Answer: \(\mathrm{NP}\)-complete
Theorem 5.2 — class: hardness
PDF text-layer excerpt — equations and symbol order may be approximateMaximin is resistant to constructive AC control.
statement extracted from the paper’s text layer; consult the paper for the exact wording
Given disjoint finite candidate sets \(C\) and \(A\), a target \(p\in C\), a budget \(k\), and a rational distribution \(\mu\) over complete rankings of \(C\cup A\), does there exist \(S\subseteq A\) with \(|S|\le k\) such that, after restricting every ranking to \(C\cup S\), \(p\) is the unique maximin winner, meaning \(\operatorname{mm}_{\mu,S}(p)>\operatorname{mm}_{\mu,S}(c)\) for every \(c\in(C\cup S)\setminus\{p\}\), where \(\operatorname{mm}_{\mu,S}(c)=\min_{d\ne c}\sum_t\mu_t\mathbf{1}[c\succ_t d]\)?
The input consists of disjoint finite candidate sets \(C\) and \(A\), a preferred candidate \(p\in C\), an integer budget \(k\), and an explicitly listed rational distribution \(\mu\) over complete rankings of \(C\cup A\). For \(S\subseteq A\), restrict each ranking to \(C\cup S\). A candidate \(c\) has maximin score \(\min_{d\in(C\cup S)\setminus\{c\}}\sum_t\mu_t\mathbf{1}[c\succ_t d]\); \(p\) is the unique winner if its score strictly exceeds every other score. If \(p\) is the sole candidate, it is the unique winner.
Is deciding whether some \(S\subseteq A\) with \(|S|\le k\) makes \(p\) the unique winner in \(\mathrm{P}\), or is it \(\mathrm{NP}\)-hard?
For a finite list of unweighted voters, this candidate-addition problem is NP-hard. No separately published result for the stated rational-distribution formulation was verified.
The problem is \(\mathrm{NP}\)-hard under the supplied premise. In fact, it is \(\mathrm{NP}\)-complete. Normalizing voter counts into a rational probability distribution gives a polynomial-time reduction that preserves every successful candidate addition.
Reduction from the stated unweighted problem.
Use the supplied premise that the same candidate-addition problem, with a unique-winner requirement and an upper-bound budget, is \(\mathrm{NP}\)-hard for an explicitly listed collection of unweighted voters.
Consider such an instance with candidate sets \(C,A\), preferred candidate \(p\), budget \(k\), and complete rankings \(R_1,\ldots,R_N\), where \(N\geq 1\). Construct a rational-distribution instance with the same \(C,A,p,k\). For each distinct ranking \(R\) occurring in the voter list, let \(m_R\) be its multiplicity and set
\[
\mu(R)=\frac{m_R}{N}.
\]
These probabilities are nonnegative and sum to \(1\), so they form a valid explicitly listed rational distribution.
The construction takes polynomial time: one can group identical rankings by direct comparisons. There are at most \(N\) distinct rankings, and each numerator and denominator requires \(O(\log(N+1))\) bits. Thus the output length is polynomial in the explicit source-input length.
Preservation of the winner condition.
Fix any \(S\subseteq A\) and write \(B=C\cup S\). For distinct candidates \(c,d\in B\), let
\[
V(c,d)=\bigl|\{i\in\{1,\ldots,N\}:c\succ_{R_i}d\}\bigr|.
\]
Restricting a ranking to \(B\) does not change the relative order of \(c\) and \(d\). Consequently, their pairwise support in the constructed distribution is
\[
\sum_R\mu(R)\mathbf{1}[c\succ_R d]
=\sum_R\frac{m_R}{N}\mathbf{1}[c\succ_R d]
=\frac{V(c,d)}{N}.
\]
When \(|B|\geq 2\), denote the unweighted and distributional maximin scores by \(s_V(c;B)\) and \(s_\mu(c;B)\), respectively. Because \(N>0\),
\[
s_\mu(c;B)
=\min_{d\in B\setminus\{c\}}\frac{V(c,d)}{N}
=\frac{1}{N}\min_{d\in B\setminus\{c\}}V(c,d)
=\frac{s_V(c;B)}{N}.
\]
Multiplication by the same positive constant preserves all strict inequalities. Hence, for every \(c\in B\setminus\{p\}\),
\[
s_\mu(p;B)>s_\mu(c;B)
\quad\Longleftrightarrow\quad
s_V(p;B)>s_V(c;B).
\]
If \(B=\{p\}\), then \(p\) is the unique winner in both formulations. Thus every feasible \(S\) succeeds in the source instance exactly when it succeeds in the constructed instance. Since the budget is unchanged, this proves a polynomial-time many-one reduction and establishes \(\mathrm{NP}\)-hardness.
Empty voter lists do not affect this argument: with no voters, every score in a field of at least two candidates is zero, so those source instances are directly decidable and can be mapped to fixed yes- or no-instances.
Membership in \(\mathrm{NP}\).
A certificate is a subset \(S\subseteq A\). Check \(|S|\leq k\), compute all pairwise supports among \(C\cup S\), take each candidate’s minimum, and check that \(p\)’s score strictly exceeds every other score. Handle \(C\cup S=\{p\}\) using the stated convention.
These computations take polynomial time with exact rational arithmetic. Explicitly, write each listed weight as \(a_t/b_t\), with \(b_t>0\), and use the common denominator
\[
Q=\prod_t b_t.
\]
Its binary length is at most \(1+\sum_t\log_2 b_t\), which is polynomial in the input length. Each pairwise support has integer numerator
\[
\sum_t a_t(Q/b_t)\mathbf{1}[c\succ_t d].
\]
All these integers have polynomial bit length, so their computation and comparison take polynomial time.
Therefore the stated problem is \(\mathrm{NP}\)-complete. The hardness conclusion uses the supplied unweighted hardness result; it does not require a separately published theorem for rational distributions.
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The argument is correct under the supplied unweighted hardness premise. It establishes \(\mathrm{NP}\)-hardness by a polynomial-time reduction and establishes membership in \(\mathrm{NP}\), hence \(\mathrm{NP}\)-completeness. No repair is needed.
The output resolves the assigned complexity question and justifies its stronger completeness claim. There are no blocking issues or required clarifications.
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Tier: machine-proved, adversarially reviewed by an independent model. No human has checked this proof. Generated from pipeline artifacts by tools/atlas_build.py.