| paper | d4-journals-geb-2016-0022 |
| authors | — |
| venue | ? |
| filed under | unclassified |
| judged by | gpt-6-luna / xhigh (triple__luna__xhigh__c6r1) |
| judge confidence | high |
| authors would recognise it | no |
The paper’s named propositions establish equilibrium behavior, comparative statics, and a large-group limit, but none states a qualifying computational result. Proposition 3’s limit is an analytic result; the proposed heterogeneous-type equilibrium-computation problem would be new work, not a computational mirror anchored in this paper.
fails bit a — no named computational result to mirror
No result is covered: Propositions 1–3 are analytic equilibrium and limit results, while Experimental Results 1–5 report observed behavior, learning, and efficiency.
I cannot make a valid anchored case for a computational mirror: the paper has no named computational result. Its Propositions 1–3 concern equilibrium behavior and a large-group limit. Proposition 3, for example, shows that as group size grows, the limiting information-acquisition probability is \(1/(1+e^{c/\mu})\) for \(\mu>0\), and the group decision is almost surely correct. That is an analytic result, not a complexity or algorithmic result about a computational problem.
The paper’s large-group analysis makes a continuous-population setting natural, and its model could inspire a new question about computing equilibria from a distribution of voter types. But there is no qualifying result here to anchor that question to. Presenting it as a mirror of this paper’s computational result would overstate the case.
No named result survives as a computational anchor. Propositions 1–3 characterize equilibria, comparative statics, and a large-group limit; the experimental results report observed behavior. None defines a computational problem or establishes its complexity. Proposition 3 is the closest candidate: it already gives the limiting acquisition probability, \(\tilde{\gamma}=1/(1+e^{c/\mu})\) for \(\mu>0\), and uses the law of large numbers to show that the group decision is almost surely correct. A continuous-population version would restate that analysis, with a homogeneous society represented by a single type.
The strongest expanded mirror would allow types to differ in signal cost or accuracy and ask for equilibrium acquisition rates and decision accuracy from their distribution. That is a plausible committee model, but the continuum removes the pivotal events that drive the paper’s strategic incentives: each agent has zero influence on the outcome. In the paper’s noise-free equilibrium, positive-cost agents then have no incentive to acquire information. Under its logit model, acquisition follows the type-specific cost and the aggregate is obtained by integrating those rates; the continuum of signals obeys a law of large numbers. This yields an equilibrium-modeling question, without the algorithmic problem or complexity landscape that the paper’s results could anchor.
Keeping finite pivotality by studying large finite committees with repeated cost or accuracy types could support a separate high-multiplicity equilibrium-computation project. The paper neither formulates nor analyzes that problem, and its fixed common-interest, common-parameter model does not supply a computational result to mirror. The proponent’s suggestion to compute equilibria from a type distribution therefore proposes new work rather than rescuing an anchor.
The negative case is strongest for the requested mirror and less conclusive as a universal claim: a sufficiently broad extension can always produce a new computational question. Such a question may merit separate consideration, but this paper offers no named computational result whose continuous mirror would advance the programme.
The adversarial triple: the proponent anchors on up to three named results; the opponent sees that case and must defeat every anchor; the judge decides which case convinced it. These are the pipeline’s own outputs, generated by tools/triple_run.py — no human edited them. The paper’s own text is not reproduced here beyond the quoted statement above.