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Simulating Multiwinner Voting Rules in Judgment Aggregation (aamas22-00033)

Answer: \(\mathrm{NP}\text{-hard}\)

The anchor (named result in the paper)

Theorem 14 — class: hardness

PDF text-layer excerpt — equations and symbol order may be approximateOutcome(PAV-JA) is NP-hard.

statement extracted from the paper’s text layer; consult the paper for the exact wording

The continuous mirror question, as graded

Given an agenda \(\Phi\), integrity constraint \(\Gamma\), rational distribution \(\mu\) over complete judgment types \(\theta\), and partial judgment \(d\), decide whether some feasible judgment \(J\models\Gamma\) agreeing with \(d\) maximizes the PAV-JA population score \(\sum_{\theta}\mu_{\theta}\bigl(f_{\mathbf u}(|J^+\cap\theta^+|)-f_{\mathbf v}(|J^+\setminus\theta^+|)\bigr)\).

Packaged proof task (what the prover saw — nothing else)

Let Φ be a finite agenda with \(m=|Φ|\). A complete judgment type \(θ\) is a map \(Φ\to\{0,1\}\), and \(θ^+=\{φ\inΦ:θ(φ)=1\}\); a rational distribution \(μ\) is given by its finite support and binary-encoded masses summing to \(1\). For \(J^+=\{φ\inΦ:J(φ)=1\}\), set \(f_{\mathbf u}(r)=r\), \(f_{\mathbf v}(0)=0\), and \(f_{\mathbf v}(r)=\sum_{q=m-r+1}^{m}1/q\) for \(r\geq1\). Thus \(S_\mu(J)=\sum_{θ}\mu_{θ}\bigl(f_{\mathbf u}(|J^+\capθ^+|)-f_{\mathbf v}(|J^+\setminusθ^+|)\bigr)\). A partial judgment \(d\) is respected when \(J(φ)=d(φ)\) on its domain.

Target. Is the problem of deciding whether some \(J\models\Gamma\) respecting \(d\) maximizes \(S_\mu(J)\) solvable in polynomial time, or is it NP-hard?

For explicitly listed finite judgment profiles, the corresponding Outcome(PAV-JA) problem is NP-hard. The discrete hardness result does not address rational distributions over judgment types.

Prover output (gpt-5.6-sol / xhigh, Bolzano prover prompt)

Complexity of Distributional PAV-JA

Decision problem

Let \(\mathcal R=\{J:J\models\Gamma\}\), and let \(\mathcal R_d\subseteq\mathcal R\) consist of the judgments respecting \(d\). The outcome question is whether

\(\operatorname*{arg\,max}_{J\in\mathcal R}S_\mu(J)\cap\mathcal R_d\neq\varnothing\).

Theorem

The distributional Outcome(PAV-JA) problem is \(\mathrm{NP}\)-hard.

Proof

We give a polynomial-time reduction from the stipulated \(\mathrm{NP}\)-hard Outcome(PAV-JA) problem for explicitly listed finite profiles.

Let an instance of that problem contain the nonempty profile

\(P=(\theta_1,\ldots,\theta_n)\),

together with \(\Phi,\Gamma\), and \(d\). For a judgment \(J\) and type \(\theta\), define

\(g(J,\theta)=f_{\mathbf u}(|J^+\cap\theta^+|)-f_{\mathbf v}(|J^+\setminus\theta^+|)\).

Thus the finite-profile score is

\(S_P(J)=\sum_{i=1}^n g(J,\theta_i)\).

Let \(T\) be the set of distinct types occurring in \(P\). For every \(\theta\in T\), let

\(c_\theta=|\{i\in\{1,\ldots,n\}:\theta_i=\theta\}|\),

and construct the rational distribution

\(\mu_\theta=c_\theta/n\).

These masses are positive and satisfy

\(\sum_{\theta\in T}\mu_\theta=\sum_{\theta\in T}c_\theta/n=n/n=1\).

For every judgment \(J\),

\(S_\mu(J)=\sum_{\theta\in T}(c_\theta/n)g(J,\theta)=(1/n)\sum_{i=1}^n g(J,\theta_i)=(1/n)S_P(J)\).

Because \(n>0\), multiplication by \(1/n\) preserves all strict comparisons and all ties. Hence, for every \(J,K\in\mathcal R\),

\(S_\mu(J)\geq S_\mu(K)\) if and only if \(S_P(J)\geq S_P(K)\).

Consequently,

\(\operatorname*{arg\,max}_{J\in\mathcal R}S_\mu(J)=\operatorname*{arg\,max}_{J\in\mathcal R}S_P(J)\).

The agenda, integrity constraint, and partial judgment are unchanged. Therefore, a finite-profile maximizer respecting \(d\) exists if and only if a distributional maximizer respecting \(d\) exists.

It remains to verify that the transformation is polynomial. There are at most \(n\) distinct types. Each mass \(c_\theta/n\), reduced or unreduced, has binary encoding length \(O(\log n)\). The multiplicities can be computed by sorting or hashing the explicitly represented \(m\)-bit types. Thus the entire distribution is constructible in time polynomial in the finite-profile input size.

This is a polynomial-time many-one reduction from the stipulated \(\mathrm{NP}\)-hard discrete problem, proving the claim.

Encoding observation

Expanding an arbitrary binary-encoded rational distribution into a finite profile can require exponentially many voters. That reverse transformation is unnecessary here: the hardness reduction goes from an explicitly listed profile to its empirical distribution, whose denominators are at most the explicitly given profile size \(n\).

Thus rational distributions do not yield a polynomial-time algorithm unless \(\mathrm{P}=\mathrm{NP}\).

⟨structured verdict parsed — rendered above⟩

Adversarial review (gpt-5.6-sol / high, Bolzano verifier prompt)

Verification report

Summary

The reduction is correct and fully resolves the target by establishing NP-hardness. It converts an explicitly listed profile into its empirical rational distribution and proves that every feasible judgment’s score is scaled by the same positive factor. Hence the set of maximizers, including those respecting the partial judgment \(d\), is unchanged.

Step-by-step audit

\[ \mu_\theta=\frac{c_\theta}{n} \]
is positive, rational, and binary-encodable. Since the multiplicities sum to \(n\), the masses sum exactly to \(1\).

\[ S_\mu(J)=\frac{1}{n}S_P(J) \]
for every judgment \(J\). This calculation is exact and correctly accounts for multiplicities.

No unjustified mathematical step, missing hypothesis, or relevant edge case remains. The assumption \(n>0\) is explicitly stated and is needed only to define the empirical distribution and positive scaling.

⟨structured verdict parsed — rendered above⟩

Tier: machine-proved, adversarially reviewed by an independent model. No human has checked this proof. Generated from pipeline artifacts by tools/atlas_build.py.