50a7f86384b83 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-9b4f2c566fd99587762cc239e382794b269f0a9a | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-9b5c0439fd01e635c447a8fd9a6d30f7f683c213 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-9b6c011d79aec6fb2b181e8f533173d3c7376875 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-9b70656b35b6cb04f9ebbcdb9f20d88381a71313 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-9b731beebb7ea2f4f839907e4f0b3f0a0071789b | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| s5-9b8ee11e00abbd98b83e332a062c09ccec8b6f77 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-9ba949c2ec4542fb2da8c160436f34236b48ff50 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-9bc8037a8cc7de9a920981e8bbe1b0cde9f01128 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-9bccf8ba03dde80c444e8fb0e642c71b9539dbb9 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-9be9724f5701387272cec3bf942d4408fdf1beeb | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-9bf20ede452f78fe6865e10336f7fcc3c054fcfa | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| Guaranteeing MMS for All but One Agent When Allocating Indivisible Chores | Jiawei Qiu, Xiao-Wei Wu, Cong Zhang, Shengwei Zhou | Fair Allocation · Shares & Guarantees | ARXIV.ORG 2024 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| s5-9bf87a2ce6f783713da1a065ae7e5d9983fca14d | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-9bf8e18988c94086373f0ca7362f58e0234ff6d1 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | ↗ | triple proof | |
| s5-9c13aa8649bcced5aa82361cfd3e64bf870db3df | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-9c1635c654b080d2610f4d3d21d4b4917910b94a | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| s5-9c2109f4f39a5154f09228d4373f9187ea904e02 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-9c23992e285e866fa06bccdd59cbf347e76a47b2 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-9c25ae8a9dd68d2b5f0e925734ce94afd99d75f0 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-9c37c09ef721ab4c694acc744bcdce7cf5451d03 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-9c3a52073cb393b3b5dc1dd68595bf6fa717313b | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-9c3aae780e0fbc56d8e9832c111b151d7561fdad | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-9c4469169bf90a3d4600a2473b4e3e4d6b80cbed | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-9c4f2ddc6ea175f68b24bb4f198cd89d648d7f5c | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-9c510f529b07333002c9844106e535eb952bd66b | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-9c53844f05f348cc26edcbba69867c7d0339520d | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-9c55780284d91f9c96a8bd28a93f9a1a8cff6846 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| Weighted Fair Division of Indivisible Mixed Manna | Nicholas J. Teh | Fair Allocation · Chores, Online & Dynamic | ? 2026 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| The Panel Complexity of Sortition: Is 12 Angry Men Enough? | Johannes Brustle, Simone Fioravanti, Tomasz Ponitka, Jeremy Vollen | Frontier · Computer-Aided Methods & Data | ARXIV.ORG 2025 | – | – | triple | |
| s5-9c5912d5adf6447407488caafa9b9aefa71af422 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-9c64a0974e7b3341a6c43ee8fa3f424127d93b54 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-9c69dc749fd38675862d817c12e05b4888fc3a16 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-9c76e1aef8bbcff1f651d3d629b16efe71e976fc | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-9c7fe1848e056cd7231b55349b5779370ed660af | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-9c845f771b61f70f761da696370dfc5e84c385e1 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-9c96751365fd8d9d2d2ca96c6bd90549509c744d | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-9caf1d2fe8de14839059c5d20b85548304685020 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-9cb28fa222da52624901abf21065997ceb30560e | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-9cda13933410c35e08effdf87b1c28f551e3aa7f | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-9cf25691299a8354ef08e6a5da4b3ecd6b14ad60 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-9cf8634a279163f057546f95d67c8b846eace041 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-9d00b7bc9a8cced2cda5fb9e3195ee5feac3f049 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-9d100f987e04265e97ae41a6e603dd7252fe946d | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Breaking the Metric Voting Distortion Barrier | M. Charikar, Prasanna Ramakrishnan, Kangning Wang, Hong-Xun Wu | Voting · Distortion | ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms 2023 | – | – | triple | |
| s5-9d4b315a48a6bfe6aeaf681fe3b3131b04bca000 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-9d5259fe2aabc61bf27bcfd02734c597071699e3 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-9d659626b891c96d6119912f71e70964cd475e83 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Convergence of Multi-Issue Iterative Voting under Uncertainty | Joshua Kavner, R. Meir, Francesca Rossi, Lirong Xia | Voting · Combinatorial Domains | ARXIV.ORG 2023 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| s5-9d8e2125dfc90b6533b63e719b83b218372421d3 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-9d95a9b268c8776e852eae3499528ac9111fdcd1 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-9da619771d3720b9378526dbbafdb85ec2404df9 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-9db3e8253edd69dd35d0c190edbcaea733b6b414 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-9db614e9c5c7d8530bf63dd0a9db0aceb881f0df | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-9df33293bdb054c311a373b723ab9928ace05c6d | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Tight Approximation Algorithms for p-Mean Welfare Under Subadditive Valuations | Siddharth Barman, U. Bhaskar, Anand Krishna, Ranjani G. Sundaram | Fair Allocation · Fair Division Theory | Embedded Systems and Applications 2020 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| s5-9e50b4e51691c16471f23fde23326d63cb0cf266 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-9e715b24f2ae6dc170dc6c945c48d01f5d52b382 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-9e86f99684a6529ae76c7d5d9c2c06918a81b70c | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-9e8afc94454b629373fbd818d66b96b3cd2ed377 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-9e914bfaa15615eb66b9b90b7c96d08a39a6cee2 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| How should we score athletes and candidates: geometric scoring rules | Aleksei Y. Kondratev, Egor Ianovski, Alexander S. Nesterov | Voting · Voting Theory & Axioms | Operational Research 2019 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| s5-9eb06c4eb5bf6d6745e0207f13c513378ad3d6a7 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-9eb9762e72bb32eb7e89af9f876262762367cc93 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-9ecfe6f8b738e6da99245a3284d9031ca8770849 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-9ed7a7bc91ff489258137ad096b05b07cf71882f | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-9eeb509bea0bd9141046c325aa8efe64af2ba6dc | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-9efbf0462db0f9f2becd168c4aab9d1f6876b3ac | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-9f08292ea9dbbaa476d992d477ffbd2701b1a5f2 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| s5-9f0a7da933c5a60bdfa37789b714c2dd23484f20 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-9f1be3c3046dc1654f0d6ca9a421666296b8fbde | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-9f2bb120e44195cea7ff01f667e8a0c226c5b6d2 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-9f341f8687159909660f72321f17d285ade50dc9 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-9f3c4447fa55abbf11a409d620c777210c761c70 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-9f3cd6a2236a81f92b6d1549b519ae914115bd1f | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-9f4da8df32ef1263cfc06e08e271c8b1ba30069d | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-9f52b910aaa2d6e64079931eb3da29cf5a7ff79a | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-9f576c085322ecc4b8c707375c6fa40d9d384973 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-9f5952f799f29a6af1a732bc70d9a41ae5a795d9 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-9f674fbebcda3dbdaeb2e9ab02b0cbbafbaee367 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| s5-9f6bfaa8e5b86c980b3f4e513c4ebf8e2702d944 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-9f6fd47ec8a086b0a3eb4e2fa21980e4a79d3cac | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-9f79e016ec594bc6b923df3faa7e5a54fa0cf368 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-9f8069ab6154ce3c0e532e9c56d2930eda1a8e45 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-9f8323d230c1c24de4a6154025c888209613b018 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-9f86c5870acbd1bc261d4211ad66e200bebaae7a | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Complexity of Mechanism Design | Vincent Conitzer, T. Sandholm | Voting · Manipulation | Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence 2002 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| s5-9f8e9baa15b354f1f20485a5e1d89558e03e0f9c | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| On the Complexity of Destructive Bribery in Approval-Based Multiwinner Voting | Yongjie Yang | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | Adaptive Agents and Multi-Agent Systems 2020 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| s5-9fa9a366117d110b4d0056b3efd876255450a7d0 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-9fb29c8a0af53b9aead2c36b9eb5838806217f37 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-9fb971263fedc8a27992f1560c0a85941dfb022d | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-9fbebb23e2bba26a3c810021d92065eea71e2263 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-9fc19bd8f7a0db8c60ba9393fce484ae6eed7569 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-9fc30ac2bd07b0cdf86b0fef5376115b14ffc713 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-9fd13151d36804b76f8c5f89bd8a64a1e46f6069 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-9fd9814f485bd9de059b5691087432fef2dbeabc | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-9fe276f1c26e609a258464b762890be26756d3fb | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-9fe36505ad71d7a6a6881229c75b44835c12e0b5 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-a00ca4131e6fa173e9d01c9a3a20314ce8441696 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-a01609e28f4c1fe45bc3ac1c52c92440d10d603b | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-a0441224189f3ed989a2deb47ea25eae6569bc87 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-a06b421129c1d0f259b2010942ed74793e174339 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-a081d6beb7aecd313816fcc5431c3fd63081a467 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-a08c276f0c517bdb097b228f934564e867d9d459 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-a09bf8b70845ee82c35d4ce79aa79a1f81fd04e0 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-a0a4e426bd13a9c176c959ee52cf4438d841ae8d | unclassified | ? | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| s5-a0ac3f22027fedcfd8a2badea99dc236a9c8cc09 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | ↗ | triple proof | |
| s5-a0bc5ab58bfee498d80869f681a66aeb5309d6a2 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-a0bc92bb72216ad8a4b05a20fecaf8c470b1eacd | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-a0be99c3093c8ba29046831d5d4f4f38950f5ad6 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-a0c7500713137a2c56a9c21eddc406c35e6666ce | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-a0d5e242a4d41303ec82e281c5e6ab827bdfd82b | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-a0e27f6e982852e853398a64d494ac4cad00670b | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-a0fed10bb2bd969900da04bb0c42a2338037f74f | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-a106f2d8669a5c757a5144204d0bee8663e862d4 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-a106fcbd0fbc8e3fc2496ce94d78adfccab343c8 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-a10add4254c8e023b186f135dffe1d45195a06a0 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-a1106678d2903a8ce6d817d9276c53c1ef9419b7 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-a13507dd6e43586d046a276ecb93ce28b41dbdef | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-a13d3836bccccd45f1363239575a5bea5072722f | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-a1537e41fb2f733d8aacb0e9d8ef5127468bbf00 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-a165d83f3d4aba80610355665f484fb3ff6b6f26 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-a17418397615631583ee11b6614e28daf489daed | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-a17539e9141a10b3f141e7428486c319186cbaec | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-a1850ee3f6badb3218b774e00bdac08029ab49ab | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-a18801392b0d9f0e5c28856569984fc01f6e7286 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-a18df42ad48241ec740e1e98127ad665866b4d89 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-a1913cbf146a31e94a916f6c619e900b1e481b6f | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-a1aa30ff459a99b60ba09ae636ad64e5bf8a1b6c | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-a1baedb1779c967272d2b65169702dd088bd257d | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-a1c5439f36066611bd1c5c047e88bcad187f449f | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-a1dce553fdeb862468d6a59a3415c2f07f8c79bb | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-a1dfc4f4539f7a7e9b2a22bcec03067b17f92146 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-a1f2d7089a9482322221140549f4af8e65928829 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-a1f3c5be9b48c2610e7edc9f8f0c7adf757e2af2 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-a1fd866db00f9ba2047e85e6d0aa6b827917c49e | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-a203d1b6e5d6fa12131561b18ef5dbfcc98d94ea | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-a2266adb0fb817a8f6ea44016192da8ccff75ff9 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-a234fedc6b2d6c175493a3f43189dff894a69b09 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-a23dcfecffcd7ce05e68b3fa7f9db40869529244 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-a24416fb359e2bee1cd4fd5995e74e7a0228bc33 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| s5-a245089b701c6c128ab0d813e0515dcbc794b6bf | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-a248e80ac3a7c5d1140897fd422b7a0d2a4f586b | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-a26b67d0320e2612a206a22af9ad05abe4cac6fc | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-a281c6a5f7ab068c653d90ad4b7f9894bfb366da | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-a29fd4e90e2afb3d042b5b789e39179d5f26e243 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-a2d56971e79465ceb633be5a212f64df91d77d56 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| s5-a2e7605dc19f98587937fcc26aa118c169d28782 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-a2eb8b0d824f9919a1fa60c4bb46510924c2c5d1 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-a2eba0883aa99863af43ad2ba2d5f2284b08e236 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-a2f220c66968ec8cd8dbb6dc700fb9a525dd49e7 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-a2f9283e7ed9760c58113f1154ebeb0dba30c2f9 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-a2ff7c7e5dd1d08aed3c5677e8fdaf12b913fa4b | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| Approximate-EFX Allocations with Ordinal and Limited Cardinal Information | Aris Filos-Ratsikas, G. Kalantzis, A. Voudouris | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | ARXIV.ORG 2026 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| s5-a303b65490f8e43060104a5a0561809698a55967 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-a30a037a99a300d6000c60f1aeb01ca20133e58b | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-a30e10d12b8b0997c634dfdf8e0b227210265c63 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-a3115ef02f0df3a933ddadab227daa7528abe1fa | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-a334e5d85281c74f44d1054715bc4d8bdb348e7e | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-a33c985aee2bb1c812ef052523843443abe4a09b | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-a34e02fc26bdcfd10ef6869b1c0559b525c143b9 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| s5-a371d7786b0f94ac2a436f33c45e314388b57d2e | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-a37c638c4397d452ab1f5ee0c3852167f82551cc | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-a3956c490f4f7ba3f3bed8ff254652283cd46d22 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-a39da9aa7d534798fc89f4e9ce87d718b61682ba | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-a3ab03e59f63f95b2538c5d4bee9c42ee53770dc | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-a3ad5776b432c4a9ba0415201317282ee35eea5d | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Solidarity to achieve stability | Jorge Alcalde-Unzu, Oihane Gallo, E. Inarra, Juan D. Moreno-Ternero | Coalition Formation · Matching under Preferences | European Journal of Operational Research 2023 | – | – | triple | |
| s5-a3b1d2d0f518d1fbbf37cdd57dbb83ff3382af55 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-a3be89498846d9f5cedc1cfd4bee5889f8ffc52d | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-a3c0abf26afc1d760f31ec66d21c99d9f9b26a9c | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-a3c1f76212991a08329a99bb6503a4084fa65098 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-a3c4722d9ca3da70e1ea20f8101eed8b23277a72 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-a3cea5144578a9a5cdaf7e9a0a5cf2334ffa5211 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-a3e28d47c8d3fc38073c880e5f2845e0241d0119 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-a3e31745245e65a510d9f8deafa3dd0250c1a8a1 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-a3fb23e21b932bb01e31986ec38e010a2c44a33c | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-a3fc48dc701c836f7fdd316d49a65d76401153a0 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| Can Market Participants Report Their Preferences Accurately (Enough)? not comsoc | E. Budish, J. Kessler | unclassified | Management Sciences 2021 | – | – | triple | |
| Computing welfare-Maximizing fair allocations of indivisible goods | H. Aziz, Xin Huang, Nicholas Mattei, Erel Segal-Halevi | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | European Journal of Operational Research 2020 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| s5-a416267fcb4633a2ad04b6ba09ceadda2ba33e6e | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-a41d7b1960f0db130e08b8d5503fb09aa7bd0034 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-a4263b7467a1a3284bab8cd3b1a064ae7a1faa36 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| s5-a452c419412f62abf7c5d6a5439d59205b424d0a | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Cycle Cancellation for Submodular Fractional Allocations and Applications | Chandra Chekuri, Pooja Kulkarni, Ruta Mehta, Jan Vondrák | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | ARXIV.ORG 2025 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| Contiguous allocation of indivisible items on a path | Yasushi Kawase, Bodhayan Roy, Mohammad Azharuddin Sanpui | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems 2024 | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof |
| s5-a46daa376f6cc3310ea65e4ee037e094bd475c58 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-a4733948beec16d1c73c580e1b37f5cc3f90c79c | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Measuring majority power and veto power of voting rules | Aleksei Y. Kondratev, Alexander S. Nesterov | Voting · Voting Theory & Axioms | Public Choice 2018 | – | – | triple | |
| s5-a4883f9a8981c92ce625aacefa24044564fb5066 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-a4899f33e9c2821e9993ff9f8b1444dcadb127f7 | unclassified | ? | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| s5-a49459c93fd2f42ca79ffcb734044b1f55cba6df | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-a4c362212fe5c95f874946fa04647c4e64270a09 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-a4d4fc0c52f3eb7e5a5760f72a65f506344198bb | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-a4d8b219fcc2f4d7d01dbafc8d32c3bcca5a9b0a | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-a4ddc5f61ef53c5ac90a635a3c4243cd5a06fcde | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-a4e0bf1044d125b1c49d03626e9a4f43e9c5f385 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-a4e486fa8a14c10861278bb218c245c40a7d502a | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| s5-a4e806f39af6fbbb27bd109d7e3e2b427f1da58e | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-a4e8883b63394211a28eab9e02d11c2116278edd | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-a4f518ea3a20d54d3cac034b55c40b7760f48514 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-a4f9a605a0c87febc210456f1e2418ccfae439cc | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-a4fae90c5eee81322754be9b6df6054b68b045da | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-a4ff1b34426bd862034268c1a39f643bfe111f1d | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-a50c85a576527fb548dc972c1177f9708a250145 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| s5-a50f5c68e17d65027111c6f0ec759d9a5a6d7a6f | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-a5215d3834d9f8075f93186e569ade3701eb8e66 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-a543635ebf121a9845993b9f0259e6caf553040d | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-a54d411a0a7d51713649bee097f0fec5dec69b37 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-a560d11fac9ea1fbb67dd0e0e735682497290bc8 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-a570a7d5670cecd4d0268d2a930207efe1655b72 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-a5922e103fea40d72b17ce7d120f23edc8ed4c8c | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-a597b366e182ed32517b4a192474b8923303ea85 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-a5ac6ba7f8ae47056606459cad3e4de5c7d76266 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-a5b2f421e8df872f2d5a47c6bb4a1044ff73af9e | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-a5bb0340d0c42072ea027de0fd25899637caca3c | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-a5bfdc7d7b3662e25c6532ee90ee749320c3e6c0 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| s5-a5d7154dc82150a4baeac3ce91152a32e6c16aab | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-a5db4e99a59411bdbb3be0e971985dc258245c33 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-a5e55c527a0518ddc35c7607b17f962d16f38a98 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Stability and Competitive Equilibrium in Trading Networks not comsoc | J. Hatfield, S. Kominers, A. Nichifor, M. Ostrovsky, Alexander Westkamp | unclassified | Journal of Political Economy 2013 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| An Axiomatization of the Random Priority Rule | Christian Basteck | Fair Allocation · Fair Division Theory | Social Science Research Network 2025 | – | – | triple | |
| s5-a6068562afd5a78d55fc997d3a9ca73dd16ed841 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-a63ac1e1b402bd31f43eb5b1e57f76df77366d74 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-a63f70c88aad2a5f1609977d17080325239701e7 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-a63fd065e62535e1cd9521d0f5b2afdc2f343a66 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-a6434bc1af573d3df07eaeb64fbac16787a8c118 | unclassified | ? | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| s5-a65af54e17a709aacfb3fb6409a164b565d983f8 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-a668998a6f3ba509b40053b0212f562d837faff4 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-a687ba3c72e8df572be2a8d71a57308bb65588e2 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-a68ec14d183b5c62670293f229ea57767e208423 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| The Hospitals / Residents Problem with Couples: Complexity and Integer Programming Models | P. Biró, D. Manlove, Iain McBride | Coalition Formation · Matching under Preferences | The Sea 2013 | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof |
| s5-a6bd9d33b0616ae7c44afb91b607e0b3ccca5ef2 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-a6ce00ee134ace2e060567efb34a583310dba365 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-a6cf79b8b6b9233dd67fa3b64a9e5db3b9ccb4cd | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-a6d0b2e974af186ae902e37396eeea075a1e350e | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-a6d15d29d01471b07ad7cc0b0a7a29fe9c7205e5 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-a6ee4abd3f07f2a480ffe95a40e72d0ea50e8c78 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-a701827335207324e35646944cdbd46c9fa21808 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-a7299c298b5d98b26548278f4002b92ad2ec0025 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-a72a9d50a130b6971b96f4f2e43e912a54023787 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-a74e4071609904cf9821b500e46c0ab29aeb17cd | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-a75c2754154523ce43053e65ecb28f25ba11f3be | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-a75e797465f3d4661cf166766b2bd4e70f717665 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-a77873d1aafdf1983741f2bcec88fad6faeb25f0 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-a77a88a3765d9795b38d3c0f039ea46997a68c0e | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Almost Envy-Freeness with General Valuations | Benjamin Plaut, Tim Roughgarden | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms 2017 | ✓ | – | ↗ | triple proof |
| s5-a7b02890cd68742f1b1522cca967410dfd0fd345 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-a7b0b89b503f1db4f2ea036470bf34a01597c627 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-a7cd174f6d8a5c57dc46302fd6775cd60f3a38d5 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-a7ce0966689e59485c73057b012520ef850c38e3 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-a7d38375d74591f996f752f1ee5dcde06d8cb8b1 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-a7e3b7e805cdb1b5fa674861b075fe09789fd0e4 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-a7e4b69ba02474e74ffb9d7bb783d80fa3e22192 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-a7e59934bfc1eae9a7e1845b8aa8e8e2dd72b1bc | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-a7e92f4ccaaf2a94dc92a9cfad5066a602993fda | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-a81a8d16a4af3627ae12443d1e717ce0653efed4 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-a82074319bed0e892543ca6082afc614b6f7b000 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-a82652290be18f7a9ab9cb7e98f0700edbb95124 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-a833d8262ce8546bdef17d886aff88119ddbbec6 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-a84559209bb3a5b146cd88dcdeff9404296b6bcd | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-a84847280d52951a810146a099457ed3a222e14f | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-a86025dc5620dd9ffdf3f043c4a71a1c0e774f59 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-a861cdd748cc9a66599952b9a95688a62b2a2406 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| Strategy-Proofness, Envy-Freeness and Pareto Efficiency in Online Fair Division with Additive Utilities | M. Aleksandrov, T. Walsh | Fair Allocation · Chores, Online & Dynamic | Pacific Rim International Conference on Artificial Intelligence 2019 | – | – | triple | |
| Understanding Preferences: “Demand Types”, and the Existence of Equilibrium With Indivisibilities not comsoc | E. Baldwin, P. Klemperer | unclassified | Econometrica 2019 | – | – | triple | |
| s5-a884ea63c59dfc90b14de6d752e67cafccb37410 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-a8b3495f3b4cfefb8d20fdb377449eb2d947df53 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-a8b4608d95887fba78f3f9476d57d1b11f73aa0e | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-a8b78fb061a3319af8def6263b2b22d5c2a290e8 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-a8bb07d588b6d7df1379e8b72b700e53a3640a87 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-a8cb33971caaad147de9b4a6a90e9f4cf8fdc185 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-a8cf45a22e2be50e2fcac4b4acfd7006faeac8f7 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Mechanism Design for Facility Location Games with Candidate Locations | Zhongzheng Tang, Chen-Hao Wang, Mengqi Zhang, Yingchao Zhao | Voting · Distortion | International Conference on Combinatorial Optimization and Applications 2020 | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | |
| s5-a8d55ecb3a08b4fc3a7f901c56d62d2559313092 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-a8d824c89604d4df7820b5351c61936c7bbaf678 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-a8e1398e55e7544741a00bbca1ca449c52c31016 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-a8e49b97d66f6383532c29291d6b54dd7adbb0b1 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-a90d8db1f5055f60e9bdef7f595003f298c314f9 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-a90e5b6c1c0e3015585f047014a3fdd2543ad614 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-a91ad8e85a087356f0b02c40aa278fafe3fea7a3 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-a921a44a6a786bcc412cbd3c209cc8d894aba417 | unclassified | ? | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| s5-a929d334a25b3bb332a2d965d88f5694751fc497 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-a92e701a0437028edcdbf345d8f0a619a0c2a382 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-a930f30b40d98ae8608d3021ea13ddc62dab44c4 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-a93962a2325ea3c31730970ad11f93cc927e16a4 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| s5-a959a73f97471338c38a71bc0423ad59577a842e | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-a967d420965d4693ed3614d3284ad23fc6eac5a4 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| Dynamic Collective Choice with Endogenous Status Quo not comsoc | Wioletta Dziuda, Antoine Loeper | unclassified | Journal of Political Economy 2016 | – | – | triple | |
| s5-a9b34ed53e41eff65b733dce533a99f62b28c2a2 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-a9b4080be96c947550addcbf8050db488a3a2541 | unclassified | ? | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| s5-a9bda89caa7d1a739fb59771e62cc1b13532cfe1 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-a9c0ea050ed9e800388708dd8783eedac967e052 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-a9c2f1ab182edab4a42e202260c746aad8ff7051 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-a9db09470bb14b06a1bab23fd960d33ceb49db97 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| s5-a9ddaaf7562b10647c993ad2cdf4c1506b19bf7c | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-a9f0deff91279ed429c7a345c413c3c2446ddead | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-a9f9e4b948b61600256b157ba299f7e19737d5d2 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-aa091d533abd1c3c83c4d102a979332df3df3fd4 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-aa451e8ce98a8907e57fbab296fdbbbcac108f10 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-aa47f506dcb489ba6f04e01cb4bf1160e50731dc | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-aa4a578985eaf21b3e47d963165f6d75b1c2dfdd | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-aa51337ba8f98b93eed4b5024408c89a6ac86b27 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-aa5e34e3c374a040b73c97fb0bd4a96b8de75b9e | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| Robust Voting Rules on the Interval Domain | Patrick Lederer | Voting · Voting Theory & Axioms | ARXIV.ORG 2025 | – | – | triple | |
| s5-aa7100f9d5920e2a9d256450516394b1cfdc6b49 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-aac6a60b80f220a6ab00babd2df10d08119de114 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-aadb68f0e87801ce3845f3f2a0f4eb9c401847df | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-aae764d14baec66d17e4da84a09996954c2ed2b6 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-ab0361984f9c1bd85e2f2857af9579ecff71f01f | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-ab14966201951d0fccf945042eae0786b3020a87 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-ab20d9ef6b1aa72992b8cf7368e2333252bae3b3 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-ab263f1c0038f6ff9edb3a8aa87eb9f5042c8a8e | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-ab3f55a8da5915c5090eca2c2618b5a578f32ce7 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-ab44588d104f2e54b8d5af89a844c8abd8af9f69 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-ab484205e8b9b8cdd5b30ce2676f541bdbc3134f | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-ab63bbb07fbedffe90698877fff098455b9c9502 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-ab753025ccc5646eaa243f4ca91bac5a1faeb26b | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-ab7adcde5f7fde0f961ead2c3e85b0693bfbe758 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-ab7c67af53603c24de5411fa375ab5cf30e84e06 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-ab9a88259e8730de1ae089421cfaa69a3f5705e5 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-abacaf4696e9cf31db5745ee80b6a6f1cdd36e62 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-abc1ea409b31147e9aade6ab37703203879a00e6 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-abc6938a28338fb154d94d6b68a734259000841f | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-abd62b65552b98214efdeea5e0bdb80b7009d13d | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-ac36e129a067443561693573c3b178d01d75de49 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-ac3a36aae9a49a0c5076c9fa7bc45cdd7b9fa5a4 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-ac3a6fe919993b26093b839ce37f866793a58d18 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-ac4281d483b927b3adaa919ab4ad831fbc85f848 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-ac476fe0794e356f287b3e145e50b003606968f9 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| s5-ac54e77c5b1d7251150711c4ddfd3f82f24e8686 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-ac6418634152111e10f1ab7c4a1259d1f07e47da | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-ac839305ceeb6498826b33e620b55a4dab05e9b5 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-ac92342cf165a86a9c115e1264329a7c96d89a6a | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-ac941c1cdb5c63e09b5b6588ffc768e661f04ce7 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-acaab60052084e6dfe74333c8a9863a366946219 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-acb11e33850720cbf92050d238960d9dea377a99 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-acb8d9b04dab8cfb4fddbabbf26259cfba41cf82 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-acc69303b1b82fcbb6d9e46b41b5b5a6469e7006 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-acd1fc9fe9ed03055736c4cd5535ebe36094c6d2 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-acd58275dd00f89633695a2e7066a6289dca2e22 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-acde4f6938bdc2463a8002b17ed74ee9967c8f26 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-acef69214578a5f8730b0d323c1619b28769e88b | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-acf1c480d31881cbc22b752673d3442813ce0886 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| s5-acf658e9f4bb1cf4c23d3ecd2809bdd0a3903b28 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-acf9a85e63227ba89d070d6c63bb1c6a89fb4e12 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-ad03d1500f34bbecb1d49f274d6a1c919d069e11 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-ad041d17e734157b98d4a693b5e03850d47a2522 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-ad43bee883cd2b216e142eb5c5426c57cc192a29 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-ad449d0566a6109c0fe5b625c0caeacf0ae98820 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-ad61a226f19e364ad2dfe266cc5c69c5141f6381 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-ad631b80849c1554a859a775a52f09b6bbc9096d | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-ad7cfad88d01db4a17024b8e24034f793b0094ef | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-ad8d6d835be4663cd179c1605456a0bcd71f4188 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-ad97bab027d7b3a475b3596f93925caf8f99d4a5 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-ad9bfc60b887dd0c55f1362cde67f850fabaed3f | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-ada96f7e4eaba5a92c9f350b2d7abc9ecb00ad6d | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-adb622b3407ae45630e35a59e89ecf18375ac83a | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-adf1af83c8feca1a48b63c608b948f53564f7b26 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-ae070b37788826b055cd278ccb1fc526d60b06dc | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-ae0f2c5fac120db3e070354b6f70ad160cabda6c | unclassified | ? | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| s5-ae13415bdc2d2f8910a515885d6c84c4bc215a3b | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-ae2c91eb6d73f32374c99ecb49436f6093533d3a | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-ae2c99add62ca18bb54104f8e5f09e5be5b22631 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-ae2f3565fd651a5e623c9d97a54126081d34d3b3 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-ae34e34a27ca96931226f5c95ecad132f996a854 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-ae546638cc67c01278bc00f4b67bec8efb1f1380 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-ae59255dd315d5579a3507acfaf04b1259ec7b5b | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-ae7a7435607bcba8dee1a1bc3e7e1f47a0791176 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-ae85912691ffc34a95d3af4f2e25a39e12759c0b | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| Arrovian Aggregation of Convex Preferences | F. Brandl, F. Brandt | Voting · Voting Theory & Axioms | Econometrica 2017 | – | – | triple | |
| s5-aeae8aa33c7d475bb577415e210929dd42acf0a5 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-aecefb616782e22d2d212a6903cd45af550881e6 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-aed30f9d770f337f677db0ccda19cd076e1581a8 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-aee0b7bf628e37d3b88c51345c786df7e3c37f30 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| Fair integer programming under dichotomous preferences | Tom Demeulemeester, Dries R. Goossens, B. Hermans, R. Leus | Fair Allocation · Fair Division Theory | ARXIV.ORG 2023 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| s5-af052890a52031a698d2160a85943cc52aca6fd4 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-af2b9ba398059a113d783b26637db78bec5ee931 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-af2f5b863eafaedcdf6bba641e6d0908bb639952 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-af4273b8ad8275d811b3d0263135b099079f4ee4 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-af50ec3e27bdec2e1b3525f2a09c657fdd70787d | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-af5281a7c7e45035fc070c36e250ccbc9f441d1c | unclassified | ? | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| s5-af576f9974d786abbf201f60f6006b49de5fa3c5 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-af6d2659298605089839715eab2925d76c82e5f0 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-af70526205e5400f3bd6634b80ca47657bdd1d21 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-af7091fc3c8a34914a235a7ee0c4423814693040 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-af7735eb0f9de51f44bb908a837bc96d16978455 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-af8567c84b57e1fab7588ef48be36bf2ce2f92ac | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-af9660eee883467712f089e97412176120aaf31f | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-af979aaf86691ff8c0d9ff76cc9c196e69dd97cc | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| Matching with Couples: Stability and Incentives in Large Markets* | Fuhito Kojima, Parag A. Pathak, Alvin E. Roth | Frontier · Computer-Aided Methods & Data | ? 2013 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| s5-afaf3e26c1f6cbd1466a3eb2dadbe5f7cf1b7ab4 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-afd1bad6c28c79ba7f8600b2576676b64da7a3ee | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-aff4657457dce3dec6f4ce72daa5bc5591bcfd41 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-aff5cf067cf5382e3241b59225b9b48017c5b595 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-aff95ff6cf00927324a1d927598d3f39a2e56d91 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-aff9883aaf0d6375ed2e11b25f71398f459fbfd9 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-affa7e6a9ab2789624a8686dffe67e849efe0dec | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-b000f114ae767087a5421f855a51460b8b1ab873 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-b003a8dd85e30c362fff436743475d1a2d25cb5e | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-b00a2d3bb8ce01e9a4e0d14b3a9dd25721b3ab4c | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-b03c4dcdb05fbb94bab8f9e0f7f78e872720032d | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-b044278b91321d573d1cdf2edcdd0fe6ebe1c95f | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-b04e67c057618b7ac815de607c9cf659dc6f8ed3 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-b052255e5ea823d73916ebf0c04b4fe7d7b1757e | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-b0590cc6dde060f101ae390154b78e0faad57747 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-b05ce00c5069779e63f21cc3d801e6afa5835ec6 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-b05f8a61a4ecc63e4c474e186b52aafeb8511e3c | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-b0640dcf8c72f17bdce5dd1b85d49261183d0ed3 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-b068e95f3962589c5c66520dafb27a302a30029f | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-b09b17187a7517d09501ed82aaf3bc051aa8846c | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-b09be6ec2b9d415577bfeb32fafe2fc8b366a47d | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| The complexity of controlling candidate-sequential elections | E. Hemaspaandra, Lane A. Hemaspaandra, J. Rothe | Voting · Bribery & Control | Theoretical Computer Science 2012 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| s5-b0af51bf861311d553f8ea05f14c869410b1246f | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-b0b81ed927dc76390e5d010f77990efa9e584af2 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-b0bb34a9a63ca1c5e8d828f88099ad3ff57b576b | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-b0bd58585d98ac60696861f441ad42c7da01a8aa | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | ↗ | triple proof | |
| s5-b0c5efec6d6e42421a31a84f36849f76f9f7b005 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-b0d874c215064fb6e18ac98fa3c1b8c09800f9c4 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Participatory budgeting with cumulative votes | P. Skowron, A. Slinko, Stanislaw Szufa, Nimrod Talmon | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Participatory Budgeting | Theory and Decision 2020 | – | – | triple | |
| s5-b0f00774003825e6d6bbf6a20ffa8b241f4c8f37 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-b0f4e3525be1a5bfab3800f6af814c1c1b112e16 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-b0fd01d59a86545cc92f3433d0ca8631da9f1f43 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-b0ff1ae4a36d6b31028575f78d7d86f54c13a1db | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-b108461d34f26e4be0f2112fdcddbdef00d1eb66 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-b11200fa31deec0094d7f664e457c2d76a6db2f7 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-b112ec6ac29dfffb7583c1a5818aa6c27e711c6f | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-b125414250c8a19f0514452db58c561c22ebfde3 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-b12a103126617ff4b930c60cdf3adaf45be05730 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-b141bdd9abce8c13fab61d009323ce6a33d72769 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-b1716e64ba8142d6ef64cfb141340f3cc2673be1 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-b17b9e41126318608d8f183a49c2c2603a8063df | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-b182a38a1fe1e6dc3ed30ef1f73d6600a9f6fbd6 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-b1a43e68f1e129a77163636c6570c2f06b9ba467 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-b1cda064decc073881941c6d4f4ef3d6a3daafb4 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-b1d640e951bc1b57002923ea6d4dcf3be8fd3f9b | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-b1d8fe8690a5a53cf0bdbbd150cf05cd9da92fcf | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-b1fae0eef5f58b88d93f1bf63246f3d826ffcb17 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-b20541be511e0de961c0335e7f155f9e223cf142 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-b21d5a4a3b66f6cf4d422f9f04f6e866660610a9 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-b244d8dd8fce2e3cabda4478332e450e622fc740 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-b247ea525a1ed6fb30f690cae8add93720b7d1e3 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-b24932d63484ad45b0cc945f86c3b129b20b72e8 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-b24f22ff89bfd7b2637250ce6238e43046471a9a | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-b2535a727f21dc8b7a3ae78c9e2f8e4cc94fc722 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-b25877472cab75dc643af27bca734b0707726db4 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-b26de842678aad75e90a185de5c97efbb698e64e | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-b2810fb17603d917e7481cca5caf18263c2d4b61 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-b2a54136972686d32abf5a9eb538a23615a63b2c | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-b2a5b511694fa6aa47be895479db0f89d97b985c | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-b2d8e37ad9bcbc48f43615561f554ee133f640fd | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-b2f15be4cfc027afc7836889e4c3dee240c2ce27 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-b2f485dff6421f8bb3811844180b7de022fbc78e | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Approximate Proportionality in Online Fair Division | Davin Choo, Winston Fu, Derek Khu, Tzeh Yuan Neoh, Tze-Yang Poon, Nicholas J. Teh | Fair Allocation · Chores, Online & Dynamic | ARXIV.ORG 2025 | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof |
| s5-b300d7f71cfe1814d0578810aad5b4b6dff58b74 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-b30502860e1859b81425c454ee8e6abf15012d6f | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-b30773fd506c6a77451d7f81eda33c36fe2519ce | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-b31e258b99114b3856ddd07cec1af02dc2305507 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-b32d95f551cd81d0091f108d348276d0513976e0 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| On Gale and Shapley "college admissions and the stability of marriage" | J. Gabszewicz, Filomena Garcia, J. Pais, Joana Resende | Coalition Formation · Matching under Preferences | ? 2012 | – | – | triple | |
| s5-b36a2febad34e800d356151b83cdd0e9a253a1e1 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-b36ac93e0fb24958ce97449400874e2955f267da | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-b38779b853d34221be75636ed8c0f7126bd4c077 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-b38936461f26d3b7d49081feab9d6501b7851056 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-b394d415eb8e7ceef0ae11bd29b747fdbb4f5d3e | unclassified | ? | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| s5-b3a600059d8ff18b08b12f9458ca5cadbd190193 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-b3a794dc9b701cdaa3719f5b1d30c1fc7e9672ef | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-b3ab73c5c0ed86a496ad80bfff70017a1e166f37 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-b3b94ec62e351be9d903124c5ba140939acf7ce3 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-b3cd4e2ca3507cbeb304a9af5d1c480e7966bd34 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Changing the Boston School Choice Mechanism: Strategy-proofness as Equal Access | A. Abdulkadiroglu, Parag A. Pathak, A. Roth, Tayfun Sonmez | Fair Allocation · Markets & Equilibria | ? 2006 | – | – | triple | |
| On the parameterized complexity of manipulating Top Trading Cycles | William Phan, Christopher Purcell | Voting · Manipulation | ARXIV.ORG 2018 | – | ✓ | triple | |
| s5-b3e9b6cd82b45292773ccbd36b5c0752856a061f | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-b4000de12da2468db48f2de7ae450bff9da3805b | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-b405ade4b4dd4fca3c44784abdd973620937a915 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-b406eb85407a149b8124693c6444483307426d1f | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| s5-b408728896fe28c09e5240a039b5c23ff67bee3e | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| s5-b409555bca80bda883939f6f2c4f28303fee33a1 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-b412ee0644aed05ce2ce720f76b9b07f5b0c9295 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-b4153d65d9ec67a463fab3ce86ff363aead49cf5 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-b42153628c97edd7e7b2464ba4e283c1b9cd3b31 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-b426cd77f9e804363907f992d897755a55315792 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-b434183fd4f33ca6f5e999136e8b99e40ca479cb | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Lie on the Fly: Strategic Voting in an Iterative Preference Elicitation Process | L. Dery, S. Obraztsova, Zinovi Rabinovich, Meir Kalech | Voting · Incomplete Information | Group Decision and Negotiation 2019 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| s5-b451a59d0cde3f5637e334faf61eff5f5dcb5baf | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-b4577b5897f08d21b1c2ec49ca247087028ffb6e | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-b45bb2d4f17d63d3a24eca369a2b2a4e1ce5d183 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| Fair algorithms for selecting citizens’ assemblies | Bailey Flanigan, Paul Gölz, Anupam Gupta, Brett Hennig, Ariel D. Procaccia | Fair Allocation · Fair Division Theory | NATURE 2021 | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof |
| s5-b4669a11b04a42b168f3dab8243e43c8201e0d0d | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-b46a5959129e2de1588c60e230b302a4ede2e3c1 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-b46c29d7a72f857ed9cac5b3c8ad0441cc825489 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-b47de43a5a4157b85852475e0e2afdc162bc6da5 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-b484eeaaa7e9ebf0dae41abd0623dd81a2d8eb4b | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-b486277110d8d692fe992978d2c56afa6b54445a | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-b49b2d2e7904086fa5a579e86d54835690df5e84 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-b49d1c0b645d4314fde6e577f686d4184139592c | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Online Coalition Formation under Random Arrival or Coalition Dissolution | Martin Bullinger, Ren'e Romen | Coalition Formation · Hedonic Games | Embedded Systems and Applications 2023 | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | |
| s5-b4ab9d9fddf1f7e60a76921e8e74627b96b4bc07 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-b4d73b8af12b0f5f72e8fbb47ab5a20d1bc347ee | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-b4e635bef2353422227d189e22ecbe9d998d4bbb | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-b4e63a6f14566a8f776ac10e9f6b20ce574736e9 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-b4f7f2879bbf27f1e3d90f08928a82df7abeaae7 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-b4fe196a058d0be5b05e88cfa3db5600933de6ec | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| Condorcet's Theory of Voting | H. Young | Voting · Weighted Tournaments | American Political Science Review 1988 | – | – | triple | |
| s5-b50f93ca355c7d9897deabe2d3364d79655b4023 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| s5-b5134e896573a08eec7b27000c478717e8ae4318 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-b51dbbb25fe92a79aafe0e6df08d7d6a32564681 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-b537ef48fcc5bef7584aeea4dc9b04013be42931 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-b540b22cf0d43db1f614c7ba2a34785d226fe290 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-b5431199c99d50cc03a621b83f9e5e2c35ff33a5 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-b54bc24d203ccec9a3a7aaaa2c2a292748fd1169 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-b583bf8314275398b54f1e66fabfb608f31040bb | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| The Query Complexity of Cake Cutting | Simina Brânzei, Noam Nisan | Fair Allocation · Cake Cutting | Neural Information Processing Systems 2017 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| s5-b59dbcd39299e9021e272ae5b64131e7e224ab32 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-b5a325f971c037485a68ec0838531f7328f4093c | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-b5b78745a444a437afe9e7ae2995c24a516364d8 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-b5c021c3374ae8c72d171cd41d3e02b934eb5c7f | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-b5c137906bd866a7eb5edccd7148a406d48cd3a6 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-b5df8c0dafd030547d719c9871fd9b5f4b1ff626 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-b5fafecb39b71c785fb0ef9fcaec1bb3c957619e | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-b5fb8e9e078db36cb510d14c6dfe92f779334602 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-b61c7fc16def88ee1c95c8c715a631746a176647 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-b624f42e0d37e88cef0910755727166ce20fa7dd | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-b62833420540b0699edebdf840469562aa9d3f8a | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-b62ef36ad4fc9ec1f792968d0b823e4543ae4083 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-b653910fc41e04b96af4264916250033cdc20f40 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-b65af232b918b2d505571dbbdc671299014ef9bf | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-b66490e09ef226316fc3cec9559794dbb4306e25 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-b6842bdce0967441a5c5b4a5b5a7a393cdf5dabe | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-b6874de018505599e35d8814ccdd1081529702c5 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| On the Fair Division of a Random Object | Anna Bogomolnaia, H. Moulin, Fedor Sandomirskiy | Fair Allocation · Fair Division Theory | Management Sciences 2019 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| s5-b6924c74011542fc8f8acbfbf9746dc325884b67 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-b697f23948644bbb7454b9c3140886b273901364 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-b6b33a5c4155b2eff881fce63b5dd34d1aa38b56 | unclassified | ? | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| s5-b6b81e8d8f8f31e9c888e6afa88c710d1455fb3b | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-b6ddc9fc80241518dc0155ba5b3ea159617cafe1 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-b6f2b87fc2ea12449d14640e7a2cab8f5e39f0f0 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-b6f2cc025ee675ddf02498f85ed5d71a2ee9e724 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-b6f3f0b69299f2088004c38b89c83b6f87891109 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-b6fe9a33bf0d0986d571a7a4a5ee4065cda547b3 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-b704334d2bdf679b0db7c45897a59ba2602b1d92 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-b7279fa1cfe867061d5211c034081fdffe480bb5 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-b7280c237541628c38c7c1fcf3ce7a21ecd0ef3d | unclassified | ? | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| s5-b7292ec4ea8997bcb461df4fd096a6c16d1f239c | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Best-of-Both-Worlds Fairness for Mixed Goods and Chores | Haris Aziz, Xiao-Lin Bu, Xinhang Lu, Simon Mackenzie, Mashbat Suzuki, Biaoshuai Tao et al. | Fair Allocation · Chores, Online & Dynamic | ARXIV.ORG 2026 | – | – | triple | |
| s5-b73e80af97dfc227b9519fc58bf4fcc3b4edc9ff | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-b744b59f1d05ea32684feed850219e71625c41f8 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-b746f03552ed4fa15dcffe003a80e32569585082 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-b747901daa6adfb1ab423339bd80cb7c44f8a238 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-b7546ee37a499ded809224f0728a95af66d6c9f5 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-b75a3a3f2390737fb6178ee2996b6fcf913bc06a | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-b77399cf961bddd71eff9923bcc6d65c8341cc4f | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| s5-b780b65d3a343a76ac4b1b261f16ca7e62ee5452 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| s5-b7899a8889fa28775863c55f04f2c7a7eebbb935 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-b7a6e0abd0b048fb5b596eb24edc1e7bb3e7543b | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-b7b37f15d6cf934c3d4a46c76ea3db3765ce3d54 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-b7bc486ce08d5bd870021168db55f42ff5b9d2b1 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-b7c4ff9512d2442c8ba996cc1792596d6653220f | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-b7cf95306c1737ee8a90b878e6aacdcff49a4a8c | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-b7dc8e2ed8cd5fe08e2f8399cc643bc40975935c | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-b7e334cd36f9322e01b04487a598fb1c01bbf100 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-b7ecc1b548d4942a8609b8f83e1daa65b214a48e | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-b7f50477b6dc84bfee96a7f9224b149c4227f8f5 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-b7f8dcb79abd1ff80150b7fc9a3c6ac7241a4651 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-b80a5d28c238432ef8a8a75f6a0f1a1e934e1426 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-b80fe0b80196b00cf21791e122f3808d68548fc6 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-b8132cc090215c28806feb1126ec1fefa7651262 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-b829a16059d6978fbf2a080d5ae8b152bab403de | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-b82cb7b3d15fdcdacd72d0b92a9523c5115071a6 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Resolving the Optimal Metric Distortion Conjecture | Vasilis Gkatzelis, Daniel Halpern, Nisarg Shah | Voting · Distortion | IEEE Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science 2020 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| s5-b849fbd135b915b645765bcec05503e7a0549d10 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-b8580ed95ac25fdaeea6f720f62e1fb43a81d505 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-b85a11d9a26cb741ffd0b7d973356e3400c9f5f2 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Agenda manipulation-proofness, stalemates, and redundant elicitation in preference aggregation. Exposing the bright side of Arrow's theorem | S. Vannucci | Voting · Manipulation | ? 2022 | – | ✓ | triple | |
| s5-b85d8f11c84638784c5bc8590c6c12c1fa0726c1 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-b85df73e2fb27d206796276f4b3aead54d59c1e4 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-b86e7fa362e5ce1c7f6d295cb9608f8da9922f4e | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| When Are Local Incentive Constraints Sufficient | Gabriel D. Carroll | Voting · Manipulation | ? 2012 | – | – | triple | |
| s5-b89985676970196a4c0eefc5a518c65018047ff8 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| On Approximate Envy-Freeness for Indivisible Chores and Mixed Resources | U. Bhaskar, A. Sricharan, Rohit Vaish | Fair Allocation · Chores, Online & Dynamic | International Workshop and International Workshop on Approximation, Randomization, and Combinatorial Optimization. Algorithms and Techniques 2020 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| s5-b8c1b2253548d5de6f12864ab539f50db2e3e815 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-b8c47855ee64486bfe677a97288f45fe78283839 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-b8ceb4f3702163b33e68ea616ed0e11b98baa505 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-b8d12c456dc461d4617f2f29fac75f7fdd5a263a | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-b8f849deff1658cd8ddd8048d3f769be96257e1f | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-b92794a6afdbdd18e447886cc5d86dfae5d0a912 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-b927a8312af71a1794502034e54d03388bbe4ab8 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-b92f56733ddc0b7bdea8785c5dbeb7095b4b4d04 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-b93ff9dd22294087b0ea6fe0800b8847ed955df2 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-b943523e070551d03a16718e298369208dc94176 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-b96bd9b10bc049afab45734c2f1a71d15d5580b6 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-b9882d0568c214b21f0c16074a5020ed0a456086 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-b98c61961d5f46768b8024b8f4cd72fb28ef5797 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| On the Price of Fairness of Allocating Contiguous Blocks | Ankang Sun, Bo Li | Fair Allocation · Shares & Guarantees | Information and Computation 2022 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| s5-b99f4dfa6c95b2e50eb3eff275726260f3a99029 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| s5-b99f67f44019248e7e014dd41cc6c7544b9f4e7a | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-b9a6ffa323c388383c0e130af290a8c06414685c | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-b9a7a52c75d68635b104f8f14d5db26397befbc6 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| s5-b9ac48031d9b6fe20ea7bb84037c0c70b75a46d7 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-b9b8148f100e657c4a7b3906e8104028c163c29c | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-b9c324b5afd61ba941705bbd9d453c94a54576cb | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-b9da4dc61dacf516c52b3942085f0dd42e5f3e69 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| s5-b9f745841b6c41ee9eb3249000b174a1b4c93aeb | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-ba1744807482b2d4a724877340e9187c20ffcfef | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-ba2c4a17dfb7c2dbe7db24139ad899c6a877929c | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-ba371893d6f3e4886799e95e3d3f32818ada0f2c | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-ba3f0f2fe9eb0c868f9ac6fa61f80b399e31eb78 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-ba4fa98fa0b4025c58f4032d5ef853a814f1974e | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-ba5358706b010f7d6f0100f15c3403887fef711e | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-ba5e3559a2d54bb0e8d7678c9905b4a77da63f71 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-ba680b101053c4374027db490bfd0aaf59b4ef1c | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-ba76e826b38f78a7b1fe32fe6ec690d80ae851c0 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-ba94849168cb2302672b57bb413a87a0e887a9f0 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-ba996c3399d16267a207c3d448737defb6c318c8 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-ba9e3375db0306651aa8e29783d86a00e734f91a | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-baa793169f9abd6273c44f6f9fcbc454ce83d0d8 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-baaa784243c7a2079926dd780f01f3162fa34fc9 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-bab29adbc495cc53128bb8e808e825a661b9a31b | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-badba37d491a86539227c02dcf2612b4baed3448 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-bae3465939d08ae287f7b153e05953cbaa195e31 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-bb00bf4fabb25de20d0785ae80383ea428bab067 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-bb1489783522e9763dfadafcb120b215855e4a9f | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-bb16b007a13a48f8201ea6b1a6e84e267ddc5a8f | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-bb453936ce25ddb39c200fa93a711ba00a561bdd | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-bb4e651068d8eff74b6f3c9183cdc869badde8b1 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-bb697add7163764db227ede0f8ae7af5d66bfa54 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-bb6b3655f1b3f405a890348391133e63a15224ca | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-bb86b7025242d55dd8aa01eaae8a2b8b88e67184 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-bb8eb24ba6f8d708c2ee71ab10debe340e97e2ac | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-bb94ee03337821a7f0fe1355ed5192df8e98224f | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Get Rid of Unanimity Rule: The Superiority of Majority Rules with Veto Power | Laurent Bouton, Aniol Llorente-Saguer, F. Malherbe | Voting · Incomplete Information | Journal of Political Economy 2018 | – | – | triple | |
| s5-bbaf708292f3efe13241e36386ba4510f41a4004 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| s5-bbb34e87056ea2484ed2f0608b1ffaa98d4478a9 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-bbc59bf58db59c0eb925cb09dc76771f52ae758c | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-bbd8235cc735effa79c618fcaee806c8efc33ce5 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-bbda062372fa52df788a320b9222ef25eb2654bc | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-bbda50f3f9d5e01ed9109607bb1a4e830dc0b26f | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-bbf217a07ee5a3620ece576da2604ea9eddc2125 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-bc05a89b34fcc35de6396589123d0af189f114e7 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-bc0c87d86ea01b429d3b665d29fbd19b95f496bd | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-bc11c177c152d3d78bd2651003484c4dcef95b83 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-bc335b07fe1ac256e55db742d674f4ce1611b50b | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-bc42f70758f993adcf79cc92b39fe0cdef0660aa | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-bc4e9680ad317f8ae84b1578b1573522b5c7a5d1 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-bc5078016dc17d39195be08133e61e5caf69af34 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-bc51b99c30798719723bb7b3c849bc7a018f0277 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Consistent Probabilistic Social Choice | F. Brandl, F. Brandt, Hans Georg Seedig | Voting · Probabilistic Social Choice | ARXIV.ORG 2015 | – | – | triple | |
| s5-bca229c9770490a4aeb0cb89f91ed5716acc73d0 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-bcbfe320b59e242c821745d31f2e778816556415 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-bcd4928363cef7e610d7d186f8b96c76d3120ddd | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-bcd65617538b6609655d3da85f5a3d2ff9d960c8 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-bcd9585f4aa4ea1a3065ae149cbc8bf0f16382bd | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-bcda8e40d4f7450a87749faca2659e2d73ef7a53 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-bcdaa96fb8454b536567c355a1dbf32f530c0b6f | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-bcec077b32019736c43bc53b7871795ee7b58e79 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| s5-bcee06f24831f793f4a28bd4c35cb0c031d187f9 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-bd0d8cef41f5988a6edecfd8d6675ecc6d236f9c | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| s5-bd1548f00ec8887539b7cdc1df39edb080964eea | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-bd293ff90000bac3cd550e6b5724a8124ada957c | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-bd576b6d0df69c04714d18d0d5eac56b70eec310 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-bd5f873dcb89b48ee3bbab1d98be590d6f291b2f | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-bd6221c1064f4bffbdc818a2e2b65881e3e01d96 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-bd692e8124997dcb5ca8a38551b283d3599271bb | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-bd7b5ac4e599ee1d19c96f533b156b1d87696ae9 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-bd809cc34ee2692da17bfcd53ef3d034face8e28 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-bd84dfc06281ffee2b4d7838bc12a47cbff0dc15 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| s5-bd8e1c99d1afedea84a4658cd59e5f06b2f3ffd7 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| s5-bd8fe24d98d6bae6542824f72beec7af21fcf14a | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-bd919e1ee7ea234956c608c10d5fb46001e375b2 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-bdb1605c0237681660260742feb9482de898f93b | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-bdb1ff5a2041ca01e1054a65b756942541b69e7b | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-bdb2d694df7af39247c1f80fdea60e40cd8e6ae8 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| Satiation in Fisher Markets and Approximation of Nash Social Welfare | J. Garg, M. Hoefer, K. Mehlhorn | Fair Allocation · Markets & Equilibria | Mathematics of Operations Research 2017 | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof |
| s5-bdbe6a11fc50b4ee3ff1be17cb1f68716b87d868 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-bdc06a488300dcd35b0c9b2b4adbd734186bf21a | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-bdc714d74a5c4ca4b032515e1ac72a0b7bef1770 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| s5-bde655e9438e36f30ff11f6eb6c7612b5c4ec58b | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-bdef790e070744676545f6552ab592f14d48740d | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-be06a69f8312f521e9c03c07500b3800c79ddbfd | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-be3be1fee9fdca4e3200b45edc193276eff3b7bc | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-be49d7fd9b732cd6550565d8829a28028d180af9 | unclassified | ? | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| s5-be5c4ceab712bfe8613abcde791587f9b77c549a | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| CABOB: A Fast Optimal Algorithm for Winner Determination in Combinatorial Auctions not comsoc | T. Sandholm, S. Suri, Andrew Gilpin, David Levine | unclassified | Management Sciences 2005 | – | ✓ | triple | |
| s5-be6f013bfa94869fa55765f1fa2d80c404f6ac78 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-be790a2b3c1e761fdf1735d19117a351a6a5375a | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-be86f25fd90a1dcf00844ec2395ee13484b54d07 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Extension of Additive Valuations to General Valuations on the Existence of EFX | Ryoga Mahara | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | Embedded Systems and Applications 2021 | – | – | triple | |
| s5-be8f824af43762a0776196103e9b73f6cceee62f | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-be99bac3fd3d49f550b923f0b6be6b1e28bb333e | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-bea709a1d3520ce91c9fb4b07ece6f2ebfa768c7 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-bebdc354760303d64694637982a01a35ef9f00ca | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-beca09ffd1674205aa5ae0a99830c5e234a6b227 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-bed8698ef554f29a725dc21c9d47bfbb813ca854 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-bedbe3620083bf8be8e1a03d5669ee8de3c19768 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-beebaa78f855cf793996bf742c3198ac6c945da0 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-beecbda2e40ea09b51e2dcf680c196bcd98cf90c | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-bef06d300bdf848452479c38fc119eb2214725d5 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-bef0b8286560bdaed1adcd900f942e038befc5d1 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-bf00e9a0bae0dc518ec5e47237378033701d76ca | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-bf05fc3ab8a79b94c6c6ca8e946ad8b4af8e4a1b | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-bf11681b7e9cae3191cd7a3cc65de0d61ed0fe04 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-bf375fb654856f8a300d4c1f9d382f1456987d94 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Fair Division via Resource Augmentation | Hannaneh Akrami, Siddharth Barman, Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, A. Fiat, Yoav Gal-Tzur et al. | Fair Allocation · Shares & Guarantees | ? 2025 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| Strongly polynomial algorithm for a class of minimum-cost flow problems with separable convex objectives not comsoc | L. Végh | unclassified | Symposium on the Theory of Computing 2011 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| s5-bf64a2daef77fe2682b6ba2e494d7a52ddfd59f4 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-bf820cbcc4d3f3533b865ef591346423936d1a1b | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-bf85aca0814d2ab7df8ad9d6c3a8786a1a4e9215 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-bf909dcb3c3e701ce6fe8ba093211b5d275704e3 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-bf964622d2fddf6181c04e2713ba065cb89ef172 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-bf98069f61d55a5bc936a5bcd70948e2605f375e | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-bf9bb30ff1fe8f50f360ef5d3d8fdcc74d7cbeab | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| Online Fair Division with Additional Information | Tzeh Yuan Neoh, Jannik Peters, Nicholas J. Teh | Fair Allocation · Chores, Online & Dynamic | ARXIV.ORG 2025 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| s5-bfcaf648cc0bcc1b654c345ecfa639682b5873e0 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-bfcc2cdd502e36cea1343eedfe82f378e4f02960 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| EFX Allocations: Simplifications and Improvements | Hannaneh Akrami, Noga Alon, B. Chaudhury, J. Garg, K. Mehlhorn, R. Mehta | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | ARXIV.ORG 2022 | ✓ | – | ↗ | triple proof |
| s5-bfdc082ea4b9b5ceccbd8d0494df2963475a5df9 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-bfe6a226fb6225f684559b26a0446547ef95266d | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-bfef5cac9b128c39aa2923085a6e6839750d7592 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-bffa58946e83111d58c6ac17568e3869677b635c | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-bffe787e31177dcf6587a89f6013f4e882c37671 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-bffe7d394633d866efe466c9dcab1dfcb97a7286 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-c006c7c12c9ba777150a210070b8f7faf06fa89f | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| Computational Efficiency Requires Simple Taxation not comsoc | Shahar Dobzinski | unclassified | IEEE Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science 2016 | – | ✓ | triple | |
| s5-c03f928b183b32c50dcf3d30745de65279bcf841 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-c0449081b6a92705e4e89add7bd5027aa436bb01 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| On Simultaneous Two-player Combinatorial Auctions not comsoc | M. Braverman, Jieming Mao, S. Weinberg | unclassified | ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms 2017 | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | |
| STRATEGY-PROOF JUDGMENT AGGREGATION* | F. Dietrich, C. List | Voting · Manipulation | Economics and Philosophy 2007 | – | – | triple | |
| s5-c065fff1570c4b2f4b4f03cc95b06248a3e1b3c2 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-c066ffd8837844b2bbd13c9062e75b8697975450 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-c096ec97ecc4f8325f6db7f32398445d6a39f959 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-c098c6e8092e7571875a33f8308b36f1630396d0 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-c0a0c03c05dab40597671aec8eb65bc494f87be1 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-c0c95b50b3c2ae85dc0dcb8d1b00e98ba932c336 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-c0ca4e365bfe774b3c905c001761f27a0cbcfeee | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Parameterized complexity of incomplete connected fair division | Harmender Gahlawat, M. Zehavi | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems 2023 | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | |
| The Shapley index for music streaming platforms not comsoc | G. Bergantiños, Juan D. Moreno-Ternero | unclassified | Information Economics and Policy 2024 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| s5-c0eff59c178c8698e5a34e1701cf7bbb68d780f6 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-c11b56eee5c4babc9863b99aac3f1a7d944c5510 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| s5-c124d2169806adb601cfd0892a8fe87b9454b2c1 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-c126e70dbfcbb1b8c79f3483bdd8d99731c231b0 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-c13b54613b6be2da317adff6849327f40260dd0d | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| The Complexity of Online Manipulation of Sequential Elections | E. Hemaspaandra, Lane A. Hemaspaandra, J. Rothe | Voting · Manipulation | Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge 2012 | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof |
| s5-c13c335195729aef4198efc0f30dbe76f9a865e0 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-c151b60904cfc36f0c42c0114a785857aed58ccd | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Stochastic Online Fisher Markets: Static Pricing Limits and Adaptive Enhancements not comsoc | Devansh Jalota, Yin-Yu Ye | unclassified | Operational Research 2022 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| s5-c16661f843c284a34084cf090de9d6515bc0ca30 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-c167290e0bb97c6cc64bf90a199d25ab5b73c19f | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-c170bf47ae0523acef643dbb23c7856b96a2f6e3 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-c183724cf32a19cfa73357b21628969f179ab9a7 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| Investigating the characteristics of one-sided matching mechanisms under various preferences and risk attitudes | Hadi Hosseini, K. Larson, R. Cohen | Coalition Formation · Matching under Preferences | Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems 2017 | – | – | triple | |
| s5-c19255193e82a36fe5a9b0eeadea657cff6784be | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-c196a56a34d203dba6a9b9d991078ef92b6e1b7f | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Stable roommates with narcissistic, single-peaked, and single-crossing preferences | Robert Bredereck, Jiehua Chen, U. Finnendahl, R. Niedermeier | Coalition Formation · Matching under Preferences | Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems 2019 | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof |
| s5-c1a54b5ec910fafa03438816807f5e6c332ed635 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-c1ab7bc6448ef56beccf8356588e52a0c643ca41 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-c1af44c0d372396673f4396c4ae3ba4bd8ba792f | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-c1ca0678bf9343d93bccc8519c00d2b150cf35ad | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-c1ce306b4a90e4bb8df79c7443476b55437d20e4 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-c1d9b94026fcd84fe1fe15af0d252276df95f1ea | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-c20bc31e0d60b0576f1b01535878fc6067492578 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-c21a49a9697c6dff17916c4571141e86d783a10b | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-c21d26877fa0f5a9e8210dbdfe921a7958b7412a | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-c226a580838d8a3da534767355fc74051c30ee96 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-c22fbc2607f3aa7f3c2529af5f9fab5658e1bd37 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-c2376eeffd208537471971a0fdac2257196265f2 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-c25d4f32aa4b9520b886dd9141c8699e06b465b3 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-c26a1c05d2a8c37849050d6f4ec4ef928a0fb9ac | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-c272714daacc3f009dac58c932393ae4dfe3d898 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-c2813e0783a49d7178055631120ea49a39172945 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-c2859bbdab8eba6c8552e2cc980ed30f32821c17 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-c29be4e9f4ff03f7a5af1cf52468c4c3db31d973 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-c2bcff187b43510c7f763245fe2302be8fb090ca | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-c2ce4ab8bcf00ab1b2ca8cb741cbee2f42fa5570 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-c2d173575883c461017d5744cb46d9fa0116d53f | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-c2db9a5c61e7bab85dd5e3d4d221f502e7545758 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-c2df75cc05e2972d1455520d87ee870b10d87f02 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-c2f0c679e13ea9831b17e5ae0797dd4fcf546737 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-c2f11c9a879ffc3c39c07a8232fa6540eff431cd | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-c2f49e73ba39f64b00cd35e9e4a96acf37993211 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-c2fe7215fe90faf5781d0c314d9a9a4d572cd200 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-c305bbf0bfeb7aec68ea49e72dd93bc85924f8aa | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-c30f50f447c38b1b3054b801e156852dc194cc55 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-c3231f7daf76357a24a9aa01b97a3ac355fe5370 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-c32bfad34389b026c883c9055a917482341dd416 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-c33f1e3af18ddb3ea19c81adcd9d17801cb539b8 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Almost Envy Freeness and Welfare Efficiency in Fair Division with Goods or Bads | M. Aleksandrov | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | ARXIV.ORG 2018 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| s5-c359cf432dee7345cea68370f9cf08a5fa841ddc | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-c35b021104384333be0ea7a31223d1c7812b00aa | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-c35c960e13f119c40ccf7fad28f2ebd90a376ea1 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-c360611fbac85ee40a9b995c210f0f4144f4bbd1 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-c37a5ed8f5304b9e18910ff3151848f05e0d9af4 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-c37c69cd5751c6ad79897397ba5dc604c276da10 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-c38e2a777908894c974893bfd025dd15dd3c42f4 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-c3ace026281e778491f35a1f8fed15c92257f98e | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-c3b84b5a7c79a49b6bc7da2235191acbd91b86a9 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-c3c4aa57fa470a42c7b4766fff3451d607684588 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-c3de1032f5500bd2ec605327a4ee995380056929 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| s5-c3e36a7a8bab5f59d1630e856a6b9571d0780538 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-c3e43e076ada324fc21f508df90acf41c7c29f92 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-c3fa769a8cf5519fd8433b0e21f621a09e81d4d3 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Welfare Ratios in One-Sided Matching Mechanisms | G. Christodoulou, Aris Filos-Ratsikas, S. Frederiksen, P. Goldberg, Jie Zhang, Jinshan Zhang | Coalition Formation · Matching under Preferences | ARXIV.ORG 2015 | – | – | triple | |
| s5-c406b38fc248e4d402a6a78807f7dd5689fa5afc | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-c40b82f0fbb75ef2d8a5e9434fb35a5b8e2a2436 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-c40cb2ee637aeff61d4345132bead87e10c4b14f | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-c40eb340adfb18f340756ee5e13b822a35bead14 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-c410f5b8d7c2f213be4e79436c8a6c7f874e210a | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-c41fca69fb6060b681f31842901ee7112bb3f6ca | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-c4242f3a9fc2c3619788db9bdfaf6650f10f79d3 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-c44066b20f67e2a757e8c639b7e84bdf87737882 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Axioms for Top Trading Cycles in Multi-Object Reallocation | Jacob Coreno, Feng-Ping Di | Fair Allocation · Fair Division Theory | ? 2024 | – | – | triple | |
| s5-c475ca5177d01cf56c5bd65e7cd50a19eed4f34b | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Improving Efficiency of On-Campus Housing: An Experimental Study | Yan Chen, Tayfun Sönmez | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | ? 2002 | – | – | triple | |
| s5-c48393627923dbf8f80548b1e9ef3dbdd903070f | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-c48687d64163c381e28d63802c8f9f91e0407f1b | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| Information Aggregation, Rationality, and the Condorcet Jury Theorem | D. Austen-Smith, J. Banks | Voting · Voting Theory & Axioms | American Political Science Review 1996 | – | – | triple | |
| A Maximum Likelihood Approach For Selecting Sets of Alternatives | Ariel D. Procaccia, Sashank J. Reddi, Nisarg Shah | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence 2012 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| s5-c4a7f897a7a9aa11120691eb9a68d15f3b5c4406 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-c4ae55294c7cfb4cee814284bbf52960689018d9 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-c4efaeccd7f0d900b1df95dadf51bad74264f613 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-c4f3fc10dd86928d8f83cb2d955551e9e15b4120 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-c4f523273bc324d8d86d01aa3512eca161706da4 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-c4f8abeeeca6193520a706d9d72d44e3639d73b3 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-c51147aa50f51ff6edd2086796352408e28bba36 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-c51df44c233af8dfb20299a6ddde3ce5356c849b | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-c51fcad7dcc21b06eee164cf63ca85f3dac3b549 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-c5335adb5ec78007098112c705a5abf4f7da4246 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Fair and Efficient Allocations Without Obvious Manipulations | Alexandros Psomas, Paritosh Verma | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | Neural Information Processing Systems 2022 | – | – | triple | |
| s5-c550e97780593010bff31d87d8b8618d815a4b7c | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-c559d2bb17b39995b5acb40c01cf9b3ac1ccc64c | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-c55e1bfeade0f6ba9e9d7c77f2cda48d9e54a9b5 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-c55fbf48a6751b92b3956215697e623d3286caf8 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-c56238f738b245e7a204deaf74ed481ae6dbc886 | unclassified | ? | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| s5-c584954c0c7c271ddea906ccfa82fb97d632e7b9 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-c590b59933bdd4be591bed88a0ccfd13a3468557 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-c591e2decf0e10d0e4a0768fe503a9863e25f16e | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-c5c7976acaa7f749ab8a66ca0d5f9d29c220fe5a | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-c5d02bbc0da056726690a18a29751e6b83dec203 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-c5d48f949d1808b845cd70754661b45d51953b31 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-c5eb744edad7052e8c51eaa150b32ab36c8f5f4f | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-c5efc49cc1c3ecf4887dd848018a2d2bf426b882 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-c5f1d8db2b1c035f4c81f59efa65a18cd0097804 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-c5fc35a19ca57b23a5a8c4e88e2cffd6faef4d5b | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Capacity Variation in the Many-to-one Stable Matching | F. Bobbio, Margarida Carvalho, Andrea Lodi, Alfredo Torrico | Fair Allocation · Fair Division Theory | Operations Research Letters 2022 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| s5-c623e3c7a0055e61b010bf40fc625a3568aff250 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-c62c9cb3ab0202f3fe9866ccac443d18878969b5 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-c63d66af7e504baa93622d26ea553be2e4358828 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-c64ce2f2a84294e9d07d7b1abda41cf83b58897a | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-c658986a555f64048b803b4fe65264b93120579b | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| Keep Everyone Happy: Online Fair Division of Numerous Items with Few Copies | A. Verma, Indrajit Saha, Makoto Yokoo, B. Low | Frontier · Computer-Aided Methods & Data | ? 2024 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| s5-c66ac8a7849dd5a193cbd2181253c93bcb4b1bac | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-c670aeb751a9367bedf9dd4cf4a3905fb812b12b | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-c673e3ecd3d8e95eff7aca5af9e22096efcab9b8 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-c6746a2b40d8c5c7065c09cfefa3b61936e7d006 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-c67b6f9e952dccafe18210efb98b82f38c8fec29 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| Fractional Pareto-Optimality in Multiwinner Voting | Patrick Becker, N. Boehmer, F. Frank, Lara Glessen | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | ARXIV.ORG 2026 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| s5-c6a9689f4cd857217220f55dd6d0880b92a46140 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-c6b1fa97ec3f2b3e4f15274cd68e0a46865ac5f8 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| s5-c6bfa3f4c6f7ee58b87a88c39ebf92788d037db8 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-c6c5798c934ed07b31b90e0c5755074716c25d05 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-c6e09ca4347e25cff522b8b217753618bbe9656b | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-c6fa439bb63fd9cd7a123baef73e248150f1374a | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-c6fe49a8718761926a49c57f4387a38ff8572a28 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-c70c372373e3766af72477b00874b7b6511396b5 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-c70d93fba394e236ff11769d92f015a0d4f50220 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-c71d4f2a1630a37732d38211f7d901b7075e60f0 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-c71d916bd356551926963f6de9b9a7bf62aa66d9 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-c729ce1bad6542677156e0a5ef203cb3c54bbaa0 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-c736759f600369b7731b044a38be8fdb3423e8ff | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-c7490118bb6f99b96bd832011cf1ba88aace876f | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-c74ab25d3ae4e7242524776aedb46d4191f606df | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| s5-c775efae16883af1c65d5e24e39b2ddf60b279f7 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-c79636562c847968d10aab69ece2d2849ab6cd74 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| Stable project allocation under distributional constraints | K. Ágoston, P. Biró, R. Szántó | Coalition Formation · Matching under Preferences | ARXIV.ORG 2017 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| s5-c7aab558350233cbc564f286f4b3a73d9958b9cd | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-c7c78fed60ba9bd9b6422ebfad5b022698dc9ff6 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-c7ce259d39632fde3ee16d98d92875206dae7fd2 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| s5-c7de5f41789940fa08526b9d509b16e1f545f242 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-c7f0072b4a5cd716200fb8d668b13a121c2a1820 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-c7f9cb5415b5318acb02d7201ce166aeaea5b83d | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-c7fc901f88cf2145f0be6bdac4d3f9c93ebcbc1d | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-c80d3a17ce9dd5f30e138f007a96ed6ca65a84a8 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-c82b1b840b2ef4cea831d5e446c13f56125f4dec | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-c84ae38ca2374ddf453efa67ce49b4a2a45d41e7 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-c85cb78cd47a1f2fb490f91aead92f9860e1018e | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| s5-c86653398fb2c2cd2e4cab4be105fc8348084d91 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-c8674a689c5c49120b48221735ad39c21b1d913b | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-c88162f682a679089ed1403d84793c50a5f2df6a | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-c88174426e08c2442d140dee5e57472ab0029167 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-c881ec6b69eb54c6803f3cb1f7c57f0e1c2fad08 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| Chore Cutting: Envy and Truth | Mohammad Azharuddin Sanpui | Fair Allocation · Cake Cutting | ARXIV.ORG 2023 | – | – | triple | |
| s5-c8ac47f8f1b3db333c7962fb16679fc4c6fb118c | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-c8ac6968a2d26acbd0316f3f9da81a2f8037901a | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| Stable Matching with Mistaken Agents | G. Artemov, Yeon-Koo Che, YingHua He | Coalition Formation · Matching under Preferences | Journal of Political Economy Microeconomics 2022 | – | – | triple | |
| s5-c8d4007eeb7f0fbb3c9b798888fa6bb4758de791 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Proportional Cake-Cutting among Families | Erel Segal-Halevi, S. Nitzan | Fair Allocation · Cake Cutting | ? 2015 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| s5-c92053637d8f277dca73a4e9e9cd4d4328a6b7ed | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-c929b9edf3ee8fb955b52f5ab2d7c3ca3b8bcd78 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-c93255aa485edcf334a358f9f5a6649e7739e398 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-c93db50c43d7231b5d721a74a6985e0864c073e3 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| s5-c940195cb051454eb01b14d88afaa90ee84e9166 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-c945c14b56cb1fbd2eb16cdbbdf002c2222498e2 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-c94beb11693143fd574f6d1d6ed3daa7c6ae6141 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-c95d1143ef4b70891f32d4c457bc7023731b3dcd | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-c975975a664f9e2191795f0073e4d90cdb430037 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-c97a33e90763f62e2984825f9a01409a2dc15d3c | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-c9807f0775df5a15173a651221c9777e0156716c | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-c9a36083f0c84ab2711e04049711399eff074e0c | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-c9a706d9935e4854dc937a79ce3872c23c4498be | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-c9aa0af5e6337f4f979be3e7432bed9b292d191b | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-c9c8934167b4561712dc4bfb4834b1cf1ba18e27 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-c9ec22e5143a3c1792f0e975fd9991f8210b7859 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| s5-c9f756ae1a0ce67e067d4c796b371959e94a5c96 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-c9f875d74b6dffa436f5be8e67c15ce94fdf2c3d | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-ca0201d2ca9812ecc0c255d3bddf346ab06edd93 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-ca0453d416b2b7fb9346fd8a4c18f26e988b1f46 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-ca0728f323a83e4c215d435dbc6fddcd06a013ca | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-ca15a25f9238170a545900d21cb0bfa926504b50 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-ca1ad7462af0a785c83fa874595e735c35b9c3c0 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Dividing goods or bads under additive utilities | Anna Bogomolnaia, H. Moulin, Fedor Sandomirskiy, E. Yanovskaya | Fair Allocation · Fair Division Theory | ARXIV.ORG 2016 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| s5-ca4c2c975fbb66a57caf32d3dda0e4cc12e34520 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-ca55fedf9da50b55c5f976e8eac30b1b61501474 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-ca5e6f7e27a664d2cfcad3978a4c002edd6c9159 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-ca6169a2a492e1433cc6a3cf6b6429f05d961213 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-ca64b40c2fc4898bf289a41cb594c9f15d070da7 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-ca6571db58cf3d801c96974f401e3594cd6cab53 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-ca84fad4e3311b858e9ee34d691ae7871d3f438d | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-ca9887f662c80ae27221975a4f61750c6f04ee2a | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-caa722ce88cb886d5d308217cac75d8c10dfa593 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-cab011193ca9d3864b7f70007cec310c9bc65f5d | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-cab420dd07933c199a1f0d695c4e400c0717498e | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-cabb7381009236a9246bf831cb5f6e377c171fa0 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-cabbe4d61ddb7ad563d255ed1e75e99390d9f740 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-cacb4bb69cca761706795a474fc31b4b7b5727b6 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-cae14bcf578a0bbe52e384a145a4166fd11b4dfe | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-cae354086ee86223f7bc0ee0767b043b9a48dcfc | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-caea8a640bbdb6f19b303ffd58d1f799d25c1c03 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-cb150ef90f36c1e0069cb36892e65f1101006017 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-cb263682eb3bbc5f24f54b0ba15b3d306de67c9e | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-cb3452fce0cd49a757a74251c3bb5287e0f513c2 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Computational Complexity of the Hylland-Zeckhauser Scheme for One-Sided Matching Markets | V. Vazirani, M. Yannakakis | Fair Allocation · Markets & Equilibria | Information Technology Convergence and Services 2020 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| s5-cb4f3daf9750e4b195ebbfb9b1b37a5a413bea79 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-cb5e5118aa9a5ed377074ed504f4bce5049d8383 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| s5-cb8d7b40787365dd275557a9fd2ca625cf279d9e | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Fair integer programming under dichotomous and cardinal preferences | Tom Demeulemeester, Dries R. Goossens, B. Hermans, Roel Leus | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | European Journal of Operational Research 2023 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| s5-cba8ee3eb39a66f2744b1aa4b7052cbaae2c5903 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-cba90f5d83d6bb0fdbb6fbffcafb726dd54112fe | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-cbaf866ac89b61b4e859d66dd5a6b9d86bad32a8 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| s5-cbb354013ab94a8ab7e3941920e92a3a52363d0a | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-cbbb13ebad557dc1114fb0b02a9c706dd4a954fd | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-cbc9f3cec4e101ccfc10ad16818840d0beee80ae | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-cbd0853564a53b02c1697cd2f312c86c76b1d827 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-cbd4909c2f8bf85675f78a6c9cf010f9da660fac | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-cbda5226940a59e10111067dcaa83986ded3ca8d | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-cbee38ab133cfe1c154c85055ed12d9cd0fddaae | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-cbf080b5d2ebd82412e2a3ef4ca5662f76156b9f | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| Fair Payments for Efficient Allocations in Public Sector Combinatorial Auctions not comsoc | Robert W. Day, S. Raghavan | unclassified | Management Sciences 2007 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| s5-cc03427bddc561db449e8c7cdc9461f7f446bc04 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-cc0d4feebcea449eb8321e97069d1fe24f030d70 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| The Competition for Partners in Matching Markets not comsoc | Yashodhan Kanoria, Seungki Min, Peng-Yu Qian | unclassified | Management Sciences 2020 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| s5-cc0f437cab6dd211d295152c36bdfa52ffba4382 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-cc259d0d6a5ea492acf7fcae3531e6dfc72492a0 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-cc2acea4de7ee97af7f87030d9c5560a7c51e9db | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| s5-cc32f84cf1521d03acd0c5d87fe065d9c9af2ef1 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-cc353306d4d500f2156bc4823cff478422d321da | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-cc3c5d4f11eed0e85851756da577176de677c5cb | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-cc3e9ac99e47faf1bd14c1e3eb7f9c834099289b | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-cc53bca06aeec1e216e539604aa3f629cd59bf85 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-cc7f9a90a78cd55708593ae6dceaf1ceacebd475 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-cc8220b877e09f66629b3c05935bc4a5c4b1ac5f | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-cc889ed53a058b4416967a2d69d5f5d540ad9a2f | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Assignment maximization | Mustafa Oǧuz Afacan, Inácio Bó, Bertan Turhan | Coalition Formation · Matching under Preferences | Journal of Public Economic Theory 2020 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| s5-ccae6a2627a8a8337316068263500d28b10f6c4c | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-ccb6c666c44cf6cc9dda17892a36ac7809c1ffa7 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-ccd3d057449c43db9f197ed5846862e0369d4ecb | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-cce5ddbe22a9d7e4062c92c6f84c575483a49285 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-cce8c2f280918647fd24d7325c22598269f54450 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-cce9415d47d01b26f9c921951b3c8b96267ba207 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-cd1c0b5537283d3ff2899ce48254101f1dcad9d4 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-cd2bc6a9d4ab9ec400dfe3b16ad0a8413abf08b1 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-cd337fc8ce0bc74b7f6c9c25155bbe435d203fa5 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-cd37218018be7f6c2dc22afeb3625ad45c9d0a4c | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-cd3d9a5fb1a45dc58002f1b7ad2f01559588d100 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-cd48760a142830b796b8a85a158cd469f3e5feb0 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-cd4e67ae87a0b419c4f57092e9032e4e79c08aef | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-cd5d4cdffa09831301d038973ca8640e76cd17ec | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-cd6df983b4c05e6c98cfdf241c2d64f55987c7b5 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-cd9e144746e52fffa16ef116fbe6b55a9bcdb7cb | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-cdac15b110bb7e0c5d28575cd24b636d1259f21e | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-cdacc9629d5ad193e7ea9ffeac5ccba01546d3ea | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-cdb58d430dfec4c1ec67c0649e32ba4a8f1f2d56 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-cdbdc7064a6d573cfd58d27c4b3dcdcacccea92c | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-cdc0942e88c4ccc215b4cf9d16cd2d642ecf7254 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-cdc26bc30e8bf98efd9bfe7f4a0839194899d0b7 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-cdc5e75a98d52e1810f704a52b11ea1f24a772aa | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-cdc9ab6c5aaa3afe16e9bb5adce2fc9cd9401412 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-cdc9d6de9a7db4da6d3997625e3d9b3771d25435 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-cdceabf41cca8abfd33bc26727cc7e4d90c96b22 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Limited Farsightedness in Priority-Based Matching | Ata Atay, A. Mauleon, Vincent Vannetelbosch | Coalition Formation · Matching under Preferences | Journal of Public Economic Theory 2022 | – | – | triple | |
| s5-cde678e90523049fbee35c6c2793a5cb4ca5ef2d | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-cdf61c4024af395bdbc970a63308e8080accd71d | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-cdf7e35f15393f719d5b28144581c23b65bf4594 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-ce04bdbffc318463f1154f2abaacd83f135785cc | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-ce0686952961a4d7722c10e6ed2acd69412e3c98 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-ce0f11060fd1c1aed6ec76246a8516c00be0af84 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-ce1e3aea76433752b46c7ca1fad5535dcc82c34d | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-ce63a88f1343dcfb497da825aa0363314291e98f | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-ce64814c442c6ad24890c810833ced55b9c74a1a | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-ce7968faa0d165aefaeb7cc00971416a0d5cdaa9 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-ce8800deb4a0a98a09a8af060ada660fa051ec99 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-ce8818b3172e9eaa4ab62560dad00342570929ee | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| On the Egalitarian Weights of Nations | Sascha Kurz, N. Maaser, S. Napel | Fair Allocation · Fair Division Theory | ARXIV.ORG 2012 | – | – | triple | |
| s5-ce9e219131fd7d246260e258305de1a025050e4e | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-cea55ddd428ac7e38b54e5ff63e5edc12d392124 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-ceacf4939558c0c5d7d25fb52372e134fa115a7b | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-ceada82e462dcc3e0b2582cb5306b4407b03879c | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-cee5f2e5a0f588ccc1fc883ecd0e3373cd0a80d5 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-ceee7c27d9b57dab95c24e57cf255968d6d673ec | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| s5-cef3c53a0b131cd46c745e6c8bce7359c2c78c1a | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-cef583f5b2b98c2e9e6cdf2f89c519ff58f135f6 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-cef7e17f197246979da135bc75475a3c27863ace | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-cf03895cf83027efb2fb1f77a74fce479cc9cc16 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-cf298acf551b1a34865cef447da0c40d1a198435 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-cf34de984a8f40f66ac00ab28b151acf2ae623b4 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-cf3e822d8049ea03cf49c6f91500cbbbb2b0b9db | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-cf410b4ac801156848bbf3d23fdcc5fb5f5bf078 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-cf4da4603d2b87522e2cc56fdf8d011721c8d533 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-cf4e1453e0b7293842bbccec9b0b120bcaee746c | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| s5-cf55df6d6dd753db66426d2e29703b2fdb73be66 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-cf61be1c0a6aadf12caec1d51f9964347f01822d | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-cf85a8e0f06078d37101b3531992972fbac8e9aa | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-cf89e89d803e9adc00abe778b156537b9754a45e | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-cf8bdc27f4a99883c4a1ff35082bd037ff44c478 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-cf9557bf29e35548a0a26f02b9bc5c4e5b02217d | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-cfa72d810b22407169cc91ba2237f0865c8a22cc | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-cfa7bccfad4b22de082a4e6185be06267072ca97 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-cfad7d1da5c625c76839d8a88d2ff49d0b4cc61f | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-cfadcf4134c573edda7b7970389bb3b39bc39d0e | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-cfaefb3e8f2e8ecf57848fc15d9782a1786a6291 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-cfc4a7669b6c0c8c4c9593206aa02ff2b33156d9 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-cfce4c94c999788fbdaef2b2d84cb78d241f351f | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-cfce5fe5bcfbecb989e616f966a056cbb6b50dcc | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-cfd26fc8b920d39a1035163143fcf4758a23ddab | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-cfd34eaf2d25595b08c031101d807fc3323ad229 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-cff635e14b41bdf85b040c8e0ff7ee3e870c70b4 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| A Linear Theory of Multi-Winner Voting | Lirong Xia | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | ARXIV.ORG 2025 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| s5-d01aac0a53043644def78dbe203975be538b4055 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-d0250b27a57040afd24c5cbff54fde02916b8539 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-d03c7c47fb80bf644393d16ff31b7da5d98b7924 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-d048012830248f2aa9f0a5fd6ddb3cae46fa8694 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-d049e489fd28441a28b652120cd30e25ba725fcb | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-d04a4f8e12a5a2465417147d9fc1f3f2ee678cb4 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-d04c7c2de7840d66d2e3be78cf5fdd7172f175a4 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-d086b3eeac41d6ea4e41b67f33ac9b693cfa9375 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-d09f8d47d0306ca37d5323c56dd56e52f80e1544 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-d0c17a0f341960e4331f29ae34bd0c73ee742d50 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-d0da2d280795bb8391b4567babaf92b41dcb6518 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-d0e20c60cc099cadfea56ded0cf5bdb560d20b42 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-d0ed64d79666ac52339d1c37da125f4f0cfdb9de | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-d0fe82449e0f813aa413051b0486cff90256b4c6 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-d105de425d05d0978e1975e411ded13d5aa16fac | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-d110ca1e814f9655b33607d2260ae75cfae4c216 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-d12861295c93ed0d7be66357b0a05c7ce4fa926a | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-d13b41481fe1406bd20f6eca0b780fa6ccb49cfd | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| s5-d14ec7effebfdc55ba42af6ecdbf8d2e868bd3d8 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-d1578064f8a57a64150370d257c7366bd584602c | unclassified | ? | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| s5-d15a98881c34bc76cd8187721654739bdabfa671 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| s5-d15aefa0ab7250f408c38d0bfabb59ead8739f90 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-d168fadb1692503f8d10b9373bcd293d3658e1a4 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| s5-d17c1905e266cd4d921770ab55c8b82094c1aa17 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-d1876ce926394cc1fa20d75be92a7014708db3e3 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-d189531a90223cba7ef67747cf42797707a9215d | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-d18a9ae1cf5e9dadf250d54d57b13d8bed182f90 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-d1983b45c2bdd47e5e1e51a9ed7a5ef68e415b3a | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-d19a589e5b94b9d3eeec34a527f46a673f455bbd | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| s5-d19a911d74683010e0dafca63a4fe85df3aa6b33 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-d19b10bcf55b6f0c93d8ac2b56580db246542a68 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-d1a8fc0f866fad9cd102b0dd52075ab2cea81ad3 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-d1b4967e0332aa3619d6ca1ee058b24c553ae232 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-d1d32157aed63aca116ac738e5da3779edd9fdc1 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-d1f7069e28359b8a0e2df75bdcf7fafd0df26874 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-d2066b558043c494af27d44e5b7c23a7e5bf9f71 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-d208166b542a7f43ca9f3037aee12b35bc9304c7 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-d2197738bc6fe797df478f7374ecd07d4ea47079 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-d23b1b7d2d26baf5b06329d431d08b04ed80f096 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-d257954df669c939ed3cdcc49a42396f3fc5730b | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-d25a56974bbc2497b54c184ea37b4834afa89af6 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-d261d27e3debb6be663a03a9222189b8ab6703dd | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-d26a532ac129ec5bc44c59574a5c8470e64f3162 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-d26e99b7f15187bba81fa1a02455f71f41c60d06 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-d278516eb85a244436f94d823959bfffc5e8e9e5 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-d2793760aafd6597b4dbfb7b5d263fe055e9e01a | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-d27f7aabaafcd3c8b8c9c784a2ffa8a3bb13e6d3 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-d281d9a3a8bba0abacd9eb197228aeb0124c40e7 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-d2905c05f052d4afb4551df6e79c31dcb13a86ef | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-d29b7af2b924a350c038378c4c1ab88156a88f9c | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-d29f3d14de747a05630561be7ded5d2d568c358c | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-d2ad8299ab8bfdfaa7a3acd3e4e5258b1631dedf | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-d2b09ae344d4b09415c4213112320793f562dc68 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-d2bb54396d9c4468fb51b89dae9b760e12e6ebff | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-d2bf98b3a01dd4d4ba0e6697d162d4c15af8d3fe | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-d2ed000a2daba8b6b35154f26ea9742059000c9c | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-d2fad1142bb806ff74b5f62561138fcc2f1aa895 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| s5-d2fadc5ac5203a4df6490e4e2dd5eba6006ca78b | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-d30205b7301da917147a11111f382369874af7a0 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-d30af45f6df50f2580405760c5e11ee2f6ed7651 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-d31b2798ee006cc3be4cc1d046625c81f4e03431 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-d3373dd97cb76d61129dde4235f648edcde2d265 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-d376bf06b4ba0c836741df976d94b096c8754cf4 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-d379d32286b62e1e2c72445438b73e570068a273 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-d38f1db31b2ab4ede79d1462f006c8afcec44ebb | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-d3a8295abddeaccae12e4c88f70a429d1922f8d3 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-d3aa6a02e9b7ee8cecfcbe55c01c45a3be1a8d03 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-d3aace9b209a8e4dd523023018f26ec13e55616a | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-d3cbdf5adaad47d118882ea575a1e55ed5236cbd | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| s5-d3ec8db8af6e4d8d03a19c82778d0b526bc934b6 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-d3f99416e0e94f70f9a22908c3d72e0f2d67befb | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-d4005fb1bcb2a28cdcda8e430a736796f46f4475 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-d40ac5a3da3beef3737e39993bed02140fdd40d3 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-d41eaad6d1ed208d6709cd3eca8f60729f619931 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-d4228f781e53ff9af27c8f41b9659327b44bc6ca | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-d4393832ea4b2dbb9d90217387872fa598356160 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-d44dbe0e5a93a002ff3cd0256fd5fd8388be6857 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-d45175127e4d56267bfbbbfc94b904bb9b6ed421 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| s5-d45801409d1fab1db8009810e6a46238d5e0b565 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-d4587de92a4eaba5c8dbe833caa41357338a61e2 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-d46df7550be2286f6dae6d7525d523a350405966 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| s5-d4710aaac4a0beafd9ec404b0b33599df7cd3a81 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| s5-d47acde9a642d0909f116caa0e94811557b6f99d | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-d47eebcab60238c5a19972dba91d207783c12268 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-d48837db37bc9c2f516b4f5878a9a9d6bfd31596 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-d488cb18dade8930cbf0e5c270700bad59df55d0 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-d48d84f7c8b1f0e3079123f40d1f2a6409378ed0 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Adaptation, comparison and practical implementation of fairness schemes in Kidney Exchange Programs | William St-Arnaud, Margarida Carvalho, G. Farnadi | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | European Journal of Operational Research 2022 | – | – | triple | |
| s5-d4969fe719e4ecb24e049ebb3120c16b4af61c01 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| The Cost of EFX: Generalized-Mean Welfare and Complexity Dichotomies with Few Surplus Items | Eugene Lim, Tzeh Yuan Neoh, Nicholas J. Teh | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | ARXIV.ORG 2026 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| s5-d4b9d3fbe9211d731f3580db5768aea4c89878e5 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-d4c4a0b1eb994c041c6a434a33a781fac9060410 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-d4d7ad8da6acbcd666deb9c33cf31146cf35c9f9 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-d4e3b9ba7dfabb3bd3f6820b67375d9a1b3a8848 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-d4ea5ac40f04bf48a26fb8c2238f3573fc1a5111 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-d4ea81cd957999e8372b23d1ed064616d5734b01 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-d4f96be0d34da6b6c62babba68143334db933821 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-d50a1a996ad067b6ec318d75057d5e262626e7aa | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-d50e71050c3fb870bb9fc35f960af41fbced8caa | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| s5-d534cfc5fd94b533aa296f8b50e5ff8fde73f032 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-d5351f53a1e9fd8794436716f96e237778b75f22 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-d53addfbce25600cd86c1dd05f954472a9a0fb35 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-d53f57eaa84b71f7f3d9b5831a34573cc041f051 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-d5444325cb9d8f8c3cbb7245b38845d651d0e638 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-d566af54fd67ed063eb9fcf7a7034dfffe8cd1f6 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| Optimal Mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions and Combinatorial Public Projects via Convex Rounding not comsoc | S. Dughmi, Tim Roughgarden, Qiqi Yan | unclassified | Journal of the ACM 2016 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| s5-d576dee41d887e1e17fe4caca7cd4ec7f2a26557 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-d5ac8889a0f15a8e57497198f0754c452b128dbb | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-d5cc556b6fd2f1e7587c6a7e6e71f444706779df | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-d5e782047ea4f6523c4ea356164ebdb2dbe375b9 | unclassified | ? | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| s5-d5f6df6b35ef9aa77e8142bb106a0c7e77f6c529 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-d60fbc86df6eb93ac42dfed66b6a3801cb4998e4 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-d631aca7db44cfe1783a1ca4f196969e13cbffa8 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-d634fc4d6e763f2eb1d58a91488bd2f49d88830b | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-d641047763eb5063b7fb12d96d02d5d969686aa2 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-d647823fd08ffddfa9d58717d5488ed7890fce9a | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-d65bd290b8586a55ba79a527653168dfe104f2f7 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-d65e7127937bee7b303ba0517d832fab00984763 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-d6700c1fba3cb85885ec64a3d7ca25905030166e | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-d6712b2fcc61feb0dae6594dbb23091b4c02ef5c | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-d677fb915818f295c1d341b6418ef4697d246567 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-d679f0a16b50660fa7f18d91c0a87e9e2d50219b | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-d6802f074c3afe3441786256d9ac98733263266f | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-d68209dbcd2cb308c1fc52835379500eb82c2cff | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-d6867fc4b9489978675b1b0c898e2590446b243f | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-d68eff43e527413abb53a36705374b42e0872d5f | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-d6bd73fe623974a2cec9dcb529c8d43976cc9145 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-d6c49e37f8d7c0f3a3b02ef279b46c37435d1451 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-d6ce32d95964919a492034f2b7dcfe189d3bfcd1 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-d6e3fd726e912c64c29c6c1b210ef69cc63b607b | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-d6f560692be7d5fda8577ac8fa2c4f961af8c59b | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-d6fc31aac8aadef95bea8c8c1ddb021277cb97fd | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| s5-d7055160dca62fd55d9cf0c4e64dd3f8309142cd | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-d70c874aac43fcbbe46a3a256a41246c6b430fad | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-d712e3f5fcb8ab8748287c7244cecf031bbec5ca | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-d722733dc067f57f0fb4666aad210325a5a7d4b7 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-d72289a1b7ce1e25afb4f1673978e7cb1004d357 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-d732ade22f356cc1630898b738dacb4bad2f9ab6 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-d747d4b8696aa0c965e9d9933b3e72603b45be11 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-d74c23f977de94fdf7a86f908f5f242ee410d381 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-d755e6431beac827980908bc6d37c0f03ea5a112 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-d757167e071d9bad1dea4c7153f153012539e276 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-d75c68a439c64161d6f3ee0bb91eba40a20af204 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-d760c5c8dbf0770bab97615e3e4bb850d30ec257 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-d768caae1760fe807662be18771d1048821b67e0 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-d76aff2c446cbd74981d0dc7335fb40481cd3757 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-d774cc322fc4a301af8608a7a854a6ddeb931f4c | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-d77aa33464c021241bc8c760e74839cc8ea1b928 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-d785c44777350bdeb3fd88651067b83859331b05 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-d79b1dfcb5311184064d3b4a8fcc48ef1e7d3d4b | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-d7aa4ac6f89bd3e6a918557e66ad74023cc68ad8 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-d7be9524afc0f8e0098e86f6cafe96138dd63185 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| s5-d7bf541db0e08aa3fb6600fea1a766d060e6c975 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-d7c7c692d005cd93bf0a3f196ce8c0402b1d5887 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-d7cbdea1e67202adf13a958293226158648539bb | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-d7cdeb6b9189cf47882bdfec01c3795d968bc1ca | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-d7d5f8731af20dac0b49bd2d44ed283dceda547d | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Justifications of welfare guarantees under normalized utilities | H. Aziz | Fair Allocation · Fair Division Theory | SeCO Workshops 2019 | – | – | triple | |
| s5-d7ee4eedbba7df141558f1e7b9bd05601628c617 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-d7f9c3253552e13f24c3b73bc055ef60388af57c | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-d7ff65e082422d0ca3d6520a540110d7e9848476 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-d8155715fa3f199ba9291237a537bdeb2fedf454 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| Proportionally Fair Clustering | Xingyu Chen, Brandon Fain, Charles Lyu, Kamesh Munagala | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | International Conference on Machine Learning 2019 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| s5-d81c1ca9227f76f12d68e1f7b9871352e3a7ac1e | unclassified | ? | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| s5-d81e1e059695d6e9f72dd0576db73cfe6dd2d1af | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-d81fe150f5ddc7d7b2d6f441f6a8476bd3dfe7ac | unclassified | ? | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| s5-d8216a85b33c5c43e42a22c70ad9a73ff2b55fcc | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-d8503dcc650a6291a5526ec01b0bc3d731651875 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-d856f434d0aae4eb2cc7cf3c0fc9c7853025b4a2 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-d87195c72667c89d67512ed7267f05d7a2806be9 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-d883603753f4f5a41d982c01f32fa54d81dd3851 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-d88e87a2b5094f9a44b9cf69e5b5d059f5055e7f | unclassified | ? | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| s5-d8966dfd89d71ac4a24140541fd6e99f1b5f4a4b | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-d8bb8ba39f39484f7e87f6004f42d306299aebfb | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-d8c5202d4b4c4d11b414a869c4210ce9541d1026 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-d8cbb7bf066322b565351ac1973ec29528ded2d8 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-d8cf63ca52474a52123d9a1400ddec6d6313ec56 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-d8d7ba2efd7a8f1f4f5fa1b0267514634d37e475 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-d8d99c9c43e74d5f45f30978a28b174b0cc4d981 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-d8e3722bea3d37bf50106b8c4e66a1bffec1b9bb | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-d8ebb9efaf39e17ffabd345eba93e4f37d2ad1e4 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-d8efccfbbbe62520d68962b1fc7de1067d0b815e | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-d9020e6c1dc6d2945ca3cb115123993b28444faa | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-d902405f22f848e9f41e1435b5278a5a493875b6 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-d9141f9cbcc504b2aecd45119f374561d54b2e3b | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-d91524019e09b39f5dc32705675838d2ba3712b8 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-d916bf108ea48bae4ff0c387a9959175e33ead1e | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-d92c221c049deb0a88bc0a4cdcee456ae6b14493 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-d9344097071ae93c5c3dc8713379e41635d70d7c | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Fair allocation of combinations of indivisible goods and chores | H. Aziz, I. Caragiannis, Ayumi Igarashi, Toby Walsh | Fair Allocation · Chores, Online & Dynamic | ARXIV.ORG 2018 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| s5-d94ac35aa8770c96017dbd364dcd8bcd8687e627 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-d95054e4e2a384beea74daf1d5000760ae60add2 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| s5-d95298f500c34eff58fe20a1ef9c46ddfed68a3f | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-d963d3078c2f37dbe1368cc93cbcf8c61809137b | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-d965b91aa045d02d9bde896a63d03c4b35d844d4 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-d96a7975cc13f074a7c97129bb19890290d52cb2 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-d97939ac456c806dcf55184cafa9d4badd083e82 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-d97a4fc898fc510f576484071cb2d29f6d2cbd07 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-d98a80c012c0fa5c7064e82e90a614c4d9b88bd1 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-d98e318f5c239f0264958064b1b43776328c4818 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-d9a26a40f415ca940aeaf3c4824ecfc84e1fd085 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-d9ada8d1d6031ceb9340a582c1fbe421953b97a8 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-d9b44f12598fe5b439f9e5c016cf95fde6f43862 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-d9caabc238b7c4b904c699a89ba0ee9b10350eeb | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-d9cd38331d9133ef71411cd4ab333fdce9a6f8e2 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-d9db429c662cd6bc334482bbf8d34a17156271ec | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-d9ecd3f1e2d35ac59e7e6fb719e23a2dc1fdc57a | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-d9fdbe209e4f18fcd0b38dd235fd588c6a6fe964 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-da08b4c1d4c7e1a43e942de6cea5d7d90932ea74 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-da14018b4198a835de2b56d956c1e978b4cd56ba | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-da1f22dd6d834e031eb733d2b70320f34ef9458f | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-da227867bc6ae8185d3133257e81349180831193 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-da32d5b5efee26651e7b07608ceb54fdaaca7edf | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-da3c49d46cabf5aeb3e855b2b651c0791139035d | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-da3d73310a4d597131983e166d7df04f9f3f3fdf | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Making Serial Dictatorships Fair | Adam Hamdan | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | ? 2026 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| s5-da55c5fb426586e36296e65979fa9b28d3867010 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-da5b0299c7927315a151e77de4f976e01d77ef91 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-da5cce0bec2ba0bca28c8bf87ece7776de659048 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-da8b20aeee3f389206745d213e1a07c241a61df4 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-daa01cf30de027107981100eaa7df4fbfdcd7df8 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-dab5b4dfd119f87f5176b7e30c6e4da117d58397 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-daddbfb856a4e35c547611509aa9da5f529a9085 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | ↗ | triple proof | |
| s5-dae0f66b8060982e7a2b6eef80644749f1e768a7 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-dae290be3fbcc01d4f6db0a1c2e10af4aa349772 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-daec915a06ecd45706bbfcb1d3bf4c9603192a7c | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-db0d3ff281264e6aae2a7ad22e34ae91c19b3ff3 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-db14cfff3421fbe6fe08deb8bdfffd5af59679cb | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-db1d678070466f35f770b3bec5f93d9e3b4cee45 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-db32da8f3b075d566a73512f4ccc2c95449c75a1 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-db3f43ef95cde7f8c8ab47dd83cb92ec770eec76 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-db4eed82b44649c3037b30c615b58f5f76c62ebb | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Matroids are Equitable not comsoc | Hannaneh Akrami, Si-Yue Liu, Roshan Raj, L'aszl'o A. V'egh | unclassified | Combinatorica 2025 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| s5-db5725432272d185e863900b691c14bca245b762 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-db61006218409dd5ea8a818edf8d1e4ed09865a6 | unclassified | ? | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| s5-db67e564c7e37c545287dec1c8464ffd41d92352 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-db75e73d2a0b26d03d3b5db76cb6929266aae83d | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-db782d6050c379b905d9907e1566b8537f8f2017 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| s5-db7ce614747c9bf250e4172e60ff64afea5a73ce | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-db83393c1cc55bec9bbd7e84496ef37feeca1d3b | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-dba5fb9956a929cb95108a41f09fca15c46a4957 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-dbbad120c90e4e1b3148338b37467431ab225f45 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| s5-dbbe52cc3ed9b38537530308dbf618dbc41d0a49 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| Collective decisions under uncertainty: efficiency, ex-ante fairness, and normalization | Leo Kurata, Kensei Nakamura | Voting · Voting Theory & Axioms | ? 2025 | – | – | triple | |
| s5-dc057153724952ec15ab5ca61f467b43e601554a | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-dc1b100d686e13d4fa419a17f6f3d0b6216d9901 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-dc30490adae78d4923eada9d28f7c941b15f9c85 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| Straightforward Elections, Unanimity, and Phantom Voters | Kim C. Border, J. Jordan | Voting · Manipulation | ? 1983 | – | – | triple | |
| s5-dc568316e0ae4df3d1f6c38b12824402ebeb70d3 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-dc59419f04b925035e9d6df149f3fb57f9621d5d | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-dc6c84fafa007de87aad86fb4009817ed3b296fd | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| The Algorithmic Landscape of Fair and Efficient Distribution of Delivery Orders in the Gig Economy | Hadi Hosseini, Šimon Schierreich | Fair Allocation · Shares & Guarantees | ARXIV.ORG 2025 | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof |
| s5-dc70432e4379815768587ed80a70bdb9749f1d96 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-dc80606ad8d12e549210bc81c716b9963f0f6c8f | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| s5-dc88db4de8c74610f03941b91c04a5102a393b1a | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-dca7cf9d82c104440c0cd8d904269e889d85a8e5 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-dca9f900dcdaf9514f41b19e2dcc57397ceeb8e0 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-dcb2075626618cf1e65ad487a296abb217e43fb6 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-dcb3fc5752dd41ae4c2f183f37132acaff34caef | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| Reasoning With Conditional Ceteris Paribus Preference Statements not comsoc | Craig Boutilier, R. Brafman, H. Hoos, D. Poole | unclassified | Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence 1999 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| s5-dcd1918d9438a469548436b120965676726029e2 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-dcd57c338032e9dceb800465c5fba72d67f87e4f | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-dce47db3afeec3c7a9276dddd4dd528002766c11 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Proportionality from Sampled Approvals | Gregory Kehne | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | ARXIV.ORG 2026 | – | ✓ | triple | |
| s5-dd099bd3f8c18fd1a0404c87afec51f8af9f980d | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-dd0a58fa0899bf024b06a184b96167a8cb1d81c2 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-dd1c6926dfc7b2cd5cd9daa9c3cee5532ffcd805 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-dd1df2032e603ecab5255414cff441ddc183431b | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-dd34f50e2fa528c744c9a052af44d5d6318099ce | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-dd3abe8aeaa70216f2412600c848cdd4ab54d793 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-dd4b4c6953da0cb88f5ce6a10a12d34ec025592e | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-dd4d847e0b083f8aa4ee5c90157f0b26c05ab75d | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-dd57093e2ea7c8c07b376d830b1219b04885ade1 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-dd6a777356ca4eac5039264c0eceeb2c94579473 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-dd6df12ce0ced6b03f73347f52ee28a94b06a89e | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-dd826809d60f1fed8b3d40b5d8c0150235762a6c | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-dd8744fa6ce225a364d7f1402397d2d14569f44a | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-dd95939b20961ef585c9d2ba0cb387f7e6f77f1f | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-dd9d30491e2ac1a275295fcfe1503a1a7fe04c62 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-dda19edc2d62361ba21c6146a17bb05abc791b39 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-dda780c6e3ba66deca2ab5b45b34fbd5aae89b31 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-ddbaca6da34c4c0a63b75366441d1f50877ae406 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-ddc36f5d8a3f04ea5c306f8aaeac13f266b8097f | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-ddcca26276320b5cdd6404a10f411c4b6d66ae55 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-de1552f1909d4736f6b5db44d864d62993de65c1 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-de41aff5534f80aa1fa2fc5f9b590a58d9a1737b | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-de43c158ea8fc8709657182f5bd29d7d13851a59 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-de53cff294dfd576e1d6621f81c83ba71b1241a4 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| Introspectively Envy-Free and Efficient Allocation of Indivisible Mixed Manna | Siddharth Barman, Paritosh Verma | Fair Allocation · Chores, Online & Dynamic | ? 2025 | – | – | triple | |
| s5-de603ef5f18d33a4d313f0f9ad3697baf055dd43 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-de6473a8a72b6c21880f8328b3e642b319fdbe50 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-de7360669d19300610f57d96d5db964758639f7d | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-de77ea9bc711fa840d9b8c4d1772e967eedf8612 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-de7d796229b7e06ad41ee083b6074bc76e48ec6a | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-de876dd5dbcff65626e073afac523f82a5b065a4 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-de8aa16de460ae3af95d96a13bcd23d2e06a4a1e | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-dea5407840152f7f8e64d6a852edef857e6c08bc | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-debb94ed022865fad2d28a0ba212093568278b9b | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-decef1dd0daf90634c520d9e66e855daf98203d6 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-ded7a23ac384dcd707e2fcb788cc55aa7685ce02 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| A Quantitative Version of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem for Three Alternatives | Ehud Friedgut, G. Kalai, Nathan Keller, Noam Nisan | Voting · Manipulation | SIAM journal on computing (Print) 2011 | – | – | triple | |
| s5-defe4d064a2f878c407d2bbf6f66238936e2d6bc | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-df0e7f3189787d5e10f24a5f87b9d2fa6483b3c7 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-df23720d2e3640e96f3efd2d7c2920b0cbce7f44 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-df26750131ed39e6a3f8284df1eb9a4711beae24 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-df3df4f54cc92f075830f7c10f09f1adf973474a | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-df40035ecba7b050526a8e9b8d9f3b4396f975a8 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-df41eda34dbe337069064ab5ebe4a9d3d329f684 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-df49e98d73a374dc9052db1b6abd50751c7d4746 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-df5449319b2d10d0524eaace40af361e943060bc | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-df7d124d5b042e6a85fe4f9476b5c9cb2ffbb2f7 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-df7d9178f86a28afc819488715f31dc12ba71aeb | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-df8456c6f837cf4f476c8508c4e82642cd0ff081 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-df8d71fe5f12d6807990133ad6b6625ed64426b6 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-df9bad52daf5e6f1cee0bf0604c38ec0c0ee20cd | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-df9f8f180828da3cd1d37a1e9e9937c16e3adaa8 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| Spectral Methods Meet EM: A Provably Optimal Algorithm for Crowdsourcing not comsoc | Yuchen Zhang, Xi Chen, Deng-Yong Zhou, Michael I. Jordan | unclassified | Journal of machine learning research 2014 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| s5-dfbd44f069a0687994b07a014473305a51b871bf | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-dfc233797678c10c4321b5e863da5523fe26b380 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-dfca3a0f4d3e98bdc94117c719c18ea8f0ac5ef5 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-dfd231b2fb8f80182da4c71971233d6451ee54f8 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| Chore division on a graph | S. Bouveret, K. Cechlárová, Julien Lesca | Fair Allocation · Chores, Online & Dynamic | Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems 2018 | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof |
| s5-dfe76ee49d4dfd43855a60a4fa88a14774632270 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-dfea85cdda2c4b9307fbfdcc4d7d63cd09e0d3af | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-e01a2665f4fccb1be183de241f44a280e1c238e6 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-e0235de9224719ab7552ac45267d57ba80662e74 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-e02d46d1010ab981fad5b836fef69fdeee2b7a51 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-e0428c1d27ecfa33375d197970a6fcfefa753860 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-e042cb7e06808f856a72fe3e404c7906b27c9e38 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| s5-e06eab97735c4f3f30abd87992615719f5391d3f | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-e09142f0cd6a09c42d95b2554349da574a56c9d8 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-e0d8fde4c48492d960691c1c9483a5713cc3ab6d | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-e0e05956a6f6b38ee4f11e0466c0105bb910df5d | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| s5-e0ebf010c3db479f9bf655a516e8ecb379ee2bae | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-e0edfdf6947469255003da1f78121c63be11c9c5 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-e104bab01aa54559c23ba5814f53d6ef1335c793 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-e105585d191571af76d691367a475b664fdaa954 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-e1285c1054a881059aaae862c4a4e481fbb53c75 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-e1318534da59dfa32c2bf3778f5082da48ae2b96 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-e1369fed733c8298ce1c3bd4a9d396d57437b523 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-e1629f9627f992ac5516cd529e56c3db5c9afa03 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Incentives and Efficiency in Constrained Allocation Mechanisms | Joseph Root, David S. Ahn | Fair Allocation · Fair Division Theory | ? 2020 | – | – | triple | |
| s5-e17a30915defef223f6444f40e7084e602bd08c4 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| s5-e1887a368ebc54295aed3913d917b8bfacb4fbde | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-e1a042c7b254ba430fb44a71e400765ae41fca89 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-e1ac3210172e4e2d0792b6f9ee9c5711e1f249ab | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-e1b55ac2eaee14d20b6116fcb5870a7d99b8b2f2 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-e1c2506a94baaa86c5cda36edab4a63516ad66be | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| The Allocation of Riparian Water Rights | Ricardo Martínez, Juan D. Moreno-Ternero | Fair Allocation · Fair Division Theory | Environmental and Resource Economics 2024 | – | – | triple | |
| s5-e1d7e120c80cbb01d64a0d026f3bd759c3367c2f | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-e1ea044d2ea31af85f8063a8c49e61bc91bf0f30 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-e1f6682c62ea14652af6d34f013443ce477e747b | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-e223ec07ba4f0d75e1060418903373d1ef08fac0 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-e2259dc71d37ca2a1f49e25458056476a6be53c8 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-e22d87284764c7687910689d5cc2d1aefde6ffee | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-e233c2ad1e00726b1e8425247b8b570f33c9024f | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-e235069b8a53b3a585dbb757d3fb088d7e17143c | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-e238aa29e7fce808f60899363764937fe4c43606 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-e239a392d1925873a15b4af5aaca232d56724bb8 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-e23db676a6ac5cee70393bd6b419f0ee2a34d3b4 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-e25fb82f91f72d9284c48161f91aa6676a6be135 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-e261fa72a767f7fe4a1d4641406d7c471292e071 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-e266f82446586a71e54c33dab222bb6b881944c8 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-e27dd3dc9fb453e8830c377e2c8c65cc840da45e | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-e2846f8329211fd0b409ed17177cf0fa9c8778e7 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-e28d1635ebbc9c12243c5b51ecbcfb1512303c2c | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-e2a924f0427ebe9a32ab8116015ccdf72a7037e1 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-e2ab2439d45ddd02e20f3efc35577c959dd7d8c0 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-e2ad4c1c82aad8f60cdcba9252d3b36c2502b208 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Resolving the Complexity of Some Fundamental Problems in Computational Social Choice | P. Dey | Voting · Bribery & Control | ARXIV.ORG 2017 | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof |
| s5-e2cfd7a2977138102be036a1b341dc9c3387a4ed | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-e2d78d2800910060696c3a376043b88b92aa5665 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-e2dcf4b1a7dc50acb38bead96419b5a80fc24129 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-e2e63ad5c503a461552bf154458109a58921c97a | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-e2ee7e29526cf256aa320db3a367cde67fba1241 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-e30395f9b4fa3eeb3950ab0b3afba4567fb12a30 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-e31efa7295e5d6681607ed8ef9c45300d64227aa | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-e32f6b0a08e4f9f5818fa5be24600ac095578126 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-e34e0126120cb1c6a66b62441bdcfb7e6914269f | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-e35506787fc1a42b80a441284ac421acd5f5c050 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-e36064159b2dca15470ced8a638e6b516989ad59 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-e3665df825a67da332a9acfee4b8fd152ff29153 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-e37d205369833d1bb5f6f91b9c3194f021b8ce6a | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-e39fb2347d61387e2a75e09dfbf6a08dab14b067 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-e3a392d62a099f1030487eeec70af9ffd0309c6b | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-e3aa794f59f8edcdb6c243e91f93de4aa521ffc3 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-e3b1332511aacdc665bbf4f80e22f54514c42c42 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-e3bad9b3f706deb5b3879645cca4f32fbfca8c14 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-e3d58be3aff6d8b76b503439dbc2a2be19c77167 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-e3d9696861d44dd38c7b44ad2129a55905ab45df | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| s5-e3dca434a0cd608f2d50a74ec38369acb7d6dbf2 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-e3e956ea893ba5ab594a4b15b40673f677e5fc44 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-e3eeb07ad75ac13f7c77843820073c1fd6703760 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-e40ac19db684804fa30b61a0303790de1e2872e0 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-e41daa2e9ff18740e453f0ad85439f0bad77c299 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| An approximate truthful mechanism for combinatorial auctions with single parameter agents not comsoc | Aaron Archer, C. Papadimitriou, Kunal Talwar, É. Tardos | unclassified | ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms 2003 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| s5-e45e491001f4dee0579f6d089fa4c87917f3116b | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-e46cbb0248fab40c8c33a26ec6c62467c21ad253 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-e46e3cd9f804a2beb48807b0db64d347954cb9ef | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-e470ef3946972aa7b5d2591c6d3aacd255b93a11 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Immigration Lottery Design: Engineered and Coincidental Consequences of H-1B Reforms | Parag A. Pathak, A. Rees-Jones, Tayfun Sönmez | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | Review of Economics and Statistics 2020 | – | – | triple | |
| s5-e47f4f38c02ae700b5bc3718ba4df32238a91e63 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-e4829f1de5d09cc55a433ea84ae7f61563fd0171 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-e482e186c1d1a747d245e7a1a76415f5ef501c0f | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Improved Truthful Mechanisms for Subadditive Combinatorial Auctions: Breaking the Logarithmic Barrier not comsoc | Sepehr Assadi, Thomas Kesselheim, Sahil Singla | unclassified | ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms 2020 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| s5-e48ed7fa3b151566de6f3b686ac8e5764e195d0a | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-e49b7c9e1eaaa4afee3cd37db752d99d1cfbd292 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-e4b94b5aed6a3580d70ec796c38cf83d7c75bdf1 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-e4cd784c887a9b76bc37d8abdd12f59a2fc266e1 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-e4d05bf7fdacc3f35c36a7fcaf770b1b635af420 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-e4ea8aa86cb294b2608cc04fcf195078b5ca1590 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-e4edf7396064f0d83076bd5a9152d195b731a327 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-e4ef454013c8f0fa021c103ba581f1fb8a14e9d4 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-e4f1cef1908698f86966b2e7fcf00df16ff8b284 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-e4f8288e2bd63b40d90984dbdb1a93659f99f258 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-e4fab037089ed12503f7428fed8813b755e2f3c9 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-e5081d6f90403edcc4548880f7a5e6a49640d66f | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-e50bfc822adb884c23b6a15b9f23f3a5cdf3f8d6 | unclassified | ? | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| s5-e539e4b3452dadbb1b224d8511eb12675defdd39 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| APX-hardness of maximizing Nash social welfare with indivisible items | Euiwoong Lee | Fair Allocation · Markets & Equilibria | Information Processing Letters 2015 | – | ✓ | triple | |
| s5-e554228bec30b0ba436696da62fe03c3db70787f | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-e55c1a7d2e9227f982e9f72fe44035fa6e0d3d27 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-e564f53f6aa00cfe625e88aba5237a29447efd3f | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-e568ffbc2b50492fc6ac78f3fbc6fa4dd05f813a | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-e57c47ae32ee6d96c836a800d4744c50082eb34a | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-e599297b3d381f8a6141516fdb8cd85b9149be56 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| Competing Bandits in Matching Markets not comsoc | Lydia T. Liu, Horia Mania, Michael I. Jordan | unclassified | International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Statistics 2019 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| Robust Lottery Compression for Metric Voting: A Transfer Principle for Bounded Randomness | Jianying Jia, Bo Peng | Voting · Distortion | ? 2026 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| s5-e5c1bae6c1c73795160558677966c45a97ea5233 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-e5deb54ebd98a84e48c7887367347cab1cf0d5e9 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-e5e33df92e06a973ca62cf50970c07511feaed23 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-e5e637280e02bcdf9d6b8cb02a54ead356d1ed85 | unclassified | ? | – | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-e5e91c6c9dac1e3d8544bb62b0b3b2bc0818a463 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-e60c57bf856829dcce05397c98da7974ded860ec | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-e61dc2f01d2eb38f4c8b6bb7f37eace8764019ac | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-e61f580d54c8e27ccc2a471f906b0797ea93bed8 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-e644e1b9a7a2cee4bce3194243d2c615f29a84f8 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-e64ca8bcd5d63401bb1f65859d669166f442f335 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-e65850a9a1369b0e1bea916a17bc5a31cda64d74 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-e67f5cddb358ace9dbfd94a67584c3ab94741b1c | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| Approximately classic judgement aggregation | Ilan Nehama | Voting · Combinatorial Domains | Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence 2010 | – | – | triple | |
| s5-e6bf752cbad97ab5484bb294c1062ac3354a7717 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-e6df9f6948506bed6ee1bf24283562e0b5ab4b22 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-e6e1bd70a6dc39f3481b42359ea16f3d2a4b98a7 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-e6ead72a6178d62dcdb1dbb405c202b3c2a2fe3e | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-e6f2bb5e08a29764684ed1e7decef21a31f98cfa | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-e70a0ab219f9e62c8e437bbf861361baad47d504 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-e7193d0351d43356ae3d3a721fef1b512fd2cb80 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-e736651d8e5e27e5e8f69cdbe07cad3d68d04ae3 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-e739609b739513af59f8b36aa3a571db2a4c14b9 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-e75ce8910913681adf7ec16b5443637371d691f1 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-e767dfb72fce30d9b7a5f73d53b568466471691b | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-e76d7a96292c0d29b36dddf54e7b598b20c235dd | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-e770b5cfa61bcab65e3f73b73ed6ed34031218bc | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-e7722fbca1575f165069f1331cf5fb4a825c8309 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-e7764496289e19ccd27747b41a8356cc7656a7e9 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-e77b12557facfd1267e67aec457437c88863e0bb | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-e7867281ae646ae56eb7e5a9bea7d50302f948bd | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-e78a7a1d0fcd55d7eff046f0f592d4eba879f898 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-e790f1a58c02e1b1898cd8f0667349fd70f7c94f | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-e7a440e1e9e214b41c3b02d214dd9ef5dfe6cb61 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-e7acf2f81de3ea528524b81d79f61382cbf07437 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-e7c154377c0e49eef1fa8d50d2fa541d87f33262 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-e7d0c03f51b9ccbac25acb754932f6c1717025a9 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-e7d5fb5f6e9bfba23fb631d1d0db89eb05316fed | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-e7e1739e8f21ef41c0a071eb9a0ba1208def04db | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-e7e8bd2e132721a7a7e5fcb7df74a96a962620e6 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-e7eef56f4ffdf9593c391917d92dc4847d7f1569 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-e7f4d55b1f1c04c762296a8d51e5c6a7084c245b | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-e7f5840faf17e68dbdf01e8d1db127fcd960a72d | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-e7fb04f2e26a441ec33d5344346fa4d924662534 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-e80984b9350c2ee24dafda63b8a002fa9b25aba3 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-e8228cf29537e5d3e8660bb7086243b6073f5a33 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-e82de0ae2e067b5da26d32d681282fe97b792b80 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-e82f65c0d1607bdfe865483f80ea0c910bf7839c | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-e83a2efad9ed80e4782d4de6815f0fe888d95607 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-e86c721c6a1576e09dadc92ccb5d3ecec2d9df63 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-e88ef825436467b88a69df24d6854f7a662449cf | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| s5-e899061f878da92424ecd327d9501d44053caa7d | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-e8a01f57d119e1acd77c95853e62932ffec1272b | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-e8a8b1080f7f69cdfdd8dae6781f7bed07ad4cf8 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-e8ab9e44da1e6574e9a8251925b650052ad5d3a8 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-e8b451ec23253c44e396c1433285adf7c93f1fac | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-e8bd750a6341f2489d29680936238dd3e3c9e444 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| s5-e8c1cd807ce619bc1e5abf3368b059f92a3d362f | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-e8dcc74d43f7d182279c7afd169e149ede79513c | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-e8e0a9063d368c11a94ff936a673c452a1095a98 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-e8e21ed9fbdb589e0d8f57a1219a0c13fbfd48af | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-e8e4680aaab3c29d9d42b8876018113ff3ca3bea | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-e8f87e15de767e06be468feb63ff6a0c20c150fa | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-e8fc7d6fdb99961e3b54674251bc84dba809da2c | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-e8feaaaef87f582b66daac5841f0c3c19f9e4989 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-e906a838eaf0720facef3e88c71c7ebe2427a816 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-e908485d744af978018b8c0c84047ae37cd51120 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-e90e9316277ae1baea96969bf019cf78db188017 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-e9122cf109830c256b813bdd2d8b7d7ca0bd8986 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-e91a35f539ed2e8ce457f9509557ef18dc39bfca | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-e9266ff9c8b85f4ee5aa0b6d83a843a95484b577 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-e92f41db60788fda337c1ebfa91f031a303dc362 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-e94d6b0ec5b47407d5b68b6079f709094347324b | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-e953e16da0b659e5dbb5601036baa6c43c1d2201 | unclassified | ? | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| s5-e955c38c44762cfbc56c2e1b7664907dfe5bf4bd | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | ↗ | triple proof | |
| s5-e95e72d882ea5e2d45478463a2d186444c565ac3 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-e96e6a5fce0439f19515a4fbbece400e0c87aa69 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-e9792143d2d95995f1c03b67423a478799c75047 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-e984d4ad439d57d18a55d551e32ee19cff5ab943 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-e988da0b48ba69c9908ba1a50dc06ed421b4b7c7 | unclassified | ? | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| s5-e9931f031440f09c24b8e853764a9e853c3b2807 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-e99ad80313fce53bf143979ad9747e542e28e716 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-e9c1faa4d342498147cbf082d00313f6d2cfc63d | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-e9c8548ce2b39654fbb7639ff01bb1d956102f9c | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-e9d4dedccf08d46334363081b6a2491ce43f92d1 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-e9e9030840d465935d4c9d075ddbbe382fb532b1 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-e9f0c8872ee7a1a909da86cc9759c69b0d5026f4 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-e9f83e80b33896ff455b45d7498ec23451de5339 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| Almost Envy-Freeness under Weakly Lexicographic Preferences | Hadi Hosseini, Aghaheybat Mammadov, Tomasz Wąs | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | ARXIV.ORG 2024 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| s5-ea1b04b65e62d4debb2d4c2d7a92d95408be15f0 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-ea1ba09a2fbde6ce13407a213de2ade54f79175a | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-ea369d62c63661d66af5a8be8803e99290b41321 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-ea4876a89a1339c5deb60dcce3878e7b93b5b725 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-ea4d9557be68b88b2c6543f548c2f1be7a4defe8 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-ea506ba36bfbdc527d7e0ebf07b95c85ab6eeed4 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-ea58764b5a3b220f9735762f6d3adb5be5bb65e0 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-ea5f57b2c66ab65f66f5e9af29e42720d5a0de3c | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-ea6928f426269819bc7be36caa6e711d2d413509 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-ea796a81164de74c086308a1a5513429b8822f30 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-ea826263ed139699dc567be1675a8e61791542a3 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-ea98643bc579738a2400fa0ae0f1100c097fa9d5 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-ea9ad081d50c3be46fb33e028ed8067ccca7032e | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-eab41aa384eb9e8d49aeaf187383e283b4657439 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-eac827622c250a39b8b854096516fc47e9c7842e | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-ead113220db9eec11c5cf699a8b46e2aadebfe35 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| s5-ead25866014f88df2ca05e28715d1d8090dacb29 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| s5-eb12cd7bfbd5f95becdd39b3b1c4780236c8f01a | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-eb1af9164b37ea8655064327130d95c9dff8b83b | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-eb3e6b9ca11475f53758d6416604387a40bc9be3 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-eb47a5211144f9c814b5789f19eb9b59b07ad304 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-eb73a4090cf3fbadef302b2e22d75dcd0287ce2b | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-eb77e0b851a8ba72bc6abaf95e422c879f3514f9 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-eb8482153fabfc3128b25c7318142ac9aa20e869 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-ebc4ad83703da335792d34a7cf8564338cd30f3f | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-ebcd4dc9f4dab74fb2a3f43c09f03b4502372e9b | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-ebd8ac6ec75e319c279ae56c958ca945c8cdf54e | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-ebe1b6b87d3719fbd0a1d70bf77793352cbe4f6d | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-ebed947a52873f32fed1e35f0b7615bf7885acba | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-ec178cf5d5af727fd8969bcf930b979eaa90a4e2 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-ec261a0d4690de656eca8218e2b2b9cce9bbbf9f | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-ec2bc10aa56fe1bb910fb9901389243715831752 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-ec34d5654a1594eea0d6fd8f1c5926e1540ccf27 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-ec3a284bcc933da00d3d4a49805ac49a8a6f2fbd | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-ec45533e4792a0cb120242021099a5e23b8e02da | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-ec5c038f6917bc005755dc34020abf766f90352a | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-ec6170e407a1ad8e2f8f3165d30f99039b5f0124 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-ec6207dc4a3efa52075153f7095557c6141b8cd3 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| s5-ec75b6e3bcf3540544f3e20787572690a694eb99 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-ec8519fac4a1c4a10697612d7085bc1aca425002 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-ec8f3b37deaa65dae535a54dc93e56491dc7cdc1 | unclassified | ? | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| s5-ec93068a5c22a0315774bf53d1ebf70a6c2cef32 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-ecd1f497fff091233d41b33cfe41a42147a99c33 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-ecd4e52261ab89db74d66c8043ca86d34301d05e | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-ecd814ff0da63a7b9d624d1660c16fde59d97eb7 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-ed0aacbb5568c09edd8baa514f27ad9e17243478 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| s5-ed0ba54fa2fe42d281fe7ca2aa9053857c4077d0 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-ed153c30aa45dee389cff73fb2a038b804601726 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-ed1568eda26359334b805cb75c0ec1d0ce708782 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-ed21d2ae5a26ccc777dde63c6cc36f0132b60e90 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-ed2ae890825ce3c6b3bfe2fc9fa741609d8fd3b4 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-ed3464fdea414d2dca8fe750bda73045031c0bfb | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-ed3bf5e8d7e1edb6769f33dc0bf912ef5838d438 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-ed42962d8e2fd9065dc7b8ddb7ebf9b2fbf53a57 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-ed51614d8fccbcc444879baae7038e9b20703dfd | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-ed544659b833993a48801260dd95766206097976 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-ed5c1d0acfbebcdae83c8ec29af182c1a2732199 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-ed618733c2450b2f92771fba76f7b270b151eab4 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-ed64f4eb80bde224076a4e7b4e2bc2a1c02f0a86 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-ed8cf755013533fd4c501564b5195aaac0e72e92 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-ed9050f72d6ae59d82cca9e01b9b48b664270863 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-edd269feefc50b297fc4c7544c12a6d0806895ac | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-edd45ccccdd8b997598751ea08e35bad59259e2b | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-edd6d5ccdaaba5386a4c5fe93409df3cdb1d4994 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-edd752812ec33bbb1695ee39f2560e91d39a9111 | unclassified | ? | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| s5-eddb92c9382b97100dff66badfebaded286ebc3a | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-ede3a95a1e02f4c5efcd269c31c6de161b1b3d1b | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-ede8c5a37a78f004d7fa8df443b22098f0579f0b | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-edec60889e143367c2d686efe48099726796f439 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-edef1ce358b491d7dab40e83e10b8f84d34a0d94 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-ee0aede387672b88ea5ed6e1c008ad4815c2f05e | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-ee0b7462da05140a284436938058f90ff221e938 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-ee1813ed0fb40eaa5225d93a1e04d1cde6971ef0 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-ee2d0620a91a36d56670d629c9c1aebce7746b5d | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-ee35b868d95a4a10cf57285604f558823283e6fd | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-ee367efc54f8e5377f70d9a27968f033da5ed852 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-ee37150f35e86fe26807d95e7e74f18b575f98c6 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-ee3ac1f37e876f0c0ddcf5fc2fbbdb529d72de68 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-ee4c09fc2c3f911e91bcdd50396a962e7b1410e9 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-ee6ad1878b02d9956efaa5d53df46f78ae3ae710 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-ee6ae63e08e789185265860e6ccf16157b34d11c | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| Envy-free Relaxations for Goods, Chores, and Mixed Items | K. Bérczi, E. Kovács, E. Boros, Fekadu Tolessa Gedefa, N. Kamiyama, T. Kavitha et al. | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | Theoretical Computer Science 2020 | ✓ | – | ↗ | triple proof |
| s5-ee6fc6bcec9c1e74f64863283618008ba6e59dd9 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-ee7210bcc99201db74d8c353878264a22a78983d | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | ↗ | triple proof | |
| s5-ee72e4149a669bbfc2c67184487696aaeb48619e | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Discrepancy And Fair Division For Non-Additive Valuations | Max Dupré la Tour, Kaito Fujii | Fair Allocation · Envy & Proportionality | ARXIV.ORG 2025 | – | – | triple | |
| s5-eeac903dffdc46e8d8e2b623bf7a7e9af27cc608 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-eeb8c8fc54b1aa9a50dc12b2773d0bd97ad4dc01 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-eec31850804303e6a479298e94c551b994f01ed4 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-eec7a7160c5dd3db0fa03d328387eb66867c5df6 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-eee44538e4f51cb852fb0dfc03c0e318b040ea33 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-eee5481f3e41eabc98787b2e518f80f1daf55b77 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| s5-eef14e3beb23badc89e7cd669d7eea004bca5c3a | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-ef004a88684369ec8f5220a6d95783b8cadf28ef | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-ef02a68912e38727b1361bfe526fba32addcff4b | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-ef1916a62f8ffaa56c6893175ce3342f8524053a | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-ef37515a4dd389db728aed982bb4ea585bc82cdf | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-ef611f32725da9c4cb16752309c1145c46363934 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-ef68ec9741ec9c9ec44ad6d3f3fcd223d060a6e0 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-ef722ea9e57d61c7142152b77bc35dadd39bd372 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-ef8d75691f9d66168fee1d4aa5fbd21cbee16c6b | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-ef942c95c67e8c5638607e8b85e872ed8695a956 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-ef9b0405d3ad4280d3da60619c297d3c9e2b7978 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Nash Social Welfare for Indivisible Items under Separable, Piecewise-Linear Concave Utilities | Nima Anari, Tung Mai, S. Gharan, V. Vazirani | Fair Allocation · Markets & Equilibria | ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms 2016 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| s5-efa0573d918692d186ad3cd8a99d49e74e07a6b2 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-efa14e81cce29d8077961cd5842c58200c9c4d1f | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-efb48e76aa677601fc245dfe994c3210785be21b | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-efb60ee67737374c320a19662390bf5a25630071 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-efce9c38d082d62129f977b617c570b9e2e803a4 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-efd04407b563e174765e48fee1de3965bd9fe538 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-efe39f005f17344427193a5304a21109e0b5c661 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-efe40db9df6e3e1d08dec0acd45ef9d207885d06 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-f0129f6afb53622ea18ddc6c438dee6c156b9664 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-f020014c53f752d59dd499b19c04811db1a7ffb7 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-f024abe381418afc46c97fe9a3f61d058be73fc6 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-f02ebf25a43a4c4b71184a9d0e9fb7f5aaeb2243 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-f033bbcec3c38c98d929ac9469b8256284f1180a | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-f03b74ad66116f7c8597375b43af99f95b499d63 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-f045a7533c71d76905921673b8bcc6b6d4817a6f | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-f05198af22090c9480119b92011893570f184609 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-f05afcefed9d47973969d31e142ee10e0197db0e | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-f0933ec3a8468b18be6bbe7a58805b1aba27f225 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| The Distortion of Stable Matching | Aris Filos-Ratsikas, G. Kalantzis | Frontier · Computer-Aided Methods & Data | ARXIV.ORG 2026 | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | |
| s5-f0984ec1aece91b33606d464044be7c11c998d6a | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-f09cbfcef66d775d6089dfb00847eabea7cee1df | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-f0a5fa8824334a0ea301f5f2a2e47e6329311c1b | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-f0abbe78bbe2fc4a232627b6b6ba574954c4e83b | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-f0cdc51859df025608138e347ff2df237b8a68d4 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-f0cfefbf9c2358f3e0c6bedbc8e108994fc9f991 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-f0d738d4244bf5b3247d026692be4238df28c283 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-f0d73e3e301ce8a927a91aab60b7c23d1f228fab | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-f0daf0caab12b0de0c9213d9e2af0ee134557129 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-f0fd3b57a8a999c3c55a29a4c3ec564caa5179e3 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-f10047e4f913a492771c8551b264bb04bfedb866 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-f1026204ed1163e840757ef0aac9984c44c6a6e9 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-f1093f40f2d352087a28b43301deedb746b882df | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| s5-f10d078346f5bad97d57c1fac9d5697e25f59da8 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-f10fbffefb29b6ce04a256a8adfb9a62b67d3616 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-f11eb5a7a18f854e37fe3d2b8d05dcd04135669c | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| s5-f15f3276c919aa02ea239151a5a7143c8fb613c6 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-f175518c13ebe24048f3ac2b8bf2f271eff9590f | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-f17f7d8be8edb01207ec04d7b7a0d43f9bd8996a | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-f18ee5102e4fa70ff471cc26e6b167f516ea5b88 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-f1b0f0ce5428aa6568f888f929448f6d2a8361d0 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-f1c040e096729791e8e9852392201f91846d017e | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-f1c6529625c7c305d701e0aaa3e6982e274eec69 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-f1dfde753bc83e4f7974a7372264d3cf051019e0 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| A Discrete and Bounded Envy-Free Cake Cutting Protocol for Any Number of Agents | H. Aziz, Simon Mackenzie | Fair Allocation · Cake Cutting | IEEE Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science 2016 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| s5-f1fd7db6f70ba0fd6e4c4791a6da170806503ceb | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-f205d55bf11c991a01387080ad65928b18b1e804 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-f20af2b9d581c76c466e08b94b096ee9f8358e64 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-f21eb6536816f820c2405ebf874d685011b3bb36 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-f22f8a57ad517560c4fb137b680d0787dc8836af | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-f2319b8aac9589ba8164eb62adf5ff7386bd309b | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-f234bc3246cd9b1bdc1cdb883135e16f2548776a | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-f23856a1da2031995bba509e0b3e149594b8b0b9 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| s5-f23b8d4b09bdb313e8cf7eca99d85da4253e3fb8 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-f23d460f334df83965183b563db6a3b85089aca9 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-f26dccd801462df409be62d3554826ac2a5496f3 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-f2754c88295efb63c931c7a623da0805d948e568 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-f27969a0315b28e198fbdb65b83389813a408dbf | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-f28729f999b10ae63fc636a5303e0c82964fc5e0 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-f293ba072ae785a409d0d1876322f97714e933f0 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-f2acb1822ade0500ab1acf7c71607fd938963a0e | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-f2cd4bacb67628e34950a18d5ab9f2d34047230f | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-f2e36f0f07ea2ffe3105bd4f2a54109e2a2be3bc | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| Settling the Complexity of Arrow-Debreu Equilibria in Markets with Additively Separable Utilities not comsoc | Xi Chen, De-Cheng Dai, Ye Du, S. Teng | unclassified | 2009 50th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science 2009 | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | |
| s5-f2f25adc81083e6a12d13f380361918ceaa18d64 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-f2f92186741eeea7338f3c207abb9530afc03fc4 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-f2faea1b306bea5ed8455fca08cc56d7cb36d031 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-f2fe6749fbc5b686b4c042f0987d0ed27b06308e | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| On the Parameterized Complexity of Controlling Approval-Based Multiwinner Voting: Destructive Model & Sequential Rules | Yongjie Yang | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | ARXIV.ORG 2023 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| s5-f31aaf912ef8a0bf75d55a4dc31f8d78f1a0cb92 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-f334416696303f193c96b4f780f5fe94cf44c8c5 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-f336d5cc5e2caf07e515517e9ae3ce19b7e81337 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-f37986be8834b4fd9761588469e2cf2c7088926b | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-f385a873c1a37f6863d45db6c7f3a598862a2984 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-f38c698f8fbe1bb2497b167441a5f3e1d0ba5737 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-f391132b08670ff5f6ead02a6fd9c87b5406cc2f | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-f39c4918da04a3a696781ec3d4e994456864838b | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-f39cabd3a91165bafa36798b75ca6dfcb7388e75 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-f39fcbf34322edcfa22cd998763409c3ddc76a1a | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| s5-f3a39c2354ad885e71035b702d2e3443d2eef3ce | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-f3a6f9841a4f711e49ed4f1b803d6c7912868545 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-f3d8f62de2dbdfdc08f41bc64757ffaf401a4ca3 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-f3ec995202a770dc632491ddb95523d16c03846e | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-f3f5fe7e88f12f651065a619982308e543133422 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Tight Subsidy Bounds for Weighted Proportional Allocation of Mixed Manna | Jugal Garg, Eklavya Sharma, Xiao-Wei Wu | Fair Allocation · Chores, Online & Dynamic | ? 2026 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| s5-f43691b2ed7f144a418b315adc2e0b471efbe736 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-f444521c1d42b8b0066e061bcfd8311eb8691e67 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-f44aba86581f3c3317e0ffde985a1de295cfad3f | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-f45281e0f3963bbf26c51df96c658293529f0d07 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-f49f70f0537e7735867e9f2a502549d24eccbdcd | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-f4a2c7d3911901c4bfccb90834ca468fcb4fbffc | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | ↗ | triple proof | |
| s5-f4aa63e0723950247b1f818c0eb7793155c3f5d5 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-f4c0a976d11ce36e74863df40a45a03ab69bff24 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| Sincere‐Strategy Preference‐Based Approval Voting Fully Resists Constructive Control and Broadly Resists Destructive Control | G. Erdélyi, Markus Nowak, J. Rothe | Voting · Bribery & Control | Mathematical Logic Quarterly 2008 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| s5-f4c9160735d7de23dc1ecd1d03269e9b504d4149 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-f4d6c48464c43dfac125d2a5cffcd146ff2406ab | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-f4ddc5c64e9c9ff2355937a059bab9511c3df999 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-f4e141ffcc3904bc061aff8d4ee2d048a9f9f330 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-f4f2491cc9891ae1000cdf315293a96ad9b2d4b1 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-f4fe8c424394ca51426133e063c88fd417c5918c | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-f50fd4f378419e19032ac4104c27796fb59aec71 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-f51f41a899437f3ab550d7e58a3f95c81336f083 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-f5298749243653da9d69dae4f60eab975d1c10d1 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-f5383ddd01b03b3a8ff7c1c21ba9f7efaadab085 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-f539e392016eb6f06e1e6ea0ccba7d45f1ead809 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-f55ce760a5b2da6ba7fb67a7ec4234560f76ee88 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-f58d0a34f1c5052ffe303d98b52ae7e7fe91517a | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-f595b38aa248288f598261534cb89de8d0db76da | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-f5a5d154c0f458f87cb95541c24465ec250c0101 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| s5-f5af97cc061109bcf5c1638fb5f5805cc85b095b | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-f5d289b1a33af534492ae0e4359b980be9eecdbc | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-f5dda2b9bd1862b277666a8ce5bb3021672c808c | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-f5e12075f8c78ea0c833571df4ab6f712d2e4979 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-f5e19c2cf985f8b88d74fc2f477b4b84d78aefdd | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-f5ed82cd8d8d0a97ba8c33af83ee0675a491a781 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-f5fe384a11a14ee8d5121841b883f21a6fd1be05 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-f60c72cd83e696c4d177c426c95681a4016412a4 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-f60ec951eee3fe75371ed49723c4cefaac8fd7aa | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Fairness criteria for allocating indivisible chores: connections and efficiencies | Ankang Sun, Bo Chen, X. V. Doan | Fair Allocation · Chores, Online & Dynamic | Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems 2021 | ✓ | – | ↗ | triple proof |
| s5-f661c7aadcbb2937e0c2a63de1322bc9b6c4e4f4 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-f668ad82bd0ebfcffe9d46ca957c2e9ef5d30c96 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-f66dfbb75e0f0c6478d5579eb38568910899531f | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-f6770e5a2ada7a7bfd89da2fd9b728f9572c4c9e | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-f69d4af1498192014776217e91ab2f4db4b19280 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-f6be1fc400253ac980e79534502cd726f25990d2 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-f6d0b9d3698e64398e41157f53218fe76c2f481f | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-f6dac1ccc2814714dfe9b367f1122df4b711a3b4 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-f6fc736bdf3ec3b8e29de4fc90cd90d2761dc6af | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| s5-f6fd2147f139917eb1fb5cfd749ee117f9c00509 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-f6fe0bd2a34f0e3ca67315c5849391fce3603e72 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-f717d0e0545d596e1bbe4a2485a1851707dd47b4 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-f722516337c7bf9841fc4422e11a8c2de512a784 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| s5-f72d70095dedfed654f6033c712773d38b01476e | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-f7329b26b786d5da1a3e5f13d60fa3bf2e6e69b7 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-f73e1c2071b1243bc23f20189ef55a329c21b0e2 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-f76a64d6e3af2c5b3961f8a550391b72abfdb4cd | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| Combinatorial walrasian equilibrium not comsoc | Michal Feldman, N. Gravin, Brendan Lucier | unclassified | Symposium on the Theory of Computing 2013 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| s5-f76f90adc89fcf3573ac2e926fd9f7cc5a61d80b | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-f788f0e1eff31dc1285216db83114a013ed37edd | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-f78ba523d0f36f189ce96127fff5a914284f6ead | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-f78c3267732f4996d6264e30b0d40ec5eede65a9 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-f79361dda56ee755fc56ab83cf0d9f12d42b2d5e | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-f7a9d992c23d1ab0c7ecf23ab2e8a42cac9b8df1 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-f7ae676ef8f8f210af8b4b87b4001ff160f2f69d | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-f7dfbac5f23f27acbdb79d3aac88db20800ebab1 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-f7e46efc4f2e22ac331a1047f096a374d19df03d | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-f7f027c6f1808b3136eac8480a60f52d08b5dbaa | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-f7fd8764ae3bbd86836ad30432b4cae0ccea76e6 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-f7ff6a79d95232b9ec7c12e057b391b3ed70959e | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-f81c35b85c42a78b15744c1a738570b10fbbe7f9 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-f820fcb59ae9a3b9ff46f36f7a5ebfd632d59d06 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-f8243a3af3e77e5fab9293d5972c2db99543705d | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-f830bc51b14ddb4311bad9d4cd77e852a28a94fa | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| s5-f84d796a13dfc5cc8c378c250187983d1bac948a | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-f84ebc535cbbda413b256875da1ba96867a084e7 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-f85c18a74eaacb71dd43d99d35011c8b8d7597a7 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-f86af3a5517ef84b2fb499fabf4360ae54f35a14 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-f8714b69c2135283faa2052220553e1be45e7780 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-f88063aacfc0a9832cf40268f65504c218f43b56 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-f88d726492e61f51bfe5d78f54bc8aff442b2fec | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-f89c1b2a48824caa61bb536b7004b709863dce97 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-f8a18693f9fcd5d47fd924f8640c8546a0634246 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-f8a50f6c5ab54c2bbb3f48f4eadeee897e45cb0b | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-f8abff91f6dcd22e460393a38ba241f88d9ff523 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-f8bb3b4524fc13dc9687d84011e1058b19a5e942 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| s5-f8dd9e9754283e7a223d7dafef0deb1c5830d830 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-f8e12596301757f062cd58f25f1e7f9d507f9664 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-f8e789be9b47b791cd41b5eda0607daf57f4dfef | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-f903d7736d2ee83840435776c10f8bea77669bb8 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-f9060ffd64a3e66e9ce4eb6360693b9fec40591d | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-f908b6ddb992e2d8fab94ad1ac5b71a98fdf8d62 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Fair and consistent prize allocation in competitions | Bas J. Dietzenbacher, Aleksei Y. Kondratev | Fair Allocation · Fair Division Theory | Management Sciences 2020 | – | – | triple | |
| s5-f959949be06108c74b4473beb00fd170bad67a5d | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof | |
| s5-f964b33ae5b511f18e0e24ec7fbe9283c3818691 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-f98197bd7bea0f8900de6fff604198d23de6c14a | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-f983ec6665863cfa3e4410631ef0f4fbb44966de | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-f984b41ed23810d6e3571f3a449d2e3ba6b55b9a | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-f987686b29731fd68006626e7c35d131fe0f0555 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| Cognitive Hierarchy and Voting Manipulation | Edith Elkind, Umberto Grandi, F. Rossi, A. Slinko | Voting · Manipulation | ARXIV.ORG 2017 | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof |
| s5-f99692f5dd1a7ac443d70c5879e46c97e30a05a5 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-f998a940a20322ff7ca6f84c72d61d2d52a6e7fb | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-f99ab2eaced7ee3433fd04ffe48cf42d7787a756 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-f9adda17db2043b16e072a379e4340d802b90678 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-f9e32b30fd9ad50cce12ffb753c7be88100b6dc2 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-f9e9b551277217be74ea921c6e3fc11ea17f2337 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-f9eaf52d1ed52bd216f1bf317616af525a312ca0 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-fa209b3799b9f01b6c972cf3b80d0072e6f9fece | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-fa23ecc48dfc921badc95048380ea63ab3f60097 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| s5-fa28822835fc0c26d23d343ed89e529ba3deb5a7 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-fa2f0a99aa41f16aa29361380a9c192cc10e39c9 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| An Efficient Ascending-Bid Auction for Multiple Objects not comsoc | Lawrence M. Ausubel | unclassified | ? 2004 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| s5-fa497ac34d78c2282382c6d511add15b3e256df5 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-fa5258fe9d2c8f11672fb54d773fbd2e1876c26f | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-fa55c793397f67fba0c770cd59ac3f5c61cda9a1 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-fa57d446af321550d12aa5d90f86d56d03448fd2 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-fa5da6a563071ea7152e3419682ac127eab2d667 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-fa5e553cb4c4b888b19920d7f27e5d0ac95a1b26 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-fa6b88e2f1ed73e9a8c4070ea1b5a011e50b349a | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-fa91aebdd88c1afb61b124ad830da050803adf22 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-fa9ed9b1f3eb920e8cb5ecadc70415063b8c1db1 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-fab3214504c4b20b2c49551594ef26944c98b237 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-fabf9d419470a86f9d0e7358028d5cf5ad92d969 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-fac3d6a1b485e451a681d562b555fa9db030e298 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-fad334d611711cc2852fdc82ff65d5fbd554e178 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-fad383d5d9b91b7ad0083419341bfc780f1c30ed | unclassified | ? | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| s5-fad40bc729808ffc09580bbb1181a4f1ecf42883 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-fada14e512746769232e438157a18b38105fa653 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| s5-fadb5a33a7d0a8eae859d57bbc35c30b382229c4 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-fae1e07e8aaaef2dea5f6ca26f73f6449a4b7029 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-fae29526d1ba0d75e866823abdb8d9e28edfb53c | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-faf54ee0782d602c4e1ac8022b77c7dd93f477a4 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-fafa5e7e3894263725ae333b4a01dc44b2ab288e | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-fafecff2f7e90f3c6c5e1c8cbc2135e76bc01c40 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-fb003726f1f467d03a76de97b14890ff2715c961 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-fb04ca92bff03a082ea3a17dc37496d2991d5772 | unclassified | ? | – | ✓ | triple | ||
| Polynomial Time Algorithms to Find an Approximate Competitive Equilibrium for Chores | Shant Boodaghians, B. Chaudhury, R. Mehta | Fair Allocation · Markets & Equilibria | ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms 2021 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| Ex-post Stability under Two-Sided Matching: Complexity and Characterization | Haris Aziz, Péter Biró, G. Cs'aji, Ali Pourmiri | Coalition Formation · Matching under Preferences | Algorithmica 2024 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| s5-fb24dfe9ce4e48c433190521086e9d3bb6883715 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-fb2aea6bf0cf831455a36980a5916807f5881d0a | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-fb396cd3a3aa1677b0a88dac7de4686c05a1e0f5 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-fb4b36b09c3f0efb2249a629e9a668027c50191d | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-fb5531175d71f9ceda53be9b5739c19bbb8b7455 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-fb6252a4f7aeec3e4db685b14f21f9a1bc86335e | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| The Complexity of Online Bribery in Sequential Elections | E. Hemaspaandra, Lane A. Hemaspaandra, Joe H. Rothe | Voting · Bribery & Control | Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge 2019 | ✓ | ✓ | ↘ | triple proof |
| s5-fb77dd5c01fb58a5da7a0bec1aa2a937bbac4709 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Limitations of VCG-based mechanisms not comsoc | Shahar Dobzinski, Noam Nisan | unclassified | Symposium on the Theory of Computing 2007 | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | |
| s5-fb80161aa852ea4bc0624c1b269ed47cc248f86a | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-fb8959840ea9023e6295d8c470f57d64fc16daa5 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-fb925a3ff26ab4cfff1545a08fd34500b32e186b | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-fbc859a9ced7f776ff90bee2aa82d180ba79b230 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-fbd8826ea1d8c8bee720be4aafaa780ba19cc4cd | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-fbefbe73412f292e0bfa4db3dd68f62399ba457e | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| Improved algorithms for computing fisher's market clearing prices: computing fisher's market clearing prices not comsoc | J. Orlin | unclassified | Symposium on the Theory of Computing 2010 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| s5-fc132004f6a442f9dba6244b52c742f9dd209f61 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-fc2b7babf9ef6c4b29de3b1eb7d642ed49df62f8 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-fc3ea72fd4c40fa3386ca1e9d2db9ebfa0d45e29 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-fc6360c14284ce0475351425c2a0f21da36d7b3e | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-fc6d057d90b649c497e6f13465df8be3f8cc49ae | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| A Generic Approach to Coalition Formation | K. Apt, Andreas Witzel | Coalition Formation · Hedonic Games | IGTR 2007 | – | – | triple | |
| s5-fc7cc86442968c4c23cc06b6371836c52dd2f8c3 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-fc80916745ab74e9b367e01be49ebccb8ae6ffc7 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-fc9807f07bf5d50f9a5fd252924c0d09fac55eb9 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-fcc4db78f5c0e65afab5764728e39073039045de | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-fce52c81730e80df985c5ec6ce730bd799e2627c | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-fceab6cb9942ffdde0b7fb673cec0bf3a485a5fe | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-fcedee4017859e53ba78074373f4e421f26ade22 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-fcee07d7fb0af4f5cb04bcf897f5c5daf785274c | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-fd1fb42943fafe7acea3e253f951ac730f1681f7 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-fd37a98462d973e52c239f46e25c2afd245dd05a | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-fd3d11bb9bee7a3d92709e1505bea36df16486bc | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-fd51853ceb2fe571fc169a78f0864b2816c605d9 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | triple proof | ||
| On Best-of-Both-Worlds Fairness via Sum-of-Variances Minimization | Moshe Babaioff, Yuval Grofman | Frontier · Computer-Aided Methods & Data | ARXIV.ORG 2026 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| s5-fd5c6bba653d90fe61a10bd8cf3a19ac90dc8d5a | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-fd5cf707acfe7cd16fe13f92f938536e496f80dc | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-fd6060ac4a2b49cf6421e48f99aa8c62ed46012c | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-fd670ad8f62663712a956b0c6b40f1c97a174660 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-fd7896c22ae43eb05e6f0c82a7e2c892e1eda59e | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-fd81baacafebd1d7c18f473ba3cb522e014f9917 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-fd8beada0461d6e4ef02def067847b0eda0f4dc3 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-fd9cb7952786b1894a2a9a306294926982ced38c | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-fdbb3a927c52366c9439c3f35b054d5871ef27c2 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Matching With (Branch‐of‐Choice) Contracts at the United States Military Academy not comsoc | Tayfun Sönmez, T. Switzer | unclassified | ? 2013 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| s5-fdc8d7eff8526902f44bba616fe1b1ee416cf68f | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-fdef4c0f9e7977af45b31ea183d7eb993cae2022 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-fdf13c8b7547b581c060781dcf4933efe7cadf63 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Candidate Resignation Monotonicity in Approval-Based Committee Elections | Y. Oh, Dominik Peters | Multiwinner & Participatory Budgeting · Multiwinner Voting | ? 2026 | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof |
| s5-fdfa0bb9ba53b28346bac634d7eeee673bbf3e37 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-fe18cd8df3c161924dba87703c64a2d27961d142 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-fe1b81ece12fa6fc3eac900d24d95e20ba809a17 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-fe300490751df039eab9cfd1452f503db18c8e3c | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-fe35a4dad6143bc339d0a52f4d448bd62be4ab8e | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | → | triple proof | |
| s5-fe3d2915e9c39acc67e5cd9812b5747cfe608693 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-fe43bddbb2a46dc21a15ae09b4e85b82d1aaec1f | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| On minimum sum representations for weighted voting games | Sascha Kurz | Voting · Voting Theory & Axioms | Annals of Operations Research 2011 | – | – | triple | |
| s5-fe559adcc1db3481db79be5fb32c0f5f6ed590ae | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-fe65be57a8914d4cb35d1d617a10377f4821c977 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-fe7517eb7bd7b1b574ec985fd2c94eab8cd57f8b | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-fe85878b77b84a434d5ee9718ff4733a4fd05175 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| Monotone and Online Fair Division | M. Aleksandrov, T. Walsh | Fair Allocation · Chores, Online & Dynamic | Deutsche Jahrestagung für Künstliche Intelligenz 2019 | – | – | triple | |
| s5-fe966e80c07e93dfcfe7e5a38511470df3e991a8 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-fe9d6a42b4e7837c9b142f2910863b13c33ef33e | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-feb7fbe196770a997f26512b854b4c8028ac6ff4 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-febe3c99e5d7c06b8c4ae52249b70290e7e1750c | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-feccd09ec696d71d41ee387f6560c392d09ad928 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-fef9114dd6f7360dc8c60d5efd09222b02813404 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-ff0bf21ad2b39d010028417ac90fd542e9d857b9 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-ff0dcab06f777ed2a68b281847d192535a718b16 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-ff1c85515a38adb72f0239b7f965d69d3b499792 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-ff2712a3a9242fa92c3510ba99902d4db6532571 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | ↗ | triple proof | |
| Split Cycle: a new Condorcet-consistent voting method independent of clones and immune to spoilers | W. Holliday, E. Pacuit | Voting · Weighted Tournaments | Public Choice 2020 | ✓ | – | → | triple proof |
| s5-ff434b6ac09dc7b56fa21b355a29b2b5e37fb2a3 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| Proportional Fairness for Harmful Decisions | Benjamin Cookson, S. Ebadian, Dominik Peters, Nisarg Shah | Fair Allocation · Markets & Equilibria | ARXIV.ORG 2026 | ✓ | – | triple proof | |
| s5-ff4db4e86877c93f80ad74704c66a0d3ef5964dd | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-ff608955914fb3b9224aa59d91e58c5ee61dc7e9 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-ff679e9e35cade9e6cbe841d161ae65444eb9152 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-ff6cefba6187334de127472b34310b1aeb712915 | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-ff6f6ee7b62aa046021582786aac0f9396b99ef9 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-ff77058f1877f2900edd30b5483f632c2d8de3ed | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-ff7a3bc489befdef0edad75f357a50f42fff4c7c | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-ff859362680539519c20b8ea546b847a30e22f4d | unclassified | ? | ✓ | ✓ | → | triple proof | |
| s5-ff974a05f243b49d2b8db95f03f150b3b0ad349a | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-ffa2bcde05a0c815e8ab091864777820e6124318 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-ffb5ab90cf3d138bcd60aa9622ba86153c57246b | unclassified | ? | ✓ | – | triple proof | ||
| s5-ffb6025f1f719b3d6c7d630d7dfab0a13db15aa2 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-ffbfe7ef2e7d17857070dcbdf166ccae86c20fb2 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-ffc4b80c481d2f4fad2f4f7c1fd5b55f9fb4861e | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-ffdb3a551fa688c2841126e0d52a5a3afeed16fa | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-ffddd19e72d89fc5d8c6443a4df30094e2f9a4ce | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-ffe34a7b38fae1edcd516836813a08a404b9766f | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-fff1218ffafbf8ddbea62f0bce13f4d5e491bef5 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-fff42fffacffe3f95bb08f70eea92f160edb4bb8 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-fff45c6f4243701e2438688fee3ecc9e52c2e4f7 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple | ||
| s5-fff67b333025f421633f216fc89954b2bacfda54 | unclassified | ? | – | – | triple |
Δ is the settled direction of the complexity change, discrete → continuous: ↘ drops (the prize), → preserved, ↗ rises, ↘* encoding-dependent. Blank = mirror not yet settled by the prover round.
608 cells · 127 carry a classical status (81 NP-c / 77 P / 22 NP-h / 4 Θ₂ᵖ, over 196 variant entries from ~30 source-checked papers) · 9 explicitly open · continuous mirror: 1 machine-proved & adversarially reviewed + 35 entries proved in the ChoCo paper (17 drops ↘) + 16 open targets incl. INV-PERM-MAX · 133 cells n/a · 57% of the town uncharted
| attack \ rule | Plu | dAp | Bor | Sco | App | SPA | Fal | Buc | Cop | C1 | Mxm | Kem | Sla | Cnd | Dod | You | Bal | Nan | IRV | veto | PluRO | Coo | rp | SNTV | kBor | CCr | AVm | SAV | GAV | RAV | PAV | referenda |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Winner determination | → | → | Θ→ | Θ→ | → | Θ↘ | Θ↘ | |||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Swap Bribery | P | ±↘→ | N↘→ | P→ | – | N | N? | N | N | ?→ | → | P↘ | ? | ? | N | P | – | – | – | – | – | – | ||||||||||
| Shift Bribery | P→ | ±↘ | ↘ | – | ? | P | P→ | N | ± | → | → | ↘ | ? | ? | N | N | N | N | N | N | – | – | – | – | – | – | ||||||
| $Bribery | ± | ↘ | N↘ | ±↘ | ± | ± | ±? | N | N | P→ | → | ±↘ | P? | P? | ± | |||||||||||||||||
| Microbribery | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | P | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | ||||||||||
| Support Bribery | ± | ± | ± | ? | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | |||||||||||||||
| Mixed Bribery | N | – | – | – | – | – | – | |||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Extension Bribery | ? | N | P | – | P | N | ± | – | – | – | – | – | – | |||||||||||||||||||
| Manipulation | P | ± | N | P | P | ± | ± | N | N | N | ± | N | N | |||||||||||||||||||
| CCAV (priced) | P | ± | N | N | ± | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| CCDV (priced) | P | ↘ | ↘ | ± | ↘ | N | N | → | → | ±↘ | ? | ? | ||||||||||||||||||||
| Possible Winner | P | N | N | N | – | N | N | N | N | P | N | N | – | – | – | – | – | – | ||||||||||||||
| Combinatorial Shift Bribery | N | N | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | |||||||||||||||||||||||
| Committee Shift Bribery | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | P | N | N | ± | N | ± | ± | N | – |
| Margin of Victory / destructive | P | P | P | N | N | N | P | N | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Multimode / candidate control | ± | ± | N | ± | P | ! | – | |||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Frugal Bribery | ± | ± | N | N | N | N | N | N | – | |||||||||||||||||||||||
| Persuasion | P | ± | N | ± | P | – | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Lobbying (referenda) | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | ± |
Primary color = the CLASSICAL discrete status (P vs NP-hard), assembled from ~30 source-checked papers; every colored cell clicks through to its variant-by-variant statuses with citations — the same cell is routinely P and NP-hard under different cost models, which is why the legend needs ±. Arrows are the continuous mirror: a cell can carry several at once (k-Approval × Swap drops for additively separable costs and stays hard for general costs). Most of the town is still uncharted — and this is one paper's vocabulary plus one literature sweep, before multiwinner or weighted voters.
The top trust tier of this atlas is formal (Lean) verification, and the experiment was to formalize the bribery paper behind the town. The finding is that “formalize the paper” is the wrong unit of work: what actually has to be built is the theory the paper — and half of computational social choice — stands on. Exact rational LP duality and the ellipsoid method (a large chunk of Grötschel–Lovász–Schrijver), a real machine model in which “polynomial time” is a theorem about Turing machines rather than a slogan, and the parameterized-complexity basics (what an FPT reduction is, hardness of Clique) that the Handbook's hardness results silently assume. None of this existed in mathlib. The chart below is that theory, partially built — and it is a reusable foundation for every future pin, not a per-paper cost.
External results enter as explicitly stated assumptions (Lean interfaces — never axioms),
so a paper can be verified modulo named citations: “†” below marks these. That packaging is what makes
paper-scale verification feasible at all, and it is also the sharpest danger: mis-formalize an assumption and
everything above it silently rests on a falsehood. This is not hypothetical — the machine audit of this very
development flagged the GLS vertex-encoding interface as likely false as stated (a \(10E^2\) bit
bound where Cramer-rule arithmetic forces roughly \(E^3\)), and found a legacy layer in which
P = NP was a structure field, so theorems “concluding” it concluded nothing.
Both were caught by auditing the assumption surface — the discipline this page exists to display.
596 Lean files · 111,968 lines · 0 axiom / 0 sorry / 0 native_decide · 42% of the mathematical development is assumption-free end to end · 19 external interfaces tracked · 1,118 automated #print axioms checks · snapshot 2026-08-12
Metrics regenerate from the repository via tools/lean_audit.py (tripwire greps, import-cone
analysis, watchlist diffs) as the formalization progresses; the module structure and assumption audit are from the
machine inventory of the development. 223 regression files pin proved statements to
their intended shape, and an axiom-audit file re-checks every central declaration on each build.
Most of computational social choice studies finite societies: a list of voters, an integer program, an NP-hardness proof. Nearly every such result has an unexamined continuous mirror: replace the population by a distribution of voter types with masses, keep the computational question. Sometimes the mirror is easier — the integer program relaxes to a linear program and NP-hardness drops to P. Nobody has charted where. This atlas is the chart, and it is being drawn by an automated pipeline.
Each paper of the pilot corpus is read by an adversarial triple (proponent, opponent, judge — GPT-5.6 class models). A pin is green if the judge finds a named result whose continuous mirror survives the opponent's best case against it; red otherwise. For green papers, a packaging stage turns the mirror into a self-contained proof task (target chosen by fixed rules from what the discrete result asserts), a prover attempts it, and a second, independent model is prompted to BREAK the proof — an adversarial review, not a rubber stamp. A gold ring marks a new result: the prover settled the mirror and the adversarial review failed to break the proof. No human has audited these — that is the next tier, and saying so plainly is the point of the tier system.
Every element here is the output of a fixed chain of tools, each stage writing machine-readable records that the next stage — and this site — is built from:
atlas_build.py renders this site from those records and nothing else. No pin,
verdict, quote or proof on this site is hand-typed.machine-claimed (prover only) < adversarially reviewed (an independent model tries to break the proof and fails) < human-checked < formalized (Lean — see The Foundations). Every gold element on this site links to its full provenance — the exact task, the proof, the adversarial review. Nothing here is hand-typed except the map background and the curated grid data, which was itself extracted from the literature by an agent and struck by a human.
This is a growing chart, not a finished one. It currently covers 8763 papers across 391 venue-years (2008 49th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science 2008, 2009 50th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science 2009, ?, ? 1978, ? 1979, ? 1983, ? 1990, ? 1992, ? 2002, ? 2004, ? 2006, ? 2008, ? 2009, ? 2010, ? 2011, ? 2012, ? 2013, ? 2014, ? 2015, ? 2016, ? 2017, ? 2019, ? 2020, ? 2021, ? 2022, ? 2023, ? 2024, ? 2025, ? 2026, AAAI 1998, AAAI 2002, AAAI 2008, AAAI 2011, AAAI 2012, AAAI 2013, AAAI 2014, AAAI 2015, AAAI 2016, AAAI 2017, AAAI 2018, AAAI 2021, AAAI 2022, AAAI 2023, AAAI 2024, AAAI 2025, AAAI 2026, AAAI Conference on Human Computation & Crowdsourcing 2014, AAMAS 2022, AAMAS 2023, AAMAS 2024, AAMAS 2025, ACM Journal of Experimental Algorithmics 2012, ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms 2003, ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms 2006, ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms 2009, ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms 2013, ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms 2014, ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms 2015, ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms 2016, ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms 2017, ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms 2018, ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms 2019, ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms 2020, ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms 2021, ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms 2022, ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms 2023, ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms 2024, ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms 2025, AI 2011, AI 2014, AI 2015, AI 2017, AI 2019, AI 2022, AI 2025, ALDT 2009, ALDT 2021, ARXIV.ORG 2009, ARXIV.ORG 2011, ARXIV.ORG 2012, ARXIV.ORG 2013, ARXIV.ORG 2014, ARXIV.ORG 2015, ARXIV.ORG 2016, ARXIV.ORG 2017, ARXIV.ORG 2018, ARXIV.ORG 2019, ARXIV.ORG 2020, ARXIV.ORG 2021, ARXIV.ORG 2022, ARXIV.ORG 2023, ARXIV.ORG 2024, ARXIV.ORG 2025, ARXIV.ORG 2026, ATAL 2006, ATAL 2007, ATAL 2011, ATAL 2013, ATAL 2014, ATAL 2015, ATAL 2016, ATAL 2017, ATAL 2018, ATAL 2020, ATAL 2021, Adaptive Agents and Multi-Agent Systems 2012, Adaptive Agents and Multi-Agent Systems 2020, Algorithmica 2017, Algorithmica 2024, American Political Science Review 1988, American Political Science Review 1996, American Political Science Review 2000, Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence 2010, Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence 2014, Annals of Operations Research 2011, Annals of Operations Research 2012, Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems 2012, Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems 2017, Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems 2018, Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems 2019, Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems 2020, Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems 2021, Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems 2023, Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems 2024, Combinatorica 2009, Combinatorica 2025, Computing: The Australasian Theory Symposium 2010, Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence 1999, Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence 2001, Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence 2002, Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence 2005, Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence 2012, Deutsche Jahrestagung für Künstliche Intelligenz 2019, Deutsche Jahrestagung für Künstliche Intelligenz 2020, Discret. Math. Algorithms Appl. 2009, Discrete Applied Mathematics 2020, ECAI 2010, ECAI 2014, ECAI 2016, ECAI 2020, ECAI 2023, ECAI 2025, Econometrica 2017, Econometrica 2019, Economic Theory 2016, Economics and Philosophy 2002, Economics and Philosophy 2007, Educational Data Mining 2013, Electronic Journal of Combinatorics 2008, Embedded Systems and Applications 2020, Embedded Systems and Applications 2021, Embedded Systems and Applications 2022, Embedded Systems and Applications 2023, Environmental and Resource Economics 2024, European Economic Review 2019, European Journal of Operational Research 2017, European Journal of Operational Research 2019, European Journal of Operational Research 2020, European Journal of Operational Research 2022, European Journal of Operational Research 2023, European Journal of Operational Research 2024, European Journal of Operational Research 2025, European Workshop on Multi-Agent Systems 2022, Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science 2018, Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science 2024, GEB 2004, GEB 2010, GEB 2015, GEB 2018, GEB 2019, GEB 2021, GEB 2022, GEB 2023, GEB 2024, GEB 2025, GEB 2026, Group Decision and Negotiation 2019, IEEE Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science 2016, IEEE Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science 2019, IEEE Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science 2020, IEEE Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science 2021, IEEE Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science 2024, IGTR 2007, IJCAI 2003, IJCAI 2007, IJCAI 2009, IJCAI 2011, IJCAI 2015, IJCAI 2016, IJCAI 2017, IJCAI 2018, IJCAI 2019, IJCAI 2020, IJCAI 2021, IJCAI 2022, IJCAI 2023, IJCAI 2024, IJCAI 2025, IJTCS-FAW 2023, Information Economics and Policy 2024, Information Processing Letters 2015, Information Processing Letters 2024, Information Sciences 2019, Information Technology Convergence and Services 2010, Information Technology Convergence and Services 2016, Information Technology Convergence and Services 2020, Information Technology Convergence and Services 2021, Information and Computation 2012, Information and Computation 2022, International Colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming 2008, International Colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming 2015, International Colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming 2017, International Colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming 2024, International Conference on Agents and Artificial Intelligence 2010, International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Statistics 2019, International Conference on Combinatorial Optimization and Applications 2020, International Conference on Interaction Sciences 2018, International Conference on Machine Learning 2019, International Conference on Machine Learning 2023, International Conference on Machine Learning 2024, International Conference on Web and Social Media 2015, International Journal of Game Theory 2015, International Symposium on Algorithms and Computation 2009, International Symposium on Algorithms and Computation 2022, International Workshop and International Workshop on Approximation, Randomization, and Combinatorial Optimization. Algorithms and Techniques 2011, International Workshop and International Workshop on Approximation, Randomization, and Combinatorial Optimization. Algorithms and Techniques 2020, JAIR 2004, JAIR 2006, JAIR 2007, JAIR 2008, JAIR 2009, JAIR 2010, JAIR 2011, JAIR 2012, JAIR 2013, JAIR 2014, JAIR 2015, JAIR 2016, JAIR 2017, JAIR 2018, JAIR 2019, JAIR 2020, JAIR 2021, JAIR 2022, JAIR 2023, JAIR 2024, JET 2018, JET 2019, JET 2020, JET 2021, JET 2022, JET 2023, JET 2024, Journal of Mathematical Economics 2017, Journal of Mathematical Economics 2021, Journal of Political Economy 2013, Journal of Political Economy 2016, Journal of Political Economy 2018, Journal of Political Economy Microeconomics 2022, Journal of Political Economy Microeconomics 2025, Journal of Public Economic Theory 2020, Journal of Public Economic Theory 2022, Journal of Theoretical Politics 2020, Journal of combinatorial optimization 2014, Journal of computer and system sciences (Print) 2005, Journal of computer and system sciences (Print) 2017, Journal of machine learning research 2014, Journal of the ACM 2016, Journal of the ACM 2022, Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining 2003, MSS 2012, MSS 2017, MSS 2018, MSS 2019, MSS 2020, MSS 2022, MSS 2023, MSS 2025, Management Sciences 2005, Management Sciences 2007, Management Sciences 2019, Management Sciences 2020, Management Sciences 2021, Management Sciences 2023, Mathematical Logic Quarterly 2008, Mathematical programming 2020, Mathematical programming 2021, Mathematics of Operations Research 2001, Mathematics of Operations Research 2010, Mathematics of Operations Research 2013, Mathematics of Operations Research 2015, Mathematics of Operations Research 2017, Mathematics of Operations Research 2019, Mathematics of Operations Research 2020, Mathematics of Operations Research 2021, NATURE 2021, Neural Information Processing Systems 2017, Neural Information Processing Systems 2020, Neural Information Processing Systems 2021, Neural Information Processing Systems 2022, Neural Information Processing Systems 2023, Neural Information Processing Systems 2024, Neural Information Processing Systems 2025, Operational Research 2019, Operational Research 2022, Operations Research Letters 2019, Operations Research Letters 2022, Pacific Rim International Conference on Artificial Intelligence 2019, Pacific Rim International Conference on Artificial Intelligence 2021, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 2012, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 2018, Public Choice 2018, Public Choice 2020, Review of Economics and Statistics 2020, SAGT 2010, SAGT 2013, SAGT 2014, SAGT 2015, SAGT 2016, SAGT 2017, SAGT 2018, SAGT 2019, SAGT 2020, SAGT 2021, SAGT 2023, SAGT 2024, SAGT 2025, SCW 2016, SCW 2017, SCW 2019, SCW 2022, SCW 2023, SCW 2024, SIAM Journal on Discrete Mathematics 2020, SIAM journal on computing (Print) 2011, SIGECOM 2000, SIGECOM 2001, SIGECOM 2004, SIGECOM 2007, SIGECOM 2008, SIGECOM 2010, SIGECOM 2011, SIGECOM 2012, SIGECOM 2013, SeCO Workshops 2019, Social Science Research Network 2019, Social Science Research Network 2023, Social Science Research Network 2025, Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science 2012, Symposium on the Theory of Computing 2005, Symposium on the Theory of Computing 2007, Symposium on the Theory of Computing 2010, Symposium on the Theory of Computing 2011, Symposium on the Theory of Computing 2012, Symposium on the Theory of Computing 2013, TARK XIII 2009, TECO 2014, TECO 2019, TECO 2020, TECO 2023, TECO 2025, The American Economic Review 2019, The American Economic Review 2023, The Future of Economic Design 2020, The Sea 2013, Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge 2012, Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge 2017, Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge 2019, Theoretical Computer Science 2009, Theoretical Computer Science 2012, Theoretical Computer Science 2017, Theoretical Computer Science 2020, Theoretical Economics 2020, Theoretical Economics 2021, Theory and Decision 2020, Theory of Computing Systems 2010, WINE 2010, WINE 2012, WINE 2014, WINE 2015, WINE 2016, WINE 2017, WINE 2018, WINE 2019, WINE 2020, WINE 2021, WINE 2022, WINE 2023, WINE 2024, WINE 2025, Workshop on Internet and Network Economics 2023). The proofs are adversarially reviewed by machines, not checked by humans — and “verified” is a word this atlas reserves for the Lean tier. The town grid is one paper's vocabulary. The point of the atlas is not that it is finished — it is that every element you can click was produced, end to end, by a pipeline that can now be pointed at the next conference, the next cell, and the next area.
Openness about the pipeline is part of the point, and it arrives in two steps. Already now, every published build of this site is stamped — see the footer — with the exact commit of the pipeline repository that produced it, and every gold element links its full provenance: the task as posed, the proof as returned, the adversarial review as it happened. The pipeline itself (code, prompts, harness) is still changing weekly and will be released in full once it settles; because the build stamps are public first, that release can be checked retroactively against every build that ever appeared here. One thing is never published: paper full texts — provenance pages quote only the specific named statements under discussion.