Answer: \(\mathrm{P}\): the required inequality holds for all measurable coalitions if and only if \(m=0\).
Theorem 1.1 — class: algorithmic
PDF text-layer excerpt — equations and symbol order may be approximateThere is an O(n log n + mα(n)) time algo- rithm to check whether a given b-matching game is convex, where α is the inverse Ackermann function1 As an application of our characterization, we derive a polynomial-time algorithm to compute the Shapley value of a convex b-matching game. Computing the Shapley value is #P-hard even if b = 1 and c(e) = 1 for all e ∈E [Aziz and de Keijzer, 2014]; therefore, this result indicates that the convexity yields computational tractability on this game.
statement extracted from the paper’s text layer; consult the paper for the exact wording
Given a finite type set \(T\), a loopless compatibility graph \(H=(T,F)\), integer capacities \(b_t\), positive rational surpluses \(c_{tu}\), and rational masses \(\mu_t\ge 0\) summing to \(1\), form an atomless population \(\Omega=\bigsqcup_{t\in T}\Omega_t\) with \(|\Omega_t|=\mu_t\). Each individual of type \(t\) has capacity \(b_t\). For every measurable coalition \(S\subseteq\Omega\), let \(z_t(S)=|S\cap\Omega_t|\) and define \(\nu(S)=\max\{\sum_{\{t,u\}\in F}c_{tu}q_{tu}:q_{tu}\ge0,\ \sum_{u:\{t,u\}\in F}q_{tu}\le b_tz_t(S)\text{ for each }t\}\). Decide whether \(\nu(S)+\nu(R)\le\nu(S\cup R)+\nu(S\cap R)\) for every pair of measurable coalitions \(S,R\).
A society is given by its support: a list \(T\) of \(\tau=|T|\) types with positive binary-rational masses \(\mu_t\), summing to \(1\); \(\tau\) counts supported types, not all possible types.
The input also contains a simple undirected loopless compatibility graph \(H=(T,F)\), positive integer capacities \(b_t\), and positive rational surpluses \(c_{tu}\) for \(\{t,u\}\in F\), all encoded in binary. Put \(m=|F|\), and let \(L\) be the total input bit length.
Realize the population as disjoint intervals \(\Omega_t\) of Lebesgue measure \(\mu_t\), with \(\Omega=\bigsqcup_{t\in T}\Omega_t\). Coalitions are arbitrary measurable subsets of \(\Omega\).
For a coalition \(S\), put \(z_t(S)=|S\cap\Omega_t|\) and define
\(\nu(S)=\max\{\sum_{\{t,u\}\in F}c_{tu}q_{tu}:q\in\mathbb R_{\ge0}^{F},\ \sum_{u:\{t,u\}\in F}q_{tu}\le b_tz_t(S)\text{ for every }t\in T\}\).
There are no additional edge capacities.
Is deciding whether \(\nu(S)+\nu(R)\le\nu(S\cup R)+\nu(S\cap R)\) for every pair of measurable coalitions \(S,R\) in \(\mathrm P\), with running time polynomial in \(m,\tau,L\), or is it NP-hard?
For finite vertex coalitions, convexity of the corresponding integral multiset \(b\)-matching game is decidable in \(O(n\log n+m\alpha(n))\) arithmetic operations, where \(n\) counts vertices and \(\alpha\) is the inverse Ackermann function. [Kumabe–Maehara (2020)](https://www.ijcai.org/proceedings/2020/0037.pdf)
The same source claims that relaxing matching integrality preserves convexity for finite vertex coalitions; this does not address arbitrary measurable coalitions. No result settling the stated atomless decision problem was located.
The decision problem is in \(\mathrm{P}\). More precisely, the required inequality holds for every pair of measurable coalitions if and only if \(m=0\).
The atomless quantifier is decisive: even a graph consisting of a single positive-surplus edge fails, because one endpoint type can be split into two competing portions.
Fix an edge \(\{t,u\}\in F\). If a coalition \(Q\) contains agents only from \(\Omega_t\) and \(\Omega_u\), then every matching variable except \(q_{tu}\) must be zero.
Indeed, every other edge has an endpoint \(v\notin\{t,u\}\), since the graph is simple and loopless. Its variable is zero because the capacity constraint at \(v\) has right-hand side \(b_vz_v(Q)=0\), and all matching variables are nonnegative.
Consequently,
\(\displaystyle \nu(Q)=c_{tu}\min\{b_tz_t(Q),\,b_uz_u(Q)\}.\)
The upper bound follows from the two endpoint constraints, and it is attained by setting \(q_{tu}\) equal to the displayed minimum.
Suppose \(F\ne\varnothing\), and fix \(\{t,u\}\in F\). Define
\(\displaystyle \lambda=\min\left\{\frac{b_t\mu_t}{2},\,b_u\mu_u\right\}>0.\)
Thus \(2\lambda/b_t\le\mu_t\) and \(\lambda/b_u\le\mu_u\). Because the type populations are intervals, we can choose disjoint measurable subsets \(A_1,A_2\subseteq\Omega_t\) and a measurable subset \(B\subseteq\Omega_u\) with
\(\displaystyle |A_1|=|A_2|=\frac{\lambda}{b_t},\qquad |B|=\frac{\lambda}{b_u}.\)
For example, choose two consecutive disjoint subintervals in \(\Omega_t\) and one subinterval in \(\Omega_u\).
Set \(S=A_1\cup B\) and \(R=A_2\cup B\). Their intersection is \(B\), and their union is \(A_1\cup A_2\cup B\).
In each of \(S\) and \(R\), both endpoint capacities equal \(\lambda\). In the union, the capacity at \(t\) equals \(2\lambda\), while the capacity at \(u\) remains \(\lambda\). Therefore the preceding formula gives
\(\displaystyle \nu(S)=\nu(R)=c_{tu}\lambda,\qquad \nu(S\cup R)=c_{tu}\lambda.\)
The intersection contains only type \(u\). Since there are no loops, \(\nu(S\cap R)=0\). Hence
\(\displaystyle \nu(S)+\nu(R)=2c_{tu}\lambda>c_{tu}\lambda=\nu(S\cup R)+\nu(S\cap R),\)
where strictness follows from \(c_{tu}>0\) and \(\lambda>0\). This disproves the required property whenever an edge exists.
If \(F=\varnothing\), the objective is an empty sum, so \(\nu(Q)=0\) for every measurable coalition \(Q\). The required inequality therefore holds with equality.
Together, these arguments prove the characterization.
Read the edge list and return yes exactly when it is empty. Including input reading, this takes \(O(L+m+\tau)\) time, hence time polynomial in \(m,\tau,L\). No expansion of the binary-encoded capacities or population discretization is needed.
This obstruction explains why the [finite vertex-coalition result](https://www.ijcai.org/proceedings/2020/0037.pdf) does not settle the atomless problem. With only two finite vertices, a single positive edge yields a supermodular game: incomparable coalitions are the two singleton coalitions, whose values are zero. The measurable model additionally permits the disjoint portions \(A_1,A_2\) used above.
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The prover’s claim is proved. The characterization holds: the required inequality is valid for every pair of measurable coalitions if and only if \(m=0\). The argument establishes a polynomial-time decision procedure and contains no substantive or minor gaps.
\[
0\le q_{tu}\le\min\{b_tz_t(Q),b_uz_u(Q)\}.
\]
Since \(c_{tu}>0\), the stated value formula follows, including attainment. This reasoning also covers coalitions supported on only one of the two types.
No additional clarification or repair is needed.
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Tier: machine-proved, adversarially reviewed by an independent model. No human has checked this proof. Generated from pipeline artifacts by tools/atlas_build.py.