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Complexity of coalition structure generation (d4-conf-atal-2011-0113)

Answer: Computing an optimal coalition structure is in \(\mathrm{P}\), with running time \(O(\tau L^2)\) bit operations.

The anchor (named result in the paper)

Proposition 2 — class: hardness

PDF text-layer excerpt — equations and symbol order may be approximateFor a WVG, checking whether there is a coalition structure that attains social welfare k or more is NP-complete.

statement extracted from the paper’s text layer; consult the paper for the exact wording

The continuous mirror question, as graded

Given finitely many types \(T\), rational masses \(\mu\in\mathbb{Q}_{\ge0}^{T}\) with \(\sum_t\mu_t=1\), rational per-agent weights \(w_t\), and a rational per-capita quota \(q>0\), partition the unit mass into finitely many profiles \(x^1,\ldots,x^r\in\mathbb{R}_{\ge0}^{T}\) satisfying \(\sum_j x^j=\mu\), maximizing the number of blocks \(j\) with \(\sum_t w_t x^j_t\ge q\), using a compact multiplicity representation for repeated profiles.

Packaged proof task (what the prover saw — nothing else)

A society is given by its support: a nonempty list \(T\) of \(\tau\) types with positive binary rational masses \(\mu_t\), where \(\sum_t\mu_t=1\). Here \(\tau\) is the support size, not the number of possible types.
Each type has a binary rational weight \(w_t\ge0\); the binary rational quota satisfies \(0<q\le\sum_t w_t\mu_t\), so the whole society is winning.
A coalition structure is any finite list of nonzero profiles \(x^j\in\mathbb R_{\ge0}^{T}\) with \(\sum_jx^j=\mu\). Mass is freely divisible, and a block is winning exactly when \(\sum_tw_tx_t^j\ge q\). Its welfare is the integer number of winning blocks.
An optimal structure maximizes welfare. Represent repeated profiles by pairs \((y^i,c_i)\), with binary rational nonzero profiles \(y^i\) and binary integer multiplicities \(c_i\ge1\), satisfying \(\sum_i c_i y^i=\mu\); multiplicities count separate blocks. Losing blocks are permitted.
Let \(L\) be the total input bit length. State running times in \(\tau\) and \(L\); there is no separate parameter \(m\) in this scalar-weight problem.

Is computing an optimal coalition structure for this continuous weighted voting problem in \(\mathrm P\), or is it \(\mathrm{NP}\)-hard?

For finite indivisible players, deciding whether welfare at least \(k\) is attainable is \(\mathrm{NP}\)-complete, and optimization is strongly \(\mathrm{NP}\)-hard. [Aziz and de Keijzer](https://arxiv.org/pdf/1101.1007).
A related splittable bin-covering model is polynomial-time solvable, but uses restricted assignments and proportional credit for partially covered bins. [Hellwig and Souza](https://arxiv.org/pdf/1109.3544). No result settling this exact continuous formulation was located.

Modeling choices made when packaging the task

Prover output (gpt-6.1-sol / high, Bolzano prover prompt)

Result

Computing an optimal coalition structure is in \(\mathrm P\). In fact, one repeated profile suffices.

Write \(W=\sum_{t\in T}w_t\mu_t\) for the society’s total weight. The optimal welfare is
\(\displaystyle K=\left\lfloor\frac{W}{q}\right\rfloor\),
and an optimal compressed structure is the single pair \(\displaystyle (\mu/K,K)\).

This construction uses precisely the stated freedom to divide every type’s mass.

Proof of optimality

Upper bound. Consider any feasible coalition structure \(x^1,\ldots,x^r\), and let \(J\) index its winning blocks. Its welfare is the integer \(h=|J|\). Each winning block has weight at least \(q\), so

\(\displaystyle hq\le\sum_{j\in J}\sum_{t\in T}w_tx_t^j\le\sum_{j=1}^{r}\sum_{t\in T}w_tx_t^j=\sum_{t\in T}w_t\mu_t=W.\)

The second inequality follows from nonnegativity of all weights and profiles; the equality follows from conservation of each type’s mass. Since \(q>0\), we obtain \(h\le\lfloor W/q\rfloor=K\). This bound applies even to structures with irrational profiles and arbitrarily many losing blocks.

Attainment. The hypothesis \(W\ge q>0\) gives \(K\ge1\). Define \(y_t=\mu_t/K\) for every \(t\in T\), and take \(K\) separate copies of \(y\).

Every coordinate of \(y\) is positive and rational, so the profile is nonzero. Conservation holds coordinatewise: \(Ky_t=\mu_t\). Moreover, each block has weight

\(\displaystyle \sum_{t\in T}w_ty_t=\frac{W}{K}\ge q,\)

because \(Kq\le W\). Thus all \(K\) blocks are winning. Together with the upper bound, this proves optimality.

Exact algorithm and bit complexity

Write the input rationals as \(w_t=a_t/d_t\), \(\mu_t=b_t/e_t\), and \(q=h/f\), with positive integer denominators. Compute

\(\displaystyle D=\prod_{t\in T}d_te_t,\qquad N=\sum_{t\in T}a_tb_t\frac{D}{d_te_t}.\)

Each quotient in this sum is an integer, and \(W=N/D\). Therefore exact integer division gives

\(\displaystyle K=\left\lfloor\frac{Nf}{Dh}\right\rfloor.\)

Output the single pair \((y,K)\), with coordinates \(y_t=b_t/(e_tK)\).

All integers in these computations have \(O(L)\) bits: products accumulate at most the total input bit length, and summing \(\tau\) terms adds at most \(O(\log\tau)\) bits. The same bound holds for \(K\) and each output numerator and denominator.

The algorithm uses \(O(\tau)\) integer arithmetic operations. With schoolbook multiplication and division, its running time is \(O(\tau L^2)\) bit operations, and its compressed output has \(O(\tau L)\) bits. If reduced fractions are required, computing greatest common divisors preserves this running-time bound.

The multiplicity encoding matters: with \(\tau=1\), \(\mu_1=w_1=1\), and \(q=2^{-b}\), the optimum contains \(2^b\) blocks, but the single pair \((2^{-b},2^b)\) has \(O(b)\) bits.

Relation to the indivisible model

The finite-player model partitions a set of indivisible players into coalitions ([Aziz and de Keijzer](https://arxiv.org/pdf/1101.1007)). Here, dividing every type equally among all blocks attains the total-weight bound directly, so that model’s hardness does not transfer to this formulation.

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Adversarial review (gpt-6.1-sol / medium, Bolzano verifier prompt)

The output correctly resolves the assigned problem: computing an optimal coalition structure is in \(\mathrm P\) under the specified compressed representation. The proof and bit-complexity bounds are rigorous. No major or minor issues were found.

No additional clarification or repair is required.

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Tier: machine-proved, adversarially reviewed by an independent model. No human has checked this proof. Generated from pipeline artifacts by tools/atlas_build.py.