Answer: \(\rho^*(\mu)=1/\tau\) for every fixed positive rational mass vector \(\mu\).
Theorem 5 — class: hardness
PDF text-layer excerpt — equations and symbol order may be approximateThe asymptotic competitive ratio of any randomized algorithm is at most 1/n in the adversarial arrival model.
statement extracted from the paper’s text layer; consult the paper for the exact wording
Given a finite type set \(T\), fixed positive rational masses \(\mu_t\) with \(\sum_{t\in T}\mu_t=1\), and an adversarially revealed stream of item value vectors \(u^j\in[0,1]^T\), each assigned whole and irrevocably to one type, define \(W_t=\mu_t^{-1}\sum_j u_t^j x_{tj}\) and let \(\mathrm{OPT}_\mu\) be the offline optimum for \(\min_{t\in T}W_t\). What is the largest \(\rho\) achievable by a randomized online policy such that its expected welfare is at least \(\rho\,\mathrm{OPT}_\mu-o(\mathrm{OPT}_\mu)\) as \(\mathrm{OPT}_\mu\to\infty\), against an oblivious adversary; is it \(1/|T|\) for every fixed \(\mu\)?
A society is given by its support: a nonempty list \(T\) of \(\tau=|T|\) types with positive binary rational masses \(\mu_t\), where \(\sum_{t\in T}\mu_t=1\); \(\tau\) is the support size, not the number of possible types.
An oblivious adversary fixes a finite stream \(\sigma=(u^1,\ldots,u^m)\), with \(u^j\in[0,1]^T\), independently of the policy's random choices. The policy knows the masses, but not \(m\) or future vectors; each entire vector is revealed before its item must be assigned whole and irrevocably to exactly one type.
An allocation has \(x_{tj}\in\{0,1\}\) and \(\sum_{t\in T}x_{tj}=1\). Define \(W_t(x,\sigma)=\mu_t^{-1}\sum_{j=1}^m u_t^j x_{tj}\), \(F_\mu(x,\sigma)=\min_{t\in T}W_t(x,\sigma)\), and \(\mathrm{OPT}_\mu(\sigma)=\max_x F_\mu(x,\sigma)\), using the same whole-item constraints offline.
For fixed \(\mu\), let \(\rho^*(\mu)\) be the supremum of ratios \(\rho\) for which a randomized online policy satisfies \(\mathbb E[F_\mu(x,\sigma)]\geq\rho\,\mathrm{OPT}_\mu(\sigma)-g_\mu(\mathrm{OPT}_\mu(\sigma))\) for every stream, where \(g_\mu(z)\geq0\) and \(g_\mu(z)/z\to0\); expectation is over the policy's randomness.
State any running times in \(m,\tau,L\) and any algorithmic parameters, where \(L\) is the total binary input length on rational-valued streams.
What is \(\rho^*(\mu)\) for each fixed positive rational mass vector \(\mu\)? Is \(\rho^*(\mu)=1/\tau\) for every such vector?
For discrete agents with additive values in \([0,1]\), every randomized online algorithm has asymptotic competitive ratio at most \(1/n\), and uniform random allocation achieves it against an oblivious adversary. [Source](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2111.07235)
Consequently, equal masses have optimal ratio \(1/\tau\). No result settling this exact model for unequal masses was located in the literature search.
For every fixed positive rational mass vector \(\mu\) with support size \(\tau\),
\[
\rho^*(\mu)=\frac1\tau.
\]
Uniform random allocation attains this ratio with an explicit sublinear additive error. Both bounds below use whole-item allocations.
Assign each arriving item independently and uniformly to one of the \(\tau\) types. This policy requires neither the horizon nor future values.
Fix an arbitrary stream \(\sigma\), and write \(z=\mathrm{OPT}_\mu(\sigma)\). If \(z=0\), the required inequality follows from nonnegativity. Suppose \(z>0\).
An optimal whole-item allocation \(x^*\) exists because there are finitely many allocations. For each type \(t\), define
\[
a_{tj}=\frac{u_t^j x^*_{tj}}{\mu_t}.
\]
Optimality gives \(\sum_j a_{tj}\geq z\). Hence we can choose deterministic coefficients \(b_{tj}\) satisfying
\[
0\leq b_{tj}\leq a_{tj},
\qquad
\sum_j b_{tj}=z.
\]
For example, retain coefficients successively until their sum reaches \(z\), reducing the last retained coefficient if necessary. These coefficients are only an analytical device; the online policy does not compute them or split items.
Let \(I_{tj}\) indicate that the online policy assigns item \(j\) to type \(t\), and put
\[
Y_t=\sum_j b_{tj}I_{tj},
\qquad
q=\frac z\tau.
\]
Since \(b_{tj}\leq u_t^j/\mu_t\), every realization satisfies \(W_t\geq Y_t\). Consequently, \(F_\mu\geq\min_t Y_t\).
For each fixed \(t\), the indicators \(I_{tj}\) are independent across items, with probability \(1/\tau\). Therefore,
\[
\mathbb E[Y_t]=q,
\qquad
\operatorname{Var}(Y_t)
=\frac1\tau\left(1-\frac1\tau\right)\sum_j b_{tj}^2.
\]
Because \(b_{tj}\leq1/\mu_t\) and \(\sum_j b_{tj}=z\),
\[
\operatorname{Var}(Y_t)
\leq
\frac{\tau-1}{\tau^2}\frac z{\mu_t}.
\]
No independence between different types is needed.
Pointwise,
\[
q-\min_t Y_t
=\max_t(q-Y_t)
\leq
\sqrt{\sum_t(Y_t-q)^2}.
\]
Taking expectations and applying Cauchy–Schwarz yields
\[
\mathbb E[F_\mu]
\geq
\frac z\tau-
\sqrt{\frac{\tau-1}{\tau^2}\,z\sum_{t\in T}\frac1{\mu_t}}.
\]
Thus the policy satisfies the requested guarantee with
\[
g_\mu(z)=
\sqrt{\frac{\tau-1}{\tau^2}\,z\sum_{t\in T}\frac1{\mu_t}}.
\]
For fixed positive \(\mu\), this function is nonnegative and \(g_\mu(z)/z\to0\). Hence \(\rho^*(\mu)\geq1/\tau\).
The following is the mass-scaled version of the construction in [Kawase–Sumita, Theorem 5](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2111.07235).
Fix any randomized online policy and any positive integer \(k\). Present \(k\) identical items with \(u_t=\mu_t\) for every \(t\). Let \(N_t\) count the prefix items assigned to \(t\). Since \(\sum_tN_t=k\), some type \(h\) satisfies \(\mathbb E[N_h]\leq k/\tau\).
Complete the stream with \((\tau-1)k\) identical items having \(u_h=0\) and \(u_t=\mu_t\) for \(t\neq h\). Choose \(h\) using the policy’s distribution, before its random choices are realized. The stream is therefore oblivious; its prefix is identical for every choice of \(h\).
Each prefix item contributes exactly one normalized unit to its recipient. Type \(h\) receives no suffix value, so \(F_\mu\leq N_h\). Offline, assigning the prefix to \(h\) and \(k\) suffix items to each other type achieves value \(k\). Type \(h\)’s total available normalized value is \(k\), proving \(\mathrm{OPT}_\mu=k\).
Any claimed guarantee therefore implies
\[
\rho k-g_\mu(k)\leq\mathbb E[F_\mu]\leq\frac k\tau.
\]
Divide by \(k\) and let \(k\to\infty\). Sublinearity gives \(\rho\leq1/\tau\).
On rational streams of total binary input length \(L\), uniform allocation can read and discard the values and sample each recipient exactly by rejection sampling from independent fair bits. Its expected running time is \(O(L+m\log(\tau+1))\) bit operations, with \(O(\log(\tau+1))\) auxiliary bits beyond input/output buffers. It has no approximation parameter and performs no rational arithmetic.
The two bounds prove the claimed equality for every fixed mass vector. For \(\tau=1\), the unique allocation is optimal and the additive error above is zero.
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Verdict: proved. The output establishes \(\rho^*(\mu)=1/\tau\) for every fixed positive rational mass vector. I found no mathematical gaps or false steps.
\(\sum_jb_{tj}^2\leq \mu_t^{-1}\sum_jb_{tj}=z/\mu_t\)
verifies the stated variance bound, including its constant.
Consequently, the lower bound establishes an admissible ratio of \(1/\tau\).
The attribution matches the prefix/suffix construction in [Kawase–Sumita, Theorem 5](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2111.07235). The submitted argument verifies the scaled construction directly, so it requires no unstated transfer theorem.
The expected bit-operation bound is consistent with reading \(L\) input bits and using exact rejection sampling for each recipient. Sampling uses \(O(\log(\tau+1))\) bits per attempt and a constant expected number of attempts. The stated auxiliary-space bound is consistent with storing the type count and current sample, with input/output buffers excluded as specified.
For \(\tau=1\), the sole allocation is optimal, the variance and additive error vanish, and the upper-bound stream has an empty suffix. An empty stream, if allowed, is covered by the \(z=0\) case.
No repair or additional mathematical clarification is needed. The established result is an optimal asymptotic competitive guarantee; it does not classify the complexity of exact offline optimization.
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Tier: machine-proved, adversarially reviewed by an independent model. No human has checked this proof. Generated from pipeline artifacts by tools/atlas_build.py.